• Home
  • About RSIS
    • Introduction
    • Building the Foundations
    • Welcome Message
    • Board of Governors
    • Staff Profiles
      • Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
      • Dean’s Office
      • Management
      • Distinguished Fellows
      • Faculty and Research
      • Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
      • Visiting Fellows
      • Adjunct Fellows
      • Administrative Staff
    • Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
    • RSIS Endowment Fund
    • Endowed Professorships
    • Career Opportunities
    • Getting to RSIS
  • Research
    • Research Centres
      • Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
      • Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
      • Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)
      • Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
      • International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
    • Research Programmes
      • National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
      • Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
    • [email protected] Newsletter
    • Other Research
      • Future Issues And Technology (FIT)
      • Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
    • Graduate Programmes Office
    • Overview
    • MSc (Asian Studies)
    • MSc (International Political Economy)
    • MSc (International Relations)
    • MSc (Strategic Studies)
    • NTU-Warwick Double Masters Programme
    • PhD Programme
    • Exchange Partners and Programmes
    • How to Apply
    • Financial Assistance
    • Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
    • RSIS Alumni
  • Alumni & Networks
    • Alumni
    • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
    • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
    • SRP Executive Programme
    • Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
  • Publications
    • RSIS Publications
      • Annual Reviews
      • Books
      • Bulletins and Newsletters
      • Commentaries
      • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
      • Commemorative / Event Reports
      • IDSS Paper
      • Interreligious Relations
      • Monographs
      • NTS Insight
      • Policy Reports
      • Working Papers
      • RSIS Publications for the Year
    • Glossary of Abbreviations
    • External Publications
      • Authored Books
      • Journal Articles
      • Edited Books
      • Chapters in Edited Books
      • Policy Reports
      • Working Papers
      • Op-Eds
      • External Publications for the Year
    • Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
  • Media
    • Cohesive Societies
    • Great Powers
    • Sustainable Security
    • COVID-19 Resources
    • Other Resource Pages
    • Media Highlights
    • News Releases
    • Speeches
    • Vidcast Channel
    • Audio/Video Forums
  • Events
  • Giving
  • Contact Us
Facebook
Twitter
YouTube
RSISVideoCast RSISVideoCast rsis.sg
Linkedin
instagram instagram rsis.sg
RSS
  • Home
  • About RSIS
      • Introduction
      • Building the Foundations
      • Welcome Message
      • Board of Governors
      • Staff Profiles
        • Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
        • Dean’s Office
        • Management
        • Distinguished Fellows
        • Faculty and Research
        • Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
        • Visiting Fellows
        • Adjunct Fellows
        • Administrative Staff
      • Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
      • RSIS Endowment Fund
      • Endowed Professorships
      • Career Opportunities
      • Getting to RSIS
  • Research
      • Research Centres
        • Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
        • Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
        • Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)
        • Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
        • International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      • Research Programmes
        • National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
        • Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      • [email protected] Newsletter
      • Other Research
        • Future Issues And Technology (FIT)
        • Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      • Graduate Programmes Office
      • Overview
      • MSc (Asian Studies)
      • MSc (International Political Economy)
      • MSc (International Relations)
      • MSc (Strategic Studies)
      • NTU-Warwick Double Masters Programme
      • PhD Programme
      • Exchange Partners and Programmes
      • How to Apply
      • Financial Assistance
      • Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
      • RSIS Alumni
  • Alumni & Networks
      • Alumni
      • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
      • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
      • SRP Executive Programme
      • Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
  • Publications
      • RSIS Publications
        • Annual Reviews
        • Books
        • Bulletins and Newsletters
        • Commentaries
        • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
        • Commemorative / Event Reports
        • IDSS Paper
        • Interreligious Relations
        • Monographs
        • NTS Insight
        • Policy Reports
        • Working Papers
        • RSIS Publications for the Year
      • Glossary of Abbreviations
      • External Publications
        • Authored Books
        • Journal Articles
        • Edited Books
        • Chapters in Edited Books
        • Policy Reports
        • Working Papers
        • Op-Eds
        • External Publications for the Year
      • Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
  • Media
      • Cohesive Societies
      • Great Powers
      • Sustainable Security
      • COVID-19 Resources
      • Other Resource Pages
      • Media Highlights
      • News Releases
      • Speeches
      • Vidcast Channel
      • Audio/Video Forums
  • Events
  • Giving
  • Contact Us
  • instagram instagram rsis.sg
Connect

Getting to RSIS

Map

Address

Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B3,
50 Nanyang Avenue,
Singapore 639798

