• Home
  • About RSIS
    • Introduction
    • Building the Foundations
    • Welcome Message
    • Board of Governors
    • Staff Profiles
      • Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
      • Dean’s Office
      • Management
      • Distinguished Fellows
      • Faculty and Research
      • Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
      • Visiting Fellows
      • Adjunct Fellows
      • Administrative Staff
    • Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
    • RSIS Endowment Fund
    • Endowed Professorships
    • Career Opportunities
    • Getting to RSIS
  • Research
    • Research Centres
      • Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
      • Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
      • Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)
      • Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
      • International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
    • Research Programmes
      • National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
      • Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
    • Future Issues and Technology Cluster
    • [email protected] Newsletter
    • Other Research
      • Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
    • Graduate Programmes Office
    • Overview
    • MSc (Asian Studies)
    • MSc (International Political Economy)
    • MSc (International Relations)
    • MSc (Strategic Studies)
    • NTU-Warwick Double Masters Programme
    • PhD Programme
    • Exchange Partners and Programmes
    • How to Apply
    • Financial Assistance
    • Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
    • RSIS Alumni
  • Alumni & Networks
    • Alumni
    • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
    • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
    • International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
    • SRP Executive Programme
    • Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
  • Publications
    • RSIS Publications
      • Annual Reviews
      • Books
      • Bulletins and Newsletters
      • Commentaries
      • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
      • Commemorative / Event Reports
      • IDSS Paper
      • Interreligious Relations
      • Monographs
      • NTS Insight
      • Policy Reports
      • Working Papers
      • RSIS Publications for the Year
    • Glossary of Abbreviations
    • External Publications
      • Authored Books
      • Journal Articles
      • Edited Books
      • Chapters in Edited Books
      • Policy Reports
      • Working Papers
      • Op-Eds
      • External Publications for the Year
    • Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
  • Media
    • Great Powers
    • Sustainable Security
    • Other Resource Pages
    • Media Highlights
    • News Releases
    • Speeches
    • Vidcast Channel
    • Audio/Video Forums
  • Events
  • Giving
  • Contact Us
Facebook
Twitter
YouTube
RSISVideoCast RSISVideoCast rsis.sg
Linkedin
instagram instagram rsis.sg
RSS
  • Home
  • About RSIS
      • Introduction
      • Building the Foundations
      • Welcome Message
      • Board of Governors
      • Staff Profiles
        • Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
        • Dean’s Office
        • Management
        • Distinguished Fellows
        • Faculty and Research
        • Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
        • Visiting Fellows
        • Adjunct Fellows
        • Administrative Staff
      • Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
      • RSIS Endowment Fund
      • Endowed Professorships
      • Career Opportunities
      • Getting to RSIS
  • Research
      • Research Centres
        • Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
        • Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
        • Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)
        • Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
        • International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      • Research Programmes
        • National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
        • Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      • Future Issues and Technology Cluster
      • [email protected] Newsletter
      • Other Research
        • Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      • Graduate Programmes Office
      • Overview
      • MSc (Asian Studies)
      • MSc (International Political Economy)
      • MSc (International Relations)
      • MSc (Strategic Studies)
      • NTU-Warwick Double Masters Programme
      • PhD Programme
      • Exchange Partners and Programmes
      • How to Apply
      • Financial Assistance
      • Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
      • RSIS Alumni
  • Alumni & Networks
      • Alumni
      • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
      • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
      • International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
      • SRP Executive Programme
      • Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
  • Publications
      • RSIS Publications
        • Annual Reviews
        • Books
        • Bulletins and Newsletters
        • Commentaries
        • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
        • Commemorative / Event Reports
        • IDSS Paper
        • Interreligious Relations
        • Monographs
        • NTS Insight
        • Policy Reports
        • Working Papers
        • RSIS Publications for the Year
      • Glossary of Abbreviations
      • External Publications
        • Authored Books
        • Journal Articles
        • Edited Books
        • Chapters in Edited Books
        • Policy Reports
        • Working Papers
        • Op-Eds
        • External Publications for the Year
      • Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
  • Media
      • Great Powers
      • Sustainable Security
      • Other Resource Pages
      • Media Highlights
      • News Releases
      • Speeches
      • Vidcast Channel
      • Audio/Video Forums
  • Events
  • Giving
  • Contact Us
  • instagram instagram rsis.sg
Connect

Getting to RSIS

Map

Address

Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B3,
50 Nanyang Avenue,
Singapore 639798

