Two Decades of Counterterrorism in Indonesia: Successful Developments and Future Challenges
This article assesses developments in Indonesia’s counterterrorism policies in the past two decades. Over the span of 20 years, the Indonesian state’s capacity to counter terror threats has increased significantly, both in terms of conducting arrests, and designing and implementing P/CVE programmes. Unsurprisingly, this has curtailed various terrorist organisations’ ability to launch lethal attacks. But the terrorist threat persists – Jemaah Islamiyah has made significant attempts to win the “battle of concepts” among some communities through dakwah and infiltrating religious institutions, while Jamaah Ansharut Daulah continues to maintain country-wide networks and connections to pro-Islamic State groups in the region. Going forward, in addition to implementing various proposed P/CVE initiatives, Indonesia should increase collaborations with other Southeast Asian states, such as through joint CT operations, intelligence sharing and P/CVE initiatives.
Introduction
Indonesia’s counterterrorism (CT) capacity has transformed dramatically in the last two decades. From one of Southeast Asia’s most underprepared countries in dealing with terrorist threats at the turn of the millennium, Indonesia today has one of the region’s most robust CT capabilities. These range from a well-trained anti-terrorism unit, to expansive preventive detention mandates of terrorist suspects, and comprehensive action plans on preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) at both the national and local levels.[1] Unsurprisingly, while domestic terrorist organisations remain a security threat, their ability to conduct lethal terrorist attacks on the scale of the 2002 Bali bombings, which resulted in over 500 casualties, has significantly diminished.[2]
This article begins by tracing the four phases of Indonesia’s CT development, beginning with the pre-2002 phase, when politicians were sceptical of the terrorist threat. The subsequent 2002-2009 phase saw Indonesia focused on building its operational capacity. In the 2010-2017 phase, Indonesia began institutionalising P/CVE, while the 2018-2021 phase brought about the expansion and consolidation of state capacities on both fronts. This will be followed by an assessment of Indonesia’s future CT challenges. While Indonesia has been successful in disrupting terrorist organisations through mass arrests, the country still needs to invest further in P/CVE programmes and regional CT cooperation to address the capacity of terrorist groups to rebuild and the reach of transnational networks.
Phases of Development
Pre-2002: Scepticism and Inaction
Prior to the 2002 Bali bombings, Indonesia’s capacity to address terrorist threats was largely non-existent, owing to several reasons. First, Indonesian statesmen and politicians largely lacked the political will to respond firmly to terrorist threats.[3] The then president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, was hesitant to act against the nefarious activities of Islamist militants partly out of a perceived need to retain the support of Islamist parties in her governing coalition, such as Partai Amanat Nasional and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan.[4] Additionally, strong state actions against Muslims were widely unpopular in the wake of former President Soeharto’s regime’s repression of Muslim political expression between the 1960s and 1980s.[5] As a result, even to this day, many Muslim organisations and some human rights advocates fear that any increase in the state’s capacity to restrict Islamic groups would be misused to oppress the wider society.[6]
A second factor was the lack of experience and resources given to Indonesia’s leading CT unit at the time, the Gegana Regiment II of the National Police (Polri).[7] This unit had not been involved in the clampdown on Darul Islam (DI) between the 1970s and 1990s, which was instead led by the military (TNI). Inter-agency rivalries between TNI and Polri also prevented the effective sharing of intelligence.[8] As a consequence, the Gegana Regiment II simply did not have the institutional experience or support needed to effectively conduct CT operations such as intelligence analysis or scientifically-based crime investigations.[9] This was exacerbated between 1999-2002, when Indonesia’s main security concerns stemmed from separatist movements in Aceh and sectarian conflicts in Eastern Indonesia, which redirected state resources and focus away from CT issues.[10]
