Jemaah Islamiyah After the 2002 Bali Bombings: Two Decades of Continuity and Transformation
Two decades on from the 2002 Bali bombings, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has transformed into a full-fledged hybrid militant group that operates on three main fronts: social (i.e. school and dakwah, or religious outreach), military and political. Whilst JI’s social and military fronts have continuously featured in the group’s operations since 1993, its establishment of a political wing more recently – embracing democracy and participating in Indonesian political parties – signals the group is possibly learning from other militant outfits such as the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and Hezbollah in Lebanon. In the near term, the decapitation of JI’s military and political wings, due to a series of arrests in recent years, means its resilience and adaptability will mainly depend on its social front. Multiple factors, such as the presence of rogue elements within JI capable of conducting attacks amidst the group’s present leadership vacuum, the policies of the next JI leader and the prospect of “black swan” events, will determine if JI will revive its aspirations for a military arm as mandated by its organisational guidelines.
On 12 October 2002, JI operatives detonated three bombs in the tourist district of Kuta, Bali, an attack that resulted in 202 casualties. It remains the worst terrorist attack recorded in Indonesia. JI is also the only militant group in Indonesia which has proven capable of successfully orchestrating a deadly attack on such a scale. Subsequent to the Bali attacks, JI, established initially in 1993 in Malaysia by Abdullah Sungkar, continued to be involved in several suicide bombings in Indonesia. These included the 2003 Jakarta J.W. Marriott hotel bombing, the 2004 Jakarta Australian Embassy bombing, the 2005 Bali bombings, and the 2009 J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton bombings – the last JI attack on record. In Poso, Central Sulawesi, JI also bombed the Tentena Market in 2005 and conducted a series of other attacks in the regency.
JI in Indonesia suffered its first wave of arrests following the 2002 Bali bombings, as police hunted down the perpetrators and the group’s leadership. These clampdowns would destabilise the group and force JI to change leaders several times in the span of a few years. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir led JI from 1999 to 2002, after the death of JI’s founder and first leader Abdullah Sungkar. Subsequent JI leaders included Abu Rusydan (2002-2003), Adung (2003-2004) and Zarkasih (2004-2007). JI’s base in Poso, from which its central leadership had mobilised significant resources including manpower, was eventually shattered in a series of crackdowns in Tanah Runtuh, JI’s stronghold in the area. In 2009, Para Wijayanto was appointed amir (leader), and he set about rebuilding and revitalising the organisation, which is currently estimated to have around 7,000 members. Para remains the longest-serving JI leader to date, having helmed the group until his arrest in mid-2019.
Under Para Wijayanto’s leadership, JI has refocused its agenda within Indonesia and halted the violence that brought it on the radar of anti-terror forces. In this respect, JI has returned to its khittah (guideline) as envisioned in its organisational handbook, Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah (PUPJI). The document states that jihad musallah (armed jihad) should be waged in Indonesia only when the group is militarily ready and has garnered sufficient community support. Although JI did not plan or conduct an attack in Indonesia during Para’s tenure, it suffered a second wave of arrests. This was partially attributed to a stronger counter-terrorism law enacted in 2018, which included a broadened definition of terrorist offences and increased powers of surveillance accorded to law enforcement agencies. A total of 876 JI members have been arrested since the 2002 Bali bombings, 339 of whom were arrested in 2021 alone.
At present, JI, whose ultimate goal is to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia by waging armed jihad, still poses a security threat. This article will assess the evolution of JI in terms of its continuity, transformation and possible trajectories, as it morphs into a hybrid political-militant organisation that stands on three pillars – its social, political and military fronts.
Continuity: The Military Wing
JI is the only militant group in Indonesia to consistently conduct i’dad (preparation to wage armed jihad) toward a long-term goal. Mirroring JI’s centralised hierarchical structure, the group’s founding fathers saw the importance of running a centralised training programme (Diklat) for its cadres, to the extent that PUPJI has a dedicated chapter on Diklat and its importance in the personal training of a JI cadre. JI has also invested significant resources into centralised training over the decades.
The first centralised training camp was organised between 1996 and 2000 in Mindanao, Southern Philippines. In Indonesia, JI’s centralised i’dad took place in Buru and Ceram in the Maluku Islands from 1999 to 2001, and in Poso, Central Sulawesi, from 2000 to 2008. JI revived its centralised training initiative during Para Wijayanto’s leadership via a centralised training camp termed as Sasana. From 2012 to 2018, 96 selected JI cadres underwent centralised training in Sasana for a period of six months to one year – there was a total of 12 training sites in Central Java over the years – prior to their deployment to Syria. This centralised training scheme was then moved to Syria, where members underwent military training with various rebel groups there. The longest such stint was with the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al Nusra (The Nusra Front). These training collaborations typically lasted between one month and two years. During Para Wijayanto’s term, this centralised training would complement the basic military training for members held locally by JI’s Education and Cadre Recruitment Academy (ADIRA). Adhering to PUPJI, JI’s training module in Sasana also included leadership training.
Special Military Unit
For more than a decade, JI has remained committed to forming a special military unit comprised of its most militarily skilled members who underwent overseas military training. In 1998, JI formed a Laskar/Tim Khos (Special Team) unit that was mandated to wage jihad in Indonesia if needed. Laskar Khos deployed members to and sourced logistics (including weaponry and explosives) for militants in Maluku from 1999 to 2002, when a bloody sectarian conflict occurred. The team also bought bulks of explosive materials in the form of potassium chlorate, which was subsequently used in the series of JI bombings during the 2000s. In addition, another unit Laskar Istimata involved members who were specifically trained to carry out suicide attacks.
