• Home
  • About RSIS
    • Introduction
    • Building the Foundations
    • Welcome Message
    • Board of Governors
    • Staff Profiles
      • Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
      • Dean’s Office
      • Management
      • Distinguished Fellows
      • Faculty and Research
      • Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
      • Visiting Fellows
      • Adjunct Fellows
      • Administrative Staff
    • Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
    • RSIS Endowment Fund
    • Endowed Professorships
    • Career Opportunities
    • Getting to RSIS
  • Research
    • Research Centres
      • Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
      • Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
      • Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)
      • Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
      • International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
    • Research Programmes
      • National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
      • Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
    • Future Issues and Technology Cluster
    • [email protected] Newsletter
    • Other Research
      • Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
    • Graduate Programmes Office
    • Overview
    • MSc (Asian Studies)
    • MSc (International Political Economy)
    • MSc (International Relations)
    • MSc (Strategic Studies)
    • NTU-Warwick Double Masters Programme
    • PhD Programme
    • Exchange Partners and Programmes
    • How to Apply
    • Financial Assistance
    • Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
    • RSIS Alumni
  • Alumni & Networks
    • Alumni
    • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
    • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
    • International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
    • SRP Executive Programme
    • Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
  • Publications
    • RSIS Publications
      • Annual Reviews
      • Books
      • Bulletins and Newsletters
      • Commentaries
      • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
      • Commemorative / Event Reports
      • IDSS Paper
      • Interreligious Relations
      • Monographs
      • NTS Insight
      • Policy Reports
      • Working Papers
      • RSIS Publications for the Year
    • Glossary of Abbreviations
    • External Publications
      • Authored Books
      • Journal Articles
      • Edited Books
      • Chapters in Edited Books
      • Policy Reports
      • Working Papers
      • Op-Eds
      • External Publications for the Year
    • Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
  • Media
    • Great Powers
    • Sustainable Security
    • Other Resource Pages
    • Media Highlights
    • News Releases
    • Speeches
    • Vidcast Channel
    • Audio/Video Forums
  • Events
  • Giving
  • Contact Us
Facebook
Twitter
YouTube
RSISVideoCast RSISVideoCast rsis.sg
Linkedin
instagram instagram rsis.sg
RSS
  • Home
  • About RSIS
      • Introduction
      • Building the Foundations
      • Welcome Message
      • Board of Governors
      • Staff Profiles
        • Executive Deputy Chairman’s Office
        • Dean’s Office
        • Management
        • Distinguished Fellows
        • Faculty and Research
        • Associate Research Fellows, Senior Analysts and Research Analysts
        • Visiting Fellows
        • Adjunct Fellows
        • Administrative Staff
      • Honours and Awards for RSIS Staff and Students
      • RSIS Endowment Fund
      • Endowed Professorships
      • Career Opportunities
      • Getting to RSIS
  • Research
      • Research Centres
        • Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
        • Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre)
        • Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)
        • Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
        • International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
      • Research Programmes
        • National Security Studies Programme (NSSP)
        • Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme
      • Future Issues and Technology Cluster
      • [email protected] Newsletter
      • Other Research
        • Science and Technology Studies Programme (STSP) (2017-2020)
  • Graduate Education
      • Graduate Programmes Office
      • Overview
      • MSc (Asian Studies)
      • MSc (International Political Economy)
      • MSc (International Relations)
      • MSc (Strategic Studies)
      • NTU-Warwick Double Masters Programme
      • PhD Programme
      • Exchange Partners and Programmes
      • How to Apply
      • Financial Assistance
      • Meet the Admissions Team: Information Sessions and other events
      • RSIS Alumni
  • Alumni & Networks
      • Alumni
      • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)
      • Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)
      • International Strategy Forum-Asia (ISF-Asia)
      • SRP Executive Programme
      • Terrorism Analyst Training Course (TATC)
  • Publications
      • RSIS Publications
        • Annual Reviews
        • Books
        • Bulletins and Newsletters
        • Commentaries
        • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
        • Commemorative / Event Reports
        • IDSS Paper
        • Interreligious Relations
        • Monographs
        • NTS Insight
        • Policy Reports
        • Working Papers
        • RSIS Publications for the Year
      • Glossary of Abbreviations
      • External Publications
        • Authored Books
        • Journal Articles
        • Edited Books
        • Chapters in Edited Books
        • Policy Reports
        • Working Papers
        • Op-Eds
        • External Publications for the Year
      • Policy-relevant Articles Given RSIS Award
  • Media
      • Great Powers
      • Sustainable Security
      • Other Resource Pages
      • Media Highlights
      • News Releases
      • Speeches
      • Vidcast Channel
      • Audio/Video Forums
  • Events
  • Giving
  • Contact Us
  • instagram instagram rsis.sg
Connect

