CO05090 | East Asian Institutionalism: Where do we go now?

Finally, despite the presence of a growing number of overlapping structures, institutionalism in East Asia continues to suffer from weak structural capacities that limit their ability to respond to security challenges. The ARF has enjoyed some success in confidence-building but it is questionable whether it will succeed in moving toward preventive diplomacy. The APT does not have the capabilities to address security challenges and the complex relations between China and Japan should continue to undermine its effectiveness. The EAS should in the short to medium term be expected to be another confidence-building exercise in the region.

Driving Forces in East Asian Institutionalism

In light of these trends, what will be the driving forces for change in East Asian institutionalism in the coming years? Institution building in the region should continue to be influenced by three primary factors: US participation, the nature of China’s involvement and regionalism in Southeast Asia.

The United States has generally been supportive of multilateral initiatives in East Asia. The long-term relevance of multilateral structures may be undermined however by unilateralism in US foreign policy. The Bush administration has repeatedly indicated its preference for flexibility over institutionalized arrangements. A disinterested US participation would most likely weaken the multilateral architecture. The negative impact on the ARF of a non-active US involvement was already sensed when US Secretary of State, Dr Condoleezza Rice, decided not to attend the ministerial meeting in Vientiane in July 2005. East Asian institutionalism would certainly benefit from an active US participation that looks beyond the issues of terrorism and maritime security.

China has added a new diplomatic activism to its growing economic and military growth. The Chinese ‘charm offensive’ toward Southeast Asia, including its offer of a free trade area with ASEAN and its support for the EAS, is in contrast to China’s previous suspicion of multilateralism. Still, will China continue to be an accommodating power or might it adopt a more assertive position in regional arrangements in the coming years? Assertiveness could consist of Beijing pressing for change in the norms of cooperation, adopting a restrictive position on the agenda setting, and/or pushing for a more exclusive approach in terms of membership.

The United States would most likely refuse to be excluded from regional institution-building. Washington has already indicated its concern about the exclusive model of the EAS. The Southeast Asian countries would be particularly uncomfortable with an assertive Chinese leadership. An ongoing accommodative Chinese participation would on the contrary contribute to the development of an institutional framework where multilateral arrangements complement one another in the promotion of peace and stability.

Finally, the future of East Asian institutionalism will be influenced by the strength of regionalism in Southeast Asia. For more than a decade, ASEAN has been driving multilateral cooperation in East Asia – whether in the form of the ARF, the APT and now the EAS. ASEAN’s assigned managerial role derives as much from its unparalleled institutional experience in East Asia as from the lack of an alternative source of leadership acceptable to all. As long as it succeeds in being innovative, ASEAN should play a leading role in institution-building in East Asia. Whether ASEAN moves toward a new era of legalization and regionalism as suggested by recent initiatives (ASEAN Communities and Charter) will therefore have an impact on East Asian institutionalism.