• Home
  • About RSIS
    • Introduction
    • Building the Foundations
    • Welcome Message
    • Board of Governors
    • Staff Profiles
      • Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
      • Dean’s Office
      • Management
      • Distinguished Fellows
      • Faculty and Research
      • Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
      • Visiting Fellows
      • Adjunct Fellows
      • Administrative Staff
    • Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
    • RSIS Endowment Fund
    • Endowed Professorships
    • Career Opportunities
    • Getting to RSIS
  • Research
    • Research Centres
      • Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
      • Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
      • Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)
      • Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
      • International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
    • Research Programmes
      • National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
      • Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
    • Future Issues and Technology Cluster
    • [email protected] Newsletter
    • Other Research
      • Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
    • Graduate Programmes Office
    • Overview
    • MSc (Asian Studies)
    • MSc (International Political Economy)
    • MSc (International Relations)
    • MSc (Strategic Studies)
    • NTU-Warwick Double Masters Programme
    • PhD Programme
    • Exchange Partners and Programmes
    • How to Apply
    • Financial Assistance
    • Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
    • RSIS Alumni
  • Alumni & Networks
    • Alumni
    • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
    • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
    • International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
    • SRP Executive Programme
    • Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
  • Publications
    • RSIS Publications
      • Annual Reviews
      • Books
      • Bulletins and Newsletters
      • Commentaries
      • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
      • Commemorative / Event Reports
      • IDSS Paper
      • Interreligious Relations
      • Monographs
      • NTS Insight
      • Policy Reports
      • Working Papers
      • RSIS Publications for the Year
    • Glossary of Abbreviations
    • External Publications
      • Authored Books
      • Journal Articles
      • Edited Books
      • Chapters in Edited Books
      • Policy Reports
      • Working Papers
      • Op-Eds
      • External Publications for the Year
    • Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
  • Media
    • Great Powers
    • Sustainable Security
    • Other Resource Pages
    • Media Highlights
    • News Releases
    • Speeches
    • Vidcast Channel
    • Audio/Video Forums
  • Events
  • Giving
  • Contact Us
Facebook
Twitter
YouTube
RSISVideoCast RSISVideoCast rsis.sg
Linkedin
instagram instagram rsis.sg
RSS
  • Home
  • About RSIS
      • Introduction
      • Building the Foundations
      • Welcome Message
      • Board of Governors
      • Staff Profiles
        • Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
        • Dean’s Office
        • Management
        • Distinguished Fellows
        • Faculty and Research
        • Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
        • Visiting Fellows
        • Adjunct Fellows
        • Administrative Staff
      • Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
      • RSIS Endowment Fund
      • Endowed Professorships
      • Career Opportunities
      • Getting to RSIS
  • Research
      • Research Centres
        • Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
        • Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
        • Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)
        • Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
        • International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      • Research Programmes
        • National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
        • Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      • Future Issues and Technology Cluster
      • [email protected] Newsletter
      • Other Research
        • Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      • Graduate Programmes Office
      • Overview
      • MSc (Asian Studies)
      • MSc (International Political Economy)
      • MSc (International Relations)
      • MSc (Strategic Studies)
      • NTU-Warwick Double Masters Programme
      • PhD Programme
      • Exchange Partners and Programmes
      • How to Apply
      • Financial Assistance
      • Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
      • RSIS Alumni
  • Alumni & Networks
      • Alumni
      • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
      • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
      • International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
      • SRP Executive Programme
      • Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
  • Publications
      • RSIS Publications
        • Annual Reviews
        • Books
        • Bulletins and Newsletters
        • Commentaries
        • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
        • Commemorative / Event Reports
        • IDSS Paper
        • Interreligious Relations
        • Monographs
        • NTS Insight
        • Policy Reports
        • Working Papers
        • RSIS Publications for the Year
      • Glossary of Abbreviations
      • External Publications
        • Authored Books
        • Journal Articles
        • Edited Books
        • Chapters in Edited Books
        • Policy Reports
        • Working Papers
        • Op-Eds
        • External Publications for the Year
      • Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
  • Media
      • Great Powers
      • Sustainable Security
      • Other Resource Pages
      • Media Highlights
      • News Releases
      • Speeches
      • Vidcast Channel
      • Audio/Video Forums
  • Events
  • Giving
  • Contact Us
  • instagram instagram rsis.sg
Connect

Getting to RSIS

Map

Address

Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B3,
50 Nanyang Avenue,
Singapore 639798

View location on Google maps Click here for directions to RSIS

Get in Touch

    Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
    RSISVideoCast RSISVideoCast rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
    instagram instagram rsis.sg
      RSS
    Subscribe to RSIS Publications
    Subscribe to RSIS Events

