Myanmar
In 2023, Myanmar faced a deepening crisis as the anti-junta resistance, alongside ethnic armed groups, made territorial gains, leading to intense clashes with the military. Civilian deaths exceeded 4,000, revealing the impact of the Tatmadaw’s operations on non-combatants. These casualties highlighted the indiscriminate nature of some of the military’s actions. Ethnic armed groups played pivotal roles in anti-junta operations, and launched an unprecedented offensive from late October that led to the seizure of several towns and strategic junta bases in the northern region. Cases of military surrenders and defections coupled with the complex Rakhine State crisis added to the turmoil. The outlook remains bleak, underscoring the urgent need for international assistance to address the growing humanitarian crisis and seek a path to stability and reconciliation.
Trends
In 2023, the Myanmar resistance movement, comprising anti-junta democratic forces and ethnic armed groups, made territorial advancements in some border regions and ethnic states. Fierce clashes between these forces and the Tatmadaw (the military) were observed for control of vital transportation routes such as roads, rivers and railways. The junta regime managed to maintain a degree of control over supply lines, enabling them to sustain ground and air offensives. The ability to maintain airstrikes relatively unimpaired has given the junta an asymmetrical advantage.[1]
The armed resistance has become better organised, trained and equipped, and has posed a significant challenge to the junta and the police.[2] Over the past year, resistance forces have increasingly relied on weaponised drones laden with drop explosives to attack military targets. They have also become more effective in orchestrating hit-and-run attacks on military convoys, targeting junta officials and using social media to convince soldiers to defect.[3] The military lost control of some rural areas in Sagaing, Chin and Kayah, which have emerged as major resistance strongholds.
With the country embroiled in a full-fledged civil war, the junta and its proxies have resorted to airstrikes, heavy weapons and scorched earth tactics, including in civilian areas, to quell the resistance offensives. The clashes have exacted a significant human toll. In the past two years, the civilian death toll has exceeded 4,000 (as of August 2023), with an estimated 1,080 civilians killed in the first eight months of 2023 alone.[4] According to United Nations (UN) data, approximately two million individuals have also been displaced within Myanmar. Furthermore, over 63,000 people remain displaced in neighbouring countries following the military takeover in 2021.[5] With the ongoing state of emergency extended until January 31, 2024,[6] the cycle of violence and upheaval will likely persist into the foreseeable future. Top of Form
Resistance Movement’s Intensified Operations
Myanmar has been in turmoil since the 2021 military coup, with the state of armed conflict, insurgency and chaos only deteriorating over time.[7] In many regions over the past year, the National Unity Government (NUG), the shadow civilian government made up of activists and opposition politicians, and its armed wing, the People’s Defence Force (PDF), have collaborated operationally with some major ethnic armed groups in the border regions, to simultaneously “increase pressure on the military on all fronts”.[8]
According to the NUG, clashes have taken place across most of Myanmar’s 14 states and regions, except in Yangon and Ayeyarwady Region, both key regime strongholds, where resistance fighters have orchestrated targeted bombings. These include a recent bomb attack on a junta airbase near the capital, Naypyidaw.[9] Regime sources indicate that skirmishes have been mainly confined to Sagaing, Magway and Bago Regions, as well as Kayin, Kayah, Chin and Mon States.[10] More recently, the Tanintharyi Region in the south has seen clashes. PDFs have also acquired more advanced weaponry with support from both domestic and international sources.[11]
Analysts and some ethnic revolutionary leaders suggest that the junta is transitioning from offensive to defensive military tactics in response to the growing resistance, citing, among other claims, that the junta has lost 30,000 troops, or nearly half its combat forces.[12] Additionally, the NUG reported the capture of 28 junta bases in the first year and 107 in the second year of the resistance.[13] These claims have been dismissed by the junta. Figures cited are often challenging to verify and are frequently inflated, especially by media outlets aligned with the NUG.[14]
Despite sustaining operational losses, the Tatmadaw has maintained the capacity to carry out sustained operations on multiple fronts.[15] In particular, its use of artillery strikes and airpower makes it hard for resistance forces to hold on to territory gained for long.[16] Resistance forces are also fractured and hindered by a lack of access to sophisticated weapons. They also lack the backing of more powerful ethnic armed groups.[17] In addition, reports of criminal activities, including homicides, sexual assaults and other misconduct, have exposed internal fissures. These issues have been attributed to a perceived lack of a unified chain of command within the resistance movement and a clear code of conduct.[18]
Ethnic Armed Organisations’ Growing Footprint
Ethnic armed groups, which have for decades waged armed battle with the military for greater autonomy in some regions in ethnically diverse Myanmar, now boast significant manpower and access to advanced weaponry. As such, some have become significant actors in the post-coup landscape. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA), for one, in 2023 engaged in battles to counter junta advances in northern Myanmar’s Kachin State.[19] They also collaborated with the NUG and supported PDF troops. Similarly, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) has achieved some territorial gains in south-eastern Myanmar by capturing military camps. The junta’s response has mainly involved airstrikes and artillery attacks, including on local communities, which has resulted in a notable increase in internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kayin State.
