The Middle East
Following the recent Israel-Palestine tensions in October 2023, the Middle East is once again on a potentially combustive path that the region has not witnessed since the 1973 Arab-Israel War. As Israel is intent on eliminating Hamas despite mounting civilian casualties in Gaza, the persistence of the conflict potentially runs the twin risks of ballooning into a wider regional conflagration, with Iranian proxies or the so-called Axis of Resistance waiting in the shadows, and providing opportunities to the Middle Eastern jihadist groups to exploit the conflict for recruitment and narrative wars. Ostensibly, the Israel-Palestine tensions have paused the Arab-Israel normalisation initiated under the Abraham Accords, and overshadowed the enduring trends of violent extremism, state-society tensions and major power interventionism in the Middle East as well as the Saudi-Iran détente midwifed by China.
Trends
As a significant strategic and hydrocarbon-rich region, the Middle East changed dramatically with an unprecedented war between the Palestinian Islamist resistance movement Hamas and Israel. Hamas’ October 7 attacks on Israel from Gaza and Israel’s massive response to eliminate the group deeply shook the region. The event constituted a critical threat to what was already a fragile and insecure region. It came against the backdrop of not only some positive steps taken by the main regional players towards improved relations, but also several other sources of threat to the region. These sources range from violent extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda (AQ), the Islamic State (IS) and their affiliates as well as the Taliban in Afghanistan; inter-state tensions; national upheavals; and major power interventionism.
The Middle East witnessed some favourable signs of improved regional relations in 2023, such as the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The two regional rivals reached a China-brokered deal through lengthy backchannel negotiations and announced full resumption of diplomatic relations on March 10, 2023, after a seven-year split.[1] As the most influential actors in the Gulf who play a critical role in the wider Middle East, Tehran and Riyadh had been at loggerheads in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen by backing opposing sides, in one form or another. For confidence-building, they still have a long way to go; however, their initial steps to dial down ideological and geo-sectarian differences augur well for possible wider regional cooperation and conflict resolution as well as containment of violent extremism in the region.
The Arab League’s re-admission of Syria to its membership was another important trend. In a turnaround, the League welcomed President Bashar al-Assad to its Riyadh meeting in May. The League concluded that despite the continuation of the Syrian conflict and Assad’s brutal repression of the opposition, with the active backing of Iran, Russia and the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Assad regime had survived, and it was better to have it inside the tent rather than outside. However, this did not amount to full normalisation of Syria’s relations with all the League members, which have their individual criteria and conditions. It nonetheless marked the end of a variable that had added to the historical divisions within the League and served as an impediment to at least a semblance of unity among the Arab countries. Whatever the future, the event pleased the Assad leadership and its outside supporters. This, in combination with the Saudi-Iran détente, was generally viewed as a stabilising development in the region, although to the chagrin of Israel and the United States (US) and its allies.[2]
Meanwhile, Türkiye’s frosty relations with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE)[3] and Israel experienced an improving trajectory. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was re-elected in May, decided that he needed more investment from and trade with the Middle Eastern oil-rich states to help Türkiye’s economic and financial woes. His diplomatic charm offensives improved relations with those states. In the context of Türkiye being a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and pursuing balanced relations with major powers, he deemed it desirable to upgrade relations with Israel as America’s important strategic partner in the region, while maintaining strong support for the Palestinian cause.[4] As part of this balancing act, Türkiye-Iran ties also saw an upward trend, despite the two parties’ opposing sides in the Syrian conflict.
Regional Tensions and Conflicts
Despite Iran-Saudi rapprochement and improvement in Türkiye’s relations with key regional players, the Middle East remained prone to instability from the long-running Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as those in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan and Libya. The danger of another flare-up on the Israeli-Palestinian front was never too far away during the year. The biggest eruption in 2023 came between Hamas and Israel. It was sparked by Hamas’ unexpectedly large assault from the air, sea and land on southern Israel on October 7. Hamas fighters killed some 1,200 Israelis, injured many more, and kidnapped about 240 Israeli civilian and military personnel, including several children and foreign nationals.[5] The attacks seemingly caught Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s most right-wing government in Israel’s history and its array of intelligence and security forces, which were supposed to be the best in the region, off guard. It also surprised the US as the main supporter of the Jewish state.