Consequently, before 2002, Indonesia did very little to address brewing terrorist threats, which largely sprung from the emerging Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) group. Whereas Singapore and Malaysia had begun identifying and arresting JI members in their respective countries by early 2002,[11] Indonesia continued to deny the group’s existence altogether. For example, when JI members attacked a community of Christians in Poso, Central Sulawesi, following the 2001 Malino Peace Accord, then Coordinating Minister of People’s Welfare Jusuf Kalla simply dismissed JI’s action as “pure criminality”.[12] Furthermore, when Indonesia’s State Intelligence Agency (BIN) secretly took the initiative to capture Al-Qaeda member Omar al-Faruq and JI member Agus Dwikarna in Manila, the administration, instead of praising the feat, actively “discouraged further actions”.[13]
2002-2009: Arrests and Intelligence Development
Indonesia’s reluctance to develop its CT capacities dramatically changed with the 2002 Bali bombings. In the immediate wake of the attacks, Indonesia focused its efforts on developing intelligence and terrorist arrest capabilities in three key areas.[14] First was the passing of Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Law. Less than a week after the Bali bombings, the government issued Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) No. 1/2002, which provided the legal framework to indict suspects on terrorism charges. This was soon followed by Perppu No. 2/2002, which allowed the former to be enacted retroactively. While its clauses were less substantive than Singapore and Malaysia’s Internal Security Act (the latter has since repealed this law), the mandate it gave to the security apparatus was quite extensive – it allowed for the use of intrusive intelligence gathering practices (e.g. wiretapping) after sufficient evidence is provided as well as pre-trial detention for a maximum of six months.[15]
A second key development was the creation of a dedicated CT unit under Polri in 2003, namely the Special Detachment 88 (Densus 88), with training and financial assistance from the United States, United Kingdom and Australia.[16] To increase its operational responsiveness, Densus 88 quickly expanded its unit size to 400-500 personnel, developed a strong network of human intelligence sources and established provincial-level teams, which since 2004 have carried out the bulk of Indonesia’s CT operations against JI.[17] Between 2002-2009, Densus 88 proved to be a highly proficient CT unit, arresting over 466 JI members and conducting multiple targeted killings of JI leaders, including Azahari Husin (JI’s top bomb-maker) in 2005 and Noordin M. Top (leader of JI’s most active bombing cell) in 2009.[18]
A third development that considerably enhanced Indonesia’s CT capacity was the restructuring of inter-agency lines of coordination. Most significant was the strengthening of BIN’s authority to direct, coordinate and oversee every national intelligence operation through Presidential Instruction No. 5/2002. This allowed BIN to sidestep any inefficiencies resulting from the rivalry between Polri and TNI’s own intelligence bodies, which before 2002 had prevented the swift exchange of intelligence.[19] Another important change was the creation of the Desk for Coordination of Eradicating Terrorism (DKPT) and the Anti-Terrorism Task Force in 2004, which were, respectively, tasked to coordinate the implementation of CT policies between agencies, and CT operations between Polri’s Densus 88 and TNI’s special forces – ensuring that effective coordination occurred not only in terms of intelligence, but also policy and operations.[20]
This revamped CT capacity enabled Indonesia to more effectively counter the threat of terrorism. Notably, as successful arrests continued to deplete JI’s ranks between 2002-2009, it became harder for JI’s bombing cells to recruit skilled personnel, resulting in a steady decrease in the severity of their attacks.[21] Whereas the 2002 Bali bombings resulted in over 500 casualties, the subsequent 2004 Australian Embassy bombing resulted in 200 casualties, and the 2009 JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton bombings resulted in 60 casualties.[22] Ultimately, the successful arrests of key operatives forced JI to reassess the value of violence.[23] Indeed, it was after a successful 2007 operation targeting one of JI’s bases in Poso that the organisation decided the benefit of violence no longer outweighed the harm it brought to its ranks, and chose to prioritise dakwah instead.[24]
2010-2017: Institutionalising P/CVE