During Para Wijayanto’s leadership, a special military unit called Laskar Ightiyalat (Secret Assassination Team) was also created. It comprised the alumni of the Syrian training camp and battlefield. It is estimated that 55 JI members underwent military training in Syria, some of whom have since been arrested. Unlike the Laskar Khos and Laskar Istimata units, which were involved in mass casualty attacks, Laskar Ightiyalat’s missions would be more targeted. As of today, Laskar Ightiyalat has not conducted any attack, adhering to Para Wijayanto’s instruction to refrain from carrying out an attack in Indonesia for the time being. As the elite forces of JI, members of both Laskar Khos and Laskar Ightiyalat were also mandated to train other JI members.
In the face of repeated leadership losses, JI has suffered various splinterings over the years, with hardline elements within the group more inclined to violence. Under the specific helms of Abdullah Sungkar and Para Wijayanto, JI was relatively stable, as their leadership had strong command over the rank and file. Yet even under such strong leaders, evidence of splintering within the group was apparent. Before Abdullah Sungkar died at the end of 1999, for example, hardline JI elements were already preparing for armed jihad in Ambon city. They had organised military training in Maluku and sourced dozens of weapons and explosive materials for jihad in the area. Laskar Khos was also created in 1998 when Sungkar was still alive. After JI’s leadership was transferred to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir – who was perceived as a weak leader – in 2000, Laskar Khos, under the instruction of Hambali as the head of JI’s Mantiqi (territorial command) I, conducted a series of bombings in Indonesia and also planned some attacks in Singapore. JI members belonging to Mantiqi I (such as Malaysians Noordin M. Top and Azahari Husin) continued to perpetrate suicide bombings in Jakarta and Bali after the 2002 Bali bombings by recruiting both members of JI and those of other militant groups, acts that were disapproved of by JI’s leadership and administrators.
Under Para Wijayanto’s leadership, the impetus for splinters in the group was provided in the first instance by Usman bin Sef, alias Fahim, who had previously been arrested in 2004 for hiding Noordin and Azahari, and completed his prison sentence in 2009. Para allowed Fahim to partially circumvent JI’s rigorous and lengthy recruitment process and create his own group called Jamaah Iqomatuddin. Nevertheless, in order to be formally acknowledged by JI, Fahim’s group members still had to be qualified according to JI’s standards and participate in the last stage of JI’s recruitment process to ensure their loyalty to JI. Jamaah Iqomatuddin also had a small military wing headed by the graduates of JI’s training programme. Members of Jamaah Iqomatuddin were equipped with firearms to protect themselves and for preparation toward armed jihad. Despite the autonomy by Para, Fahim’s group did not plan an attack. When eventually Fahim and his group members were arrested in 2021, almost two years after Para’s arrest, they had already made a bunker to store weapons and explosives, and prepared a route for escape in the event that they conducted a terror attack.
Another splinter faction operating during Para’s leadership was the Banten faction led by Imarudin. In 2016, this faction had already created a sub-group due to dissatisfaction with the JI leadership. It also had close ties with Imam Samudra, a former member of Mantiqi I and the Bali bomber who worked under Hambali. After the arrest of Para Wijayanto in mid-2019, the group planned a series of attacks in Serang (Banten), Tasikmalaya (West Java) and Surabaya (East Java).
The main cause of splintering involving hardline factions within JI owes to their desire to plan attacks immediately, rather than adhere to the group’s ‘jihad later’ strategy. Whilst the pattern of splinterings in the past two decades has mainly been instigated by personnel of Mantiqi I and their close associates, the emergence of a splinter group from another military element (i.e. Laskar Ightiyalat) is a possibility going forward. In the absence of strong leadership, JI remains prone to splinterings of its hardline faction, a contingency that the JI founding fathers had not anticipated in the group’s constitution, PUPJI.
Transformation: The Political Path
Over the past decade, JI has attempted to transform into a full hybrid militant organisation that comprises social, political and military wings. Whilst JI had incorporated both social (i.e. education and dakwah) and military wings since its establishment, it was only under Para’s leadership that JI began showing interest in gaining political clout within society, as part of its long-term strategy to establish an Islamic state. In 2016, the group’s Tamkin Siyasi (political consolidation) strategy was introduced as part of its bid to win the hearts and minds of Indonesian Muslims. This strategy mainly involves JI’s attempts to infiltrate mainstream religious organisations, government institutions and national politics as a new tactic to achieve its ideological goals.
Dalliance with Democracy
In the past two decades, JI’s stance toward participation in democracy has gradually evolved. Despite still regarding democratic elections as a manmade system in violation of Islam, under Para’s leadership, JI personnel have participated in various political protests and campaigned for issues typically of concern to domestic and global Islamist interests. Members have also met with several parliamentary leaders. The latter development is in line with the statement of JI’s senior Dewan Syuro (Advisory Board) member Abu Rusydan, who said in 2015 that the mujahidin should forge connections with the national and regional parliaments, despite the latter being perceived as not adhering to Sharia (Islamic law).
