In 2022, Indonesia recorded one terror attack, a decline from the previous year when six attacks were recorded. The number of plots also declined, with five plots recorded in 2022, compared to eight in 2021. While the recorded attacks and plots decreased significantly, terrorist groups in Indonesia remained active in conducting i’dad, or preparation for waging jihad, as evinced by the confiscation of significant caches of sharp weapons, firearms and explosive materials by the police. The pro-IS Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) and Al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) networks remain the key security threats, while the arrest of militants linked to Darul Islam (DI), a decades-old organisation, points to the possible resurgence of dormant extremist networks.
Pro-Islamic State Groups
Pro-Islamic State (IS) networks affiliated with Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), or Anshar Daulah, remained significantly weakened in 2022. Effective counter terrorism (CT) policing in recent years has largely decimated various pro-IS networks operationally, while repeated clampdowns on social media platforms and encrypted messaging applications have left their online presence at arguably its lowest ebb. This follows a general trend across Southeast Asia, where terrorist groups have been in a phase of decline in terms of their activities following the onset of COVID-19, which placed significant limits on travel and mass gatherings and weakened extremist funding bases.
Some JAD-linked cells retain a limited capacity to conduct attacks against civilian and government targets, although the successful capture or killing of key leaders and facilitators has largely crippled the group’s ability to effectively coordinate attacks. In this respect, while pro-IS groups largely operate as loose networks of autonomous cells, and without a rigid hierarchical structure, pulling off a successful attack still relies to some extent on the presence of a strong network and leadership for planning, funding and weaponry.
Indeed, despite the mass arrests and repeated clampdowns online, some pro-IS individuals remain committed to recruitment and the dissemination of IS ideology, evidenced by the continued creation of numerous IS-linked accounts on social media and encrypted messaging applications. Some postings also seemingly sought to encourage supporters to target high-profile individuals. In July 2022, a pro-IS supporter shared postings on social media depicting Indonesian President Jokowi Widodo, digitally altered to seem like he had been beheaded by an IS soldier.
In 2022, there was one successful attack and five attack plots involving JAD members in Bandung (West Java), Riau, Bantul (Yogyakarta), Bima (West Nusa Tenggara) and Malang (East Java). A pro-IS independent cell named Halaqah Singa Timur, led by one Abu Jafar, was also dismantled by Detachment 88 (D88) in September 2022. The cell had apparently planned to organise an attack; no further details were provided. One of its members had also forged ties with JAD’s branch in Riau to source a location for i’dad, or physical training, in preparation for conducting amaliyah (operations) in Dumai, Riau.
Many JAD networks still regard i’dad as essential to their cause, although the rationale has evolved over time. While i’dad is viewed as imperative for attack preparation, the “rationale has been broadened to include preparation for the final battle at the end-of-time and defence of the nucleus of an Islamic State that supporters hope to establish in Indonesia”. In 2022, JAD’s network in Yogyakarta conducted regular physical training in three known locations – Mount Merbabu, Mount Andong and Gunung Kidul Beach in Central Java – in addition to engaging in bomb-making activities. Additionally, three JAD militants were arrested (two of them being recidivists) in Penatoi, Bima, for giving sermons on jihad and tawhid in religious discussion sessions.
The future of another pro-IS group in Indonesia, the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (East Indonesia Mujahideen, or MIT), however, is less certain. The last remaining member of the group, who was responsible for the killing of a Christian farmer in May 2021, was killed in September 2022 by a joint task force involving the police and the military. However, despite assessments of the group’s demise, community support for MIT in Poso, Sulawesi, where its operations have long been concentrated, remains high. In May 2022, D88 arrested 26 suspects, mostly from Poso, who had planned to join MIT.
The concerted security raids since mid-2019, which resulted in the arrest and elimination of key JI operatives and bomb-makers, have crippled the group’s overall effectiveness. While security agencies did not detect a JI-linked terror plot in 2022, the group remains a threat given its well-organised and strategic nature. In the past two years, and amid the pandemic-related restrictions on their fund-raising and recruitment activities, some members have increasingly turned to extremist-linked charities and other donation channels to fund their operations.
In July 2022, a JI member, who had been a prominent fund-raiser for the group in West Sumatra, was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. Along with other JI members, he had set up a foundation, “Yayasan Muslim Bersaudara Sejati”, which generated Rp 260 million (US$17,326) in 2017. During a 2018 charity event to increase awareness of the plight of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, he also raised around Rp 20 million (US$1,332). Both sets of proceeds were then sent to the JI-linked One Care foundation, under the guise of providing humanitarian aid in Syria and to the Rohingya community.
Some of the money was also used to incentivise JI members to fund the tuition fees of students and JI’s dakwah (outreach) programme as well as to provide economic assistance to local communities. Another JI leader in Aceh, arrested in August 2022, was discovered to have been the head of JI’s Pesantren Communication Forum (Forum Komunikasi Pondok Pesantren, or FKKP) since 2010. FKKP plays a crucial role in maintaining JI’s networks and recruitment apparatus as well as funding sources.