View location on Google maps Click here for directions to RSIS

Get in Touch

    Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
    RSISVideoCast RSISVideoCast rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
    instagram instagram rsis.sg
      RSS
    Subscribe to RSIS Publications
    Subscribe to RSIS Events

    RSIS Intranet

    S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
    Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University

    Skip to content

     
    • RSIS
    • Publication
    • RSIS Publications
    • Singapore’s Food Security – Rethinking Self-Sufficiency: Lessons from Singapore’s Pig Farming Past
    • Annual Reviews
    • Books
    • Bulletins and Newsletters
    • Commentaries
    • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
    • Commemorative / Event Reports
    • IDSS Paper
    • Interreligious Relations
    • Monographs
    • NTS Insight
    • Policy Reports
    • Working Papers
    • RSIS Publications for the Year

    CO22088 | Singapore’s Food Security – Rethinking Self-Sufficiency: Lessons from Singapore’s Pig Farming Past
    Choo Ruizhi

    02 September 2022

    download pdf
    RSIS Commentary is a platform to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy-relevant commentary and analysis of topical and contemporary issues. The authors’ views are their own and do not represent the official position of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced with prior permission from RSIS and due credit to the author(s) and RSIS. Please email to Editor RSIS Commentary at [email protected].

    SYNOPSIS

    In 1984, Singapore shifted completely from pork self-sufficiency to meeting all its pork needs through imports. As Singapore turns toward boosting local food production, what insights can be gleaned from this shift from local production 38 years ago?

    Pig farm Vampula 9
    Pig farm, Wikimedia Commons

    COMMENTARY

    IN 1981, Singapore farmed nearly 1.25 million pigs annually. Its pig farms were among the most advanced and intensive in the world. The country was effectively self-sufficient in pork.

    In 1984, however, the Government announced that it would phase out pig farming. By 1989, all pig farms in Singapore had been closed down. Today, Singaporeans consume only imported pork. What were the drivers for this change?

    As Singapore steps up efforts to boost local food production to meet its ambitious “30-by-30” targets, what insights can be gleaned from Singapore’s historic decision to turn away from pork self-sufficiency?

    Policy Justifications

    In March 1984, then Deputy Prime Minister Goh Keng Swee announced in Parliament that pig farming in Singapore would be phased out.

    He noted the immense environmental and economic burdens of continuing pig farming. Raising pigs locally consumed valuable land, water, and energy resources. Conversely, importing pigs would not only be more economical for Singapore in the long run, but would also potentially bolster relations with supplier countries.

    While these were entirely valid justifications, the Primary Production Department (PPD – the government agency in the Ministry of National Development in charge of farming activities) had been dealing with these challenges for years and had developed many innovative solutions for them. For instance, experiments had been conducted into using pig waste to generate electricity, or recycling it into animal feed. Though the economic and environmental challenges of intensive pig farming were indeed complex, PPD officials had long worked closely with pig farmers to manage them.

    The government’s economic logic for phasing out Singapore’s pig farms was hence only part of the story. There was another more contentious dimension to this decision – the complicated relationship between the government and the local pig farming industry.

    Government and Domestic Pig Industry: A Complicated Relationship

    Between 1972 and 1984, government agencies clashed with industry players in at least six notable instances, over accusations of “blatant profiteering”, and artificial supply disruptions. This recurring “controversy over pork” attracted significant press coverage and public interest.

    Remarkably, such supply disruptions occurred even in times of surplus, as pig farmers and pork merchants alike sought to control local supplies and improve their revenues. As pig production came to be concentrated in a small number of large farms, the PPD found evidence of artificial shortages and “speculative manipulation” by pork merchants and influential farmers.

    In addition, the Singapore Pork Merchants’ Association (SPMA), which represented a significant portion of local pork retailers and butchers, refused on numerous occasions to slaughter pigs and sell fresh pork in local markets, taking extra rest days to “avoid losses”. Consequently, there was occasionally no fresh pork in the markets as the SPMA responded against what it perceived as various “unreasonable” state levies and fees.

    Although government officials decried industry players for their “most irresponsible” efforts to disrupt local pork supplies, these contestations also hinted at the difficulties of regulating the local pork sector.

    Hence, although Singapore was virtually “self-sufficient” in pork by 1977, and local farms were producing over a million pigs annually by 1980, pork prices continued to spike erratically throughout this period.

    Finally, in 1981, after years of disputes with local pig farmers and butchers, and price surges caused by artificial pork shortages, the government began highly publicised trial imports of pigs from a jointly-owned Singapore-Thai farm in Hat Yai, Thailand. Agreements were also finalised for additional pig shipments from Johor.