    RSIS Intranet

    S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
    Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University

    Skip to content

     
    • RSIS
    • Publication
    • RSIS Publications
    • CO15082 | Expanding Maritime Patrols in Southeast Asia
    • Annual Reviews
    • Books
    • Bulletins and Newsletters
    • Commentaries
    • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
    • Commemorative / Event Reports
    • IDSS Paper
    • Interreligious Relations
    • Monographs
    • NTS Insight
    • Policy Reports
    • Working Papers
    • RSIS Publications for the Year

    CO15082 | Expanding Maritime Patrols in Southeast Asia
    Euan Graham

    07 April 2015

    download pdf
    RSIS Commentary is a platform to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy-relevant commentary and analysis of topical and contemporary issues. The authors’ views are their own and do not represent the official position of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced with prior permission from RSIS and due credit to the author(s) and RSIS. Please email to Editor RSIS Commentary at [email protected].

    Synopsis

    Coordinated patrols by littoral states are credited with containing piracy and armed robbery in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. What are the prospects for their enhancement?

    Commentary

    ATTENTION FROM various quarters is currently focused on the possible expansion of counter-piracy sea patrols in Southeast Asia. There are several strands and potential modalities to this, not all of which have been reported accurately.

    Three basic options have been suggested: an ASEAN-led maritime force for counter-piracy and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR); observer status for Myanmar in the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP); and counter-piracy patrols east of Singapore.

    An ASEAN-led Maritime Force?

    In March, Vice Admiral Robert Thomas, Commander of the US Seventh Fleet, was reported by media to have mooted the establishment of an “ASEAN-led maritime force” in the South China Sea. His remarks at the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace exhibition were made during a panel discussion on how to address the spread of piracy to the south-western reaches of the South China Sea.

    However, international media reports conflated this with earlier comments suggesting that Japan could in future expand its naval and air presence into the South China Sea, and appeared to infer US support for a more expansive patrol concept for Southeast Asian navies in the context of maritime territorial disputes with China.

    The ease with which such statements can be taken out of context highlights the difficulty in differentiating issues of maritime security from strategic factors in the South China Sea. This “ambiguity problem” has also reinforced Southeast Asian countries’ caution about embracing maritime security initiatives at a collective level in the South China Sea for fear of “offending” China, or raising mutual sensitivities around sovereignty.

    As a result, like-minded ASEAN states have tended to pursue maritime capacity building and cooperation bilaterally or mini-laterally, while others travel at a slower pace, reflecting their less acute threat perceptions.

    US efforts to boost maritime security and domain awareness in Southeast Asia are broadly tailored to reflect this patchwork reality, with HADR providing a common denominator template for defence-led engagement across ASEAN’s various multilateral security forums. There is no indication that the US Navy is promoting a new maritime patrol initiative in the region, though “ASEAN-led” efforts towards a more concerted region-wide approach are generally welcomed and encouraged.

    Myanmar MSP observership?

    In a separate development, Malaysian Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein has invited Myanmar as an observer to the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) counter-piracy initiative. Established in 2004, the MSP – Southeast Asia’s best-known maritime security mini-lateral – has three components: i) the Malacca Strait Sea Patrol (MSSP); ii) Eyes in the Sky; and iii) the MSP Intelligence Exchange Group. Participation until now has been limited to the three littoral states: Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, plus Thailand which takes part in the aerial patrols.

    Although the coordinated patrols are often credited with containing piracy and armed robbery in the Strait, the paucity of public data on MSP activities makes an empirical judgement about their effectiveness impossible. Their major operational limitation is that the patrols are coordinated rather than joint, in deference to sovereignty concerns. The two other options for enhancing the MSP are: i) an expansion of their geographical remit, or ii) extending membership to the near-littorals and the ‘user’ community at large.

    Given Myanmar’s capabilities, observer status or full membership would be unlikely to contribute much to the MSP’s operational effectiveness. The invitation, extended under Malaysia’s ASEAN chairmanship, is nonetheless noteworthy as a nod towards the Indian Ocean, a traditional blind spot for ASEAN and the source of multiple maritime security challenges.

    Securing Myanmar’s cooperation in the outer approaches to the Malacca Strait could be aimed beyond counter-piracy, to include stemming the seaborne outflux of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar – a particular concern for Kuala Lumpur. However, Singapore and Indonesia have yet to signal their approval. Singapore’s maritime security focus lies currently to the east.

    Piracy patrols east of Singapore?

    Less in the public eye, Singapore has been exploring the possibility of introducing coordinated patrols east of the Singapore Strait including the nearby reaches of the South China Sea. This is in response to a rise in attacks on shipping including a spate of fuel syphoning incidents in the waters north of Indonesia’s Bintan island which lies near Singapore.