Overall, JI has proved resilient and adaptive, including in the provision of social, financial and educational support for members and their families, which ensures the latter remain loyal to the network. Some JI members arrested in 2022 were also revealed to be part of the group’s tholiah (intelligence) department, which provides legal and other necessary support for members who are arrested or still on the run. Many members arrested to date had also participated in JI’s physical training called sasana, and possessed firearms and sharp weapons, underscoring that JI members continue to partake in core activities such as terrorism fund-raising, recruitment and i’dad.
Over the past decade, under Para Wijayanto’s leadership, JI has also been embedding itself in socio-religious and political groups as well as state institutions, particularly following the introduction of its tamkin siyasi (political consolidation) strategy in 2016. This strategy involves the infiltration of various mainstream institutions, in order to gain popular support for its long-term goal of establishing an Islamic state. Related to this, in 2022, two JI members, a civil servant and a member of the Partai Ummat (Ummah Party), were arrested.
Darul Islam/Negara Islam Indonesia
In March 2022, Indonesian authorities announced the arrest of more than 20 suspected members of Darul Islam (DI), or the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia, or NII). The arrests – 16 from West Sumatra and another 5 in Banten – prompted speculation over the group’s possible revival. D88 indicated that DI’s West Sumatra branch had planned low-level attacks using machetes, as part of a larger campaign to overthrow the government. These cells, however, were too small and disorganised to pose a serious security threat, officials said. Nonetheless, these developments indicate DI has been conducting physical training or preparing for an attack.
While operating today as independent cells across Indonesia, DI branches are still bound by the common dream of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. In this regard, DI “shares the same ideological space” as other jihadist groups such as JI. Additionally, throughout its history, radicalised members of DI have eventually splintered from the main organisation to join more violent jihadist groups. In recent years, members of DI’s Bandung branch have joined JAD, while the outfit’s Makassar faction has morphed into JAD Makassar. The remnants of the DI Belawan group also became linked to a pro-IS group in Kampar, Riau, in 2016.
In 2022, a JAD leader in Riau, who is also an NII advisor, planned to conduct physical training in Riau. Although the training was likely meant for JAD members, the prospect of closer interaction between JAD and NII networks or personnel needs to be closely monitored. DI in West Sumatra has a sizeable support base of around 1,125 members. Of these, 400 are active, while the rest have pledged allegiance to the group. The group also has cells in Jakarta, West Java, Bali and Maluku, and has succeeded in recruiting 77 children under 13 years old.
As in recent years, the preferred attack methods employed in 2022 involved explosives, sharp weapons and firearms. The use of explosive materials in JAD-linked suicide attacks also persisted in 2022. In December, a JAD-linked suicide bomber attacked a police station in Bandung, West Java, killing himself and a police officer. Eleven more people, mostly police officers, were also injured. The perpetrator, a skilled bomb-maker, used a pressure cooker bomb similar to one he had previously assembled for Yayat Cahdiyat, a JAD member who was involved in the 2017 Cicendo bombing in Bandung.
Separately, there were also reports of explosive materials in the possession of members of JAD Bima – which were subsequently denied by their family members – as well as an MIT member. A homemade bomb was also found after Madago Raya troops killed the abovementioned MIT member in January 2022. Of the one attack and five plots recorded in 2022, at least three also involved plans to use sharp weapons in Riau, Malang and Bima. In February 2022, a JAD member in Riau sharpened a screwdriver and planned to stab a police officer. He had also attempted to snatch firearms from a police station in Kampar district, but failed.
Besides foiling attack plots, the police seized several sharp weapons, including from the houses of arrested terrorist suspects. Additionally, while only one case in 2022 involved a plan to use firearms in Malang, a large number of ammunitions and firearms were also seized from a network of 26 MIT-linked terrorist suspects arrested in Central Sulawesi in May. Sharp weapons and firearms are used not only in attacks but also for i’dad and physical training by both pro-IS groups and JI. For example, the MIT Poso network had conducted several iterations of i’dad – likely with the seized firearms – in Ampana, Central Sulawesi, while police found archery weapons in the possession of JI members in Batam, likely also used for physical training.
Police officials remained the primary target of terrorist plots in 2022, as in previous years. The police have been labelled by militants as the thogut (the oppressor), who obstruct the upholding of Islamic law in Indonesia. In 2022, out of the one attack and five plots detected, three targeted police officers, one targeted the building of the People’s Representative Council of Indonesia (DPR) in Central Jakarta, and another targeted a café and bars patronised by foreigners, including Americans and Australians.
Counter terrorism policing in Indonesia has improved significantly over the years, aided by the enactment of the 2018 Counter-Terrorism Law. This legislation permits the police to conduct more frequent preventative detentions of terror suspects, and extends the pre-trial detention period from 120 to 200 days. The expanded crackdowns on terrorist suspects that have ensued also demonstrate D88’s improved surveillance and monitoring capabilities, including in cyberspace and in detecting propagandists, potential perpetrators and attack plots. In 2022, the police arrested members of the Annajiyah Media Centre, a digital pro-IS propaganda group that targeted the Indonesian audience and encouraged people to take up jihad. The network consisted of five pro-IS supporters who worked as video editors, translators and administrators of the group’s social media accounts.
