Global Threat Assessment 2022
Overview
When the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, the potential destabilising impact of this development was concerning. Central Asians, for instance, worried about “what precedent might be set if the Taliban successfully builds an Islamic Emirate on the borders of secular Muslim majority Central Asia”.[1] A Taliban-run Afghanistan again becoming a safe haven for terror groups to “regenerate formidable external attack capabilities” was another worry. One year on, however, such scenarios have yet to be actualised.[2] Certainly, the Taliban’s assurances that it “would not allow any terrorist group” to use Afghanistan to “launch attacks against others”[3] rang ominously hollow, with the killing of Al-Qaeda (AQ) chief Ayman al-Zawahiri in a US drone strike in Kabul in August. Zawahiri had been residing in a house supposedly under the Taliban’s control.[4] That said, a Taliban-run Afghanistan did not – as yet – pose a major threat to regional and global security, for three main reasons.
First, the Taliban in 2022 continued to face a significant domestic challenge from the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK). The latter’s “attacks and propaganda material” continued to be “aimed at ideologically de-legitimising” the Taliban – with ISK portraying itself as an “alternative jihadist group to a plethora of South and Central Asian jihadists still residing in Afghanistan”.[5] Hence, the Taliban has had to focus on “anti-ISK military operations” aimed at “not letting ISK grow big enough” to potentially threaten its rule.[6]
Second, the killing of Zawahiri, “a largely uninspiring leader of a weakened outfit”, raised further “questions about the future of Al-Qaeda central” in the “global terror landscape”.[7] That said, although AQ “can no longer be regarded as the vanguard of global jihadism”,[8] it was still able to reconstitute somewhat and “secure territorial footholds in different conflict arenas” in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.[9] At any rate, it seems clear that AQ, “which operates potently through its affiliates in Africa”, would find it difficult to preserve “a foothold in the Af-Pak region”, not least because of continued US counter terrorist operations against it.[10] One caveat is that AQ is likely to retain “an inspiring impact” on its affiliates worldwide[11] – a view supported by a recent US intelligence assessment.[12]
Third, it is worth nothing that ISK thus far appears to be operationally constrained. To be sure, repeated ISK “references to Central Asia as a target in its propaganda and attempted attacks” have been “a source of concern” across that region.[13] That said, recent Western intelligence analyses suggest that ISK “has grown little over the past six months”, and appears unable “to assert control over any territory”, while its efforts “have been limited to Central Asia and attacks against countries such as Pakistan and Uzbekistan”.[14]
Particularly notable in 2022 were indications that, following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, China would “become the jihadists’ next big target”.[15] Given the trend of recent ISK attacks and its anti-China propaganda, it has become increasingly clear that “Chinese interests” are “now at the receiving end of attacks by militants”.[16]
The Middle East, meanwhile, remained “a zone of frenemies, rivalries and conflicts”.[17] The long-running Israeli-Palestinian dispute remained fraught, while the danger of the Israel-Iran rivalry degenerating into a “full-blown confrontation remained high”. At the same time, the “fundamental ideological and geopolitical differences” between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran simply cannot be “expected to subside easily and substantially”.[18]
In 2022, the Southeast Asian threat picture was on the whole generally positive, as militant groups were significantly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, which “placed significant limits on travel and mass gatherings and weakened extremist funding bases”.[19] In Indonesia, effective counter terrorism (CT) efforts largely “decimated various pro-IS networks operationally”, while repeated clampdowns on social media platforms weakened their online presence as well.[20] Similarly, Malaysia continued to experience fewer terrorism-related arrests in 2022, possibly because lockdown measures in response to the pandemic and border closures greatly reduced the movement of people in and out of the country and “hampered terrorist activity”.[21] The adverse socioeconomic effects of the pandemic also focused public attention on practical bread-and-butter issues rather than esoteric extremist ideas.[22]
A similar positive trend was noted in the Philippines’ Mindanao region, which has seen a significant number of terrorist surrenders over the past three years, driven by various factors including fatigue, hunger and declining financial support, while leadership decapitation and effective operations by the military have also played their roles.[23] Likewise, in the Thai Deep South, “the level of violence has been on a downward trend” since the start of formal peace talks between Bangkok and Malay-Muslim separatist groups in 2013, and certainly throughout 2022.[24]
In Southeast Asia, it was the ongoing conflict in Myanmar that remained worrisome. The ongoing insurgency involving the anti-coup movement and the Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) against Myanmar’s military government worsened across the country. [25]
Operational Issues and Challenges for Religious and Ethno-Nationalist Militant Groups
Afghanistan as a Hijrah Magnet?