    A major shortcoming of the MSP’s geographical limitation is that the deterrent value of the sea patrols does not extend much beyond the Straits themselves. Since piracy is inherently mobile the threat may be displaced to the South China Sea. Singapore has received support from Malaysia and Vietnam, both of which have broader reasons for cross-bracing maritime security relations with their ASEAN partners in the South China Sea – underlining the blurring of non-state and inter-state factors there.

    However, Indonesia is unlikely to agree to an expansion of the MSP for two reasons. First, piracy continues to occupy a lower niche in Jakarta’s threat perceptions. Diverting resources to chase pirates in the near reaches of the South China Sea would be viewed as a distraction from the priority tasks associated with President Joko Widodo’s ‘Maritime Fulcrum’ aspirations, especially thwarting illegal foreign fishing in the archipelago.

    Second, the MSP remain coordinated rather than joint largely in deference to Jakarta’s unbowing reluctance to allow Singaporean or Malaysian vessels to patrol within the portions of the Straits that are Indonesia’s territorial waters. Rather than expanding the MSP to cover the south-western South China Sea, a free-standing coordinated patrol arrangement is more likely to fly, though Indonesian participation remains uncertain.

    HADR naval protocol?

    Unrelated to sea patrols but still relevant for “ASEAN-led” maritime cooperation is the ongoing development of an intra-ASEAN set of naval protocols for HADR. This initiative was proposed by the Philippine Navy at the ASEAN Chiefs of Navy Meeting (ACNM), in Manila in September 2013.

    It has since garnered support from Indonesia among others and a working group has delivered preliminary recommendations for the protocols, which may be formally adopted at the next ACNM in Myanmar this autumn. This could set an important inter-naval operational benchmark on a shared maritime interest in spite of the gulfs in capability and threat perceptions across ASEAN’s diverse membership.

    ASEAN-led naval and maritime security cooperation continues to move forward, though not yet to the level that would support a Southeast Asia-wide joint or coordinated patrol force, or even an expansion of the Malacca Strait Patrols. However, an ad hoc counter-piracy arrangement to cover the south-western South China Sea is within reach for ASEAN’s like-minded.

    About the Author

    Euan Graham is a Senior Fellow with the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

    Categories: Commentaries / Country and Region Studies / International Politics and Security / Maritime Security / East Asia and Asia Pacific / Southeast Asia and ASEAN

    Last updated on 29/01/2016

    RSIS Commentary is a platform to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy-relevant commentary and analysis of topical and contemporary issues. The authors’ views are their own and do not represent the official position of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced with prior permission from RSIS and due credit to the author(s) and RSIS. Please email to Editor RSIS Commentary at [email protected].

    Synopsis

    Coordinated patrols by littoral states are credited with containing piracy and armed robbery in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. What are the prospects for their enhancement?

    Commentary

    ATTENTION FROM various quarters is currently focused on the possible expansion of counter-piracy sea patrols in Southeast Asia. There are several strands and potential modalities to this, not all of which have been reported accurately.

    Three basic options have been suggested: an ASEAN-led maritime force for counter-piracy and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR); observer status for Myanmar in the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP); and counter-piracy patrols east of Singapore.

    An ASEAN-led Maritime Force?

    In March, Vice Admiral Robert Thomas, Commander of the US Seventh Fleet, was reported by media to have mooted the establishment of an “ASEAN-led maritime force” in the South China Sea. His remarks at the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace exhibition were made during a panel discussion on how to address the spread of piracy to the south-western reaches of the South China Sea.

    However, international media reports conflated this with earlier comments suggesting that Japan could in future expand its naval and air presence into the South China Sea, and appeared to infer US support for a more expansive patrol concept for Southeast Asian navies in the context of maritime territorial disputes with China.

    The ease with which such statements can be taken out of context highlights the difficulty in differentiating issues of maritime security from strategic factors in the South China Sea. This “ambiguity problem” has also reinforced Southeast Asian countries’ caution about embracing maritime security initiatives at a collective level in the South China Sea for fear of “offending” China, or raising mutual sensitivities around sovereignty.

    As a result, like-minded ASEAN states have tended to pursue maritime capacity building and cooperation bilaterally or mini-laterally, while others travel at a slower pace, reflecting their less acute threat perceptions.

    US efforts to boost maritime security and domain awareness in Southeast Asia are broadly tailored to reflect this patchwork reality, with HADR providing a common denominator template for defence-led engagement across ASEAN’s various multilateral security forums. There is no indication that the US Navy is promoting a new maritime patrol initiative in the region, though “ASEAN-led” efforts towards a more concerted region-wide approach are generally welcomed and encouraged.