Between January and March 2022, the police arrested 56 terrorist suspects. A further 78 terrorist suspects were apprehended from April to December. The arrest figure of 134 (January-December 2022) represented a decline compared to 2021, when a total of 370 individuals were arrested. Further arrests are expected following the December 7 suicide attack in West Java. In 2022, D88 also continued to target leaders and members of various JAD and JI networks. Key arrests included the leader of JAD Riau as well as JI leaders in Bengkulu and Aceh.
In a March 2022 counter terrorism operation, the police killed Sunardi, a Central Java doctor who held several leadership roles in JI, including as an advisor to the emir (leader). Sunardi was reportedly known in Sukoharjo Regency among his peers for his charitable work. He was also in charge of the Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI), a local charity that delivered medical aid to conflict-affected civilian populations, including in areas controlled by the Al-Qaeda-linked Al Nusra Front between 2012 to 2014. While his death evoked some criticism from Islamic organisations, human rights groups and JI sympathisers, who accused the police of overreach, the furore was significantly lesser in scale compared to the public pressure JI was able to exert on the authorities to investigate the 2016 killing of senior JI member Siyono by D88.
While significant enhancements have been made to Indonesia’s CT infrastructure, which has largely neutered militants’ capacity to mount lethal attacks, aspects of the state’s deradicalisation and reintegration programmes remain underdeveloped. Both programmes have been hindered by, among other factors, a lack of adequate evaluation, monitoring and risk assessment tools, as well as poor coordination between the state, local agencies and civil society organisations (CSOs) in the implementation of programmes.
In-prison deradicalisation programmes also lack structure, coherence and sustainability to cover the imprisonment period of a terrorist inmate. One criticism is that the programme curriculum relies extensively on seminars and discussions on vague topics like patriotism and religious harmony, with little room for interaction. Moreover, the government’s official deradicalisation programme in the prisons is not compulsory for all terrorist inmates, which results in many hardened radical inmates refusing to join the programme.
The issue of overcrowded and understaffed prisons also persists. By February 2019, almost 300 convicted terrorists were spread out over 100 prison facilities, while a few hundred were awaiting the conclusion of pending investigations or trials. These pressures have now been exacerbated by the arrests of some 500 terror suspects in 2020 and 2021. Additionally, many terrorist inmates currently in detention are on short-term sentences of less than five years, meaning such individuals are sometimes released after only minimal in-prison counselling and without sustained post-release monitoring and rehabilitation, because of the authorities’ limited capacity due to resource constraints.
As such, the risk of in-prison radicalisation and recidivism persists. In 2022, there were four cases of ex-terrorist offenders who relapsed into terrorist activity – one of them a woman who had been released in 2021. This was the first case of a female recidivist in the country. Overall, while the terrorist recidivism rate in Indonesia is low, analysts have noted it remains a challenge for the authorities to holistically understand the factors that push individuals to re-engage with terror networks, and to develop the attendant interventions needed to dissuade them.
In 2022, the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT), which monitors terrorist activity and conducts both in-prison and post-release deradicalisation programmes, enhanced its post-release economic support programme for released terror offenders. The initial phase saw the agency launch the Kawasan Terpadu Nusantara (Nusantara Integrated Area, or KTN) and Wadah Akur Rukun Usaha Nurani Gelorakan (Warung) programmes in Sindoro Mountain, Central Java. KTN focuses on providing economic support and employment for ex-terrorist inmates, with local communities also engaged as contributors.
The programme aims to ensure the successful reintegration of ex-terrorist inmates into society, by equipping them with economic skills and capabilities. KTN will subsequently be launched in five provinces: West Java, Central Java, East Java, West Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi. While the programme is wide-ranging in scope and engages many stakeholders, including local governments, community residents and public institutions, BNPT still needs to develop adequate assessment tools to gauge the radicalisation level, economic background, and work-skill competencies and interests of released offenders, in order to produce better outcomes.
Indonesia witnessed a further decline in terror activities in 2022, even as support of and commitment to both pro-IS terrorist groups and JI persist. Local pro-IS supporters retain the capacity to conduct sporadic and low-level attacks. For its part, JI has transformed into a complex militant organisation with increasingly publicly visible wings. The group still retains a significant capacity to commit violent acts of terror. The re-emergence of DI/NII networks and supporters on the radar of security agencies adds a further dimension to the threat landscape.
To address Indonesia’s various preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) challenges, including the lack of local context in state-initiated deradicalisation initiatives, the National Action Plan Against Extremism (RAN PE) blueprint was enacted in early 2021. Divided into the three pillars of prevention, law enforcement and cooperation, the RAN PE aims to enhance, inter alia, P/CVE data governance and the efficacy of post-release monitoring. In 2022, extensive resources were channelled towards improving various in-prison and post-release deradicalisation and prevention programmes under the P/CVE reform blueprint.