Mass protests such as the “212 Movement” rallies against the then Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, who was subsequently arrested and prosecuted, was also a game-changer for JI, given that it consolidated the growing political influence of the country’s religious hardliners. In the lead-up to the 2019 General Election, JI began encouraging its members to vote in the election, with the aim that Indonesia would eventually be led by a new president and parliament members who would look after “Muslims’ interests”. Previously, JI forbade its members to vote in general elections.
After the 2019 General Election, however, JI – similar to other Islamists in the country – was likely disappointed that the major opposition parties eventually joined the Jokowi administration, given that some perceive the current government as anti-Islamic. In addition, following the arrest of Para Wijayanto, Farid Ahmad Okbah (another member of JI’s Dewan Syuro and a personal advisor to JI’s amir), advised JI’s caretaker leader Arif Siswanto to create a new association for JI members as a “solution for their security”, in a bid to prevent them from being arrested.
These developments may explain the move by Farid to establish and gain a leadership position in a new Islamist political party – so JI could indirectly control and direct the path of the party. Farid was involved in the establishment of the Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia) Party in November 2020, and served in the party’s Consultative Council. Nonetheless, he failed to secure a leadership position in the party.
He then established Indonesia’s People Dakwah Party (Partai Dakwah Rakyat Indonesia, or PDRI) in May 2021 – along with several other Islamist figures who left Masyumi – and chaired the party. Besides PDRI, another JI member was also an administrator of the newly inaugurated Partai Ummat (Ummah Party)’s Bengkulu Provincial branch. Farid was arrested by the Indonesian authorities in November 2021 on charges of raising funds for JI.
These attempts to exert influence over a political party by securing a leadership position (in relation to the Masyumi party) or establishing a party itself (PDRI), marked the beginning of JI’s transformation into a hybrid militant-political force. Nonetheless, unlike the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah, both of which have managed to gain a significant number of parliamentary seats and some level of authority in Egypt and Lebanon respectively, JI’s political arm remains in its infancy. In addition, whilst it is too early to assess if Farid’s arrest marks a premature end to JI’s attempt to establish a political party, PDRI itself will face a significant barrier to contest in the 2024 General Election, since election laws require a new party to establish branches in all 34 provinces and 75 percent of all districts and municipalities in the country.
Infiltration of State Institutions and Mainstream Religious Groups
Under Para’s leadership, JI also began to embed itself within mainstream socio-religious groups and state institutions, following the path of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah and Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh, although seemingly on a lesser scale. This is a long-term strategy that aims to change the Indonesian democratic system into a Sharia-based one, and to influence the policies of the respective government agencies. JI has also been preparing for a potential future military operation, and has assigned returning militarily skilled cadres from Syria to work in several strategic government institutions that shape the country’s decision-making, such as the Ministry of Defence and the Supreme Court.
At least 19 civil servants, eight police officers and five military officials with links to JI were arrested between 2010 and May 2022. JI’s plan or efforts to infiltrate state institutions could mean it has partially departed from its rigorous recruitment process, which bans an individual whose family has ties to the police or military from becoming a member. Moreover, it indicates that JI has stepped up recruitment in top universities in the country, whose graduates are expected to fill strategic positions within key government agencies. Yet, while the actual number of JI personnel who have infiltrated state institutions is unknown because of the principle of tandzim sirri (being secretive or hiding their identity) exercised by JI members, the extent of JI’s penetration into some state institutions is likely still insignificant compared to the now-disbanded Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).
Additionally, JI appears to have infiltrated the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesia Ulema Council, or MUI), a strategic and influential semi-state agency that issues fatwa (religious edict), halal certifications and other legislation related to Islamic affairs at both the central and local levels. In this attempt, JI has targeted the most strategic position within the agency, the Fatwa Commission, which issues fatwa that will likely be followed by Indonesian Muslims. Ahmad Zain An-Najah, another member of JI’s Advisory Board, has served as a member of the MUI Fatwa Commission, while in Bengkulu’s MUI chapter, JI member CA (initials) assumed the position as head of the MUI Fatwa Commission. His deputy in MUI Bengkulu, named RH (initials), is another JI member as well as a member of the Partai Ummat.
It has ostensibly been easier for JI – whose traditional source of recruitment is from its pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) – to infiltrate the government’s religious institutions, rather than the non-religious ones. While still small in numbers, the arrest of three JI clerics – Ahmad Zain, Anung Al-Hamat and Farid, the latter of whom is also a politician – in November 2021 illustrates that JI has already made some headway in infiltrating mainstream Muslim groups in the country.
The Social Path
Moving forward, it will remain a challenge for the Indonesian government to dismantle JI’s social front (i.e. education and dakwah), which has been the main contributing factor in JI’s resiliency through the decades. JI’s social wing remains functional despite the decapitation of JI’s central leadership and military wing. The group’s main source of recruitment – its 68 affiliated pesantren – is presently thriving and expanding. Some of JI’s pesantren today have better infrastructure and higher student intakes than when they were first established decades ago. JI’s educational platform also now offers childcare services, whereas in the past it mostly offered only secondary school-level education and higher. Graduates of JI’s pesantren who become preachers also enjoy high social standing in Indonesia.