Despite the decrease in the frequency and lethality of terrorist attacks by 2009, Indonesia quickly realised that the threat from terrorist organisations could not be solved through arrests alone. It was observed that local terror groups were notably resilient and could easily regroup, move their areas of operation or change their recruitment tactics to overcome losses in their ranks. In early 2010, for example, JI member Dulmatin established the Lintas Tanzim in Aceh – a base of operations where militant members of groups such as JI, DI and even the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) could take refuge, recruit and plan attacks.[25] There were also groups like the Mujahideen of East Indonesia (MIT), the Mujahideen of West Indonesia (MIB) and the Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), which, while not as large as JI, were still actively plotting attacks.[26]
Understanding that arrests were insufficient to neuter the terrorist threat, Indonesia during this phase began investing in a more comprehensive CT infrastructure. This was marked by several developments. First was the creation of the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) in 2010.[27] BNPT is a continuation of DKPT, but markedly more expansive in its scope of work, and has greater access to resources and authority. It is tasked with overseeing all aspects of Indonesia’s CT strategies, ranging from P/CVE to CT operations. BNPT is also supported by over 300 personnel and an annual budget of Rp 700 billion,[28] and headed by a ministerial-level official (thus solving the previous problem of inter-agency coordination).[29] Additionally, BNPT also formally enables TNI to participate in CT, and more specifically in P/CVE, through the Directorate of Prevention, over which TNI has been given purview.[30]
A second development was Indonesia’s increased institutionalisation of P/CVE programmes. Indeed, Indonesian civil society organisations (CSOs) had crafted various P/CVE programmes long before 2010. The Wahid Foundation, for example, began implementing counter-radicalisation programmes aimed at students in South Sulawesi and East Java in 2008, while the University of Indonesia’s Research Centre for Police Studies has run deradicalisation programmes for terrorist inmates since 2009.[31] However, these initiatives had little to no coordination with the state. Police officers themselves had also experimented with cultural integration approaches toward terrorist inmates since the early 2000s. This involved displaying their Islamic faith and developing personal relationships to persuade inmates to abandon violence. Unfortunately, these programmes were largely ad hoc and off-budget.[32]
It was only after 2010 that the state began systematically incorporating P/CVE into its national CT strategies. BNPT first attempted this in 2011 when its Directorate of Prevention issued a 2010-2014 strategic plan with targets such as reducing the spread of radical propaganda and persuading terrorist convicts to disengage from violence.[33] This plan was further refined in 2013 with the issuance of the National Deradicalisation Blueprint, which outlined a four-step deradicalisation process prioritising the countering of narratives and terrorist ideologies through “dialogues”.[34] This blueprint was operationalised in 2014 with the National Terrorism Prevention Program, which included various state-led P/CVE initiatives such as the empowerment of mosques through “entrepreneurial assistance”, the development of terrorism prevention modules in cooperation with madrassas, and the holding of in-prison dialogues between terrorist inmates and Middle Eastern ulamas.[35]
These programmes, however, failed to produce substantive results. Observers commonly criticised BNPT’s in-prison deradicalisation programmes as “infrequent and inconsistent”, which prevented buy-in from and trust-building with terrorist inmates.[36] Additionally, these programmes also suffered from a lack of pre-testing or evaluation mechanisms, which prevented objective assessments of their efficacy. This was worsened by the fact that many deradicalisation programmes took place in overcrowded and understaffed prisons – conditions that can increase the animosity of inmates and reduce the supervision capacity of staff.[37] Unfortunately, while some CSOs’ efforts were noted to be more successful, they were largely beset by coordination and sustainability problems. This resulted in multiple programme overlaps and short-lived gains.[38] When some 20 CSOs in 2016 banded together under an umbrella coalition called C-Save to coordinate efforts and share experiences, it was quickly plagued by internal disputes.[39]