However, the effective implementation of specific initiatives has been hampered by various factors. These include the lack of priority given to the action plan by several ministries and local governments, limited budgets, weak coordination between key stakeholders, and a lack of effective impact assessment tools. Yet, amid the continued challenges posed by jihadist terrorism in Indonesia, the RAN PE still represents a promising blueprint for streamlining P/CVE activities. Greater resources should be invested by the authorities in bringing to fruition key components of the P/CVE framework, along with ensuring the active involvement of CSOs and local governments to ensure better outcomes.
About the Authors
Unaesah Rahmah is a senior analyst and Amresh Lavan Gunasingham is an Associate Editor at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. They can be reached at [email protected] and [email protected], respectively.
Thumbnail photo by Sohaib Al Kharsa on Unsplash
 Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Decline of ISIS in Indonesia and the Emergence of New Cells,” IPAC Report No. 69 (2021), http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep28849.
 Jordan Newton, “Indonesian Pro-IS supporters on Social Media in 2022: Surviving Not Thriving,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Vol. 14, No. 3 (June 2022), pp. 1-8, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/CTTA-June-2022.pdf.
 Kenneth Yeo and Unaesah Rahmah, “Change, Continuity and Trajectories: Assessing Southeast Asian Terrorists’ Attack Tactics and Trends Post-Bali Bombings,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Vol. 14, No. 5 (September 2022), pp. 29-40, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/CTTA-September-2022.pdf.
 V. Arianti and Unaesah Rahmah, “Annual Threat Assessment: Indonesia,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Vol. 14, No. 1 (January 2022), pp. 11-20, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/CTTA-January-2022.pdf.
 IPAC, “The Decline of ISIS in Indonesia and the Emergence of New Cells.”
 Most plots and attacks executed by JAD consist of cells of members skilled in making bombs, funding and coordinating personnel. Prominent examples include the 2018 Surabaya bombings, which involved coordination between three families; and the Makassar Cathedral bombing of 2021, which was primarily planned by a husband-wife duo, with support from their family network.
 He also chided followers for using women and children in attacks. Kusumasari Ayuningtyas, “Indonesian Militant Chief on Death Row for Terror Attacks Now Condemns Them,” Benar News, April 4, 2022, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/indonesia-jad-abdurrahman-terror-04042022113028.html.
 “Abu Bakar Ba’asyir Akui Pancasila: Dasarnya Tauhid,” CNN Indonesia, August 3, 2022, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20220803061930-12-829512/abu-bakar-baasyir-akui-pancasila-dasarnya-tauhid.
 Based on ICPVTR’s monitoring of pro-IS social media channels and groups. For the videos, see “Terbaru!! Aman Abdurrahman Larang Jihad dan Amaliyah,”Cek Ombak Channel, YouTube video, April 1, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-8OYFtFFNNA; and “Terbaru!! Ustad Abu Bakar Ba’asyir: Pancasila Tidak Syirik,” Cek Ombak Channel, YouTube video, April 14, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k3fd-klO_c0.
 Based on ICPVTR’s monitoring of pro-IS social media channels and groups, similar depictions on social media accounts of beheadings, which have long been a signature and key feature of IS propaganda, also targeted two prominent Indonesian politicians. Namely, Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, the Coordinating Minister of Maritime and Investment Affairs of Indonesia, and Megawati Sukarnoputri, the Chairperson of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDIP), both of whom are close to Jokowi. Beheading videos aim to terrorise and intimidate particular audiences, while at the same time strengthening IS’ image as a strong protector of the Muslims.
 IPAC, “The Decline of ISIS in Indonesia and the Emergence of New Cells.”
 Tria Dianti, “Polisi Tangkap Lima Terduga Anggota JAD dan JI,” Benar News, February 10, 2022, https://www.benarnews.org/indonesian/berita/ji-jad-militan-02102022124637.html.
 Penatoi was among the first strongholds in Indonesia for IS, with hundreds of people, including children, pledging allegiance to the group in July 2014. In total, 70 individuals from Penatoi have been arrested under terrorism charges since 2010. Of the estimated 1,500 households in the area, almost 90% come from the same family, highlighting the family connection in local extremist networks. See Ahmad Viqi, “70 Warga Penatoi Bima Ditangkap Terkait Kasus Terorisme Sejak 2010,” Detik News, June 25, 2022, https://www.detik.com/bali/nusra/d-6146159/70-warga-penatoi-bima-ditangkap-terkait-kasus-terorisme-sejak-2010.
 “Indonesian Police Kill Militant Suspected in Farmer’s Death,” VoA, September 30, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/indonesian-police-kill-militant-suspected-in-farmers-deaths/6771281.html.
 “Polisi Nyatakan Mujahidin Indonesia Timur Telah Habis Dengan Tewasnya Anggota Terakhir,” Benar News, September 30, 2022, https://www.benarnews.org/indonesian/berita/anggota-terakhir-mit-tewas-09302022123227.html.
 The MIT insurgency is rooted in a deadly Muslim-Christian conflict from 1998-2001 in Indonesia’s Sulawesi province. The group, however, retains significant community support in its former stronghold of Poso, amid long-standing grievances over issues such as land rights.