It should also be noted that the prospect of a future “activation” of JI’s pesantren resources to buffer the group’s military front will partly depend on multiple factors, such as the direction set by JI’s new amir and a possible “black swan” event. Preparations for such a scenario in the last decade were evident when JI selected its best pesantren graduates to be sent to Syria for military training and combat. JI’s pesantrens and dakwah activities have served the group’s long-term goal of securing community support and sympathy for the JI cause. Nonetheless, shutting down a JI pesantren, in a similar vein to the Malaysian government’s move in 2001 against JI’s Lukmanul Hakiem Pesantren in Ulu Tiram, Johor Bahru, is politically unviable in the current Indonesian context.
Over the last two decades, it was JI’s military wing that has differentiated the group from other Islamist organisations in the country, and defined JI as a terrorist organisation capable of wreaking havoc in the region. In this regard, the role of the post-Para Wijayanto leadership and its impact on JI splinters are factors which will bear on the threat posed by JI in the near future.
A key question relates to whether the next JI leader will revive the group’s military wing, given the importance of militant jihad in PUPJI. Related to this is whether hardline factions within JI could go “rogue” and resort to violence in Indonesia. Such concerns stem primarily from the vulnerability that has historically plagued the group in the absence of an amir (as is the case currently) or during the tenure of a less effective leader, a situation the group faced in 2002-2008. At present, it is unclear when the new JI amir will be selected. The series of arrests faced by the group in recent years has delayed the appointment of a new JI amir because Lajnah Ihtiari Lisnabil Amir (LILA) – a JI committee comprising the group’s senior figures that should have selected a new leader upon Para’s arrest – has also been dismantled.
Similarly, it remains to be seen if the new amir will persist with JI’s venture into national and regional politics or if the latter will be a short-lived. JI’s experiment following Farid’s arrest, is difficult to assess due to JI’s practice of tandzim sirri. potential scenario wherein the new JI amir decides to completely abandon its military project, especially in the absence of a black swan event, cannot be discounted at this stage. This means that JI would no longer be a group with a military front as envisioned in its PUPJI. If this is the case, JI may not constitute a direct security threat to Indonesia, although it will still pose social and political risks. Even without a military arm, JI’s structured indoctrination and ideology of exclusivity, intolerance and hatred can gradually damage the fabric of Indonesian society.
Two decades on from the deadly Bali attacks, JI has not only survived, but to some extent also thrived in Indonesia. The group has managed to retain its military front by providing centralised training for members in Indonesia and abroad. It has also maintained a special military unit that could be operationally deployed if required. In the absence of strong leadership, the splintering of JI and the potential for some factions to adopt violence again in the future will be key security threats faced by the Indonesian authorities. This is especially given JI’s status as the Islamist militant group with arguably the greatest military capability in the country. If unchallenged, this latter strength may only be supplemented over the long term by JI’s continued focus on dakwah and recent forays into national politics and Islamist organisations.
About The Author:
V.Arianti is Regional Research Coordinator (Indonesia) at Centinel, a public safety and management consultancy firm headquartered in Singapore. She was formerly Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.
 JI’s attacks prior to the 2002 Bali bombings included the Philippine Ambassador’s Residence bombing in Jakarta, the Christmas Eve bombings in multiple Indonesian cities and the Manila bombings in 2000, and the Atrium Mall bombing in Jakarta in 2001. JI had also planned to conduct a series of attacks in Singapore in 2001. See “Philippines Forces Kill Terror Suspect,” The Washington Post, October 13, 2003, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/10/13/philippine-forces-kill-terror-suspect/881eb407-ad67-4fdd-85a2-7bdb9d81a571/; Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore, The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and The Threat of Terrorism: White Paper (Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs, 2003), https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/printheritage/detail/2125a7b0-9a25-47ca-bf7f-a74a41a4261b.aspx.
 A pro-Islamic State (IS) cell in East Java conducted family suicide bombings in Surabaya in May 2018, which were the fourth deadliest terrorist attacks in Indonesia after JI’s 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings, as well as the Tentena Market bombing in Poso, Central Sulawesi, in 2005. See “Surabaya Church Attacks: One Family Responsible, Says Police,” BBC News, May 13, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44100278.
 After the 2002 attacks, the subsequent suicide bombings in Jakarta and Bali were perpetrated by a JI faction led by the Malaysian duo, Noordin M. Top and bomb-maker Dr Azahari Husin (with the exception of the 2009 hotel bombings in Jakarta as Azahari had been killed during a police raid in 2005).
 The Poso operation was sanctioned by JI’s central leadership. Attacks in Poso included the beheading of a village chief in 2004 and three Christian schoolgirls in 2005. See Muhammad Tito Karnavian, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies: The Case of al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah and Radicalisation of the Poso Conflict 2000-2007 (Singapore: World Scientific, 2014).
 JI in Singapore was neutered earlier in December 2001. JI in Malaysia, including its school Lukmanul Hakim in Johor, was also clamped down on in 2001. In the Philippines, JI’s Hudaibiyah military training camp was dismantled in 2000. See “Some still Roam Free,” Tempo, iv/6 (14-20 October 2003) [Bali Bombing: One Year On]; Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore, The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and The Threat of Terrorism.
 Karnavian, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies.
 “Densus 88 Klaim Jamaah Islamiyah Mulai Melemah,” VoA Indonesia, October 13, 2021, https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/densus-88-klaim-jamaah-islamiyah-mulai-melemah/6268531.html.
