In recent years, new forms of political violence and terrorist threats have emerged, amplified by technological innovations and advancements, while the old ones persist, albeit in an evolved manner. The power of social media and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic have fostered an operational environment conducive for the proliferation of conspiracy theories, misinformation and disinformation, and their intersection with violent extremism. This has resulted, among others, in the emergence of novel challenges such as “mixed” and “salad-bar” ideologies, whose adherents do not conform to one particular set of extremist ideologies. Instead, they pick from across the extremist spectrum, underscoring the “individualised” and “privatised” nature of the contemporary terrorist threat. Indeed, the US’ new domestic counterterrorism strategy, primarily focused on Racially Motived Violent Extremism (RMVE) and Militia Violent Extremism (MVE), highlights the need for new and enhanced Counter-Terrorism (CT) and Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) frameworks.

At the same time, the traditional threat from terrorist violence persists. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan by September 2021 has once again revived the old concern of transnational jihadism’s revival as witnessed by al-Qaeda’s formation and rise after the USSR retreated from Afghanistan in the late 1980s, and the emergence of the Islamic State following the US’ retreat from Iraq in 2011 In Indonesia, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) jihadist outfit has suffered a series of operational setbacks over the past year, but retains the capacity to revive and adopt a more militant posture. Further, the ongoing pandemic has, in contrasting ways, altered the abilities and incentives of terror-sponsoring states to harbour and support violent extremism and terrorism. Hence, it is prudent and timely to assess how various militant groups and state sponsors of violence are adjusting to evolving geopolitical, geostrategic and technological trends, and their likely consequences.

Against this backdrop, the current issue features different aspects of new and old evolving terrorist threats. The first article by Abdul Basit explores the nexus between conspiracy theories and violent extremism enabled by social media platforms and amplified by the coronavirus’ outbreak. Though conspiracy theories’ role in causing violent extremism is hard to underpin, the former plays an important social, political and functional role. Almost all terrorist groups use conspiracy theories to fuel their narratives and attract recruits without necessarily being conspiracists. According to the author, the likely consequences of this nexus are more detrimental for socially less resilient states. The author proposes critical thinking in digital literacy, pre-bunking and government-tech companies partnerships, mediated by civil society organisations, to curb the proliferation of conspiracy-theories-linked violent extremism.

In the second article, Farhan Zahid examines the expected after-effects of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan for jihadist militancy in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The author notes that despite giving counterterrorism guarantees to the US in the Doha Agreement 2020, the Taliban are still closely allied to al-Qaeda and continue to shelter them. According to him, the Taliban are adamant to take over Kabul militarily and are extending a triumphant jihadist narrative that can inspire regional jihadist groups like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, among others. The author foresees the rise of militant jihadism in Pakistan and Afghanistan due to the US withdrawal and the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan.

Next, V. Arianti assesses the prospects for the JI’s revival, amidst the Indonesian authorities’ intensified counter-terrorism campaign over the past year, which has yielded scores of arrests of influential JI leaders and cadres. According to the author, despite these setbacks, JI has continued its recruitment and education activities, and appears organisationally resilient. In this respect, JI’s adherence to a hierarchical structure provides the group with a strong agenda-setting capacity as well as the ability to exercise accountability and specialisation across the rank and file. Going forward, the advantages accruing from this organisational resiliency could enable JI to plan and execute attacks of greater lethality than the more diffused and loosely organised terrorist outfits, such as the pro-Islamic State networks, that operate in Indonesia.

Lastly, Kalicharan Veera Singam and Kyler Ong argue that the prognosis for State Sponsored Terrorism (SST) in the pandemic era is mixed. On the one hand, SST has been on a prolonged downward trend in the post 9/11 era, due to factors such as the US’ military counter-operations and economic pressures, as well as the emergence of transnational jihadist networks to the forefront. According to the authors, SST has likely declined further since the onset of COVID-19, as the devastating socio-economic impact felt globally has affected some states’ abilities, motivations and willingness to sponsor terrorist activity. At the same time, the pressure to prop up their flagging economies could spur others to partake in illicit activities, including selling arms to terrorist groups and orchestrating cybercrimes.