View location on Google maps Click here for directions to RSIS

Get in Touch

    Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
    RSISVideoCast RSISVideoCast rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
    instagram instagram rsis.sg
      RSS
    Subscribe to RSIS Publications
    Subscribe to RSIS Events

    RSIS Intranet

    S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
    Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University

    Skip to content

     
    • RSIS
    • Publication
    • RSIS Publications
    • IP22027 | A Hard Sell: Russian Arms Exports to Asia Following the Invasion of Ukraine
    • Annual Reviews
    • Books
    • Bulletins and Newsletters
    • Commentaries
    • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
    • Commemorative / Event Reports
    • IDSS Paper
    • Interreligious Relations
    • Monographs
    • NTS Insight
    • Policy Reports
    • Working Papers
    • RSIS Publications for the Year

    IP22027 | A Hard Sell: Russian Arms Exports to Asia Following the Invasion of Ukraine
    Richard Bitzinger, Kenneth Boutin

    12 April 2022

    download pdf

    The authors’ views are their own and do not represent the official position of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced with prior permission from RSIS and due recognition to the authors and RSIS. Please email to Editor IDSS Paper at [email protected].

     

    SYNOPSIS

    Russia’s importance as an arms supplier to Asian states likely will decline in the short term as a result of Russia’s arms requirements, the sanctions imposed following its invasion of Ukraine, and the perceived poor performance of Russian arms in this conflict. This could provide greater scope for competing arms suppliers, including China, to export to the region.

    COMMENTARY

    Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is likely to have an adverse effect on its arms exports to Asia. Russia’s diminished arms export capacity and potential have significant implications for the Asian arms market.

    Russia’s arms industry long has depended on exports, and particularly exports to Asia. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Moscow’s two biggest arms customers are India and China; altogether, more than 61 percent of Russian arms sales between 2017 and 2021 went to Asia and Oceania.

    China has in recent years mainly acquired turbofans from Russia for its indigenous fighter jets (particularly the J-10 and J-20, underscoring China’s continuing problem with developing jet engines of adequate performance). Beijing also has bought S-400 air defence systems, helicopters, and naval guns from Moscow.

    While India has sought to diversify the sources from which it procures arms, in part because of concerns about the capabilities offered by some Russian arms, it remains a major customer for Russian arms. Recent years have seen India procure MiG-29 and Su-30 fighter aircraft, T-90 tanks, warships, and antiship missile systems from Russia.

    IP22028
    Malaysian MiG-29s at the 2012 Singapore Airshow. Will Russia’s apparently dismal performance in the Ukraine war create difficulties for Asian air forces in replacing obsolescent Russian military equipment?
    The appearance of U.S Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement

    Southeast Asia has also been a particularly profitable market for Russia arms producers, which have exported Su-27 or Su-30 fighter aircraft to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam, and MiG-29 fighters and Yak-130 trainer jets to Myanmar. Other sales include air-to-air missiles, antiship missiles, and helicopters.

    The Availability of Russian Arms

    Moscow clearly does not want to lose access to the lucrative East Asian arms market. A number of factors deriving from the conflict in Ukraine and the international response it has generated now threaten Russian arms exports, however. How enduring these effects prove largely will be determined by how international sanctions develop and how effective they prove in the face of Russian efforts to overcome their effects.

    Russian arms losses in Ukraine, including of combat aircraft, helicopters, air defence systems and tanks, are such that the Russian government will need to devote significant production capacity to replenishing its arsenal, unless it is prepared to prioritise exports in the interest of generating export revenue. This will reduce Russia’s capacity to produce arms for export. The level of support Russia is prepared to provide for arms previously exported while it is engaged in Ukraine may serve as an important indicator of how determined it is to export arms.

    Russia’s arms production dilemma will be exacerbated by sanctions targeting the defence-industrial sector that have been imposed by Western states in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine. Although the Russian defence industry is far more insular than its Western counterparts, Russian arms production draws on inputs such as microelectronics from offshore suppliers. If, as expected, the sanctions being imposed by key suppliers such as the United States and Taiwan affect the supply of critical production inputs such as semiconductors, this will reduce Russia’s arms production capacity, perhaps significantly.

    Much will depend on the effectiveness of the sanctions that are being imposed on Russia. Russia is less vulnerable to sanctions as a result of measures it implemented in response to the sanctions imposed on it following its seizure of the Crimea in 2014 and will endeavour to offset the effects of this new round of sanctions. Russia’s scope for countering sanctions will be limited by the breadth of sanctions and the limited pool of alternative suppliers, however. Russia reportedly has sought the assistance of China and other states in overcoming sanctions, but the American government has signalled its intention to impose secondary sanctions or otherwise punish states that assist Russia in circumventing sanctions.