 V. Arianti, “Jemaah Islamiyah’s Hierarchical Structure: Security Implications for Indonesia,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Vol. 13, No. 3 (June 2021), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CTTA-Jun-2021.pdf.
 PUPJI stands for Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah (General Guideline of JI Struggle). Formulated by JI’s senior leadership and issued in May 1996, PUPJI contains the group’s religious manifesto, strategic programmes and operational manuals (including manuals on conducting military operations and decision-making processes). See Elena Pavlova, “From Counter-Society to Counter-State: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI,” (working paper, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore, November 2006), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/27881/WP117.pdf.
 Sylvia Laksmi, “Revisiting Indonesian Counterterrorism Strategies: Success and Challenges,” Asialink, November 5, 2021, https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/insights/revisiting-indonesian-counterterrorism-strategies-success-and-challenges.
 According to the police, this figure spans the period from the October 2002 Bali bombings to October 2021, and continues to grow. See Ronna Nirmala, “Indonesia: Jemaah Militants Now Infiltrating Political Parties,” Benar News, February 18, 2022, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/indonesia-says-jemaah-militants-now-infiltrating-political-parties-02182022133202.html.
 As stated in PUPJI, JI is a jama’ah (the word literally translates to congregation, but in this context, it means a group) that aims to establish a daulah (state) and eventually a caliphate. See Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah (PUPJI), Majlis Qiyadah Markaziyah Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah (Headquarter of Central Leadership of JI, May 30, 1996).
 A hybrid terrorist organisation consists of three pillars – social, political and military wings. See Eitan Azani, “The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. 36, No. 11 (2013), pp. 899-916, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2013.832113.
 Around 197 JI personnel (at the time under the Darul Islam banner) underwent centralised ideological and military training in Camp Saddah along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border from 1985 to 1995. See PUPJI; Karnavian, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies.
 For instance, between 2012-2018, JI allocated up to Rp 120-150 million (around USD 7,700-10,500) annually for members’ centralised training prior to their deployment to Syria. Additionally, there was a cost to sending JI’s cadres to Syria and bringing them back to Indonesia, which amounted to Rp 400 million (around USD 28,000). See Verdict of Sujadi Abdurrahman, East Jakarta District Court, 2020, No. 307/Pid.Sus/2020/PN Jkt. Tim. Sujadi was the treasurer of JI.
 JI’s Afghanistan alumni then transferred their military skills to 111 JI members at JI’s own camp, Camp Hudaibiyah, located in the larger Camp Abu Bakar that belonged to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The project was largely stalled when the Philippines army attacked Camp Abu Bakar in 2000. Even when JI in Indonesia suffered its first series of crackdowns from 2002 to 2005, JI’s leadership continued to send JI cadres to Mindanao for training until 2007. Later, under Para Wijayanto’s leadership, JI continued to send stipends to the remaining cadres still training in Mindanao. See Karnavian, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies; “Abu Dujana: Zarkasih Bukan Amir JI,” Kompas, February 4, 2008, https://money.kompas.com/read/2008/02/04/15435393/index-html; Verdict of Para Wijayanto, East Jakarta District Court, 2020, No. 308/Pid.Sus/2020/PN Jkt. Tim.
 JI closed the training camp after the conflict subsided and the government restored security in the islands. There were bloody sectarian conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Ambon, the capital city of the Maluku Islands at the end of the 1990s. It was estimated that around 200 people, comprising Maluku residents and Muslims from outside Maluku, were trained by JI’s Afghanistan and Mindanao alumni. See Karnavian, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies.
 Communal conflicts between Muslims and Christians also occurred in Poso from 1998 to 2002. JI conducted paramilitary training for the local Poso residents. JI’s commitment to i’dad was reflected in the work of Mantiqi (JI’s territorial command) III back then, which covered East Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Sabah and Mindanao, and was known as the “training” division. See Karnavian, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies; International Crisis Group, “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” Asia Report No. 63 (August 26, 2003), https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/jemaah-islamiyah-south-east-asia-damaged-still-dangerous.
 Sasana literally means a venue for the boxing sport.
 V. Arianti and Nodirbek Soliev, “The Pro-Al Qaeda Indonesian Connection with HTS in Syria: Security Implications,” Middle East Institute, August 10, 2021, https://www.mei.edu/publications/pro-al-qaeda-indonesian-connection-hts-syria-security-implications; Verdict of Azi Maula Firdaus, East Jakarta District Court, 2020, No. 61/Pid/Sus/2020/PN Jkt. Tim. Azi Maula Firdaus is a JI member who received military training in Syria in 2013.
 V. Arianti and Nodirbek Soliev, “The Pro-Al Qaeda Indonesian Connection.”
 Institute for the Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Impact of the Taliban Victory on Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiyah,” IPAC Report No. 73 (2021), http://cdn.understandingconflict.org/file/2021/09/IPAC_Report_73_JI.pdf.
 PUPJI; Verdict of Para Wijayanto; Verdict of Joko Priyono alias Karso, East Jakarta District Court, 2020, No. 47/Pid.Sus/2020/PN Jkt. Tim. Joko Priyono, alias Karso, is a veteran JI administrator in charge of Sasana.
 Led by Zulkarnaen, the team surveilled several shopping malls in Jakarta in terms of their construction, security and escape routes, and also observed the malls’ occupants and visitors.