    Myanmar MSP observership?

    In a separate development, Malaysian Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein has invited Myanmar as an observer to the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) counter-piracy initiative. Established in 2004, the MSP – Southeast Asia’s best-known maritime security mini-lateral – has three components: i) the Malacca Strait Sea Patrol (MSSP); ii) Eyes in the Sky; and iii) the MSP Intelligence Exchange Group. Participation until now has been limited to the three littoral states: Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, plus Thailand which takes part in the aerial patrols.

    Although the coordinated patrols are often credited with containing piracy and armed robbery in the Strait, the paucity of public data on MSP activities makes an empirical judgement about their effectiveness impossible. Their major operational limitation is that the patrols are coordinated rather than joint, in deference to sovereignty concerns. The two other options for enhancing the MSP are: i) an expansion of their geographical remit, or ii) extending membership to the near-littorals and the ‘user’ community at large.

    Given Myanmar’s capabilities, observer status or full membership would be unlikely to contribute much to the MSP’s operational effectiveness. The invitation, extended under Malaysia’s ASEAN chairmanship, is nonetheless noteworthy as a nod towards the Indian Ocean, a traditional blind spot for ASEAN and the source of multiple maritime security challenges.

    Securing Myanmar’s cooperation in the outer approaches to the Malacca Strait could be aimed beyond counter-piracy, to include stemming the seaborne outflux of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar – a particular concern for Kuala Lumpur. However, Singapore and Indonesia have yet to signal their approval. Singapore’s maritime security focus lies currently to the east.

    Piracy patrols east of Singapore?

    Less in the public eye, Singapore has been exploring the possibility of introducing coordinated patrols east of the Singapore Strait including the nearby reaches of the South China Sea. This is in response to a rise in attacks on shipping including a spate of fuel syphoning incidents in the waters north of Indonesia’s Bintan island which lies near Singapore.

    A major shortcoming of the MSP’s geographical limitation is that the deterrent value of the sea patrols does not extend much beyond the Straits themselves. Since piracy is inherently mobile the threat may be displaced to the South China Sea. Singapore has received support from Malaysia and Vietnam, both of which have broader reasons for cross-bracing maritime security relations with their ASEAN partners in the South China Sea – underlining the blurring of non-state and inter-state factors there.

    However, Indonesia is unlikely to agree to an expansion of the MSP for two reasons. First, piracy continues to occupy a lower niche in Jakarta’s threat perceptions. Diverting resources to chase pirates in the near reaches of the South China Sea would be viewed as a distraction from the priority tasks associated with President Joko Widodo’s ‘Maritime Fulcrum’ aspirations, especially thwarting illegal foreign fishing in the archipelago.

    Second, the MSP remain coordinated rather than joint largely in deference to Jakarta’s unbowing reluctance to allow Singaporean or Malaysian vessels to patrol within the portions of the Straits that are Indonesia’s territorial waters. Rather than expanding the MSP to cover the south-western South China Sea, a free-standing coordinated patrol arrangement is more likely to fly, though Indonesian participation remains uncertain.

    HADR naval protocol?

    Unrelated to sea patrols but still relevant for “ASEAN-led” maritime cooperation is the ongoing development of an intra-ASEAN set of naval protocols for HADR. This initiative was proposed by the Philippine Navy at the ASEAN Chiefs of Navy Meeting (ACNM), in Manila in September 2013.

    It has since garnered support from Indonesia among others and a working group has delivered preliminary recommendations for the protocols, which may be formally adopted at the next ACNM in Myanmar this autumn. This could set an important inter-naval operational benchmark on a shared maritime interest in spite of the gulfs in capability and threat perceptions across ASEAN’s diverse membership.

    ASEAN-led naval and maritime security cooperation continues to move forward, though not yet to the level that would support a Southeast Asia-wide joint or coordinated patrol force, or even an expansion of the Malacca Strait Patrols. However, an ad hoc counter-piracy arrangement to cover the south-western South China Sea is within reach for ASEAN’s like-minded.

    About the Author

    Euan Graham is a Senior Fellow with the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

    Categories: Commentaries / Country and Region Studies / International Politics and Security / Maritime Security

    Last updated on 29/01/2016

    Back to top

    Terms of Use | Privacy Statement
    Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
    This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
    OK
    Latest Book
    CO15082 | Expanding Maritime Patrols in Southeast Asia

    Synopsis

    Coordinated patrols by littoral states are credited with containing piracy and armed robbery in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. What are the pros ...
    more info