The successful US drone strike on AQ leader Zawahiri in August seemed to affirm Washington’s “over-the-horizon operations” deterrent capability. Presumably, this could “potentially deter the global jihadists from converging on a ‘safe Afghanistan’ under the Taliban”.[26] That said, Afghanistan in 2022 remained “a hotbed of multiple terror formations with varying agendas” and has “not become an inhospitable territory for other regional terror groups”, because the Taliban remained focused on “eliciting international recognition, funding and decimating its domestic enemies, rather than “making the country terror free”.[27]
A geopolitically volatile Taliban-run Afghanistan that thus remains “open for business”[28] attracted policy attention in Southeast Asia, where the Taliban’s return raised concerns of a spike in jihadist activity. This was especially given the historical nexus between the Taliban, AQ and regional networks like the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).[29] For instance, Malaysian authorities were aware of several online chat groups “who were discussing plans to travel to conflict zones”, including Afghanistan, though there was no evidence of this actually happening.[30] In Mindanao, Philippine Islamist militants had a lukewarm response to developments in Afghanistan, including the death of Zawahiri.[31] More than a year since the fall of Kabul, therefore, there remained “limited evidence” of “Southeast Asian jihadists performing hijrah (migration) to the Afghan theatre”.[32] Significantly, though, IS pointedly referred to Africa “as a new land of hijrah and jihad”.[33]
Cross-Border Links
The continuing importance of cross-border links of militant networks was underscored throughout 2022. In Pakistan, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) pledged allegiance to the Afghan Taliban Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada and, from Afghan territory, continued to wage a violent campaign to create a Taliban-like Islamic Emirate across the border in Pakistan itself.[34] Meanwhile, Baloch insurgents, operating from Afghan and Iranian territory, continued “to pose a long-term threat to Pakistan’s internal security”.[35] Similarly, Central Asian militant groups continued operating in Afghanistan under Taliban protection and guidance.[36] In South Asia, members of the Bangladesh-based, AQ-affiliated Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) and the IS-linked Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) were arrested in the north-eastern Indian state of Assam.[37]
Bangladeshi territory has not only been used by Islamist militant groups targeting north-eastern India, but also by ethno-nationalist threat groups targeting Myanmar. The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) had been pushed out of the Rakhine State in western Myanmar by the increasingly potent Arakan Army (AA).[38] That said, although ARSA did not carry out any operations in Myanmar, it remained active across the border in Bangladesh, in especially narcotics smuggling, but also other criminal activities in Rohingya camps and adjacent areas. As the Rohingya crisis continues to worsen, “various new armed groups” with mostly criminal intent are “reportedly surfacing across the border in Bangladesh to exploit the Rohingyas’ grievances and recruit into their ranks” – with the potential to threaten western Myanmar.[39]
The Mindanao-based Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) also remained a security concern in Sabah in East Malaysia – long a transit point for terrorists, smugglers and kidnappers. Although ASG has not carried out operations in East Malaysia since 2016, its members “still use Sabah as a safe haven and a recruitment point”, and some ASG members have reportedly found odd jobs and have blended in with the local population.[40]
An Evolving Spectrum of Attack Modalities and Targets
Multi-Modal Attacks by Organised Networks Against a Plethora of Targets
In Afghanistan, ISK attacked a plethora of targets, such as Hazara mosques, schools and workplaces. Significantly, it employed a suicide bomber in an attack near the Russian embassy in Kabul. ISK considers both Russia and the US as part of the Jewish-Crusader alliance arrayed against the global Muslim community.[41] Across the border in Pakistan, ISK also employed suicide bombings as a tactic, attacking a Shia Mosque in Peshawar, apart from attacking polio vaccination teams and their police bodyguards, intelligence and security officials, as well as members of the religious minorities in Pakistan. However, these “were low-intensity attacks”, involving small arms.[42]
In Kashmir, Islamist threat groups continued targeting minorities and migrant workers in the Muslim-dominated Kashmir Valley. Tactics-wise, most of these attacks were perpetrated by the new phenomenon of faceless “hybrid militants”: civilians with no known links to militant groups, who were “radicalised online, carry out an attack, usually with a pistol” and then “slip back to their civilian life”.[43]
As mentioned, Chinese interests in Pakistan were increasingly targeted in 2022. Baloch militants successfully staged a suicide bombing in April outside the University of Karachi’s Confucius Institute in Pakistan. The following month, they attempted another suicide attack, this time against a Chinese envoy, but this was thwarted.[44] Chinese targets aside, Baloch separatists also attacked “Pakistani security institutions”.[45]
In Indonesia, Islamist threat groups employed a mix of sharp weapons, firearms and explosive materials. Notably, unlike in recent years, the use of explosives and suicide attack tactics in Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD)-linked plots was largely absent in 2022. The police remained the primary target of terrorist plots. Other JAD targets included the People’s Representative Council of Indonesia premises in Central Jakarta as well as, rather unusually for JAD, a café and bars frequented by Westerners.[46]
