In 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 to counter the threat of terrorists obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD). All states are required to adopt legal and administrative measures to meet the threat. However, progress has been slow in Southeast Asia, with Singapore being an exception. There are several reasons for this. First, most states in the region do not consider WMD terrorism a significant threat as there has been no sign of its appearance over the years. Second, many states suffer from paucity of resources, technical knowledge and experience. Third, there is resistance in the region to priorities and measures being imposed on them under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which is backed by the possibility of sanctions being imposed for non-compliance. This goes against the grain of the ASEAN way, which prefers consensus on identifying problems and solutions. And fourth, there is resentment that major powers have set an agenda which identifies only part of the problem while ignoring the obligation of the Nuclear Weapons States to disarm.

Is the threat serious enough to override political inhibitions? Arguably, the threat of WMD terrorism does appear to be receding in Southeast Asia. Terrorist groups appear increasingly focused on local issues and their links with the major centres of terrorist violence in South and West Asia are arguably tenuous. However, the term WMD is misleading because it encourages us to think of high levels of technical sophistication. In fact, crude WMD in conjunction with conventional explosives are not difficult to produce, and materials – especially chemicals and radioactive substances – are widely available. These can have far- reaching effects as the spread of unseen materials like gas and radiation can produce panic and unpredictable mass responses. Though these are weapons of mass disruption rather than destruction, they do still have the potential to produce significant negative physical and political effects.

Current trends point to the seriousness of the threat. The WMD threshold was crossed in Iraq in February 2007 with the use of hybrid weapons combining conventional explosives with chlorine gas. Such attacks have been subsequently repeated. The use of WMD has been ideologically justified by jihadi ideologues and instructions for producing such weapons are freely available on the internet. Though these instructions are elementary and do not go far in helping to produce truly destructive weapons, they can be used to manufacture makeshift WMD with considerable disruptive potential. Terrorists anywhere can access these instructions and may be “inspired” by the crossing of the WMD threshold in Iraq. Another notable development has been the outflow of terrorist money and personnel from Iraq. According to intelligence reports, Al-Qaeda’s base in Pakistan is being strengthened by such flows. Thus, disturbingly, the possibility of similar flows reaching Southeast Asia cannot be ruled out.

Some states have sought technical and financial assistance for the implementation of Resolution 1540. But a major obstacle may be gaps in understanding between providers – often developed states with strong legal and technical infrastructures and resources – and developing countries – many lacking resources and technical knowledge. Specific problems are likely to be contextual, i.e., relevant to local conditions. ASEAN can tackle such problems effectively because its members are knowledgeable about regional conditions and constraints and because they are accustomed to collaboration over a long period of time. As such, ASEAN should establish a working group to discuss and resolve issues of common concern and provide assistance to states requiring technical (including legal) assistance. This would be similar to the ad hoc working group established at the Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism in February 2004. The group could share experiences, formulate models for best practices, develop a data base on legislative and administrative measures, and facilitate more effective intelligence exchanges. Singapore, which has been relatively successful in the implementation process, could play a leadership role in intra-regional outreach and as a link between the developed states and the region.