 Investigations revealed some had pledged loyalty to IS via the instant messaging platform, WhatsApp. Many had also provided logistical and weaponry assistance to MIT’s members in Biru, Central Sulawesi. “Densus 88 Antiteror Polri Tangkap 24 Terduga Teroris MIT, Ini Perannya,” Liputan 6, May 17, 2022, https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/4964545/densus-88-antiteror-polri-tangkap-24-terduga-teroris-mit-ini-perannya; and Keisyah Aprilia and Dandy Koswaraputra, “Polisi Tangkap Lagi 2 Terduga Anggota ISIS Pendukung MIT, Total 26 Ditahan,” Benar News, May 18, 2022, https://www.benarnews.org/indonesian/berita/isis-mujahidin-indonesia-timur-05182022161118.html
 Amy Chew, “Terror Group Jemaah Islamiah Wants to ‘Take Over’ Indonesia by Infiltrating State Institutions, With Aim of Creating Caliphate,” South China Morning Post, January 10, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/people/article/3162494/terror-group-jemaah-islamiah-wants-take-over-indonesia.
 Andi Saputra, “Penggalang Dana Teroris Modus Kotak Amal di Sumbar Dibui 6 Tahun,” Detik News, June 8, 2022, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-6116260/penggalang-dana-teroris-modus-kotak-amal-di-sumbar-dibui-6-tahun.
 One Care is a JI-linked active humanitarian group that operates along the same lines as HASI. It has managed to attract public support, including from wealthy donors and politicians, due to its humanitarian programmes. Both groups have denied their affiliation to JI. See Bilveer Singh, “Jemaah Islamiyah: Still Southeast Asia’s Greatest Terrorist Threat,” The Diplomat, October 7, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/jemaah-islamiyah-still-southeast-asias-greatest-terrorist-threat/; and “Yayasan One Care Bantah Terlibat Danai Kelompok Teroris JI,” Detik News, December 19, 2020, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5302139/yayasan-one-care-bantah-terlibat-danai-kelompok-teroris-ji.
 One of the methods employed in collecting funds involved sending charity boxes to the houses of donors. Cardboard donation boxes were also distributed around mosques in West Sumatra. “Penggalang Dana Kegiatan Terorisme Dengan Modus Kotak Amal di Sumbar Dibui 6 Tahun,” Surya Kepri, June 8, 2022, https://suryakepri.com/2022/06/08/penggalang-dana-kegiatan-terorisme-dengan-modus-kotak-amal-di-sumbar-dibui-6-tahun/2/.
 Verdict of Nasril alias Kutin alias Datin bin Basri, East Jakarta District Court, 2021, No. 1023/Pid.Sus/2021/PN Jkt. Tim.
 Anugrah Andriansyah, “Koordinator Jaringan JI Aceh Ditangkap, Pengamat: Mereka Ubah Pola Gerakan,” VoA Indonesia, August 4, 2022, https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/koordinator-jaringan-ji-aceh-ditangkap-pengamat-mereka-ubah-pola-gerakan/6686541.html.
 Under FKKP, around 40 schools were known to be affiliated with JI. According to reports, FKKP has, over the years, been responsible for contributing Rp 4.2 billion (US$300,000) for JI Central’s activities. See Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Impact of the Taliban Victory on Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiyah,” IPAC Report No. 73 (2021), https://understandingconflict.org/en/publications/The-Impact-of-the-Taliban-Victory-on-Indonesias-Jemaah-Islamiyah.
 “Densus 88 Tangkap 4 Teroris di Tangerang Jaringan Jamaah Islamiyah,” Detik News, March 15, 2022 https://20.detik.com/detikflash/20220315-220315146/densus-88-tangkap-4-teroris-di-tangerang-jaringan-jamaah-islamiyah. The tholiah department was also responsible for securing JI’s assets and monitoring the movements of D88. See Abdul Mughis, “Jalan Sunyi Eks Intelijen JI,” RuangObrol.id, October 2, 2022, https://ruangobrol.id/2022/09/13/interview/jalan-sunyi-eks-intelijen-ji/.
 This physical training includes martial arts, resistance exercises (swimming, running, sit-ups, pull-ups and push-ups), knife throwing, gun assembly and shooting. See Verdict of Ahmad Hafidz alias Memet alias Rahmat alias Angga Bin Andi, East Jakarta District Court, 2020, No. 46/Pid.Sus/2020/PN Jkt. Tim.
 While only around 30 civil servants have been charged with terrorism offences over the past decade, some were entrenched in influential positions, reflecting JI’s calculated strategy to recruit from within government ranks as part of its bid to transform Indonesia into an Islamic state. See Tria Dianti, “Indonesia: Militant Group Behind Bali Bombings Tries to Infiltrate Govt Institutions,” Benar News, November 17, 2021, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/militants-infiltrate-indonesia-govt-organizations-11172021125251.html.
 Alif Satria, “Decades-Old Darul Islam Militant Group in Indonesia Remains a Threat,” Benar News, May 13, 2022, https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/militant-threat-05132022160103.html.
 Rahel Narda Chaterine, “Densus Klaim Punya Bukti NII Sumbar Berencana Melengserkan Pemerintah Sebelum Pemilu 2024,” Kompas, April 18, 2022, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/04/18/13063911/densus-klaim-punya-bukti-nii-sumbar-berencana-melengserkan-pemerintah.