Apart from the KIA and KNLA, groups such as the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) in Kayah State and the Chin National Army (CNA) in Chin State have also emerged as significant players in the resistance movement.[20] Additionally, the Brotherhood Alliance, composed of the Arakan Army (AA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), have collaborated with the NUG, with each group pursuing its own distinct goals in Rakhine State, northern Shan State and the Kokang Region, respectively.
On October 27, a coalition of ethnic armed groups[21] launched a series of coordinated offensives against junta forces in northern Shan State. Over the subsequent weeks, ethnic fighters, many aligned with the broader resistance movement, captured over 200 military outposts and bases, as well as a number of towns and key trade routes near the border with China, in one of the most expansive resistance offensives in years. Each ethnic group in the alliance appears to have had varying agendas, from seizing lands to expanding influence along trade routes.[22]
Funding the Resistance
Amid widespread clampdowns imposed by the ruling junta on financial flows, Myanmar’s anti-coup resistance movement has largely raised funds through various diaspora networks overseas. The NUG, for example, recently reported providing US$15.7 million in funding, mainly from overseas networks, to PDFs since September 2021.[23] More recently, however, they have sought to adopt other innovative and high-tech methods, including via digital currency, real estate auctions, mining leases and bond sales.[24] The NUG also launched a digital currency in 2023, called the Digital Myanmar Kyat (DMMK), to move money within the country.
In a possible bid to circumvent ongoing banking restrictions, the NUG in July 2023 announced ambitious plans to open an online bank run on blockchain technology. There were also efforts to raise funds through mobile games. For example, an IT professional in Myanmar created a mobile game called “The PDF Game”, where players take on the role of PDF soldiers, to raise funds and awareness for the anti-regime forces. Funded by in-game ads, the game raised over US$508,000 between early 2022 and August 2023.[25] Collectively, these creative financing methods have provided both operational and humanitarian support for the opposition.[26]
However, observers say these fund-raising approaches have not yielded significant results across all areas in which the resistance forces maintain a presence.[27] In some regions, PDFs are increasingly levying tolls and resorting to coercive measures on roads they oversee – for example, by establishing frequent checkpoints. Sources say residents in some areas willingly participate in these payments, while others, particularly in the northwest, express a contrasting sentiment.[28]
Evolving Battlefield Tactics
Increasing Use of Drones
Resistance fighters in Myanmar are more frequently relying on commercial drones to conduct bombings and surveillance of military forces. According to NUG sources, technological advances and cost efficiencies have enabled drones to carry greater loads, fly at higher altitudes and circumvent the junta’s anti-drone jammers.[29] The NUG’s Defence Ministry has also distributed more drones to its armed wing, enabling a greater number of aerial attacks across the country.[30]
In 2022, there were around 642 drone attacks.[31] Rebel forces claim the use of drones increased in 2023, but did not provide details, citing security concerns. While they may not match the junta’s conventional aircraft, the increased adoption of modern war technology by resistance fighters has to some extent shifted the balance on the battlefield, observers say.[32] But drone attacks have also resulted in civilian casualties.[33]
Maintaining Air Attacks
The junta deployed airstrikes with greater frequency in 2023, in tandem with ground infantry and artillery operations. A UN report published in September 2023 stated that many of the Tatmadaw’s operations had targeted civilians, adding that 988 such strikes were conducted from February 2021 to July 2023, with a further 687 recorded between April 2022 and July 2023.[34] The strikes have resulted in several hundred civilian casualties and left communities in some areas living in perpetual fear of being bombed, the report added. A separate non-profit report also highlighted a shift in target areas for the military’s operations, with central regions now bearing the brunt of the bombings.[35]