    The Demand for Russian Arms

    In addition to the factors discussed above, Russian arms exports will be affected by three demand-related issues: international censure, the disappointing performance of Russian military equipment in the Ukraine war, and Russia’s restricted access to the international finance and banking system.

    Countries are likely to be wary about purchasing Russian arms, given the international opprobrium that Moscow has earned. This likely will be reinforced by the increased likelihood that the United States will apply the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) of 2017, in an effort to discourage states from purchasing Russian arms. CAATSA provides for the imposition of sanctions on states involved in defence transactions with Russia, though the American government exercises considerable discretion in its application. American determination to impose a high economic cost on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine makes it highly likely that CAATSA will be resorted to as a means of discouraging orders for Russian arms, though this likely will continue to be decided on a case-by-case basis.

    Second, Russia’s lacklustre military performance in Ukraine is likely to have an adverse reputational impact on Russian arms. The apparent failure of Russian arms to deliver military success is likely to discourage purchases by new and existing customers alike, complicating its efforts to generate export revenue and extend its influence.

    Third, sanctions also will impact on the demand for Russian arms exports. General restrictions on Russian access to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) cooperative international payments facility will render it more difficult to arrange payment for Russian arms. The need to resort to less efficient and probably more costly payment mechanisms, such as the Chinese-led Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), will decrease the attractiveness of Russian arms.

    The Long-Term Consequences

    Russia’s diminished arms export capacity and potential provide considerable scope for competing suppliers to supplant it as an arms supplier to Asian states. Other competitors, such as China and the United States, could exploit the vacuum created by Russia’s absence. The strong regional demand for combat aircraft could be met by European aerospace firms, for example. Of its existing customer base, India is most likely to remain as a reliable consumer of Russian arms. Russia’s particular attributes as an arms supplier mean that it likely will continue to feature as an important supplier of arms to Asian states over the long term, however.

    The loss of arms sales to Asia could be catastrophic for Russia’s defence industry. This would deprive defence producers of a source of funds that has helped to compensate for Russian government underfunding of defence R&D.

     

     

     

    Richard A. Bitzinger is a Visiting Senior Fellow with RSIS, and Kenneth Boutin is an independent researcher focusing on the political economy of security. They contributed this Paper to the Military Transformations Programme, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, RSIS.

    Categories: IDSS Paper / International Politics and Security / East Asia and Asia Pacific

    Last updated on 21/04/2022

    comments powered by Disqus

    The authors’ views are their own and do not represent the official position of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced with prior permission from RSIS and due recognition to the authors and RSIS. Please email to Editor IDSS Paper at [email protected].

     

    SYNOPSIS

    Russia’s importance as an arms supplier to Asian states likely will decline in the short term as a result of Russia’s arms requirements, the sanctions imposed following its invasion of Ukraine, and the perceived poor performance of Russian arms in this conflict. This could provide greater scope for competing arms suppliers, including China, to export to the region.

    COMMENTARY

    Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is likely to have an adverse effect on its arms exports to Asia. Russia’s diminished arms export capacity and potential have significant implications for the Asian arms market.

    Russia’s arms industry long has depended on exports, and particularly exports to Asia. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Moscow’s two biggest arms customers are India and China; altogether, more than 61 percent of Russian arms sales between 2017 and 2021 went to Asia and Oceania.

    China has in recent years mainly acquired turbofans from Russia for its indigenous fighter jets (particularly the J-10 and J-20, underscoring China’s continuing problem with developing jet engines of adequate performance). Beijing also has bought S-400 air defence systems, helicopters, and naval guns from Moscow.

    While India has sought to diversify the sources from which it procures arms, in part because of concerns about the capabilities offered by some Russian arms, it remains a major customer for Russian arms. Recent years have seen India procure MiG-29 and Su-30 fighter aircraft, T-90 tanks, warships, and antiship missile systems from Russia.

    IP22028
    Malaysian MiG-29s at the 2012 Singapore Airshow. Will Russia’s apparently dismal performance in the Ukraine war create difficulties for Asian air forces in replacing obsolescent Russian military equipment?
    The appearance of U.S Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement

    Southeast Asia has also been a particularly profitable market for Russia arms producers, which have exported Su-27 or Su-30 fighter aircraft to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam, and MiG-29 fighters and Yak-130 trainer jets to Myanmar. Other sales include air-to-air missiles, antiship missiles, and helicopters.