Yet, as the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres stated, the Hamas offensives “did not happen in a vacuum”.[6] It came against the backdrop of Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip since the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. Indeed, Israel relinquished its control of the tiny and extremely densely populated Gaza as costly, ungovernable and squalid in 2005. But it nonetheless imposed a comprehensive blockade of it, turning the Strip into what former British prime minister David Cameron once called the largest “open air prison camp”.[7] When Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, Israel rejected the outcome, declaring the group a “terrorist organisation”, with the US and some of its Western allies following suit. Hamas’ takeover of the Strip in 2007 caused a split with the Palestinian Authority (PA) as Israel’s partner in peace, but largely in nominal control of the occupied West Bank.
In contrast to the PA, Hamas conditioned its recognition of the state of Israel on the creation of an independent Palestinian state first. With Israel further tightening Gaza’s blockade, Israel-Hamas hostility deepened. It resulted in several confrontations over the years. This was despite Israel having initially backed Hamas when the movement was founded in 1987 as a counter to the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). The latter subsequently formed the core of the PA, which was set up as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people under the September 1993 Oslo Peace Accords, signed by Israel and the PLO. The Accords provisioned the creation of an independent Palestinian state within five years, but Israel’s intransigence in this respect was the main reason for the burgeoning of Hamas with active resistance to occupation, involving violent action that Israel called terrorism.
The October 7 Hamas offensives, planned and executed elaborately away from Israel’s eyes, were certainly appalling and indefensible under international humanitarian law. But they essentially stemmed from a situation of no war, no peace. Former US president Barack Obama’s push for a political settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict irrevocably ended in 2014, with Netanyahu declaring in March 2015 that there would not be a Palestinian state on his watch.[8] They also arose amid escalating Israeli-Palestinian tensions and clashes in the West Bank, Israel’s two massive raids into Jenin refugee camp,[9] violation of the sanctity of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, expansion of settlements and Jewish settlers’ revengeful attacks on the Palestinians. By August, more than 200 Palestinians, along with some 30 Israelis, had been killed in intermittent violent incidents.[10]
The Hamas attacks challenged the status quo and Israel’s position as the most powerful state in the Middle East and Netanyahu’s personal reputation as Israel’s security provider. They also played into the hands of the legally besieged Netanyahu, who faces charges of fraud, and fanatic members of his cabinet, to boost their anti-Palestinian credentials. The finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, even denied the very existence of a Palestinian people.[11]
Israel responded with a declaration of war on Hamas and an overwhelming application of brute force to eradicate the group at all costs. Backed by the US and its Western allies, Netanyahu and the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) found it opportune to act with total impunity. During the first four weeks of the war alone, Israel dropped more than 6,000 bombs on Gaza, killed over 10,000 civilians, including some 4,000 children, turning the Strip, in the words of Guterres, into a “graveyard for children”,[12] dislocated one million of Gaza’s 2.3 million population and destroyed more than one-third of the Strip. This was in addition to depriving the Gazans of the basic means of survival – food, water, electricity, fuel and medicine – creating the biggest humanitarian crisis of the century.
While the UN Security Council was paralysed, Guterres called for a humanitarian ceasefire, only to be rejected by the Netanyahu and Joe Biden administrations, arguing that it would amount to surrendering to Hamas. The US moved forces to the east of the Mediterranean to warn the powerful arch-enemies of Israel and the US – the Lebanese Hezbollah, Syria and Iran, the latter of which has nurtured close links to two of America’s major adversaries, Russia and China – against entering the war in support of Hamas. However, as the crisis intensified, the US and other international supporters of Israel found it imperative to parallel their initial unqualified support of Israel with an effort to ease the suffering of the people of Gaza under what the UN called Israel’s “collective punishment”, and minimise the damage to the US and allied global reputation as complicit in Israel’s devastation of Gaza.
The US backed a Qatari mediation, with Egypt’s assistance, to pressure Israel to agree to a “pause” in the fighting to secure the release of Israeli hostages in return for the freedom of some Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails. The two warring parties commenced, on November 24, a four-day pause, which was renewed twice for another three days. This resulted in the freedom of some 70 women and children hostages in return for the release of 240 Palestinians – most of them minors – from Israeli prisons, and the transfer of more humanitarian aid to the destitute people of Gaza. Yet, Netanyahu vowed all along to resume fighting to achieve Israel’s goal of eliminating Hamas. At the end of the seven-day pause, the two sides accused each other of violating the terms of their agreement and fighting resumed, with Israel extending its massive military operations on the ground and from the air and sea across Gaza at the cost of more Palestinian lives and devastation. The situation remains highly polarising and potentially explosive at regional and international levels.
These developments have eclipsed some of the other sources of threat, which have continued to haunt the region as in the past. The most important ones are the following three.
