• Home
  • About RSIS
    • Introduction
    • Building the Foundations
    • Welcome Message
    • Board of Governors
    • Staff Profiles
      • Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
      • Dean’s Office
      • Management
      • Distinguished Fellows
      • Faculty and Research
      • Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
      • Visiting Fellows
      • Adjunct Fellows
      • Administrative Staff
    • Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
    • RSIS Endowment Fund
    • Endowed Professorships
    • Career Opportunities
    • Getting to RSIS
  • Research
    • Research Centres
      • Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
      • Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
      • Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)
      • Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
      • International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
    • Research Programmes
      • National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
      • Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
    • Future Issues and Technology Cluster
    • [email protected] Newsletter
    • Other Research
      • Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
    • Graduate Programmes Office
    • Overview
    • MSc (Asian Studies)
    • MSc (International Political Economy)
    • MSc (International Relations)
    • MSc (Strategic Studies)
    • NTU-Warwick Double Masters Programme
    • PhD Programme
    • Exchange Partners and Programmes
    • How to Apply
    • Financial Assistance
    • Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
    • RSIS Alumni
  • Alumni & Networks
    • Alumni
    • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
    • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
    • International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
    • SRP Executive Programme
    • Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
  • Publications
    • RSIS Publications
      • Annual Reviews
      • Books
      • Bulletins and Newsletters
      • Commentaries
      • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
      • Commemorative / Event Reports
      • IDSS Paper
      • Interreligious Relations
      • Monographs
      • NTS Insight
      • Policy Reports
      • Working Papers
      • RSIS Publications for the Year
    • Glossary of Abbreviations
    • External Publications
      • Authored Books
      • Journal Articles
      • Edited Books
      • Chapters in Edited Books
      • Policy Reports
      • Working Papers
      • Op-Eds
      • External Publications for the Year
    • Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
  • Media
    • Great Powers
    • Sustainable Security
    • Other Resource Pages
    • Media Highlights
    • News Releases
    • Speeches
    • Vidcast Channel
    • Audio/Video Forums
  • Events
  • Giving
  • Contact Us
Facebook
Twitter
YouTube
RSISVideoCast RSISVideoCast rsis.sg
Linkedin
instagram instagram rsis.sg
RSS
  • Home
  • About RSIS
      • Introduction
      • Building the Foundations
      • Welcome Message
      • Board of Governors
      • Staff Profiles
        • Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
        • Dean’s Office
        • Management
        • Distinguished Fellows
        • Faculty and Research
        • Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
        • Visiting Fellows
        • Adjunct Fellows
        • Administrative Staff
      • Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
      • RSIS Endowment Fund
      • Endowed Professorships
      • Career Opportunities
      • Getting to RSIS
  • Research
      • Research Centres
        • Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
        • Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
        • Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)
        • Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
        • International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      • Research Programmes
        • National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
        • Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      • Future Issues and Technology Cluster
      • [email protected] Newsletter
      • Other Research
        • Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      • Graduate Programmes Office
      • Overview
      • MSc (Asian Studies)
      • MSc (International Political Economy)
      • MSc (International Relations)
      • MSc (Strategic Studies)
      • NTU-Warwick Double Masters Programme
      • PhD Programme
      • Exchange Partners and Programmes
      • How to Apply
      • Financial Assistance
      • Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
      • RSIS Alumni
  • Alumni & Networks
      • Alumni
      • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
      • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
      • International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
      • SRP Executive Programme
      • Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
  • Publications
      • RSIS Publications
        • Annual Reviews
        • Books
        • Bulletins and Newsletters
        • Commentaries
        • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
        • Commemorative / Event Reports
        • IDSS Paper
        • Interreligious Relations
        • Monographs
        • NTS Insight
        • Policy Reports
        • Working Papers
        • RSIS Publications for the Year
      • Glossary of Abbreviations
      • External Publications
        • Authored Books
        • Journal Articles
        • Edited Books
        • Chapters in Edited Books
        • Policy Reports
        • Working Papers
        • Op-Eds
        • External Publications for the Year
      • Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
  • Media
      • Great Powers
      • Sustainable Security
      • Other Resource Pages
      • Media Highlights
      • News Releases
      • Speeches
      • Vidcast Channel
      • Audio/Video Forums
  • Events
  • Giving
  • Contact Us
  • instagram instagram rsis.sg
Connect

Getting to RSIS

Map

Address

Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B3,
50 Nanyang Avenue,
Singapore 639798

View location on Google maps Click here for directions to RSIS

Get in Touch

    Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
    RSISVideoCast RSISVideoCast rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
    instagram instagram rsis.sg
      RSS
    Subscribe to RSIS Publications
    Subscribe to RSIS Events

    RSIS Intranet

    S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
    Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University