 In October 2022, D88 also detained a woman, Siti Erlina, for brandishing a gun at the gate of the State Palace in Jakarta. Her husband and a second man, reported to be the couple’s spiritual teacher, were also arrested separately. The trio are alleged to be sympathisers of NII. See “Husband and Teacher of Woman Caught With Pistol at State Palace Named as Terrorist Suspects,” Jakarta Globe, October 28, 2022, https://jakartaglobe.id/news/husband-and-teacher-of-woman-caught-with-pistol-at-state-palace-named-terrorism-suspects.
 Arie Firdaus and Dandy Koswaraputra, “Indonesia Police Report Plot by Islamic Militant Group to Overthrow Govt,” Benar News, April 18, 2022, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/plot-discovered-04182022164512.html.
 Satria, “Decades-Old Darul Islam Militant Group in Indonesia Remains a Threat.”
 IPAC, “The Decline of ISIS in Indonesia and the Emergence of New Cells,”
 “Peran 13 Teroris yang Ditangkap Densus 88 di Riau,” Liputan 6, September 17, 2022, https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/5072559/peran-13-teroris-yang-ditangkap-densus-88-di-riau.
 Adhyasta Dirgantara, “Polri Sebut Teroris Jaringan NII Punya 1.125 Anggota Tersebar di Sumbar,” Detik News, April 12, 2022, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-6028569/polri-sebut-teroris-jaringan-nii-punya-1125-anggota-tersebar-di-sumbar.
 The JAD-linked attacker, Agus Sujatno, was a convicted bomb-maker who had been released from prison in 2021 after serving a four-year sentence. He entered the Astana Anyar police station on a motorcycle and detonated one of two bombs during a morning assembly session. The other explosive was defused. See Arlina Arshad, “Indonesia Police Station Blast Kills 2 in Suspected Suicide Attack,” The Straits Times, December 8, 2022, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-investigating-explosion-at-bandung-police-station-report.
 Mohammad Hatta Muarabagja, “5 Fakta Bom Bunuh Diri di Polsek Astanaanyar: Bom Panci hingga Pelaku Jaga Rakit Bom,” Tempo, December 9, 2022, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1666198/5-fakta-bom-bunuh-diri-di-polsek-astanaanyar-bom-panci-hingga-pelaku-jago-rakit-bom. Other suicide attacks in the country have also used pressure cooker bombs, including the Makassar Cathedral bombing (2021), the Sukoharjo suicide attack (2019) and the Kampung Melayu bombing (2017), see Azhar Bagas Ramadhan, “Daftar Serangan Teror Bom Panci di RI, Terbaru di Polsek Astana Anyar,” Detik News, December 8, 2022, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-6450034/daftar-serangan-teror-bom-panci-di-ri-terbaru-di-polsek-astana-anyar/.
 Ahmad Viqi, “Sita Bahan Peledak, Polisi Dalami Jaringan 3 Terduga Teroris Bima,” Detik News, June 20, 2022, https://www.detik.com/bali/nusra/d-6137390/sita-bahan-peledak-polisi-dalami-jaringan-3-terduga-teroris-bima.
 “Keluarga Terduga Teroris Bima Bantah Ada Bahan Peledak,” Lombok Post, June 22, 2022, https://lombokpost.jawapos.com/bima-dompu/22/06/2022/keluarga-terduga-teroris-bima-bantah-ada-bahan-peledak/.
 The preference for sharp weapons or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in attacks, indicates low technical ability and limited access to lethal weapons among Indonesian militants, probably due to extensive CT operations. Sharp weapons like screwdrivers, machetes and knives are also easily accessible, and purchasing such everyday items would likely fly under the radar of the security apparatus. See “Anggota JAD Hendak Serang Polsek Kampar Riau Ditangkap,” CNN Indonesia, February 14, 2022, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20220213233845-12-758688/anggota-jad-hendak-serang-polsek-kampar-riau-ditangkap.
 Rahel Narda Chaterine, “Densus 88: Mahasiswa Tersangka Teroris di Malang Rencanakan Serangan ke Kantor Polisi dengan Senjata Api,” Kompas, May 25, 2022, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/05/25/12072251/densus-88-mahasiswa-tersangka-teroris-di-malang-rencanakan-serangan-ke.
 Rahel Narda Chaterine, “Densus Sita Senjata Api dari Penangkapan 24 Tersangka Teroris MIT Poso dan ISIS,” Kompas, May 17, 2022, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/05/17/17245081/densus-sita-senjata-api-dari-penangkapan-24-tersangka-teroris-mit-poso-dan.
 “Mabes Polri Ungkap Keterlibatan 24 Anggota MIT Poso dalam Kelompok Teroris,” ANTARA News, May 17, 2022, https://makassar.antaranews.com/berita/388561/mabes-polri-ungkap-keterlibatan-24-anggota-mit-poso-dalam-kelompok-teroris.
 “12 Tersangka Teroris Ditangkap dalam 2 Hari, Anggota JI-Pendukung ISIS,” CNN Indonesia, March 17, 2022, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20220317092131-12-772430/12-tersangka-teroris-ditangkap-dalam-2-hari-anggota-ji-pendukung-isis.