In the Thai Deep South in August, 16 convenience stores and a gas station were targeted. These attack tactics seemed to suggest that Malay-Muslim separatists were targeting the “economic bases of the Thai state”. [47] In Myanmar, anti-government militias persisted with targeted bombings, knife attacks and shootings. The majority of these attacks were directed against military and police targets as well as individuals or organisations possessing close ties to the current military government. Anti-government militias in 2022 increasingly adopted explosive-rigged civilian drones against military bases, police stations and checkpoints.[48]
The Lone Actor Threat
A recent US intelligence assessment of the threat posed by AQ and ISK from Afghanistan suggested that the threat from such groups is “more likely to take the form of an individual attacker inspired by these groups rather than a networked and hierarchically directed plot”.[49] The continuing threat posed by lone actors was also seen in Southeast Asia. In Malaysia, while the threat picture in 2022 continued to improve, the biggest concern appeared to stem from “attacks by lone actors or autonomous cells who are inspired, rather than directed, by a particular group’s ideology”.[50] In Singapore, “the primary threat” likewise still emanated “from individuals self-radicalised through online means”.[51]
Role of Women and Youth
The trend in recent years of women and youth assuming significant roles in the various activities of threat networks continued in 2022. In Indonesia in October, the authorities detained a female Islamist militant for brandishing a gun at the gate of the State Palace in Jakarta. Moreover, a female former terrorist offender who had been released in 2021 was found to have relapsed into terrorist activity – “the first case of a female recidivist in the country”.[52]
The role of youth seemed particularly pronounced. A fifth of the aforementioned hybrid militants in Kashmir were “juveniles”.[53] In Bangladesh, an “obscure AQ-centric outfit”, the Jama’atul Ansar fil Hind al Sharquiyah (JAHS), was reportedly involved in the recruitment of local youth for militant training in collaboration with an ethnic separatist group, the Kuki-Chin National Front.[54] Meanwhile, many Rohingya youth in 2022 were co-opted by ARSA to act as carriers in its transborder drug trade activities.[55]
Youth also appeared to play a prominent role in the wider support base for Malay-Muslim separatist groups in southern Thailand. In May, a Malay-Muslim, civil society-run youth event raised security concerns. More than 10,000 youth dressed in traditional Malay costume gathered at Wasukri Beach in Pattani in a pointed celebration of their ethnic/cultural minority identity. Most disconcertingly for the authorities, however, was the sighting of the flag of the main separatist group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) amongst the crowd, while the youth declared their oath to their “religion, nation and motherland” and commitment to “eliminate all forms of oppression”. Officials speculated if the youth “were linked to the underground separatist group”.[56]
Youth and women were also implicated in the case of the Western extreme right (see below) in 2022. In Slovakia, a teenager launched an attack, while a British official inquiry uncovered the death the year before of a teenage girl who had been radicalised and groomed into “extreme right-wing” ideas. Both cases highlighted “the threat and the extreme vulnerability of some youth being drawn towards extreme right-wing ideologies”.[57]
Role of Ideological Ecosystems
The importance of better understanding the ideological ecosystems propagating and sustaining violent extremist narratives persisted in 2022. Such ecosystems included, amongst other elements, interconnected networks of social media and print platforms, strategic influencers or persons, as well as certain extremist organisational, educational and religious places.[58]
Persons
Platforms
The year 2022 underscored the continuing strategic role played by social media and other platforms in disseminating and sustaining extremist ideology and support. In Pakistan, the TTP made heavy use of its Urdu-language propaganda magazine Mujallah Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan,[61] while ISK “expanded the production, reproduction and propagation of propaganda in Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz languages through media platforms such as Al-Azaim Foundation and Xuroson Ovozi.[62] Likewise, AQ used its Urdu-language magazine, Nawai Afghan Jihad, to, inter alia, decry China’s repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang and its “alleged complicity in perpetrating violence against Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslims”.[63] In Bangladesh, by exploiting social networking platforms, the group Dawlatul Islam-Bengal appeared to be “building a virtual structure in which members are encouraged to carry out subversive activities” towards “establishing the so-called Caliphate”.[64]
In Indonesia, the police broke up the Annajiyah Media Centre, “a digital pro-IS propaganda group that targeted the Indonesian audience and encouraged people to take up jihad”.[65] In Malaysia, the continuing importance of messaging platforms such as Telegram and WhatsApp for sustaining “online pro-IS communities” was underscored.[66]
Places
2022 also reinforced the important role played by places – physical safe spaces where extremist groups could function relatively freely and engage in training, recruitment and propaganda activities. A July report by the United Nations (UN) in this respect noted that the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) had “rebuilt several strongholds” in Badakhshan, north-east Afghanistan, with “the aim of improving its capabilities for terrorist activities”.[67]