    Skip to content

     
    • RSIS
    • Publication
    • RSIS Publications
    • CO10058 | The Korean Crisis: Going Beyond the Cheonan Incident
    • Annual Reviews
    • Books
    • Bulletins and Newsletters
    • Commentaries
    • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
    • Commemorative / Event Reports
    • IDSS Paper
    • Interreligious Relations
    • Monographs
    • NTS Insight
    • Policy Reports
    • Working Papers
    • RSIS Publications for the Year

    CO10058 | The Korean Crisis: Going Beyond the Cheonan Incident
    Chung Chong Wook

    01 June 2010

    download pdf
    RSIS Commentary is a platform to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy-relevant commentary and analysis of topical and contemporary issues. The authors’ views are their own and do not represent the official position of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced with prior permission from RSIS and due credit to the author(s) and RSIS. Please email to Editor RSIS Commentary at [email protected].

    Commentary

    The sinking of the Cheonan, for which South Korea blames Pyongyang, has triggered a crisis in the Korean peninsula. Though there is every reason to be pessimistic about the future, there is also a need to look beyond the crisis for long-term regional stability.

    SHARPLY RISING military tensions following the sinking of a South Korean naval corvette are creating a crisis in the Korean peninsula. It is not the first time that the Korean peninsula is engulfed in a crisis, but this one is different. There are good reasons to view the current crisis with grave concern. One is the nature of the crisis. The current imbroglio is not an unintended consequence of an accident. Nor was it an act of terrorism. It was what could be a carefully planned and well-executed act of war where a 1,200-tonne naval ship, the Cheonan, was blown into half, killing 46 soldiers — at least that is the conclusion in South Korea.

    The Nuclear Factor

    After a month-long investigation, the Seoul government announced that the ship was hit by a torpedo launched from a North Korean submarine. The evidence it produced included the tail part of the torpedo recovered from the bottom of the sea where the ship sank. President Lee Myung-bak, demanding the North’s apology, announced a series of measures suspending all inter-Korea cooperation except in the humanitarian area. North Korea, which earlier denied its involvement, immediately cut off almost all land, air and sea lines of communications with the South. It warned that any violation was to be dealt with by the wartime laws. It also placed its armed forces on special alert. The two Koreas appear to be heading for a serious military confrontation.

    Another factor that adds to the severity of the current crisis is the nuclear capability of the North.. Pyongyang is believed to have fissionable materials enough for up to ten plutonium bombs. Its two nuclear tests so far reinforced the possibility of all-out military flare-up involving nuclear weapons.

    The nuclear logic could certainly apply for deterring a war, but North Korea has proven that the rational logic of deterrence may not necessarily hold. Such is the risk of dealing with a desperate country whose brinkmanship tactics often defy the strategic calculus of its neighbours. The drastic decline in the South Korean stock market is indicative of how the situation is perceived. Despite all these ominous developments, however, premature pessimism is not advisable.

    The China Factor

    The key in assessing the security dynamics in the Korean peninsula is China whose policy has consistently been to avoid any serious military conflict there. What China fears is the prospect of serious social and political upheavals, even short of an open war between the two Koreas which could trigger a massive inflow of refugees, mostly poor and potentially violent, into China’s northeastern territory. Such a contingency might not only disrupt China’s economic growth but could result in the emergence of a unified Korea under the auspices of the South and the expansion of the military presence of its ally, the United States, right on its border. This strategic value of North Korea as a buffer as well as the political and economic consequences of the loss of this buffer has been at the heart of the Chinese strategic thinking toward the Korean peninsula.

    Recently the Chinese government has accorded an even higher priority to this strategy as the political and economic situation in North Korea seemed to be headed toward a critical point. Kim Jong-il’s bout with a stroke last August and his poor health since then led to the abrupt efforts in Pyongyang to arrange power succession by his third son, Kim Jong-un, who at 27 years old, has little experience in running the country. The timing could not have been worse. A series of economic mismanagement including the failure of the currency reform last November made the government lose its control over the market. The rising inflation led to incidences of open revolts.

    Power struggle?

    Experts in Seoul now pay close attention to signs of power struggle in Pyongyang that is usual during a power transition and extreme economic deprivation. They are very sensitive to the report that the military, particularly the hardliners in it, have gained a predominant position and are pushing for a confrontational policy toward the South. Many of them speculate that these hardliners were behind the Cheonan incident as they had been behind the nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. They point out to the recent reshuffle in the North’s military leadership which removed the moderates like Kim Il-Chul and promoted the hawkish generals. One of them was in charge of the naval fleet that the South believed was responsible for the torpedo attack on the Cheonan.