2018-2021: Expanding State Capacity
Amidst Indonesia’s attempts to systematise a P/CVE framework, another threat emerged in the form of the Islamic State (IS) in Syria in 2014. This quickly reinvigorated many Indonesian jihadists’ militancy, prompting some to travel to Syria and others to regroup locally under new organisations – the biggest being the pro-IS Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD).[40] Building off of the structures of older groups such as JAT and DI, JAD quickly became Indonesia’s largest terrorist network, conducting five terrorist attacks in the span of three years.[41] However, it was not until the 2018 Surabaya bombings, which involved a coordinated triple suicide attack that caused 58 casualties and saw women and children participating as suicide bombers, that Indonesia acknowledged its CT infrastructure was still insufficient to address the evolving terrorist threat.[42]
This resulted in two significant developments. First was the expansion of Densus 88’s preventive detention mandates through the issuance of Law No. 5/2018 on anti-terrorism. The new Anti-Terrorism Law enabled Densus 88 to more frequently conduct preventive detention of terrorist suspects, as it increased the pre-trial detention period of suspects from 120 days to 200 days before trial.[43] Additionally, the regulation extended the scope of activities prosecutable as terrorism-related offences. In the original regulation, Densus 88 was only authorised to arrest suspects who were directly involved in or supported the conduct of terrorist attacks.[44] In the amended regulation, Densus 88 can now criminalise individuals for being affiliated to a terrorist organisation or acting in non-violent operations such as spreading propaganda materials, even when these acts do not contribute to attacks.[45]
The expansion of Densus 88’s preventive detention mandate exponentially increased the number of arrests of terrorist suspects. In 2018, Densus 88 arrested a total of 396 terrorist suspects – a 117% increase compared to the previous year.[46] Over the course of four years, up until December 2021, the number of arrested terrorist suspects increased to 1,247.[47] The expanded mandate also enabled Densus 88 to detain key individuals who, while not directly involved in planning or conducting attacks, were vital to their organisation’s survival. In 2018, Densus 88 arrested various senior JAD leaders – rendering the organisation’s central command defunct and forcing its cells to act independently with little to no coordination.[48] In 2019, Densus 88 also arrested JI leader Para Wijayanto and, in the following years, various senior JI members, including Zulkarnaen, Siswanto and Abu Rusydan – complicating the organisation’s ongoing rebuilding process.[49]
A second important development was the creation of the National Action Plan Against Extremism (RAN PE) through Presidential Decree No. 7/2021. The RAN PE is a comprehensive P/CVE reform blueprint that aims to solve Indonesia’s various P/CVE problems, such as the lack of local context in state deradicalisation programmes,[50] the lack of coordination between CSOs in designing counter-radicalisation initiatives,[51] and the lack of standardised assessment and evaluation tools.[52] This blueprint consists of 130 government action plans divided into three main pillars – prevention, law enforcement and cooperation – with varying goals ranging from strengthening P/CVE data governance, to increasing the efficacy of post-prison deradicalisation monitoring, to developing better witness and victim protection programmes.[53]
Throughout 2021, the government reported that several programmes have been implemented as part of the RAN PE initiative. BNPT, for example, has created the I-KHub, a website aiming to document all P/CVE programmes done by government bodies and CSOs.[54] The Ministry of Law and Human Rights also collaborated with the Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian to devise a standardised mechanism for handling children of convicted terrorists.[55] However, many challenges remain. There is still a lack of impact assessment for the RAN PE programmes already implemented – I-KHub, for example, still has little to no data from CSO-led P/CVE programmes. Additionally, many provincial governments have not created derivative RAN PE regulations, which prevents them from implementing its programmes. While RAN PE is a timely and relevant document, more time is required to implement its various proposals in order to enhance the quality of Indonesian P/CVE.