A notable incident was the April 11, 2023 airstrike on the village of Pazi Gyi in Kantbalu Township, Sagaing Region, which resulted in the loss of more than 170 lives, including 42 children. This attack marked the deadliest event since the military seized power in 2021. A Myanmar military spokesperson acknowledged responsibility for the airstrike, justifying it by claiming it had targeted the opening ceremony of a public administration office held by the “civilian anti-regime” NUG and its armed wing, the PDF, which the regime has proscribed as a terrorist organisation.[36] However, local villagers denied the junta’s accusations, asserting that there were no PDF groups present in their village. They claimed their village only had members of the village defence force tasked with protecting residents’ properties and safeguarding the community.[37]
Escalating Conflict Along Strategic Transport Routes
Fighting continues to rage along key transport routes in Myanmar as the junta’s opponents contest strategically located roads, rivers and railways. They target regime convoys, flotillas and infrastructure, while the regime maintains control over supply lines. In the Dry Zone, Bago East and Kayah, clashes intensified in 2023. In early September, resistance groups launched an attack on a convoy of junta vessels on the Chindwin River in Salingyi Township, Sagaing Region.
The resistance fighters, including members of the Myanmar Royal Dragon Army (MRDA) and Monywa District Battalion 11, targeted a military flotilla transporting supplies like rations, weapons, ammunition and fuel from Pakokku Township to Sagaing Region. The clash lasted for about an hour, leading to the destruction of one vessel. The military subsequently retaliated using heavy weapon fire on nearby villages. These attacks on junta supply routes via rivers represent a continuing challenge for the military, as they rely on these routes due to land-based ambushes by PDFs.[38]
Military Defections and Surrenders
Myanmar’s military has faced defections over the past two years, as the resistance movement gains momentum. Defections have been prominent in regions like Chin, Kayah and Kayin States.[39] In 2023, the NUG claimed that around 15,000 soldiers and police officers had joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) since February 2021.[40] According to reports, these defections can be attributed to growing disquiet in the Tatmadaw’s rank and file over the military’s intensified operations in civilian areas, human rights violations and inability to quell the uprising.[41] It is also noteworthy that the NUG has set up cash rewards for defectors and publicised these events via huge photo opportunities.[42] Since late 2023, there have also been an increasing number of surrenders, an unprecedented development since the 2021 military takeover. In one instance, an infantry battalion of 127 soldiers and 134 family members surrendered.[43]
It is often difficult to confirm defection figures as both the junta and the NUG make claims that are highly questionable.[44] For its part, the military has lowered the eligibility criteria for officer recruitment and extended the defence services academy’s application deadlines. The military has also organised beach holidays for wounded soldiers, town hall meals and other activities to retain soldiers and boost morale.[45]
Ongoing Crisis in Western Myanmar’s Rakhine State
The enduring crisis in Western Myanmar’s Rakhine State was largely overshadowed in 2023 by post-coup developments elsewhere. Despite a temporary ceasefire between the junta and AA, the situation in Rakhine State has become more complex, with the AA controlling much of the countryside in central and northern Rakhine, including along the Bangladesh border, and setting up its own administration and judiciary. Tensions with the regime persisted throughout 2023 and eventually spilled over in mid-November, when fresh clashes broke out between the AA and junta forces in Rakhine State, causing tens of thousands to flee the four major townships. The skirmishes broke a ceasefire that had been in place since November 2022,[46] with the latest developments potentially having far-reaching regional and transborder implications.