 They were the Christmas Eve bombings, the Philippines Ambassador Residence bombing and the Atrium Mall bombing, and eventually the 2002 Bali bombings. See Verdict of Arif Sunarso alias Zulkarnaen, East Jakarta District Court, 2022, No. 759/Pid.Sus/2021/PN. Jkt. Tim.
 “The General of Suicide Bombers,” Tempo, iv/6 (14-20 October 2003) [Bali Bombing: One Year On].
 Arianti and Soliev, “The Pro-Al Qaeda Indonesian Connection.”
 These could include, for example, assassination plots targeting specific individuals. Such tactics, it was believed, would reduce the probability of mass casualties, as seen in some previous bomb attacks, which some JI administrators had criticised internally given they could erode community support for the group. See Verdict of Para Wijayanto.
 Verdict of Para Wijayanto; Verdict of Arif Sunarso alias Zulkarnaen.
 Solahudin, NII Sampai JI: Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia (Depok: Komunitas Bambu, 2011), pp. 246, 254.
 Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore, “The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and The Threat of Terrorism.”
 International Crisis Group, “Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Network,” Asia Report No. 114 (May 5, 2016), https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/terrorism-indonesia-noordin-s-networks.
 In 2009, after serving his sentence, Fahim met with Para Wijayanto. The latter asked Fahim to give sermons to JI members and to evaluate JI in order to save the group, as many of its members had been arrested. In 2012, Para assigned Fahim to head JI’s Forum Komunikasi Pondok Pesantren (FKPP) division, which oversaw the group’s pesantrens. Fahim was removed from this position in 2013 due to his “deviant” recruitment method, which was deemed “instant” according to JI’s standards. It was only in 2017 that Para summoned Fahim and questioned the latter’s method of recruitment. Fahim convinced Para that his recruitment method remained aligned with the JI way and assured that the quality and loyalty of the cadres he recruited were similar to other JI cadres inducted via the longer, traditional route. Para then gave what Fahim perceived as a “blanket” cheque to have his own jamaah and to receive pledges of allegiance. Members of Jamaah Iqomatuddin pledged allegiance to JI via Fahim. See Verdict of Usman bin Sef alias Fahim, West Jakarta District Court, 2021, No. 950/Pid.Sus/2021/PN. Jkt. Brt.
 A prospective JI member needs to undergo four stages of induction prior to formally being acknowledged as a member. The four stages are: participating in JI’s tabligh (public sermons on general Islamic topics); taklim (closed-door religious study sessions during which JI’s ideology is introduced); tarbiyah (more in-depth topics on JI ideology are covered, and prospective members’ commitment is also assessed); and tamhiz (selection, including a background check and an assessment of a candidate’s loyalty to JI, prior to becoming a member).
 Verdict of Usman bin Sef alias Fahim.
 “Densus 88: Kelompok Teroris JI Siapkan Serangan Baru,” Damailah Indonesiaku, March 18, 2021, https://damailahindonesiaku.com/densus-88-kelompok-teroris-ji-siapkan-rencana-serangan-baru.html.
 V. Arianti and Ulta Levenia, “Jemaah Islamiyah on the Brink of Splintering?” Indonesia at Melbourne, November 2, 2020, https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/jemaah-islamiyah-on-the-brink-of-splintering/.
 Ng Jun Sen, “The Big Read: Jemaah Islamiyah Emerges From the Shadow, Playing the Long Game,” Channel News Asia, December 13, 2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/jemaah-islamiyah-terrorist-group-indonesia-isd-20th-anniversary-al-qaeda-2373556.
 Pavlova, “From Counter-Society to Counter-State.”
 “In Tactical Shift, Jemaah Islamiyah Militants Infiltrate Mainstream Islamic Groups, Politics,” The Star, November 22, 2021, https://www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2021/11/22/in-tactical-shift-jemaah-islamiyah-militants-infiltrate-mainstream-islamic-groups-politics.
 Arianti, “Jemaah Islamiyah’s Hierarchical Structure.”
 Another key component in Tamkin Siyasi is the naqib programme, which aims to court community leaders (especially Islamic group leaders) so they will sympathise with JI’s cause. JI has a specific division that is in charge of this programme. See Verdict of Para Wijayanto.
 The meeting took place in 2015 to seek support for their “humanitarian” activities in Syria. See “Fadli Zon Buka Suara usai Dikaitkan dengan HASI Kelompok Teroris,” CNN Indonesia, March 16, 2022, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20220316135612-32-772054/fadli-zon-buka-suara-usai-dikaitkan-dengan-hasi-kelompok-teroris.
 V. Arianti and Unaesah Rahmah, “The Emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah’s Political Front,” TODAY, December 1, 2021, https://www.todayonline.com/commentary/emergence-jemaah-islamiyahs-political-front.
 The rallies brought about the defeat of the then incumbent Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, also known as Ahok – who was accused of blasphemy – in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election.
 Arianti and Rahmah, “The Emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah’s Political Front.”
 Institute for the Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Re-Emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah,” IPAC Report No. 36 (2017), http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/04/IPAC_Report_36.pdf.