Indonesia’s Future CT Challenges
While significant enhancements to Indonesia’s CT infrastructure in recent years have successfully reduced terrorist organisations’ capacity to mount lethal attacks, several challenges remain. First, jihadist organisations continue to display resilience and an ability to adapt their strategies to CT operations. This is most notable in the case of JI. Recognising in 2008 that Densus 88 could quickly arrest swathes of its members after an attack, JI changed its strategy to focus on winning the “battle of concepts” instead.[56] In doing so, JI has rebuilt its dakwah networks – investing heavily in its education division, developing a dedicated forum to manage its madrassas[57] and sending JI ulamas to off-Java provinces.[58] More recently, JI was found to have infiltrated political parties and the Indonesian Ulama Council – institutions that would give them a justifiable pretext to criticise the government and preach about the need for an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia.[59]
To address this problem, it is vital that further resources are invested in implementing key components of the P/CVE framework proposed under the government’s latest action plan. While continuing to arrest JI members who design, fund and implement dakwah programmes may disrupt their progress in winning the “battle of concepts”, it is not a sustainable solution nor will it fully halt the appeal of JI’s narrative.[60] Doing so would require a coordinated counter-radicalisation programme involving the state and CSOs, a context-sensitive early warning and off-ramping programme which Indonesia has yet to acquire,[61] and measurable in-prison deradicalisation and out-prison reintegration programmes. While the RAN PE has outlined specific programmes to this effect,[62] as noted above, its implementation has thus far fallen short. Serious monitoring and evaluation of RAN PE’s implementation recommendations by all stakeholders are still needed.
The second challenge to Indonesian CT moving forward concerns jihadist organisations’ transnational ties in the region and around the Middle East. While Indonesian jihadists today are not as well connected as JI was in the early 2000s,[63] they still maintain significant domestic and international links. JAD, for example, was speculated to have coordinated with pro-IS members in Malaysia in 2019, when two arrested Malaysian nationals were found to have participated in bomb-making training in Yogyakarta.[64] Ties between JAD and Philippine groups were also found in the 2019 Jolo Cathedral bombing, which involved two JAD members being guided by an Indonesian jihadist in Afghanistan to work under Hatib Hajan Sawadjaan, an Abu Sayyaf Group commander.[65] Recently, Dwi Susanti, an Indonesian still residing in Syria, was found to have facilitated money transfers from Indonesia used to smuggle teens from Syrian refugee camps to IS recruiters.[66]
Such examples illustrate that neutering Indonesian terrorist organisations also requires effective cooperation between Southeast Asian states. Indeed, the region has developed several notable minilateral and multilateral initiatives – though their successes vary. The Trilateral Cooperative Agreement between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, for example, has been notably successful in reducing the number of transnational criminal incidents in the Sulu Sea in recent years.[67] The ASEAN Our Eyes Initiatives (OEI), however, has not shown progress due to issues around distrust and capacity discrepancies between regional countries, which in turn has prevented visible progress in facilitating vital intelligence sharing on CT issues.[68] It is also necessary for the region to expand cooperation on law enforcement operations and P/CVE initiatives – such as exchanging information on deradicalisation evaluation practices and collaborating on post-prison monitoring initiatives to prevent recidivism. This is particularly important in border areas such as Sabah, which has long been an interstate travel route for jihadists.[69]
Conclusion
In the two decades following the 2002 Bali bombings, Indonesia’s CT capacity has developed significantly. By 2021, Indonesia had instituted an expansive anti-terrorism regulation that has exponentially increased the number of arrested terrorist suspects. A comprehensive blueprint has also been crafted that, on paper, addresses various problems associated with Indonesia’s past P/CVE initiatives. Indeed, these developments have greatly reduced Indonesia’s terrorist organisations’ ability to conduct lethal attacks. Still, Indonesian jihadists are notably resilient and maintain transnational networks that continue to pose a security threat to Indonesia, around the region and beyond. Moving forward, Indonesia needs to deliver on its pledges in the RAN PE by implementing its various P/CVE reform plans and work together with other Southeast Asian states to bolster regional cooperation in CT operations, intelligence and P/CVE.