    China’s response was one of pragmatism. Some experts both in Seoul and Beijing believe that China has decided to support the dynastic succession in North Korea and live with any future leadership as long as it leads to peace and stability on its border. It may prefer a reform-minded leadership, but the immediate concern overrides more distant goals. For this purpose, China has recently begun to invest in North Korea in various infra-structural projects. It has also provided generous economic assistance of food and energy Pyongyang needs to keep the system afloat.

    In the foreign policy area, China’s patronage of North Korea has further been strengthened. The high- profile visit in early May by Kim Jong-il to three Chinese cities and the extravagant hospitality given to Kim in Beijing supports this view. The leaders of the two allies might have disagreed on domestic and external issues including the Cheonan incident but China’s political, economic and diplomatic support is not to be weakened as long as North Korea does not destroy peace and stability in the Korean peninsula.

    China may not cooperate with South Korea and the US in their attempt to adopt a resolution at the UN Security Council to punish North Korea but would allow the issue to be discussed there hoping this could moderate Pyongyang, its hawkish generals in particular. Meanwhile Beijing will discreetly exercise its economic and political leverage on Pyongyang to urge caution and less recklessness. Chinese commentaries reveal the thinking in Beijing that an all-out military confrontation with the South is not in the interests of Kim Jong-il either although a high degree of tension will certainly serve his domestic purpose.

    Beyond the Crisis

    Some Chinese experts seem to believe that domestic politics in South Korea may have a role in the current crisis. A local election is scheduled on 2 June in the South where all heads of local governments will be chosen for a new four-year-term. The Cheonan incident has had the net effect of assisting the ruling party in Seoul which tries to prove the naïvete of the “sunshine policy” of the previous administrations now mostly in the opposition camp. Whatever the validity of this belief, the incident permitted the ruling party to be on the offensive. These Chinese observers seem to hope that once the election is over, Seoul may not pursue the issue as vigorously.

    After all, the South has important international events to host such as the trilateral summit meeting with China and Japan at the end of May and most significantly the G-20 summit in November this year, a flagship event President Lee Myung-bak takes a great pride in hosting. These, plus other considerations such as the China factor, make a less pessimistic prescription of the current crisis fairly persuasive.

    But the real task is to go beyond the current crisis. This crisis should reinforce the need for further regional efforts to create a sustainable nuclear-free working system in the Korean peninsula where North Korea feels less insecure and China exercises influence beyond the status quo.

    About the Author

    Chung Chong Wook is Visiting Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Relations (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He was a professor of international relations at Seoul National University before joining the Kim Young Sam administration as national security advisor. He was also ambassador to China and has advised the Korean ministries of foreign affairs, defence and unification. 

    Categories: Commentaries / / East Asia and Asia Pacific

    Last updated on 10/10/2014

    RSIS Commentary is a platform to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy-relevant commentary and analysis of topical and contemporary issues. The authors’ views are their own and do not represent the official position of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced with prior permission from RSIS and due credit to the author(s) and RSIS. Please email to Editor RSIS Commentary at [email protected].

    Commentary

    The sinking of the Cheonan, for which South Korea blames Pyongyang, has triggered a crisis in the Korean peninsula. Though there is every reason to be pessimistic about the future, there is also a need to look beyond the crisis for long-term regional stability.

    SHARPLY RISING military tensions following the sinking of a South Korean naval corvette are creating a crisis in the Korean peninsula. It is not the first time that the Korean peninsula is engulfed in a crisis, but this one is different. There are good reasons to view the current crisis with grave concern. One is the nature of the crisis. The current imbroglio is not an unintended consequence of an accident. Nor was it an act of terrorism. It was what could be a carefully planned and well-executed act of war where a 1,200-tonne naval ship, the Cheonan, was blown into half, killing 46 soldiers — at least that is the conclusion in South Korea.

    The Nuclear Factor

    After a month-long investigation, the Seoul government announced that the ship was hit by a torpedo launched from a North Korean submarine. The evidence it produced included the tail part of the torpedo recovered from the bottom of the sea where the ship sank. President Lee Myung-bak, demanding the North’s apology, announced a series of measures suspending all inter-Korea cooperation except in the humanitarian area. North Korea, which earlier denied its involvement, immediately cut off almost all land, air and sea lines of communications with the South. It warned that any violation was to be dealt with by the wartime laws. It also placed its armed forces on special alert. The two Koreas appear to be heading for a serious military confrontation.

    Another factor that adds to the severity of the current crisis is the nuclear capability of the North.. Pyongyang is believed to have fissionable materials enough for up to ten plutonium bombs. Its two nuclear tests so far reinforced the possibility of all-out military flare-up involving nuclear weapons.

    The nuclear logic could certainly apply for deterring a war, but North Korea has proven that the rational logic of deterrence may not necessarily hold. Such is the risk of dealing with a desperate country whose brinkmanship tactics often defy the strategic calculus of its neighbours. The drastic decline in the South Korean stock market is indicative of how the situation is perceived. Despite all these ominous developments, however, premature pessimism is not advisable.