Violent Extremism
Attacks by violent extremist groups generally subsided during the year in the region under the weight of counter terrorism pressure from states and major powers, although mostly from the US. However, IS and AQ, along with their branches, such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa, as well as the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK) in Afghanistan, remained active mostly in the region’s conflict-ridden zones. IS was availed the necessary opportunity “to rebuild its rank and file”[13] in fragile Syria and Iraq. IS operations kept the US-led Combined Special Operations Joint Task Force-Levant and regional partners very busy in targeting IS- and AQ-linked bases and sites wherever necessary and in strengthening regional capability against the groups.[14]
The triumphant return to power of the erstwhile terrorist Taliban in Afghanistan, in the wake of the US and allied defeat in mid-August 2021, boosted the group’s long-standing ally, AQ. Contrary to the Taliban’s denial of links with AQ and claim of success against the rival ISK, both entities remain active in Afghanistan. AQ has never been stronger in the country since 9/11, protected by and working with the Taliban. According to former CIA targeting officer and current global threat advisor Sarah Adams, “there are still 15 high-profile terrorists, including individuals from Al-Qaeda and other well-known terrorist groups in Afghanistan”.[15] ISK continued its periodic attacks across the land, with its latest operation causing a bus explosion in Kabul on November 7, killing seven and injuring 20 people.[16] These developments, which could only encourage other like-minded groups to aim for victory, prompted a UN warning in June about the danger of terrorism from Afghanistan.[17]
Meanwhile, the Iran-backed Hezbollah, which is designated as a terrorist organisation by Israel and the US and some of its allies, remained a very strong political and paramilitary force in Lebanon. The group, representing the Shia segment of Lebanon’s divided population along confessional lines, enjoyed a virtually veto power within Lebanon’s power structure and continued to be widely viewed as Iran’s heavily armed regional proxy against Israel and the US. It possesses a highly disciplined and battle-hardened fighting force, equipped with more than 100,000 Iran-made rockets, including precision and anti-ship missiles, and drones in its inventory.[18]
In the war with Hamas, Israel and the US strongly feared the possibility of Hezbollah joining the Palestinian group in a full-blown war. However, while Hezbollah engaged in some cross-border operations and Israel targeted several of its bases in southern Lebanon, it appeared that neither Hezbollah nor its Iranian patron were finding it opportune to enter a major confrontation. In a defining speech on November 3, Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, praised Hamas’ action as heroic, but at the same time disassociated his organisation from it by saying that it “was 100 percent Palestinian”[19] in terms of both decision and execution. Even so, he reserved the option of joining the fight should the circumstances demand it. Whatever the future, Hezbollah is destined to remain a critical player in both the Lebanese and regional landscapes.
National Upheavals
Most of the Middle Eastern states continued to live under authoritarian rulers, who focused primarily on such developmental and security changes that could serve the continuation of their reign and preservation of the status quo. This persisted in the face of the societal forces that demanded political pluralism, individual rights and freedoms, and popularly mandated governments, as well as an end to state repression, human rights violations, and social and economic inequity and injustices. A state-society dichotomy persisted in all states, although in varying degrees, and many of the region’s countries experienced major civil unrest and state suppression.
For example, Iran saw a major upheaval, led by the “Women, Life and Freedom” movement. Although it had started as a protest over wearing the hijab, it also embodied wider public disenchantment with the country’s Islamic regime over theocratic impositions and restrictions and declining socioeconomic conditions, partly due to international sanctions but largely because of mismanagement. Though the regime contained the protests through repressive measures, the underlying causes and societal grievances remain unaddressed as a source of threat to national stability.[20]
In some other cases, the gulf between state and society grew beyond social unrest. This was more prominently evident in Sudan. The struggle between the public’s demand for democratic change and the military’s determination to retain power since the demise of the country’s long-standing dictator, Omar al-Bashir, in April 2019, led to a devastating conflict between the security forces. The fight for power between the leaders of the Sudanese Armed Forces and a paramilitary group, called the Rapid Support Forces, plunged Sudan into a calamitous political, economic and humanitarian crisis. It threatened not only the destruction of the very fabric of Sudanese society, but also regional stability.[21]
The rest of the Middle Eastern states also suffered from political and social protests and forceful state crackdowns. For instance, Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt figured prominently among them. Israel was not spared either. Netanyahu’s government saw massive public protests over its decision to reduce the power of the judiciary in favour of the executive within the Israeli governmental system. As for the other ongoing conflict-ridden spots, more specifically Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, they stood in a class of their own as sources of national and regional instability.