About The Author:
Alif Satria is a Researcher in the Department of Politics and Social Change of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Jakarta, a think tank based in Indonesia. He can be reached at [email protected]
Thumbnail photo by Antonio Prado on Pexels
Citations
[1] Greg Barton, “How Indonesia’s Counter-Terrorism Force Has Become a Model for the Region,” The Conversation, July 2, 2018, https://theconversation.com/how-indonesias-counter-terrorism-force-has-become-a-model-for-the-region-97368; Leo Suryadinata, “Islamism and the New Anti-Terrorism Law in Indonesia,” ISEAS Perspective No. 39 (2018), p. 3, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/[email protected]; Irene Gayatri, “Indonesia’s NAP CVE as an Instrument of a Gendered Non-Traditional Security Approach in Indo Pacific,” AIIA Australian Outlook, February 11, 2021, https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/indonesias-nap-cve-as-an-instrument-of-a-gendered-non-traditional-security-approach-in-indo-pacific/.
[2] In comparison, the 2021 Makassar cathedral bombing only injured 20 and killed none barring the suicide bombers themselves. See “Suicide Attack Rocks Indonesia Church, Several Wounded,” Al Jazeera, March 28, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/28/suspected-suicide-attack-rocks-indonesia-church-many-wounded.
[3] Strategic Survey, “Indonesian Security and Countering Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” Strategic Survey Vol. 103, No. 1 (2003), p. 222, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597230312331339933.
[4] Ibid., p. 223
[5] R. William Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation,” The Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 55, No. 3 (1996), pp. 621-622, https://doi.org/10.2307/2646448.
[6] Leonard C. Sebastian, “The Indonesian Dilemma: How to Participate in the War on Terror Without Becoming a National Security State,” in After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia, ed. by Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan (Singapore: World Scientific/Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2003), p. 358.
[7] Peter Chalk, Angel Rabasa, William Rosenau and Leanne Piggott, The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment (Arlington: RAND Corporation, 2009), pp. 153-154.
[8] Strategic Survey, “Indonesian Security,” p. 226.
[9] Ali Muhammad, “Indonesia’s Way to Counter Terrorism 2002-2009: Lesson Learned,” Journal of Government and Politics Vol. 5, No. 2 (2014), p. 192, https://doi.org/10.18196/jgp.2014.0018.
[10] Kirk A. Johnson, “The Longue Duree: Indonesia’s Response to the Threat of Jihadist Terrorism 1998-2016,” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), p. 7.
[11] Andrew H Tan, “Terrorism in Singapore: Threat and Implications,” Contemporary Security Policy Vol. 23, No. 3 (2002), p. 1, https://doi.org/10.1080/713999756; Muhammad Bakashmar, “Winning the Battles, Losing the War? An Assessment of Counterterrorism in Malaysia,” Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 20, No. 4 (2008), p. 482, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550802257200.
[12] Sidney Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches to Radical Islam Since 1998,” in Democracy and Islam in Indonesia, ed. by Mirjam Künkler and Alfred Stepan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), p. 116.
[13] Greg Fealy and Aldo Borgu, Local Jihad: Radical Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia (Barton, ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2005), p. 36.
[14] Senia Febrica, “Securitizing Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Accounting for the Varying Responses of Singapore and Indonesia,” Asian Survey Vol. 50, No. 3 (2010), p. 583, https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2010.50.3.569.
[15] See Seng Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna, “Interstate and Intrastate Dynamics in Southeast Asia’s War on Terror,” The SAIS Review of International Affairs Vol. 24, No. 1 (2004), p. 96, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26999203.
[16] Arabinda Acharya, Whither Southeast Asia Terrorism? (London: Imperial College Press, 2015), p. 135.
[17] Tom Allard and Kanupriya Kapoor, “Fighting Back: How Indonesia’s Elite Police Turned the Tide on Militants,” Reuters, December 23, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-security-idUSKBN14C0X3; Chalk et al., Evolving Terrorist Threat, p. 154.