 For pro-IS groups in particular, civil servants, especially the police, were legitimate targets for attacks as the latter were considered apostates for working for an un-Islamic regime (i.e., the government). Quinton Temby, “Terrorism in Indonesia After ‘Islamic State’,” ISEAS: Trends in Southeast Asia, Issue 3 (2020), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/TRS3_20.pdf.
 DPR is regarded as an enemy by pro-IS supporters given it is responsible for drafting the ‘man-made laws’ in Indonesia. In 2012 and 2018, terrorist networks in Solo and Riau, respectively, planned to attack the DPR building in Central Jakarta. See “Gedung DPR Jadi Target Serangan Teroris,” Viva News, September 5, 2012 https://www.viva.co.id/berita/nasional/348915-bnpt-gedung-dpr-jadi-target-serangan-teroris; Muhammad Idris, “Teroris Mau Bom Gedung DPR, Anggota Dewan Minta Motifnya Diusut,” Detik News, June 4, 2018, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4053193/teroris-mau-bom-gedung-dpr-anggota-dewan-minta-motifnya-diusut; and Dianti, “Polisi Tangkap Lima Terduga Anggota JAD dan JI.”
 Although cafés and bars are an uncommon target for JAD attacks, analysts argue that such venues are considered by some jihadists as locations for sinful acts. Dianti, “Polisi Tangkap Lima Terduga Anggota JAD dan JI.”
 The law has extended the scope of prosecutable terror offences to encompass individuals who are affiliated to terrorist groups or perform non-violent roles such as propagandists. See Alif Satria, “Two Decades of Counterterrorism in Indonesia: Successful Developments and Future Challenges,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Vol. 14, No. 5 (September 2022), pp. 7-16, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/CTTA-September-2022.pdf.
 Satria, “Two Decades of Counterterrorism in Indonesia: Successful Developments and Future Challenges”; and Sidney Jones, “Terrorism and Extremism in Indonesia and the Southeast Asian Region,” Southeast Asian Affairs Vol. 2022, pp. 162-174, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/855269.
 Newton, “Indonesian Pro-IS Supporters on Social Media in 2022: Surviving Not Thriving.”
 “Densus 88 Bongkar Annajiyah Media Center, Pembuat Propaganda Teroris di Medsos,” Republika, March 24, 2022, https://www.republika.co.id/berita/r98uoj377/densus-88-bongkar-annajiyah-media-center-pembuat-propaganda-teroris-di-medsos.
 Ardito Ramadhan, “Sudah Tangkap 56 Teroris hingga Maret 2022, Densus 88: Terorisme Masih Ada,” Kompas, March 21, 2022, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/03/21/17030661/sudah-tangkap-56-teroris-hingga-maret-2022-densus-88-terorisme-masih-ada.
 Arianti and Rahmah, “Annual Threat Assessment: Indonesia.”
 Kusumasari Ayuningtyas, “Indonesian Police Say Use of Force Justified in Doctor’s Death,” Benar News, March 11, 2022, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/physician-killed-03112022140341.html.
 V. Arianti and Nodirbek Soliev, “The Pro-Al Qaeda Indonesian Connection with HTS in Syria: Security Implications,” Middle East Institute, August 10, 2021, https://www.mei.edu/publications/pro-al-qaeda-indonesian-connection-hts-syria-security-implications.
 In the 2016 case, JI had capitalised on its social network to pressure the government via a major Islamist group, which launched a vocal public campaign demanding justice for the alleged wrongful killing of Siyono by D88. Isyana Artharini, “Penyebab Kematian Terduga Teroris Siyono Terungkap,” BBC Indonesia, April 11, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2016/04/160411_indonesia_autopsi_siyono.
 Cameron Sumpter, “Reintegration in Indonesia: Extremists, Start-ups and Occasional Engagements,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, February 19, 2019, https://icct.nl/publication/reintegration-in-indonesia-extremists-start-ups-and-occasional-engagements/.
 Mohammad Hasan Ansori et al., “Memberantas Terorisme di Indonesia: Praktik, Kebijakan dan Tantangan,” The Habibie Center, August 2019, https://www.habibiecenter.or.id/img/publication/32214d4ad76cedc4d9f34f382b30d2ed.pdf.
 Nivell Rayda, “In Focus: How Indonesian Prisons are Battlegrounds for Deradicalisation,” Channel News Asia, March 13, 2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/in-focus-indonesia-covid-19-deradicalisation-terrorism-prisons-329616.
 Sumpter, “Reintegration in Indonesia: Extremists, Start-ups and Occasional Engagements.”
 Arianti and Rahmah, “Annual Threat Assessment: Indonesia”; and Unaesah Rahmah, “Annual Threat Assessment: Indonesia,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 14-21, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/CTTA-January-2021.pdf.
 Noor Huda Ismail, “Indonesia: Perennial Issue of Terrorist Recidivism,” RSIS Commentary No. 80 (2020), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/CO20080.pdf.