In Indonesia, attempts were made by militants to engage with “JAD’s branch in Riau to source a location for i’dad, or physical training”. Moreover, despite assessments of the group’s demise, “community support for MIT in Poso, Sulawesi, where its operations have long been concentrated”, remained high.[68] In Mindanao, militants from the Dawlah Islamiyah-Maute Group (DIMG) remained “supported by relatives and locals” in certain localities in the Lanao region where they were “able to hide among the civilian population” and recruit.[69]
The Evolving Extreme Right Threat[70]
The extreme right can be understood as comprising groups and individuals that espouse “at least three of the following five features: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and strong state advocacy”, while the far right can be regarded as referring to the “political manifestation of the extreme right”.[71] Certainly, the relatively close nexus between extreme right social movements and far right political entities continued to be a distinct feature of Western, Buddhist and Hindu extreme right movements in 2022.
Western Extreme Right
In 2022, five developments within the Western extreme right appeared notable. First was the “ongoing mainstreaming of far right political movements in various Western countries”, which promoted a climate of “perceived intolerance and social tension” that was likely “conducive to violent interpretation”.[72] Second, the “malleability of extreme right narratives” continued to facilitate the absorption of “a variety of ideologies into its fold”, rendering precise classification of the extreme right very challenging.[73] Third, a “mix of socio-political issues specific to the societies the extreme right groups are based in”, together with issues such as “the Ukraine war, climate change and China’s growing geopolitical assertiveness”, dominated Western extreme right online platforms. Fourth, in 2022, the ongoing war in Ukraine had yet to become the much-feared “magnet for the extreme right to fight, train and gain experience which they could then translate into terrorist attacks back home”.[74] Fifth, it was clear that Western extreme right activists were leaning towards Russia and Putin – who was seen as the “champion for the rights of the Christian, non-LGBTQ+ and non-minority people”.[75]
Hindutva Extreme Right
In 2022, Hindutva activists in India “targeted Muslims, their homes, shops and worship places as well as their culture and way of life”.[76] Such incidents, worryingly, represented “decentralised mob action”, executed not on the directives of “distant leaders but by millions of little people in towns and cities”.[77] The seemingly spontaneous “violent targeting of Muslims” by mobs influenced by the Hindutva extreme right, appeared to have been enabled by an “extremist ecosystem that radicalises people online, in the media and on the streets”, facilitated somewhat by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government’s indifferent attitude”.[78]
Buddhist Extreme Right
In Sri Lanka, Sinhala Buddhist extreme right sentiments remained entrenched in the political arena, casting doubt on the prospects for “genuine and sustainable inter-ethnic reconciliation”.[79] In June, then President Gotabaya Rajapaksa extended the tenure of a national task force chaired by the controversial Buddhist monk Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara Thero, leader of the “Sinhala Buddhist nationalist organisation”, the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS), which has played a “leading role in anti-Muslim violence and spreading Islamophobia in Sri Lanka in recent years”.[80] Despite the Rajapaksa government’s collapse in July, the promotion of “Sinhala Buddhist nationalism” appeared to continue pervading Sri Lanka’s major political parties.[81]
State Responses? A Mix of ‘Hard’ and ‘Soft’ Measures Still the Key
Given the challenging transnational terrorism and extremism landscape in 2022, how should governments and other relevant stakeholders respond? In essence, the 2022 survey reiterates the critical importance of a judicious blend of hard short-term and softer medium- to longer-term approaches to deal comprehensively with the full spectrum of the terrorism/extremism threat going forward.[82]
Hard Measures
Legislation
Strong counter terrorist legislation remains a key measure to deal with the evolving terrorism/extremism threat. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, for instance, empowers the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs to designate particular individuals as “terrorists” for activities including “training and radicalising youth” as well as executing and coordinating terror attacks.[83] In Indonesia, the 2018 Counter-Terrorism Law, which permits the police to impose more frequent preventive detentions of terror suspects and extends the pre-trial detention period from 120 to 200 days, is said to have strengthened counter terrorist policing in that country.[84] In Malaysia, the utility of laws like the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2015 was reaffirmed, especially in the context of “enabling the police to carry out investigations into complex offences such as terrorism and organised crime”, which mainly involve “large networks and multiple individuals”.[85] Such laws need to be applied even-handedly though. In India, for instance, it was observed that while the “government was swift in arresting Muslims involved in violence, little action was taken against Hindutva extremists”.[86]
Decapitation Strategy