[18] Gillian S. Oak, “Jemaah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase: The Many Faces of a Terrorist Group,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism Vol. 33, No. 11 (2010), pp. 1001-1016, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.514697.
[19] Chalk et al., Evolving Terrorist Threat, p. 156; Acharya, Whither Southeast Asia, p. 151.
[20] Ibid., pp. 151-152.
[21] Sidney Jones, “The Changing Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah,” Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 59, No. 2 (2005), p. 174, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357710500134475.
[22] Oak, “Jemaah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” p. 1015.
[23] Julie Chernov-Hwang, “Dakwah Before Jihad: Understanding the Behavior of Jemaah Islamiyah,” Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 41, No. 1 (2019), p. 25, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26664203.
[24] Dakwah translates to proselytisation. In practice, this manifests in the act of preaching through sermons or small study groups to spread the group’s understanding of religion. See Chernov-Hwang, “Dakwah Before Jihad,” p. 25.
[25] International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh,” Asia Report No. 189 (2010), p. 7, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/indonesia-jihadi-surprise-aceh.
[26] Kirk A. Johnson, “The Longue Duree,” p. 74.
[27] John Rollins, “Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy,” CRS Report for Congress No. R41070 (2011), p. 28, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/terror/R41070.pdf.
[28] Cameron Sumpter, “Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Priorities, Practice and the Role of Civil Society,” Journal for Deradicalization No. 11 (2017), p. 118, https://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/103/86.
[29] Chalk et al., Evolving Terrorist Threat, pp. 118-119; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, “Tugas Pokok dan Fungsi,” accessed May 27, 2022, https://www.bnpt.go.id/tupoksi; Muhamad Haripin, Chaula Rininta Anindya and Adhi Priamarizki, “The Politics of Counter-Terrorism in Post-Authoritarian States: Indonesia’s Experience 1998-2018,” Defense & Security Analysis Vol. 36, No. 3 (2020), p. 9, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2020.1790807.
[30] The BNPT is comprised of the Directorate of Prevention, Protection and Deradicalisation; the Directorate of Operations and Capacity Building; and the Directorate of International Cooperation. See Presidential Decree No. 46/2010 on the National Counter Terrorism Agency.
[31] Sumpter, “Countering Violent Extremism,” pp. 131-132.
[32] Ibid., p. 118; Chalk et al., Evolving Terrorist Threat, p. 157; Institute for Policy Analysis and Conflict, “Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Need for a Rethink,” IPAC Report No. 11 (2014), p. 2, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07787.1.
[33] IPAC, “Countering Violent Extremism,” p. 4.
[34] These steps involve an identification phase, a rehabilitation phase, a re-education phase and a re-socialisation phase. See Cameron Sumpter, “Indonesia’s De-radicalisation Blueprint,” The Interpreter, February 5, 2016, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-s-de-radicalisation-blueprint.
[35] IPAC, “Countering Violent Extremism,” p. 7.
[36] Sumpter, “Countering Violent Extremism,” p. 129.
[37] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Update on Indonesian Pro-ISIS Prisoners and Deradicalisation Efforts,” IPAC Report No. 34 (2016), pp. 2-4, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07795.1.
[38] Alif Satria, “Preventive Counterterrorism Needs Details,” The Jakarta Post, June 2, 2018, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/06/02/preventive-counterterrorism-needs-details.html.
[39] IPAC, “Update on Indonesian Pro-ISIS Prisoners,” p. 18.
[40] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Disunity Among Indonesian ISIS Supporters and the Risk of More Violence,” IPAC Report No. 25 (2016), pp. 5-10, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07792.1.
[41] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Decline of ISIS in Indonesia and the Emergence of New Cells,” IPAC Report No. 69 (2021), p. 5, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep28849.