    Importing Pigs

    Officials stated that “the government would import more pigs from neighbouring countries to check blatant profiteering by pig farmers”. The increased supply of pork from overseas sources brought prices down, though the SPMA doubted the efficacy of such “temporary” measures.

    By March 1982, the increase in pig supplies had caused prices to plunge so precipitously that local farmers publicly implored the government to halt imports, and to let them sell their surplus pigs. Though the government eventually acquiesced to stabilise local pork prices, it also warned that it would continue importing pigs until local pig prices grew competitive again.

    After years of contentious clashes, the government had found a way to stabilise Singapore’s pork supplies and prices. Over the next few years, it conducted increasingly large-scale experiments into importing pork from different countries, leading Dr Goh to eventually conclude that “it is possible to supply the whole of our pork requirements through imports”.

    Though Dr Goh’s 1984 explanations in Parliament to phase out pig farming never referenced these tensions between public agencies and the pork industry, the government’s earliest experiments with importing foreign pigs can be traced to these clashes between the government and the private sector. The frequent supply disruptions and price hikes caused by the local pork industry had hence pushed the government to finding alternative sources of pork.

    Insights and Implications

    This brief account of Singapore’s pig farming past reminds us that although greater food self-sufficiency is a commendable aspiration for a country, it is also a far more complicated process than simply increasing supplies or boosting production capabilities. A small state’s food security is also dependent on the close relationships between the public and private sectors, cooperating toward shared objectives.

    Without such synergies, even increased local production might lead to disruptions in food supplies. Despite Singapore’s virtual pork self-sufficiency, the confluence of various unfavourable environmental, economic, and social factors ultimately spurred the government to explore more reliable and secure alternatives overseas.

    This additional historical context reminds us that there are also ‘softer’, social aspects to Singapore’s food security, emerging not just from technological breakthroughs, but from the quality of the relationships and interactions between government and other stakeholders from various domains.

    As Singapore strives toward developing more climate-resilient, scientifically advanced food systems to meet its “30-by-30” ambitions, it is also important to realise that a nation’s food security is also underwritten by the conviction, imagination, and cooperation among its citizens, corporate agencies, and policy community. A balanced approach with clear long-term vision is essential for securing the country’s future.

    About the Author

    Choo Ruizhi is a Senior Analyst with the National Security Studies Programme (NSSP), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.

    Categories: Commentaries / Country and Region Studies / General / Non-Traditional Security / East Asia and Asia Pacific / Global / South Asia / Southeast Asia and ASEAN

    Last updated on 05/09/2022

    comments powered by Disqus
    RSIS Commentary is a platform to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy-relevant commentary and analysis of topical and contemporary issues. The authors’ views are their own and do not represent the official position of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced with prior permission from RSIS and due credit to the author(s) and RSIS. Please email to Editor RSIS Commentary at [email protected].

    SYNOPSIS

    In 1984, Singapore shifted completely from pork self-sufficiency to meeting all its pork needs through imports. As Singapore turns toward boosting local food production, what insights can be gleaned from this shift from local production 38 years ago?

    Pig farm Vampula 9
    Pig farm, Wikimedia Commons

    COMMENTARY

    IN 1981, Singapore farmed nearly 1.25 million pigs annually. Its pig farms were among the most advanced and intensive in the world. The country was effectively self-sufficient in pork.

    In 1984, however, the Government announced that it would phase out pig farming. By 1989, all pig farms in Singapore had been closed down. Today, Singaporeans consume only imported pork. What were the drivers for this change?

    As Singapore steps up efforts to boost local food production to meet its ambitious “30-by-30” targets, what insights can be gleaned from Singapore’s historic decision to turn away from pork self-sufficiency?

    Policy Justifications

    In March 1984, then Deputy Prime Minister Goh Keng Swee announced in Parliament that pig farming in Singapore would be phased out.

    He noted the immense environmental and economic burdens of continuing pig farming. Raising pigs locally consumed valuable land, water, and energy resources. Conversely, importing pigs would not only be more economical for Singapore in the long run, but would also potentially bolster relations with supplier countries.

    While these were entirely valid justifications, the Primary Production Department (PPD – the government agency in the Ministry of National Development in charge of farming activities) had been dealing with these challenges for years and had developed many innovative solutions for them. For instance, experiments had been conducted into using pig waste to generate electricity, or recycling it into animal feed. Though the economic and environmental challenges of intensive pig farming were indeed complex, PPD officials had long worked closely with pig farmers to manage them.