Rohingya refugees in southern Bangladesh face increasingly dire prospects of returning home to Rakhine State, even as living conditions in the camps, which house over 700,000 Rohingya Muslims, worsen. In addition to dwindling supplies of food rations, the imposition of arbitrary movement restrictions has also made it harder to move around within the camps.[47] Meanwhile, violence in these Rohingya refugee camps has steadily increased, as armed groups and criminal networks engage in turf wars as they seek to entrench themselves among the refugee population.[48]
Against this backdrop, the prospect for the repatriation of Rohingya refugees has grown increasingly bleak, with international support for a brokered settlement fast dwindling. This is despite another Beijing-backed effort in 2023 by Bangladesh and Myanmar’s military regime to restart a repatriation process following two previous failed attempts in 2018 and 2019, amid mounting international pressure.[49] The protracted malaise could push some disillusioned Rohingya refugees, particularly men and boys, towards militancy or enlistment in armed groups and gangs.
Meanwhile, the militant Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), which has been accused by state forces in the past of carrying out attacks on police outposts, increased its activities in Rakhine State in 2023. This came amid a government crackdown on its activities in neighbouring Bangladesh after the killings of Rohingya community leaders in the refugee camps. In Maungdaw Township, for example, ARSA, grappling with food shortages among its fighters, is alleged to have kidnapped fellow Muslims and sought extortion money.[50]
Frequent clashes also erupted between ARSA and AA, and there were troubling allegations suggesting possible complicity between Myanmar’s military and ARSA. According to analysts, a resurgent and increasingly bold ARSA could be receiving covert support from the junta via the supplying of weapons and granting of ease of movement around the region, as part of a strategy to weaken the AA.[51] Some reports also indicate that ARSA supporters have possibly split into four factions and that a relatively new Rohingya armed group named the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA) has emerged. The ARA, led by an alleged drug dealer, Abdullah Kane, has also been accused by local sources of being sheltered by the Myanmar Border Guard Police, with whom it is allegedly cooperating in drug-trafficking activities.[52]
Lastly, ARSA has established connections with Al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadist organisations, including Ansar al Islam/Al-Qaeda Bangladesh, Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Harkatul Jihad al Islami-Bangladesh (HuJI-B), along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border. ARSA has also maintained strong ties to HuJI-Arakan in Rakhine State, whose leader is based in Pakistan. According to Bangladeshi security sources, ARSA is actively working to expand and acquire weapons, such as AK-47s, relying on funding from overseas sources and the profitable trade of methamphetamine drugs. These sources added that ARSA’s long-term plan is to capture territory that includes parts of Chattogram Division in Bangladesh and northern Rakhine State.
Taken together, these activities have the potential to exacerbate the ongoing conflict in Rakhine State and the Myanmar-Bangladesh border region. However, local sources in Myanmar have cautioned that ARSA remains relatively under the radar in Rakhine State and is still viewed by most non-Rohingya communities in the area as a weaker threat actor compared with other armed groups such as the AA.
Outlook
The security outlook for Myanmar remains bleak, with the military government so far failing to restore peace and stability in the country amid a growing pro-democracy resistance movement.[53] Both the Tatmadaw and the resistance forces are determined to secure a decisive victory, and there are no discernible indications that conducive conditions are in place for a politically negotiated settlement to emerge in the near future. Consequently, Myanmar’s already dire socioeconomic and humanitarian crisis is likely set to intensify.
The complex and volatile situation requires a peaceful resolution, increased humanitarian aid and a comprehensive, multilateral approach. In this respect, the independent verification of events and claims by the key conflict actors is important to effectively address the crisis and its implications.[54] The outlook for 2024 will be significantly shaped by a myriad of factors, including political developments, the evolving security landscape and the involvement of international actors, with the regime deepening its economic and defence dependence on Russia and China.