 Leo Suryadinata, “Islamism and the New Anti-Terrorism Law in Indonesia,” ISEAS Perspective No. 39 (2018), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/[email protected].
 In the latest example, Agus Sujatno, the suicide attacker involved in the December 2022 bombing of a police station in West Java, had refused to participate in the government’s deradicalisation programme while serving a four-year sentence in Nusakambangan prison; Azhar Bagas Ramadhan, “Densus 88 Ungkap Peran 3 Tersangka Teroris yang Ditangkap di Bima,” Detik News, June 21, 2022, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-6138190/densus-88-ungkap-peran-3-tersangka-teroris-yang-ditangkap-di-bima.
 “Eks Napi Teroris Wanita Pendukung ISIS Kembali Ditangkap Densus 88 di Lampung,” Lampung Geh!, March 25, 2022, https://kumparan.com/lampunggeh/eks-napi-teroris-wanita-pendukung-isis-kembali-ditangkap-densus-88-di-lampung-1xkmU9SggmN.
 Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Terrorism, Recidivism and Planned Releases in Indonesia,” IPAC Report No. 66 (2022), http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26546.
 The deradicalisation programme focuses on ideological, psychological and economic components. Based on the Deradicalisation Blueprint of BNPT, economic intervention in deradicalisation is considered an effective approach for released terror offenders and their families. Since 2015, BNPT has provided economic assistance to released terror convicts and their families. See Saefudin Zuhri, “Kebijakan Deradikalisasi Terorisme oleh BNPT: Perspektif Spektrum Politik,” Jurnal Ilmu Kepolisian Vol. 11, No. 2 (2017), pp. 75-81, http://www.jurnalptik.id/index.php/JIK/article/view/85/36.
 “Kawasan Terpadu Nusantara Temanggung, Asa Baru Bagi Eksnapiter,” ANTARA News, August 3, 2022, https://jateng.antaranews.com/berita/458485/kawasan-terpadu-nusantara-temanggung-asa-baru-bagi-eksnapiter.
 Institutions involved include Muhammadiyah Malang University and Brawijaya University. See “BNPT Gandeng UB dan UMM Perkuat Konsensus Berbangsa dan Moderasi Beragama Civitas Kampus,” BNPT, July 6, 2022, https://www.bnpt.go.id/bnpt-gandeng-ub-dan-umm-perkuat-konsensus-berbangsa-dan-moderasi-beragama-civitas-kampus.
 The previous economic programme by BNPT was criticised for its lack of assessment, monitoring and evaluation tools. Research by ISPI (Indonesia Strategic Policy Institute) and AIDA (Alliance for a Peaceful Indonesia) in 2018 found a weak link between economic intervention and decreased levels of radicalisation of released terror offenders in Indonesia. They argued that dialogue with high-profile terror offenders who have since repented, such as Ali Imran, the Bali bombings perpetrator, is more effective in increasing the disengagement level of terror convicts, compared to economic intervention. Besides, they also found that economic interventions offered by the government and CSOs did not always match with released inmates’ competencies and interests, which resulted in unideal outcomes. In some cases, economic activities were discontinued once BNPT and CSOs stopped funding the programme, while in another instance in 2015, the money was misused by released inmates in Poso to support MIT. See AIDA and ISPI, “Evaluasi Program Ekonomi Sebagai Instrumen Deradikalisasi,” CONVEY Indonesia: Policy Brief Series Vol. 1, Issue 11 (2018).
 The blueprint aims to further decentralise P/CVE programming in Indonesia; facilitate the formalisation of working relationships between CSOs and local governments; mainstream gender perspectives; and streamline activities to improve outcomes and avoid overlaps, among others. See Cameron Sumpter and Yuslikha K. Wardhani, “Hopes and Hurdles for Indonesian’s National Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism,” Resolve Network: Policy Note, March 2022, https://doi.org/10.37805/pn2022.2.sea.
 Satria, “Two Decades of Counterterrorism in Indonesia: Successful Developments and Future Challenges.”
 These resources were channelled into programmes for training prisoner officers to deal with terrorist inmates, evaluations of deradicalisation programmes, and training for civil servants, police and ministry officials to dissuade them from joining terrorist groups. See Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT), Pelaksanaan Rencana Aksi Nasional Pencegahan dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan yang Mengarah pada Terorisme (RAN PE) Tahun 2021.
 Nine ministries and agencies, including the Ministry of Health, have yet to adopt specific nomenclature on violent extremism. In the implementation of policies, instruments such as regulations and procedures are considered important components. See Alamsyah M Dja’far, Menyibak Dampak Melihat Jejak: Laporan Forum Refleksi Satu Tahun Implementasi RAN PE (Jakarta: Wahid Foundation, 2022), https://wahidfoundation.org/index.php/publication/detail/Menyibak-Dampak-Melihat-Jejak-Laporan-Forum-Refleksi-Satu-Tahun-Implementasi-RAN-PE.
 BNPT, Pelaksanaan Rencana Aksi Nasional Pencegahan dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan yang Mengarah pada Terorisme (RAN PE) Tahun 2021.
 Sumpter and Wardhani, “Hopes and Hurdles for Indonesian’s National Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism.”