    The government’s economic logic for phasing out Singapore’s pig farms was hence only part of the story. There was another more contentious dimension to this decision – the complicated relationship between the government and the local pig farming industry.

    Government and Domestic Pig Industry: A Complicated Relationship

    Between 1972 and 1984, government agencies clashed with industry players in at least six notable instances, over accusations of “blatant profiteering”, and artificial supply disruptions. This recurring “controversy over pork” attracted significant press coverage and public interest.

    Remarkably, such supply disruptions occurred even in times of surplus, as pig farmers and pork merchants alike sought to control local supplies and improve their revenues. As pig production came to be concentrated in a small number of large farms, the PPD found evidence of artificial shortages and “speculative manipulation” by pork merchants and influential farmers.

    In addition, the Singapore Pork Merchants’ Association (SPMA), which represented a significant portion of local pork retailers and butchers, refused on numerous occasions to slaughter pigs and sell fresh pork in local markets, taking extra rest days to “avoid losses”. Consequently, there was occasionally no fresh pork in the markets as the SPMA responded against what it perceived as various “unreasonable” state levies and fees.

    Although government officials decried industry players for their “most irresponsible” efforts to disrupt local pork supplies, these contestations also hinted at the difficulties of regulating the local pork sector.

    Hence, although Singapore was virtually “self-sufficient” in pork by 1977, and local farms were producing over a million pigs annually by 1980, pork prices continued to spike erratically throughout this period.

    Finally, in 1981, after years of disputes with local pig farmers and butchers, and price surges caused by artificial pork shortages, the government began highly publicised trial imports of pigs from a jointly-owned Singapore-Thai farm in Hat Yai, Thailand. Agreements were also finalised for additional pig shipments from Johor.

    Importing Pigs

    Officials stated that “the government would import more pigs from neighbouring countries to check blatant profiteering by pig farmers”. The increased supply of pork from overseas sources brought prices down, though the SPMA doubted the efficacy of such “temporary” measures.

    By March 1982, the increase in pig supplies had caused prices to plunge so precipitously that local farmers publicly implored the government to halt imports, and to let them sell their surplus pigs. Though the government eventually acquiesced to stabilise local pork prices, it also warned that it would continue importing pigs until local pig prices grew competitive again.

    After years of contentious clashes, the government had found a way to stabilise Singapore’s pork supplies and prices. Over the next few years, it conducted increasingly large-scale experiments into importing pork from different countries, leading Dr Goh to eventually conclude that “it is possible to supply the whole of our pork requirements through imports”.

    Though Dr Goh’s 1984 explanations in Parliament to phase out pig farming never referenced these tensions between public agencies and the pork industry, the government’s earliest experiments with importing foreign pigs can be traced to these clashes between the government and the private sector. The frequent supply disruptions and price hikes caused by the local pork industry had hence pushed the government to finding alternative sources of pork.

    Insights and Implications

    This brief account of Singapore’s pig farming past reminds us that although greater food self-sufficiency is a commendable aspiration for a country, it is also a far more complicated process than simply increasing supplies or boosting production capabilities. A small state’s food security is also dependent on the close relationships between the public and private sectors, cooperating toward shared objectives.

    Without such synergies, even increased local production might lead to disruptions in food supplies. Despite Singapore’s virtual pork self-sufficiency, the confluence of various unfavourable environmental, economic, and social factors ultimately spurred the government to explore more reliable and secure alternatives overseas.

    This additional historical context reminds us that there are also ‘softer’, social aspects to Singapore’s food security, emerging not just from technological breakthroughs, but from the quality of the relationships and interactions between government and other stakeholders from various domains.

    As Singapore strives toward developing more climate-resilient, scientifically advanced food systems to meet its “30-by-30” ambitions, it is also important to realise that a nation’s food security is also underwritten by the conviction, imagination, and cooperation among its citizens, corporate agencies, and policy community. A balanced approach with clear long-term vision is essential for securing the country’s future.

    About the Author

    Choo Ruizhi is a Senior Analyst with the National Security Studies Programme (NSSP), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.

    Categories: Commentaries / Country and Region Studies / General / Non-Traditional Security

    Last updated on 05/09/2022

    Back to top

    Terms of Use | Privacy Statement
    Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
    This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
    OK
    Latest Book
    Singapore’s Food Security – Rethinking Self-Sufficiency: Lessons from Singapore’s Pig Farming Past

    SYNOPSIS

    In 1984, Singapore shifted completely from pork self-sufficiency to meeting all its pork needs through imports. As Singapore turns toward boosting ...
    more info