Major Power Interventionism (In a Polarised World)
The Middle East, and more specifically its Gulf subset, endured growing major power involvement in a highly divided world. The US, which had traditionally been the main player in the region, had to contend with China and Russia’s growing influence in the region. The heightening Sino-Iranian and Russo-Iranian multi-level economic and strategic cooperation, as well as the two powers’ expansion of ties with other receptive states in the region, especially Saudi Arabia, marked an important development. The de facto but wealthy and ambitious Saudi leader, Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS), sought to diversify his kingdom’s foreign relations – not to debase his country’s traditional bonds with the US as its main security provider, but to be in a position to deflect Washington’s pressure when required. He was seriously taken aback by US President Biden’s earlier criticism of him for human rights violations, especially in relation to the gruesome killing of the Saudi dissident, Jamal Khashoggi, in Istanbul in 2018.[22] The president’s release of US intelligence alleging the prince’s involvement in that killing has had a residual effect on MBS, prompting him to strengthen relations with China and Russia.[23] Also, the US defeat in Afghanistan led him, along with some of his Arab counterparts in the Gulf Cooperation Council, to become doubtful of the US as a reliable ally.[24]
The UAE also sought to energise ties with America’s adversarial powers. Its president Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ) met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in June for strengthening of ties. While MBZ desired closer relations, the Russian leader praised such a development.[25] Similarly, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi enhanced Cairo’s relations with Moscow for both economic and strategic reasons. He wanted to meet his country’s need for Russian food grain as well as to balance relations with Washington,[26] despite the latter’s close to US$2 billion annual aid that props up the Egyptian military as the backbone of al-Sisi’s rule. The US’ full-throated support of Israel against Hamas also signalled that America is still a powerful player in the region, although an entailing Arab/Muslim backlash cannot be underestimated. As such, the Middle East endures as an arena of intense major power rivalries.
Conclusion
Although the Middle East indeed experienced some earlier hopeful signs of improved relations among some of its main players, the Israel-Hamas war has caused a serious blow to these nascent developments. With Iran and its regional allies backing Hamas, although not to such an extent as aiding it by opening a northern front from Lebanon and Syria against Israel, the Arab countries have reeled from Israel’s devastating response to Hamas’ attacks on Israel. Those Arab countries that had normalised relations with Israel, such as Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan, with Saudi Arabia on the verge of doing so, could no longer find it expedient to be favourably disposed towards the Jewish state. Nor could they ignore public outrage over their failure to prompt Israel, through the US, to enforce an immediate ceasefire to minimise the suffering of the Gazan people and to prevent Israel from flattening the Strip. The Middle East has once again been placed on a potentially combustive path that the region has not seen since the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.
About the Author
Amin Saikal is Professor Emeritus of Middle Eastern and Central Asian Studies at the Australian National University, and Adjunct Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Australia, and author of the forthcoming book How to Lose a War: The Story of America’s Intervention in Afghanistan, to be published by Yale University Press. He can be reached at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Mohammed Ibrahim on Unsplash
Citations
[1] “Iran and Saudi Arabia Agree to Restore Relations,” Al-Jazeera, March 10, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/10/iran-and-saudi-agree-to-restore-relations.
[2] For a discussion, see Vivian Yee, “Arab League Votes to Readmit Syria, Ending a Nearly 12-year Suspension,” New York Times, May 7, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/07/world/middleeast/arab-league-syria.html#:~:text=Arab%20nations%20agreed%20on%20Sunday,force%20against%20its%20own%20people.
[3] “Saudi Arabia Hails Erdogan’s Visit, Improving Relations with Turkiye,” Daily Sabah, July 19, 2023, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/saudi-arabia-hails-erdogans-visit-improving-relations-with-turkiye.
[4] Humeyra Pamuk, “UN General Assembly: Erdogan, Netanyahu Meet for First Time as Relations Thaw,” Reuters, September 20, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-general-assembly-erdogan-netanyahu-meet-first-time-relations-thaw-2023-09-19/.
[5] “Israel Revises Down Toll from October 7 Attack to Around 1,200,” Al-Jazeera, November 10, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/478ejvwj.
[6] For the full text, see Antonio Guterres, “Secretary-General’s Remarks to the Security Council – On the Middle East,” United Nations Security Council, October 24, 2023, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2023-10-24/secretary-generals-remarks-the-security-council-the-middle-east%C2%A0.