The 2022 survey suggests that the ‘hard’ tactic of leadership decapitation is a potentially effective measure to neutralise threat groups in some circumstances. The elimination of “charismatic leaders” from both the local “AQ and IS factions” has rendered the “Malaysian terror landscape” leaderless since 2019”.[87] In Mindanao, the Dawlah Islamiyah Sulu, previously led by Hajan Sawadjaan, had been the “Philippines’ most active terrorist group” from 2019 to 2020. However, following Sawadjaan’s elimination in 2020, the group has not recovered.[88] In Bangladesh, the authorities were seeking to capture the AQ-aligned Ansar al Islam (AAI) leader Sayed Mohammad Ziaul Haque. Officials assessed that it “would be challenging” to bring the relatively well-organised AAI “under control” until Haque is caught.[89]
Leadership decapitation seemed less effective in the MENA region though. The “US’ decapitation” of AQ and IS leaders in 2022 did little to “eradicate the jihadist networks’ ideological vigour and operational capability”.[90] Similarly, in Pakistan, the arrest of Gulzar Imam, the head of the newly formed Baloch Nationalist Army, was assessed as “unlikely to weaken the Baloch insurgency at the strategic level”.[91]
Enhancing Operational Capabilities
Implementing effective ‘hard’ measures presupposes a strong national counter terrorist machinery. In 2022, for example, Pakistan gave the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), a lead role in the new CT policy instead of the military, empowering NACTA to “coordinate with provincial Counter Terrorism Departments in implementing the new CT strategy”.[92] In Indonesia, the “expanded crackdowns on terrorist suspects” aptly demonstrated the police CT force Densus 88’s “improved surveillance and monitoring capabilities”, including in “cyberspace and in detecting propagandists, potential perpetrators and attack plots”.[93] In Malaysia, the Eastern Sabah Security Command “beefed up its operations along Malaysia’s eastern maritime borders, particularly off the coast of Sabah”, while the Royal Malaysia Police “reportedly made plans to deploy a commando team” to Sabah’s east coast to “counter maritime threats in the area, particularly from the ASG”.[94] In an alternative approach, China is increasingly outsourcing physical security by “relying on Chinese contractors from state-owned security firms” to protect Chinese investments in “volatile regions”.[95]
International Collaboration
International collaboration also enhances ‘hard’ CT capacity, and it was notable in 2022 that Pakistan and the US resumed their CT cooperation, with Islamabad assisting the US “by reconstituting its human intelligence resources and keeping its airspace open over Balochistan” for over-the-horizon drone strikes in Afghanistan.[96] Central Asian governments enhanced CT collaboration with the US as well: in 2022, there were intensified efforts by the United States to “strengthen its ‘overwatch’ capability of Afghanistan from the region”.[97] In maritime Southeast Asia, the Philippine government sought to enhance its CT capacity by participating in cross-border collaborations, such as with the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Contact Group on the Sulu and Celebes Seas, “which aims to develop better responses to a range of maritime crimes in the area”.[98] The Trilateral Cooperative Agreement between the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia has also “enhanced capacity-building to interdict non-conventional maritime threats” in the region.[99] In October, as part of a new multi-agency national counter terrorism financing strategy, the Singapore government identified the need for “International Partnerships and Cooperation” to help address concerns over the “ease and speed with which cross-border money transfers” occur, given Singapore’s status as a global financial and transport hub in “close proximity to countries vulnerable to terrorist activity”.[100]
Prison Systems
The 2022 survey reiterated the importance of adequate resourcing of prison systems for the effective control and rehabilitation of terrorist detainees. In the Bangladeshi context, there was concern that some Islamist militant leaders were trying to manage their networks from jail.[101] In Indonesia, the “issue of overcrowded and understaffed prisons” persisted.[102]
Soft Measures
Building Community Resilience to Extremist Ideology
2022 further underscored the importance of complementing the aforementioned ‘hard’ measures by fostering ‘softer’ approaches, including building community resilience to extremist ideology of all stripes. One critical element of building community resilience remains effective counter-narratives.[103] Another important measure is inclusive dialogue with key groups: in India, while the BJP government clamped down on Islamist mobilisation by banning the Popular Front of India and its affiliates, it was noted that simply “outlawing organisations does not end extremism”, as it only encourages “the formation of new outfits with different names”.[104] Rather, building community resilience to extremist ideas must include pursuing “political processes and inclusive dialogue with marginalised groups”.[105]
An inclusive strategy was seen in Malaysia, where the police’s Special Branch “emphasised a whole-of-nation approach” in building community resilience, engaging “members of civil society, such as teachers and community leaders”.[106] Likewise, in Indonesia, one of the pillars of the National Action Plan Against Extremism blueprint enacted in 2021, apart from enhancing whole-of-government coordination in Jakarta, has been fostering community resilience by “ensuring the active involvement of CSOs and local governments”.[107] In Singapore, in April, the case of an Australian national who was convicted of a criminal act judged to have been “religiously aggravated” and motivated by “hostility toward Muslims”, reinforced the need for continued vigilance in fostering community resilience, as issues “around race and religion remain potential fault lines in the Singapore context”, which can readily be “manipulated” by extremists.[108]
Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes
The year 2022 also reinforced the continuing relevance of effective rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for militants and returnees. In Central Asia, Tajikistan repatriated 146 women and children from camps in Syria, while Kyrgyzstan pondered undertaking another repatriation exercise of children from the camps as well. It was acknowledged that the risk of recidivism amongst Central Asian returnees must be managed.[109] In Indonesia, it was observed that “aspects of the state’s deradicalisation and reintegration programmes remain underdeveloped”, suffering from a “lack of adequate evaluation, monitoring and risk assessment tools”, apart from “poor coordination between the state, local agencies and civil society organisations”.[110] More positively, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) government created “multisector surrender programmes that provide strong incentives for militants to surrender”, involving financial incentives and vocational training, to induce militants to lay down arms and pledge allegiance to the BARMM government.[111]
Addressing Medium- to Longer-Term Structural Grievances
Finally, it was clear again throughout 2022 that serious engagement with underlying structural grievances remained important to effectively mitigate terrorist and extremist threats, regardless of ideological stripe. India showed the way somewhat; with the improving security situation in the north-east since 2014, the government took two major decisions: the powerful Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958 was repealed, while the army withdrew from its counterinsurgency role in several districts of Assam, Nagaland and Manipur. These two policy decisions adroitly “addressed a key demand of the people of the Northeast”.[112]
Positive signs were also witnessed in Mindanao, the Philippines, where in September the leaders of the two key Muslim separatist organisations, the Moro National Liberation Front and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, discussed the future of the BARMM, acknowledged “the reconciliatory position” of new Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, and pledged to support “a genuine and inclusive peace not just in the BARMM but also throughout the country”.[113] Likewise, in the Thai Deep South, a key highlight of 2022 was renewed peace talks that “achieved a breakthrough” with negotiations poised to shift “from procedural matters” to “more substantive issues” – including greater inclusiveness of all relevant stakeholders in public discussions, the reduction of violence and, more ambitiously, a political settlement involving “power devolution, democracy and the recognition of the distinct cultural identities of the people of Patani”.[114]
In general, though, the 2022 survey shows that much remains to be done to address structural grievances across the board. In Pakistan, for example, the ethnonationalist Baloch insurgency – whose “centre of gravity” has shifted from the Baloch tribes to the educated tech- and social media-savvy youth of the urban middle-class – is driven by “political marginalisation and socioeconomic deprivation”, resulting in a “more radical form of Baloch nationalism”.[115] In the MENA region, a significant “state-society dichotomy” continued to dominate the geopolitical landscape. In short, all the Middle Eastern states, including Israel, “experienced polarisation between forces of the status quo”, which seek “incremental change as befitting their hold on power”, and “forces of change” seeking “a reformation of their states and societies”.[116] In Sri Lanka, it was observed that the “main threat to national security” results from the “ongoing economic crisis”, which has “severely deprived swathes of the population of access to food, health, education and a livelihood”.[117]
In Southeast Asia, where the overall security situation was generally better, issues remained. For example, frustrations over Mindanao’s lack of development, particularly in Marawi City – still yet to fully recover from the May-October 2017 conflict between the military and jihadist groups – “could still be exploited” by pro-IS threat groups to “fuel recruitment” amongst “aggrieved local communities”.[118] In the Thai Deep South, ongoing instances of wisaman khattakam, a Thai term meaning death “at the hands of state officials who claim to have acted in the line of duty”, fomented Muslim discontent.[119] Deep structural grievances will continue to drive armed conflict in Myanmar, not least in the Rakhine State. While the military regime will likely continue deploying significant firepower to preserve Myanmar’s territorial integrity, the well-armed Arakan Army will remain equally intent on violently “asserting its control in Rakhine State” to create “an autonomous region”.[120]
Going forward, it is likely that as COVID-19-related movement restrictions continue easing in 2023 and cross-border travel intensifies, “this could prompt a surge in terrorist movement and activities, including around Southeast Asia”.[121] Ominously, in December 2022, a suicide bomber reportedly linked to the pro-IS militant group JAD, attacked a police station in the Indonesian city of Bandung, killing a police officer.[122] It would thus be advisable to take heed of an audiotape released in September by the pro-IS Al-Furqan media, in which IS called on “Muslims in Singapore, along with those in other Asian states, to come forward to join” it.[123] As such, continued vigilance would be needed to safeguard societies against the evolving threat of terrorism and extremism, both in Southeast Asia, and further afield.