Getting to RSIS

Map

Address

Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B3,
50 Nanyang Avenue,
Singapore 639798

View location on Google maps Click here for directions to RSIS

Get in Touch

    Connect with Us

      rsis.ntu
      rsis_ntu
      rsisntu
    RSISVideoCast RSISVideoCast rsisvideocast
      school/rsis-ntu
    instagram instagram rsis.sg
      RSS
    Subscribe to RSIS Publications
    Subscribe to RSIS Events

    RSIS Intranet

    S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Think Tank and Graduate School Ponder The Improbable Since 1966
    Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University

    Skip to content

     
    • RSIS
    • Publication
    • RSIS Publications
    • ASEAN’s Special Summit: Can It Resolve the Myanmar Crisis?
    • Annual Reviews
    • Books
    • Bulletins and Newsletters
    • Commentaries
    • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
    • Commemorative / Event Reports
    • IDSS Paper
    • Interreligious Relations
    • Monographs
    • NTS Insight
    • Policy Reports
    • Working Papers
    • RSIS Publications for the Year

    CO21071 | ASEAN’s Special Summit: Can It Resolve the Myanmar Crisis?
    Joel Ng

    29 April 2021

    download pdf
    RSIS Commentary is a platform to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy-relevant commentary and analysis of topical and contemporary issues. The authors’ views are their own and do not represent the official position of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced with prior permission from RSIS and due credit to the author(s) and RSIS. Please email to Editor RSIS Commentary at [email protected].

    SYNOPSIS

    The ASEAN special summit outlined a set of initial, necessary conditions to the resolution of the Myanmar crisis, but it is only the start of a long and difficult process.


    Source: Unsplash 

    COMMENTARY

    THE ASEAN special summit in Jakarta on 24 April 2021 has concluded with a five-point consensus on the Myanmar crisis. It called for cessation of violence, commencement of political dialogue, a constructive role for ASEAN including an opening for an ASEAN delegation, and the allowance of humanitarian assistance.

    At first glance, analysis of the Chair’s statement showed signs of division – for instance, a lack of consensus on the release of political prisoners, a necessary precondition for dialogue to begin. Activists criticised that the statement did not go far enough, appearing to show that the summit achieved little. Yet if politics is, to quote the German statesman Otto von Bismarck, about the ‘art of the possible’, then it is necessary to set the outcome against a context of impossibilities, dead ends or worse, into which ASEAN did not throw itself.

    Difficulties with Intervention

    Disappointment with the summit may be seen in the context of calls for external intervention in Myanmar. This desire to remove the Tatmadaw should be tempered by the reality that this would be costly, risky, and no guarantee of a solution. Nevertheless, criticisms have continued about the failure to take a harder line against the junta, either through the UN or ASEAN, with neither path opening after the summit.

    The UN Security Council is deadlocked, where China and Russia would likely block moves by Western powers. While some therefore conclude that the UN system is broken, one should think about the scenario where a liberal intervention proceeded without other states’ consent:

    Myanmar could well become the first proxy battleground in a new front of an emerging “Cold War 2.0”, with the conflict sharpening and possibly accelerating US-China confrontation. Mainland Southeast Asian states are not unreasonable to baulk at suggestions in this direction, given their experiences during the Cold War.

    At the regional level, ASEAN’s options are tempered by the political diversity of its membership and its own historical experiences. When Western powers intervened in post-colonial times, they never did so purely for the sake of democratic values, but always when there was a convergence of material interests to do so, with a barely-concealed desire to secure those interests in-country for themselves. Iraq, Libya, Syria, and others provide a litany of examples of long, costly, and complex crises, with the West’s own role itself intrinsically linked to the continuation of those conflicts.

