CO05087 | Sequels Seldom Sell: Why Terrorism is losing its Strategic Value for Al-Qaeda

Although the experience of strategic air power – witnessed in the strategic bombing campaigns of the Second World War – was undoubtedly devastating in terms of the levels of physical destruction of buildings and cities, its strategic value was arguably negligible. After the initial shock waves of fear created by the first attacks against cities, the people of these cities simply became inured to these attacks. This was a pattern of behaviour that was repeated not just in London and Coventry, but in Berlin, Dresden, Hamburg, Tokyo and Yokohama as well. The people in these cities simply got used to regular bombing attacks against their cities, and got on with their regular lives as much as possible.

Assessing Al-Qaeda Bombings post-9/11

Judging the strategic value of the major post-9/11 bombings, it is possible to see that the value of terrorist bombings is slipping. Though it is difficult to calculate emotions in general, not least of all fear, the following barometers should suffice as indicators of the success of major Al-Qaeda bombings post-9/11 at generating unease, uncertainty and, of course, fear: media attention and stock market reaction. For what is considered post-9/11 bombings, we consider here the 12 October 2002 Bali bombing, 11 March 2004 Madrid bombing, 7 July 2005 London Bombing and the 1 October 2005 Bali bombing.

With regard to newspaper coverage, major newspapers such as the New York Times, The Times, The Straits Times and the International Herald Tribune have devoted increasingly less column inches towards covering the terrorist incidents listed above, with the relatively small spike during the London bombing as the sole exception. As for air-time on major global news networks, both CNN as well as BBC World have not significantly interrupted regular programming with each preceding bomb attack. Finally, if the reactions by major stock markets are used as an indicator of the strategic value of Al-Qaeda bombings, Al-Qaeda may have to consider a different modus operandi. Besides a major fall in the Dow post-9/11, major stock markets have not stayed depressed after subsequent bombings. The trend has so far been for markets to take a dip immediately after a bombing and then recover over the period of a week.

What do these indicators show? These indicators show that the strategic value of terrorism is falling and, akin to the lack of value seen in strategic bombing in World War Two, the general public is getting acclimatised to the terror it is supposed to generate.

Conclusion

In a sense, Al-Qaeda is competing in a saturated market of fear and it is not doing very well. Other events such as the threat of avian flu, the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programmes, and increasing oil prices with the attendant economic effects have become more important factors for the general public to be concerned and fearful about.

Reactions after the London bombings and the second Bali bombings drive home this point. After London, the British to their credit refused to panic. To illustrate this point, there was even a website created proudly stating ‘We’re not afraid’. Contributions to this site have been so great that a book may soon be published. After the second Bali bombings, besides the condolences and expressions of outrage that are customary, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s comments also captured how bombings are losing its value for Al-Qaeda. PM Singh hit the nail on the head when he maintained that the terrorists will not win once ‘the general masses are not scared’ and ‘these kind of stupid acts by terrorists won’t shatter the spirit of fighting against terrorism’.