    The Availability of Russian Arms

    Moscow clearly does not want to lose access to the lucrative East Asian arms market. A number of factors deriving from the conflict in Ukraine and the international response it has generated now threaten Russian arms exports, however. How enduring these effects prove largely will be determined by how international sanctions develop and how effective they prove in the face of Russian efforts to overcome their effects.

    Russian arms losses in Ukraine, including of combat aircraft, helicopters, air defence systems and tanks, are such that the Russian government will need to devote significant production capacity to replenishing its arsenal, unless it is prepared to prioritise exports in the interest of generating export revenue. This will reduce Russia’s capacity to produce arms for export. The level of support Russia is prepared to provide for arms previously exported while it is engaged in Ukraine may serve as an important indicator of how determined it is to export arms.

    Russia’s arms production dilemma will be exacerbated by sanctions targeting the defence-industrial sector that have been imposed by Western states in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine. Although the Russian defence industry is far more insular than its Western counterparts, Russian arms production draws on inputs such as microelectronics from offshore suppliers. If, as expected, the sanctions being imposed by key suppliers such as the United States and Taiwan affect the supply of critical production inputs such as semiconductors, this will reduce Russia’s arms production capacity, perhaps significantly.

    Much will depend on the effectiveness of the sanctions that are being imposed on Russia. Russia is less vulnerable to sanctions as a result of measures it implemented in response to the sanctions imposed on it following its seizure of the Crimea in 2014 and will endeavour to offset the effects of this new round of sanctions. Russia’s scope for countering sanctions will be limited by the breadth of sanctions and the limited pool of alternative suppliers, however. Russia reportedly has sought the assistance of China and other states in overcoming sanctions, but the American government has signalled its intention to impose secondary sanctions or otherwise punish states that assist Russia in circumventing sanctions.

    The Demand for Russian Arms

    In addition to the factors discussed above, Russian arms exports will be affected by three demand-related issues: international censure, the disappointing performance of Russian military equipment in the Ukraine war, and Russia’s restricted access to the international finance and banking system.

    Countries are likely to be wary about purchasing Russian arms, given the international opprobrium that Moscow has earned. This likely will be reinforced by the increased likelihood that the United States will apply the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) of 2017, in an effort to discourage states from purchasing Russian arms. CAATSA provides for the imposition of sanctions on states involved in defence transactions with Russia, though the American government exercises considerable discretion in its application. American determination to impose a high economic cost on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine makes it highly likely that CAATSA will be resorted to as a means of discouraging orders for Russian arms, though this likely will continue to be decided on a case-by-case basis.

    Second, Russia’s lacklustre military performance in Ukraine is likely to have an adverse reputational impact on Russian arms. The apparent failure of Russian arms to deliver military success is likely to discourage purchases by new and existing customers alike, complicating its efforts to generate export revenue and extend its influence.

    Third, sanctions also will impact on the demand for Russian arms exports. General restrictions on Russian access to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) cooperative international payments facility will render it more difficult to arrange payment for Russian arms. The need to resort to less efficient and probably more costly payment mechanisms, such as the Chinese-led Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), will decrease the attractiveness of Russian arms.

    The Long-Term Consequences

    Russia’s diminished arms export capacity and potential provide considerable scope for competing suppliers to supplant it as an arms supplier to Asian states. Other competitors, such as China and the United States, could exploit the vacuum created by Russia’s absence. The strong regional demand for combat aircraft could be met by European aerospace firms, for example. Of its existing customer base, India is most likely to remain as a reliable consumer of Russian arms. Russia’s particular attributes as an arms supplier mean that it likely will continue to feature as an important supplier of arms to Asian states over the long term, however.

    The loss of arms sales to Asia could be catastrophic for Russia’s defence industry. This would deprive defence producers of a source of funds that has helped to compensate for Russian government underfunding of defence R&D.

     

     

     

    Richard A. Bitzinger is a Visiting Senior Fellow with RSIS, and Kenneth Boutin is an independent researcher focusing on the political economy of security. They contributed this Paper to the Military Transformations Programme, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, RSIS.

    Categories: IDSS Paper / International Politics and Security

    Last updated on 21/04/2022

    Back to top

    Terms of Use | Privacy Statement
    Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
    This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
    OK
    Latest Book
    IP22027 | A Hard Sell: Russian Arms Exports to Asia Following the Invasion of Ukraine
    The authors' views are their own and do not represent the official position of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies of the S. Rajaratnam School of Internati ...
    more info