About the Author
Kumar Ramakrishna is Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He was previously Head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, and is currently its Research Advisor. He can be reached at [email protected].
Citations
[1] See Nodirbek Soliev and Raffaelo Pantucci, “Central Asia,” in this volume.
[2] Jeff Seldin, “Afghan Terror Groups Pose Limited Threat to US, Assessments Find”, VoA, November 17, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/afghan-terror-groups-pose-limited-threat-to-us-assessments-find/6839772.html.
[3] Soliev and Pantucci, “Central Asia.”
[4] See Shanthie Mariet D’Souza, “Afghanistan,” in this volume.
[5] See Abdul Basit, “Pakistan,” in this volume.
[6] D’Souza, “Afghanistan.”
[7] Ibid.
[8] See Muhammad Haniff Hassan, Mahfuh Bin Haji Halimi, Muhammad Saiful Alam Shah Bin Sudiman and Ahmad Saiful Rijal Bin Hassan, “Perpetrating Militant Jihadist Ideological Narratives,” in this volume.
[9] See Amin Saikal, “The Middle East: A Region of Serious Problems and Dilemmas,” in this volume.
[10] D’Souza, “Afghanistan.”
[11] Ibid.
[12] Seldin, “Afghan Terror Groups.”
[13] Soliev and Pantucci, “Central Asia.”
[14] Seldin, “Afghan Terror Groups.”
[15] See Stefanie Kam, “China,” in this volume.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Saikal, “The Middle East.”
[18] Ibid.
[19] See Unaesah Rahmah and Amresh Lavan Gunasingham, “Indonesia,” in this volume.
[20] Ibid.
[21] See Rueben Dass and Jasminder Singh, “Malaysia,” in this volume.
[22] Ibid.
[23] See Kenneth Yeo, “Philippines,” in this volume.
[24] See Rungrawee Chalermsripinyorat, “Thailand,” in this volume.
[25] See Benjamin Mok and Iftekharul Bashar, “Myanmar,” in this volume.
[26] D’Souza, “Afghanistan.”
[27] Ibid.
[28] See Iftekharul Bashar, “Bangladesh,” in Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Vol. 14, No. 1 (January 2022).
[29] Ministry of Home Affairs, 20th Anniversary of ISD’s Operations Against Jemaah Islamiyah in Singapore (Singapore: MHA, 2021), https://www.mha.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/20th-anniversary-of-isd-operations-against-ji-in-singapore.pdf.
[30] Dass and Singh, “Malaysia.”
[31] Yeo, “Philippines.”
[32] See Kalicharan Veera Singam and Abigail Leong, “Singapore,” in this volume.
[33] Hassan et al., “Perpetrating Militant Jihadist Ideological Narratives.”
[34] Basit, “Pakistan.”
[35] Ibid.
[36] Soliev and Pantucci, “Central Asia.”
[37] See Sudha Ramachandran, “India,” in this volume.
[38] Mok and Bashar, “Myanmar.”
[39] Ibid.
[40] Dass and Singh, “Malaysia.”
[41] D’Souza, “Afghanistan.”
[42] Basit, “Pakistan.”
[43] Ramachandran, “India.”
[44] Kam, “China.”
[45] Basit, “Pakistan.”
[46] Rahmah and Gunasingham, “Indonesia.”
[47] Chalermsripinyorat, “Thailand.”
[48] Mok and Bashar, “Myanmar.”
[49] Seldin, “Afghan Terror Groups.”
