Eurasia Review
23 April 2016
- RSIS
- Media Mentions
- Tailored Deterrence: Influencing North Korean Decision-making – Analysis
Tailored Deterrence: Influencing North Korean Decision-making – Analysis
With strategic realities on the Korean Peninsula becoming more “fluid” or multi-faceted with multiple threat dimensions, defence planners in the US-ROK Alliance have been rethinking existing strategies for responding to different levels of threats posed by North Korea.
Since assuming power four years ago, Kim Jong-un’s signature policy has centered on the “Byungjin Line” – simultaneously pursuing the production of nuclear weapons and the development of the national economy. The Byungjin Line has effectively underscored North Korea’s three main national security objectives: (1) preserving the current authority structure under the leadership of Kim Jong-un; (2) improving the country’s dysfunctional struggling economy; and (3) deterring “foreign adversaries” from taking actions which could threaten the regime.
In this context, North Korea’s recent military reforms have also reflected a mutually supporting dual-track approach. On one hand, North Korea has aimed to maintain the credibility and operational readiness of its large, forward‐positioned, but technologically-obsolete conventional forces; while improving its asymmetric deterrence capabilities: from nuclear WMD programmes, ballistic missiles, and increasingly cyberwarfare.
… Michael Raska is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
GPO / IDSS / Online
Last updated on 25/04/2016