About the Author
Iftekharul Bashar is an Associate Research Fellow with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].
[1] Rebecca Ratcliffe and Min Ye Kyaw, “‘Monster From the Sky’: Two Years on From Coup, Myanmar Junta Increases Airstrikes on Civilians,” The Guardian, January 31, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/31/monster-from-the-sky-two-years-on-from-coup-myanmar-junta-increases-airstrikes-on-civilians.
[2] David Scott Mathieson, “The Myth of Military Desperation in Myanmar,” The Interpreter, August 16, 2023, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myth-military-desperation-myanmar.
[3] Josua Kurlantzick, “Myanmar’s Junta Is Losing the Civil War,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 27, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/article/myanmars-junta-losing-civil-war.
[4] This data from the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) only covers civilian casualties by the regime. For details, see “Number of Civilians Killed by Myanmar Junta Since Coup Surpasses 4,000,” The Irrawaddy, September 2, 2023, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/conflicts-in-numbers/number-of-civilians-killed-by-myanmar-junta-since-coup-surpasses-4000.html.
[5] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), Myanmar – Humanitarian Update No. 33, October 2, 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-update-no-33-2-october-2023.
[6] “Myanmar Junta Extends State of Emergency for 6 More Months,” The Irrawaddy, July 31, 2023, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-extends-state-of-emergency-for-6-more-months.html.
[7] Yun Sun, “The Civil War In Myanmar: No End In Sight,” The Brookings Institution, February 13, 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-civil-war-in-myanmar-no-end-in-sight/.
[8] While the NUG nominally oversees PDFs, the latter mostly function as autonomous cells. In regions like Kayin, Kayah and Chin, PDFs maintain closer operational coordination with ethnic armed groups. Others, notably in Southern Sagaing and Western Magway, receive some support, but their level of coordination is weaker. See Priscilla A. Clapp and Ye Myo Hein, “Is Myanmar’s Junta Turning a Corner?” United States Institute of Peace (USIP), August 10, 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/08/myanmars-junta-turning-corner.
[9] “2 Years On, Myanmar’s Resistance Is Formidable Foe of Junta: Head of Shadow Govt,” Radio Free Asia, September 7, 2023, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/resistance-09072023161600.html.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Resistance forces usually use homemade mortars and grenade launchers. They have also produced devices akin to claymores/front-facing mines as well as chain IEDs – usually a string of IEDs along the road to target junta truck columns. For details on PDF’s weapons, see Anthony Davis, “Myanmar PDFs Getting the Guns to Turn the War,” Asia Times, May 19, 2023, https://asiatimes.com/2023/05/myanmar-pdfs-getting-the-guns-to-turn-the-war/.
[12] Nayt Thit, “Myanmar Junta Goes on the Defensive in August, Resistance Gains Ground,” The Irrawaddy, August 31, 2023, https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/analysis/myanmar-junta-goes-on-the-defensive-in-august-resistance-gains-ground.html.
[13] “Myanmar Junta Loses Half of Its Combat Force in Two Years: NUG,” The Irrawaddy, September 7, 2023, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/myanmar-junta-loses-half-of-its-combat-force-in-two-years-nug.html.
[14] Andrew Selth, “How Credible Are the Casualty Figures Coming Out of Myanmar?” The Interpreter, September 20, 2023, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-credible-are-casualty-figures-coming-out-myanmar.
[15] Mathieson, “The Myth of Military Desperation in Myanmar.”
[16] Andrew Nachemson, “Myanmar Anti-Coup Forces Retain Optimism in Face of Air Attacks,” Al Jazeera, February 1, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/1/myanmar-anti-coup-forces-retain-optimism-in-face-of-air-attacks.
[17] Ibid.