[50] Dass and Singh, “Malaysia.”
[51] Singam and Leong, “Singapore.”
[52] Rahmah and Gunasingham, “Indonesia.”
[53] Ramachandran, “India.”
[54] See Iftekharul Bashar, “Bangladesh,” in this volume.
[55] Mok and Bashar, “Myanmar.”
[56] Chalermsripinyorat, “Thailand.”
[57] See Raffaello Pantucci and Kalicharan Veera Singam, “Extreme Right in the West: In a Transition?” in this volume.
[58] Kumar Ramakrishna, “Countering the Threat of Islamist Extremism in Southeast Asia,” The Straits Times, July 19, 2021.
[59] Rahmah and Gunasingham, “Indonesia.” Some analysts question whether the volte-face of these ideologues was genuine. See Bilveer Singh, “Is Abu Bakar Bashir Really Walking Away from Violent Extremism?” The Diplomat, August 31, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/is-abu-bakar-bashir-really-walking-away-from-violent-extremism/.
[60] Kumar Ramakrishna, “Why Singapore Needs to Keep out Indonesian Preacher Abdul Somad’s Extremism,” TODAY, May 26, 2022, https://www.todayonline.com/commentary/commentary-why-singapore-needs-keep-out-indonesian-preacher-abdul-somads-extremism-1908671.
[61] Basit, “Pakistan.”
[62] Soliev and Pantucci, “Central Asia.”
[63] Kam, “China.”
[64] Bashar, “Bangladesh.”
[65] Rahmah and Gunasingham, “Indonesia.”
[66] Dass and Singh, “Malaysia.”
[67] Kam, “China.”
[68] Rahmah and Gunasingham, “Indonesia.”
[69] Yeo, “Philippines.”
[70] In this volume, only the Western extreme right has a single chapter devoted to it. The Buddhist and Hindu extreme right are examined as part of the Sri Lanka and India chapters, respectively.
[71] Julia Ebner, Going Dark: The Secret Social Lives of Extremists (London: Bloomsbury, 2020), p. 288.
[72] Pantucci and Singam, “Extreme Right in the West.”
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ramachandran, “India.”
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.
[79] See Rajni Nayanthara Gamage, “Sri Lanka,” in this volume.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.
[82] See Kumar Ramakrishna, “US Strategy in Southeast Asia: Counter-Terrorist or Counter-Terrorism?” in After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia, ed. by Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan (Singapore: World Scientific/Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2003), p. 306.
[83] Ramachandran, “India.”
[84] Rahmah and Gunasingham, “Indonesia.”
[85] Dass and Singh, “Malaysia.”
[86] Ramachandran, “India.”
[87] Dass and Singh, “Malaysia.”
[88] Yeo, “Philippines.”
[89] Bashar, “Bangladesh.”
[90] Saikal, “The Middle East.”
[91] Basit, “Pakistan.”
[92] Ibid.
[93] Rahmah and Gunasingham, “Indonesia.”
[94] Dass and Singh, “Malaysia.”
[95] Kam, “China.”
[96] Basit, “Pakistan.”
[97] Soliev and Pantucci, “Central Asia.”
[98] Yeo, “Philippines.”
[99] Ibid.
[100] Singam and Leong, “Singapore.”
[101] Bashar, “Bangladesh.”
[102] Rahmah and Gunasingham, “Indonesia.”
[103] Hassan et al., “Perpetrating Militant Jihadist Ideological Narratives.”
[104] Ramachandran, “India.”
[105] Ibid.
[106] Dass and Singh, “Malaysia.”
[107] Rahmah and Gunasingham, “Indonesia.”
[108] Singam and Leong, “Singapore.”
[109] Soliev and Pantucci, “Central Asia.”
[110] Rahmah and Gunasingham, “Indonesia.”
[111] Yeo, “Philippines.”
[112] Ramachandran, “India.”
[113] Yeo, “Philippines.”
[114] Chalermsripinyorat, “Thailand.”
[115] Basit, “Pakistan.”
[116] Saikal, “The Middle East.”
[117] Gamage, “Sri Lanka.”
[118] Yeo, “Philippines.”
[119] Chalermsripinyorat, “Thailand.”
[120] Mok and Bashar, “Myanmar.”
[121] Singam and Leong, “Singapore.”
[122] See “Indonesia Suicide Bombing Kills Police Officer; Attacker Leaves Note Criticising New Criminal Code”, Channel News Asia, December 7, 2022, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/indonesia-suicide-bombing-police-station-bandung-criminal-code-3127446.
[123] Singam and Leong, “Singapore.”
