The PRC has recently been involved in the launch of regional economic governance measures, notably AIIB, NDB, and One Belt One Road. IPE/IR theory tells us that international institutions can empower domestic interest groups with a stake in their success (e.g., bankers, bureaucrats). Leaders who pursue policies that undermine related international institutions can, in turn, be punished by these groups in various ways such as elections. But what about in non-democratic, non-electoral regimes? In addition, contributing significant resources to new international institutions, only to see them fail, could generate domestic audience costs. How if at all do we see these processes occurring in China?
About the Speaker:
Margaret M. Pearson is Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, College Park. She received her Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University and was tenured at Dartmouth College before moving to UMCP in 1996. She has held a Fulbright Research Fellowship at Beijing University. Her publications include the books Joint Ventures in the People’s Republic of China (Princeton Press, 1991) and China’s New Business Elite: The Political Results of Economic Reform (University of California Press, 1997), as well as articles in World Politics, The China Journal, Public Administration Review, Journal of Contemporary China, and Review of International Political Economy. Pearson’s ongoing research includes Chinese state control of the economy, central-local relations in China, innovation in Chinese firms, Chinese regulatory institutions, China’s behavior in global institutions and, most recently, a new theorization of the Chinese bureaucracy.