 This is according to a police statement, which was rebutted by PDRI. Farid remains the chairman of PDRI, despite his status as a terrorist suspect, until his verdict is out. See Adhyasta Dirgantara, “Polri Sebut Farid Okbah Bentuk Partai Dakwah Sebagai Solusi Lindungi JI,” Detik News, November 16, 2021, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5814058/polri-sebut-farid-okbah-bentuk-partai-dakwah-sebagai-solusi-lindungi-ji; Budi Sam Law Malau, “PDRI Bantah Disusupi JI, Akan Laporkan Pemfitnah Baik dari Kalangan Polisi dan Warga Sipil,” Warta Kota, November 22, 2021, https://wartakota.tribunnews.com/2021/11/22/pdri-bantah-disusupi-ji-akan-laporkan-pemfitnah-baik-dari-kalangan-polisi-dan-warga-sipil?page=all; Imam Hamdi, “Partai Dakwah Tetap Pertahankan Farid Okbah Sebagai Ketua Umum,” Tempo, December 3, 2021, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1535257/partai-dakwah-tetap-pertahankan-farid-okbah-sebagai-ketua-umum.
 This new Masyumi Party (also known as Masyumi Reborn) claims itself as the successor of the Masyumi Party that managed to gain the second position in the 1955 General Election. The original Masyumi Party was banned by President Sukarno in 1959 and subsequently by President Suharto. Masyumi proposed Sharia as the foundation of the Indonesian state. See Alexander Raymond Arifianto, “Indonesia’s New Parties: Evolving Conservative Landscape?” RSIS Commentary No. 198 (2020), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/indonesias-new-parties-evolving-conservative-landscape/#.YpZGKi8Rrq0.
 Susunan Pengurus PPII Masyumi Terbentuk, Ustaz Farid Okbah Jadi Ketum,” Suara Islam, February 19, 2021, https://suaraislam.id/susunan-pengurus-ppii-masyumi-terbentuk-ustaz-farid-okbah-jadi-ketum/; “Ahmad Yani Terpilih Sebagai Ketua Umum Partai Masyumi,” CNN Indonesia, March 30, 2021, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20210330070535-32-623654/ahmad-yani-terpilih-sebagai-ketua-umum-partai-masyumi.
 Petrik Matanasi, “Pemilu 1955: Saling Tuduh Curang Antara PNI dan Masyumi,” Tirto.id, September 29, 2018, https://tirto.id/pemilu-1955-saling-tuduh-curang-antara-pni-dan-masyumi-c26j; Muhammad Ibrahim, “Profil Ustadz Farid Okbah yang Ditangkap Densus 88 Sempat Nasihati Jokowi Soal 5 Hal,” GalaJabar, November 18, 2021, https://galajabar.pikiran-rakyat.com/nasional/pr-1083041584/profil-ustadz-farid-okbah-yang-ditangkap-densus-88-sempat-nasihati-jokowi-soal-5-hal.
 Friski Riana,“Densus 88 Tangkap Farid Okbah Ketua Umum Partai Dakwah Rakyat Indonesia,” Tempo, November 16, 2021, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1529101/densus-88-tangkap-farid-okbah-ketua-umum-partai-dakwah-rakyat-indonesia/.
 Partai Ummat is a splinter of the National Mandate Party (PAN), a Muhammadiyah-based party. Founded in October 2020, Partai Ummat’s orientation is Islamist, compared to PAN which is more nationalist. Muhammadiyah is the second largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia. See Arifianto, “Indonesia’s New Parties: Evolving Conservative Landscape?”; Dita Angga Rusiana, “Partai Ummat dan PAN Bakal Berebut Suara Muhammadiyah,” Sindo News, August 29, 2021, https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/525212/12/partai-ummat-dan-pan-bakal-berebut-suara-muhammadiyah-1630195728.
 “Kian Panjang Daftar Agen Jamaah Islamiyah yang Susupi Lembaga Publik,” Detik News, February 15, 2022, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5943090/kian-panjang-daftar-agen-jamaah-islamiyah-yang-susupi-lembaga-publik.
 Ahmad Nuril Fahmi, “Polri: Farid Ahmad Okbah Dkk Diguna Danai Danai Teroris,” Times Indonesia, November 20, 2021, https://www.timesindonesia.co.id/read/news/382757/polri-farid-ahmad-okbah-dkk-diduga-danai-teroris.
 In 2012, a Muslim Brotherhood-led coalition secured 47% of Egypt’s parliamentary seats. In the same year, Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi won the Egyptian presidential election, but was later overthrown in 2014. Meanwhile, a Hezbollah-led coalition formed a majority in the Lebanese parliament in 2018-2022. See, for instance, David D. Kirkpatrick, “Islamists Win 70% of Seats in the Egyptian Parliament,” The New York Times, January 21, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/world/middleeast/muslim-brotherhood-wins-47-of-egypt-assembly-seats.html; “Hezbollah and Its Allies Lose Their Majority in Lebanon’s Parliament,” NPR, May 17, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/05/17/1099451406/hezbollah-loses-majority-in-lebanon-parliament.
 Arianti and Rahmah, “The Emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah’s Political Front.”
 Mounir Rabih, “How Hezbollah Infiltrated the Lebanese State – Part I of II,” L’Orient Today, June 28, 2021, https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1266603/how-hezbollah-infiltrated-the-lebanese-state.html/; “Egypt Passes Law Expanding Right to Sack Civil Servants with Suspected Links to Muslim Brotherhood,” Haaretz, July 12, 2021, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/egypt/2021-07-12/ty-article/egypt-passes-law-allowing-government-to-purify-itself-from-muslim-brotherhood/0000017f-dc44-d856-a37f-fdc4c6c30000; Iftekharul Bashar, “The Challenge of Radicalisation: Hizb ut-Tahrir in Bangladesh,” RSIS Commentary No. 23 (2012), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/1685-the-challenge-of-radicalisatio/#.Yp7h_i8RpmA.