    In each case, domestic divisions interwove with foreign interests to amplify the conflicts. Roll back further in time and one finds the price of intervention was to have to accept brutal military leaders for whom loyalty to their patron was the primary factor for their grip on power. Post-colonial states in Southeast Asia rightfully reject this option.

    One thing ASEAN has done well is ensure that cultural and ideological diversity among its members did not lead to conflict. Breaking that formula in order to “fix” Myanmar risks opening Pandora’s Box for ASEAN member states, and this dismal conclusion unites them notwithstanding sometimes diametrically opposed political systems.

    Summit’s High Points

    Within these constraints, therefore, ASEAN has little room for manoeuvre. Yet it managed to accomplish several key things at the summit.

    First, Tatmadaw Senior General Min Aung Hlaing attended, which was uncertain even days before the summit. He chose to talk to ASEAN and virtually no one else, providing a necessary opening from which a solution must be found. Under the gaze of ASEAN leaders, he could not decline ASEAN’s offer, something which he would have de facto accomplished by simply failing to show up.

    Second, he met UN Special Envoy on Myanmar Christine Schraner Burgener on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit. While what transpired has been kept under wraps, the mere fact of meeting would have been impossible without his arrival in Jakarta.

    Third, on ASEAN’s part, it presented one of the most public and interventionist outcome statements the regional grouping has ever delivered to another member state. This represented a big step beyond ASEAN’s usual practices and demonstrated their view of its potential impact on regional security and the importance they have placed on resolution to the crisis.

    Next Steps

    While critics lambasted the lack of details, this is overstated. There are few details because ASEAN is in uncharted waters, never having done such action before – itself a sign of how far ASEAN went to secure this outcome. ASEAN does not commit to things it does not believe it can do. Implementation details will be hammered out in ASEAN capitals and the ASEAN Secretariat soon. However, this is just the start of a long process.

    While the outcome was a big step for ASEAN, the path out of crisis for Myanmar will be a much longer journey. ASEAN has led the figurative horse to water, but it cannot make it drink. During Myanmar’s short-lived democracy, the National League for Democracy (NLD), failed to resolve federal questions about the country and the Tatmadaw did not learn the soft skills it needed to become a guardian of the country’s future.

    The Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw has taken first steps to build a more inclusive framework and draw in allies through the new National Unity Government (NUG).

    While the NUG has the soft power, it is the Tatmadaw with the hard power. Both are necessary elements for governance in Myanmar, and only when the parties are willing to begin dialogue will a sustainable solution to the Myanmar crisis become possible.

    About the Author

    Joel Ng is a research fellow at the Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.

    Categories: Commentaries / Country and Region Studies / International Politics and Security / Regionalism and Multilateralism / East Asia and Asia Pacific / Global / South Asia / Southeast Asia and ASEAN

    Last updated on 29/04/2021

    comments powered by Disqus
    RSIS Commentary is a platform to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy-relevant commentary and analysis of topical and contemporary issues. The authors’ views are their own and do not represent the official position of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced with prior permission from RSIS and due credit to the author(s) and RSIS. Please email to Editor RSIS Commentary at [email protected].

    SYNOPSIS

    The ASEAN special summit outlined a set of initial, necessary conditions to the resolution of the Myanmar crisis, but it is only the start of a long and difficult process.


    Source: Unsplash 

    COMMENTARY

    THE ASEAN special summit in Jakarta on 24 April 2021 has concluded with a five-point consensus on the Myanmar crisis. It called for cessation of violence, commencement of political dialogue, a constructive role for ASEAN including an opening for an ASEAN delegation, and the allowance of humanitarian assistance.

    At first glance, analysis of the Chair’s statement showed signs of division – for instance, a lack of consensus on the release of political prisoners, a necessary precondition for dialogue to begin. Activists criticised that the statement did not go far enough, appearing to show that the summit achieved little. Yet if politics is, to quote the German statesman Otto von Bismarck, about the ‘art of the possible’, then it is necessary to set the outcome against a context of impossibilities, dead ends or worse, into which ASEAN did not throw itself.

    Difficulties with Intervention

    Disappointment with the summit may be seen in the context of calls for external intervention in Myanmar. This desire to remove the Tatmadaw should be tempered by the reality that this would be costly, risky, and no guarantee of a solution. Nevertheless, criticisms have continued about the failure to take a harder line against the junta, either through the UN or ASEAN, with neither path opening after the summit.