[18] “Rooting Out the Resistance Criminals That Threaten Myanmar’s Revolution,” The Irrawaddy, August 28, 2023, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/rooting-out-the-resistance-criminals-that-threaten-myanmars-revolution.html.
[19] Hein Htoo Zan, “KIA: Myanmar Junta Under Attack in Kachin State,” The Irrawaddy, September 1, 2023, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/kia-myanmar-junta-under-attack-in-kachin-state.html.
[20] The KNDF, despite Kayah State’s modest size, has engaged in multiple clashes with regime troops and has emphasised cooperation with other anti-regime groups. The CNA, situated in Chin State, has intensified attacks on military convoys. The situation in these regions remains unpredictable.
[21] The Brotherhood Alliance comprises AA, MNDAA and TNLA. It is noteworthy that AA had a ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar military, but the group ended it in November 2023. AA has reportedly clashed with the Myanmar military in the western state of Rakhine.
[22] Underscoring Beijing’s ability to significantly influence Myanmar’s security environment, some analysts say China, which has significant influence in parts of neighbouring northern Shan State, was likely aware of developments prior to the ethnic offensives. Its ensuing inaction has been linked in part to frustrations with the Myanmar junta over a failure to shut down scam operations targeting Chinese citizens in the area. See Leong Wai Kit, “CNA Explains: Myanmar’s Rebels Are Gaining Ground With Their Latest Attacks. Could They Overthrow the Junta?” Channel News Asia, November 20, 2023, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/myanmar-junta-ethnic-resistance-operation-1027-brotherhood-alliance-3933466.
[23] Ministry of Defence – National Unity Government of Myanmar, “Press Release – 3rd October 2023,” Facebook, October 3, 2023, https://www.facebook.com/modNUG/.
[24] Zsombor Peter, “Raffles, Bonds and Crypto Are Funding Myanmar’s Armed Resistance,” VoA, July 8, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/raffles-bonds-and-crypto-are-funding-myanmar-s-armed-resistance-/7172762.html.
[25] Despite regulatory challenges from Google Play and Apple’s App Store, the online game continues to support the PDFs and humanitarian efforts. Ko Toot aims to raise US$1 million per month to help the people of Myanmar in their struggle against the military. See Oliver Slow, “The Mobile Game Funding a Revolution in Myanmar,” BBC News, August 27, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65906961.
[26] Peter, “Raffles, Bonds and Crypto.”
[27] Their bonds are scheduled to mature by November 2023, and it is likely that most, if not all, of the bondholders will choose to either donate their proceeds or agree to the NUG’s proposals when the bonds mature. However, local observers on the ground believe that this situation does not bode well for the NUG’s long-term fund-raising efforts.
[28] “Death Highways: Driving in Myanmar’s Conflict Zones,” Frontier Myanmar, August 23, 2023, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/death-highways-driving-in-myanmars-conflict-zones/.
[29] “Myanmar’s Resistance Says It Has Cracked Junta’s Anti-Drone Jammers, Radio Free Asia, September 27, 2023, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/anti-drone-jammers-09272023121251.html.
[30] “As Resistance Drone Attacks Rise, Myanmar Junta Seeks Regional Help,” The Irrawaddy, September 26, 2023, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/as-resistance-drone-attacks-rise-myanmar-junta-seeks-regional-help.html.
[31] Radio Free Asia, “Myanmar’s Resistance Says It Has Cracked Junta’s Anti-Drone Jammers.”
[32] Kyi Sin, “Resistance Forces in Myanmar: Changing the State of Play with Weaponised Drones,” Fulcrum, February 10, 2023, https://fulcrum.sg/resistance-forces-in-myanmar-changing-the-state-of-play-with-weaponised-drones/.
[33] One incident in April 2023 saw a drone strike hit a school in northern Sagaing’s Kywei Pon village, resulting in eight casualties, including five children who were celebrating a water festival. Some local media quoted pro-resistance sources who claimed the victims were affiliated with the Pyu Saw Hti militia. Myanmar’s Deputy Home Affairs Minister called for improved border controls to prevent such groups from acquiring drones. See The Irrawaddy, “As Resistance Drone Attacks Rise.”