 Verdict of Joko Priyono alias Karso; Detik News, “Kian Panjang Daftar Agen Jamaah Islamiyah yang Susupi Lembaga Publik.”
 The figures relate to the period between 2010 and November 2021. Another civil servant in Tangerang Regency, a suburb of Jakarta, was arrested in March 2022. See Nivell Rayda, “Jemaah Islamiyah Infiltrating Indonesian Religious, Civic Institutions: Senior Counterterror Official,” Channel News Asia, November 23, 2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/jemaah-islamiyah-infiltrating-indonesian-institutions-terror-group-2332941.
 Verdict of Sujadi Abdurrahman.
 Institute for the Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Re-Emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah.”
 Ihsanuddin, “Menpan-RB Akan Beri Sanksi PNS Anggota HTI,” Kompas, July 24, 2017, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/07/24/14003071/menpan-rb-akan-beri-sanksi-pns-anggota-hti; Fabian Januarius Kuwado, “Mendagri Minta PNS yang Kader HTI Mundur dari Jabatannya”, Kompas, July 24, 2017, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/07/24/11415241/mendagri-minta-pns-yang-kader-hti-mundur-dari-jabatannya.
 Alexander R. Arifianto, “Indonesia Ulema Council Edges Closer to the Centre of Power,” East Asia Forum, December 8, 2020, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/12/08/indonesian-ulema-council-edges-closer-to-the-centre-of-power/.
 Bayu Nugraha, “5 Hal Seputar Ahmad Zain An Najah Anggota MUI yang Ditangkap Densus,” Viva News, November 18, 2021, https://www.viva.co.id/berita/nasional/1424300-5-hal-seputar-ahmad-zain-an-najah-anggota-mui-yang-ditangkap-densus.
 Detik News, “Kian Panjang Daftar Agen Jamaah Islamiyah yang Susupi Lembaga Publik.”
 See, for instance, “Dituding Radikal oleh BNPT, Ponpes Darusy Syahadah Terus Berkembang dan Santrinya Ribuan Orang,” Panjimas, February 5, 2016, https://www.panjimas.com/news/2016/02/05/dituding-radikal-oleh-bnpt-ponpes-darusy-syahadah-terus-berkembang-dan-santrinya-ribuan-orangponpes-darusy-syahadah-sangat-diterima-masyarakat/.
 Noor Huda Ismail. “Al Jamaah Al Islamiyah Dahulu, Kini dan Dimasa Mendatang,” Diskusi Publik Daring, Kajian Terorisme SKSG UI Official, YouTube video, October 12, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1NkqLHyY04E.
 Noor Huda Ismail, “Navigating Pro-JI Pesantrens,” RSIS Commentary No. 40 (2022), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/navigating-pro-ji-pesantrens/#.Yp76eS8RpmA.
 Examples of past “black swan” events were the Ambon and Poso religious communal conflicts between Muslims and Christians in the late 1990s and early 2000s; the 212 rallies (domestic event); and the Syrian war (international event).
 International Crisis Group, “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous.”
 The National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) apologised to MUI for stating that there are 198 pesantren affiliated to terrorist networks (68 of which are affiliated to JI). Such a statement was perceived as Islamophobic and was deemed to have tarnished the reputation of pesantren – a respected educational institution that has been around for centuries since the early days of the spread of Islam in Indonesia. The government could arrest the leader of a JI-linked pesantren, but dissolving a pesantren is another issue altogether. See Marselinus Gual, “BNPT Ungkap Ponpes dan Rumah Singgah yang Terafiliasi dengan Jaringan Teroris,” Alinea.id, January 25, 2022, https://www.alinea.id/nasional/bnpt-ungkap-ponpes-dan-rumah-singgah-yang-terafiliasi-jaringan-teroris-b2fd29APy; “BNPT Minta Maaf: MUI Singgung Kebijakan Terkesan Islamofobia,” CNN Indonesia, February 4, 2022, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20220204102643-20-754935/bnpt-minta-maaf-mui-singgung-kebijakan-terkesan-islamofobia; Noor Huda Ismail, “Navigating Pro-JI Pesantrens.”
 LILA was led by Arif Siswanto (arrested in 2020). Another member of LILA who was arrested was Abu Rusydan (arrested in 2021). See Rakhmad Hidayatulloh Permana, “Ditangkap Densus, Ini Jejak Terduga Teroris Abu Rusydan Dewan Syuro JI,” Detik News, September 12, 2021, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5720295/ditangkap-densus-ini-jejak-terduga-teroris-abu-rusydan-dewan-syuro-ji; “Ini Peranan Pentolan Kelompok Teroris JI Abu Rusydan Mantan Napiter yang Sembunyikan Pelaku Bom Natal”, Radar Tegal, September 15, 2021, https://radartegal.disway.id/read/553469/ini-peranan-pentolan-kelompok-teroris-ji-abu-rusydan-mantan-napiter-yang-sembunyikan-pelaku-bom-natal.