    The UN Security Council is deadlocked, where China and Russia would likely block moves by Western powers. While some therefore conclude that the UN system is broken, one should think about the scenario where a liberal intervention proceeded without other states’ consent:

    Myanmar could well become the first proxy battleground in a new front of an emerging “Cold War 2.0”, with the conflict sharpening and possibly accelerating US-China confrontation. Mainland Southeast Asian states are not unreasonable to baulk at suggestions in this direction, given their experiences during the Cold War.

    At the regional level, ASEAN’s options are tempered by the political diversity of its membership and its own historical experiences. When Western powers intervened in post-colonial times, they never did so purely for the sake of democratic values, but always when there was a convergence of material interests to do so, with a barely-concealed desire to secure those interests in-country for themselves. Iraq, Libya, Syria, and others provide a litany of examples of long, costly, and complex crises, with the West’s own role itself intrinsically linked to the continuation of those conflicts.

    In each case, domestic divisions interwove with foreign interests to amplify the conflicts. Roll back further in time and one finds the price of intervention was to have to accept brutal military leaders for whom loyalty to their patron was the primary factor for their grip on power. Post-colonial states in Southeast Asia rightfully reject this option.

    One thing ASEAN has done well is ensure that cultural and ideological diversity among its members did not lead to conflict. Breaking that formula in order to “fix” Myanmar risks opening Pandora’s Box for ASEAN member states, and this dismal conclusion unites them notwithstanding sometimes diametrically opposed political systems.

    Summit’s High Points

    Within these constraints, therefore, ASEAN has little room for manoeuvre. Yet it managed to accomplish several key things at the summit.

    First, Tatmadaw Senior General Min Aung Hlaing attended, which was uncertain even days before the summit. He chose to talk to ASEAN and virtually no one else, providing a necessary opening from which a solution must be found. Under the gaze of ASEAN leaders, he could not decline ASEAN’s offer, something which he would have de facto accomplished by simply failing to show up.

    Second, he met UN Special Envoy on Myanmar Christine Schraner Burgener on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit. While what transpired has been kept under wraps, the mere fact of meeting would have been impossible without his arrival in Jakarta.

    Third, on ASEAN’s part, it presented one of the most public and interventionist outcome statements the regional grouping has ever delivered to another member state. This represented a big step beyond ASEAN’s usual practices and demonstrated their view of its potential impact on regional security and the importance they have placed on resolution to the crisis.

    Next Steps

    While critics lambasted the lack of details, this is overstated. There are few details because ASEAN is in uncharted waters, never having done such action before – itself a sign of how far ASEAN went to secure this outcome. ASEAN does not commit to things it does not believe it can do. Implementation details will be hammered out in ASEAN capitals and the ASEAN Secretariat soon. However, this is just the start of a long process.

    While the outcome was a big step for ASEAN, the path out of crisis for Myanmar will be a much longer journey. ASEAN has led the figurative horse to water, but it cannot make it drink. During Myanmar’s short-lived democracy, the National League for Democracy (NLD), failed to resolve federal questions about the country and the Tatmadaw did not learn the soft skills it needed to become a guardian of the country’s future.

    The Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw has taken first steps to build a more inclusive framework and draw in allies through the new National Unity Government (NUG).

    While the NUG has the soft power, it is the Tatmadaw with the hard power. Both are necessary elements for governance in Myanmar, and only when the parties are willing to begin dialogue will a sustainable solution to the Myanmar crisis become possible.

    About the Author

    Joel Ng is a research fellow at the Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.

    Categories: Commentaries / Country and Region Studies / International Politics and Security / Regionalism and Multilateralism

    Last updated on 29/04/2021

    Back to top

    Terms of Use | Privacy Statement
    Copyright © S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. All rights reserved.
    This site uses cookies to offer you a better browsing experience. By continuing, you are agreeing to the use of cookies on your device as described in our privacy policy. Learn more
    OK
    Latest Book
    ASEAN’s Special Summit: Can It Resolve the Myanmar Crisis?

    SYNOPSIS

    The ASEAN special summit outlined a set of initial, necessary conditions to the resolution of the Myanmar crisis, but it is only the start of a lon ...
    more info