[34] Hein Htoo Zan, “Central Myanmar Sees 324 Percent Increase in Air Strikes: UN,” The Irrawaddy, September 27, 2023, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/central-myanmar-sees-324-percent-increase-in-air-strikes-un.html.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Yuzana, “Horror of Myanmar Junta’s Aerial Massacre in Pazi Gyi,” The Irrawaddy, April 20, 2023, https://www.irrawaddy.com/features/horror-of-myanmar-juntas-aerial-massacre-in-pazi-gyi.html.
[37] Ibid.
[38] “Resistance Groups Kill 10 Myanmar Junta Troops in Attack on Military Flotilla,” The Irrawaddy, September 4, 2023, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/resistance-groups-kill-10-myanmar-junta-troops-in-attack-on-military-flotilla.html?fbclid=IwAR29DkFg1WOHS5ZJ3LI0r9TRvrbDhfK3z5UlJjvnXZYueglSisJawbiSyT4.
[39] “Myanmar Military Suffers Spike in Defections as Resistance Gains Ground,” The Irrawaddy, August 25, 2023, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-military-suffers-spike-in-defections-as-resistance-gains-ground.html.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid. See also Ko Ko Aung et al., “Myanmar Coup: The Soldiers Refusing to Fight,” BBC News, May 30, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65743887.
[42] Another group, Pyithu Thar Kaung, provides cash incentives for defectors with weapons. See The Irrawaddy, “Myanmar Military Suffers Spike in Defections.”
[43] Grant Peck, “An Ethnic Resistance Group in Northern Myanmar Says an Entire Army Battalion has Surrendered to It”, The Associated Press, November 16, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-ethnic-group-army-battalion-surrenders-a4832dd5b74ba44b58b1868e1f28d0b1
[44] The military has also offered cash rewards for PDFs to defect and similarly made huge photo ops for supposed PDF defectors. For details, see “Myanmar Junta Offers Cash Rewards to Resistance Defectors,” The Irrawaddy, May 11, 2023, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-offers-cash-rewards-to-resistance-defectors.html. According to sources on the ground in Myanmar, there have definitely been some PDF defections, albeit at a much smaller scale than the military/police ones, but it is something the military is trying to expand.
[45] The Irrawaddy, “Myanmar Military Suffers Spike in Defections.”
[46] Approximately 500,000 people have been displaced nationwide since October 2023, prompting the UNOCHA to urge urgent funding to address the growing humanitarian crisis. “Tens of Thousands Flee Intensifying Clashes in Myanmar’s Rakhine State,” Radio Free Asia, December 1, 2023, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/clashes-12012023151051.html.
[47] Tan Hui Yee, “Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh Say Living Conditions Worse Than in Myanmar: Report,” The Straits Times, September 23, 2023, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/rohingya-refugees-in-bangladesh-say-conditions-there-worse-than-in-myanmar-report.
[48] “Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: Limiting the Damage of a Protracted Crisis,” International Crisis Group, October 4, 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar-bangladesh/rohingya-refugees-bangladesh-limiting-damage-protracted.
[49] Ibid.
[50] “ARSA Blamed for Killing Muslim Villager in Rakhine,” The Irrawaddy, September 13, 2023, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/arsa-blamed-for-killing-muslim-villager-in-rakhine.html.
[51] “The Arakan Army Alleges the Junta’s Covert Support for ARSA,” BNI Online, September 1, 2023, https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/arakan-army-alleges-juntas-covert-support-arsa.
[52] Naing Lin, “A New Dimension to Armed Conflicts in Arakan?” Transnational Institute (TNI), September 20, 2023, https://www.tni.org/en/article/a-new-dimension-to-armed-conflicts-in-arakan.
[53] Ibid.
[54] “ARSA Spreading Through Western Myanmar,” The Irrawaddy, September 4, 2023, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/arsa-spreading-through-western-myanmar.html.