    The China Factor

    The key in assessing the security dynamics in the Korean peninsula is China whose policy has consistently been to avoid any serious military conflict there. What China fears is the prospect of serious social and political upheavals, even short of an open war between the two Koreas which could trigger a massive inflow of refugees, mostly poor and potentially violent, into China’s northeastern territory. Such a contingency might not only disrupt China’s economic growth but could result in the emergence of a unified Korea under the auspices of the South and the expansion of the military presence of its ally, the United States, right on its border. This strategic value of North Korea as a buffer as well as the political and economic consequences of the loss of this buffer has been at the heart of the Chinese strategic thinking toward the Korean peninsula.

    Recently the Chinese government has accorded an even higher priority to this strategy as the political and economic situation in North Korea seemed to be headed toward a critical point. Kim Jong-il’s bout with a stroke last August and his poor health since then led to the abrupt efforts in Pyongyang to arrange power succession by his third son, Kim Jong-un, who at 27 years old, has little experience in running the country. The timing could not have been worse. A series of economic mismanagement including the failure of the currency reform last November made the government lose its control over the market. The rising inflation led to incidences of open revolts.

    Power struggle?

    Experts in Seoul now pay close attention to signs of power struggle in Pyongyang that is usual during a power transition and extreme economic deprivation. They are very sensitive to the report that the military, particularly the hardliners in it, have gained a predominant position and are pushing for a confrontational policy toward the South. Many of them speculate that these hardliners were behind the Cheonan incident as they had been behind the nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. They point out to the recent reshuffle in the North’s military leadership which removed the moderates like Kim Il-Chul and promoted the hawkish generals. One of them was in charge of the naval fleet that the South believed was responsible for the torpedo attack on the Cheonan.

    China’s response was one of pragmatism. Some experts both in Seoul and Beijing believe that China has decided to support the dynastic succession in North Korea and live with any future leadership as long as it leads to peace and stability on its border. It may prefer a reform-minded leadership, but the immediate concern overrides more distant goals. For this purpose, China has recently begun to invest in North Korea in various infra-structural projects. It has also provided generous economic assistance of food and energy Pyongyang needs to keep the system afloat.

    In the foreign policy area, China’s patronage of North Korea has further been strengthened. The high- profile visit in early May by Kim Jong-il to three Chinese cities and the extravagant hospitality given to Kim in Beijing supports this view. The leaders of the two allies might have disagreed on domestic and external issues including the Cheonan incident but China’s political, economic and diplomatic support is not to be weakened as long as North Korea does not destroy peace and stability in the Korean peninsula.

    China may not cooperate with South Korea and the US in their attempt to adopt a resolution at the UN Security Council to punish North Korea but would allow the issue to be discussed there hoping this could moderate Pyongyang, its hawkish generals in particular. Meanwhile Beijing will discreetly exercise its economic and political leverage on Pyongyang to urge caution and less recklessness. Chinese commentaries reveal the thinking in Beijing that an all-out military confrontation with the South is not in the interests of Kim Jong-il either although a high degree of tension will certainly serve his domestic purpose.

    Beyond the Crisis

    Some Chinese experts seem to believe that domestic politics in South Korea may have a role in the current crisis. A local election is scheduled on 2 June in the South where all heads of local governments will be chosen for a new four-year-term. The Cheonan incident has had the net effect of assisting the ruling party in Seoul which tries to prove the naïvete of the “sunshine policy” of the previous administrations now mostly in the opposition camp. Whatever the validity of this belief, the incident permitted the ruling party to be on the offensive. These Chinese observers seem to hope that once the election is over, Seoul may not pursue the issue as vigorously.

    After all, the South has important international events to host such as the trilateral summit meeting with China and Japan at the end of May and most significantly the G-20 summit in November this year, a flagship event President Lee Myung-bak takes a great pride in hosting. These, plus other considerations such as the China factor, make a less pessimistic prescription of the current crisis fairly persuasive.

    But the real task is to go beyond the current crisis. This crisis should reinforce the need for further regional efforts to create a sustainable nuclear-free working system in the Korean peninsula where North Korea feels less insecure and China exercises influence beyond the status quo.

    About the Author

    Chung Chong Wook is Visiting Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Relations (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He was a professor of international relations at Seoul National University before joining the Kim Young Sam administration as national security advisor. He was also ambassador to China and has advised the Korean ministries of foreign affairs, defence and unification. 

    Categories: Commentaries

    Last updated on 10/10/2014

    Back to top

    Terms of Use | Privacy Statement
    Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
    This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
    OK
    Latest Book
    more info