[7] Nicholas Watt and Harriet Sherwood, “David Cameron: Israeli Blockade Has Turned Gaza Strip Into A ‘Prison Camp’,” The Guardian, July 27, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/jul/27/david-cameron-gaza-prison-camp.
[8] “Netanyahu: No Palestinian State On My Watch,” The Times of Israel, March 16, 2015, https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-no-palestinian-state-under-my-watch/.
[9] “What is Behind Israel’s Major Attack on Jenin?” Al Jazeera, July 3, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/3/what-is-behind-israels-major-attack-on-jenin.
[10] “UN: Over 200 Palestinians and Nearly 30 Israelis Killed in 2023, Highest Since 2005,” Spectrum News NY1, August 21, 2023, https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/international/2023/08/21/this-year-over-200-palestinians-and-nearly-30-israelis-have-been-killed–highest-since-2005–un-says#:~:text=U.N.
[11] Hadas Gold et al., “Israeli Minister Says There’s ‘No Such Thing as a Palestinian People, Inviting US Rebuke,” CNN, March 21, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/21/middleeast/israel-smotrich-palestinians-intl/index.html.
[12] Nidal al-Mughrabi, “Gaza Death Toll Tops 10,000; UN Calls It a Children’s Graveyard,” Reuters, November 7, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/pressure-israel-over-civilians-steps-up-ceasefire-calls-rebuffed-2023-11-06/#:~:text=The%20health%20ministry%20in%20the,every%20day%2C%22%20Guterres%20said.
[13] For a detailed discussion, see Katherine Zimmerman and Nathan Vincent, “The State of Al Qaeda and ISIS in 2023,” Critical Threat, September 11, 2023, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-state-of-al-qaeda-and-isis-in-2023.
[14] “Combined Special Operations Joint Task Force – Levant,” Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, https://www.dvidshub.net/unit/SOJTF-LEVANT.
[15] Afghan Analyst (@AfghanAnalyst2), “They Are Coming For Us,” X, November 5, 2023, https://twitter.com/AfghanAnalyst2/status/1721134237888172163.
[16] “At Least 7 Killed, 20 Injured in Kabul Minibus Explosion,” Arab News, November 7, 2023, https://arab.news/y7njv.
[17] United Nations Security Council, Fourteenth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2665 (2022) Concerning the Taliban and Other Associated Individuals and Entities Constituting a Threat to the Peace Stability and Security of Afghanistan, S/2023/370, June 1, 2023, p. 3, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/125/36/PDF/N2312536.pdf?OpenElement.
[18] For details, see “Lebanon’s Hezbollah: What Weapons Does It Have?” Reuters, October 31, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-hezbollah-what-weapons-does-it-have-2023-10-30/.
[19] See “Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah Speech on Israel-Hamas War: Key Takeaways,” Al Jazeera, November 3, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/3/hezbollahs-hassan-nasrallah-speech-on-israel-hamas-war-key-takeaways.
[20] Amin Saikal, “Iran’s Protests Go Back to the Future,” The Strategist, January 19, 2023, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/irans-protests-go-back-to-the-future/.
[21] Amin Saikal, “Sudan’s Double Crises,” The Strategist, May 2, 2023, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/sudans-double-crises/.
[22] For a detailed discussion, see Christina Pazzornese, “Biden May Regret Releasing Report on Khashoggi Murder,” The Harvard Gazette, February 27, 2021, https://tinyurl.com/2jbzbtuf.
[23] Saudi Arabia even decided to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a Dialogue Member. For details, see “Riyadh joins Shanghai Cooperation Organization as ties with Beijing grow,” Reuters, March 29, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/riyadh-joins-shanghai-cooperation-organization-ties-with-beijing-grow-2023-03-29/; Iran became a full member of the SCO on July 4, 2023.
[24] For details, see Amin Saikal, “America’s Diminishing Influence in Charting a New World Order,” The Strategist, August 15, 2023, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/americas-diminishing-influence-in-charting-a-new-world-order/.
[25] “UAE President MbZ Tells Russia’s Putin: We Wish to Strengthen Ties,” The New Arab, June 16, 2023, https://www.newarab.com/news/uae-president-tells-russias-putin-we-wish-strengthen-ties; David Hearst, “Only When the UAE Help Putin Does the West Panic About its Malign Influence,” Middle East Eye, September 18, 2023, https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/uae-putin-help-west-panic-malign-influence.
[26] Gamal Essam El-Din, “Growing Egypt-Russia Relations,” Ahramonline, March 15, 2023, https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/50/491735/AlAhram-Weekly/Growing-EgyptRussia-relations.aspx.