[42] Kirsten E. Schulze, “The Surabaya Bombings and the Evolution of the Jihadi Threat in Indonesia,” CTC Sentinel Vol. 11, No. 6 (2018), p. 5, https://ctc.usma.edu/surabaya-bombings-evolution-jihadi-threat-indonesia/.
[43] Pemerintah Pusat, Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia No. 15 Tahun 2003 Tentang Penetapan Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2002 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Terorisme, Menjadi Undang-Undang, April 4, 2003, pp. 14-29, https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Home/Details/43015/uu-no-15-tahun-2003; Pemerintah Pusat, Undang Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 5 Tahun 2018 Tentang Perubahan atas Undang Undang Nomor 15 Tahun 2003 Tentang Penetapan Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2022 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Terorisme Menjadi Undang Undang, June 21, 2018, pp. 11-12, https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Home/Details/82689/uu-no-5-tahun-2018.
[44] Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia No. 15 Tahun 2003, pp. 4-10.
[45] Undang Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 5 Tahun 2018, pp. 8-10.
[46] Irine Hiraswari Gayatri, “Even Through a Pandemic, Terrorism Persists in Indonesia,” Australian Institute of International Affairs, July 23, 2021, https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/even-through-a-pandemic-terrorism-persists-in-indonesia/.
[47] This data is obtained through a personal dataset that the author has constructed using reports from local and national level news sources.
[48] IPAC, “The Decline of ISIS,” p. 6.
[49] Institute for the Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Impact of The Taliban Victory on Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiyah,” IPAC Report No. 73 (2021), p. 8, http://cdn.understandingconflict.org/file/2021/09/IPAC_Report_73_JI.pdf.
[50] Mohammad Hasan Anshori, Imron Rasyid Muhamad Arif, Sopar Peranto Johari Efendi and Vidya Hutagalung, Memberantas Terorisme di Indonesia: Praktik, Kebijakan dan Tantangan, (Jakarta: The Habibie Center, 2019), p. 76; Gusti Bagus Dharma Agastia, Anak Agung Banyu Perwita and D. B. Subedi, “Countering Violent Extremism Through State-Society Partnerships: A Case Study of Deradicalisation Programmes in Indonesia,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism Vol. 15, No. 1 (2020), pp. 3-4, https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2020.1722317.
[51] Alif Satria, “Preventive Counterterrorism Needs Details,” The Jakarta Post, June 2, 2018, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/06/02/preventive-counterterrorism-needs-details.html.
[52] Noor Huda Ismail, “Indonesia: Perennial Issue of Terrorist Recidivism,” RSIS Commentary No. 80 (2020), p. 2, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/CO20080.pdf.
[53] Husni Mubarok, Setelah Terbitnya Perpres RAN PE? Refleksi Peran Masyarakat Sipil di Indonesia (Jakarta: Wahid Foundation, 2021), pp. 13-14, https://wahidfoundation.org/index.php/publication/detail/Setelah-Terbitnya-Perpres-RAN-PE-Refleksi-Peran-Masyarakat-Sipil-di-Indonesia.
[54] “Pusat Informasi dan Kolaborasi Pencegahan dan Penanggulangan Terorisme dan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan,” I-KHub BNPT, 2020, https://ikhub.id/.
[55] Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, Pelaksanaan Rencana Aksi Nasional Pencegahan dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan yang Mengarah pada Terorisme (RAN PE) tahun 2021 (Jakarta: BNPT, 2022), p. 15.
[56] The “battle of concepts” refers to the competition between the supremacy of an Islamic Caliphate over democratic governance. In this “battle”, JI intends to use dakwah to convince Muslims of the Caliphate’s supremacy, while undermining the authority of democracy by showing its flaws such as inequality and corruption. See Verdict of Para Wijayanto, East Jakarta District Court, 2020, No. 308/Pid.Sus/2020/PN Jkt. Tim., p. 25.
[57] This division is called the Madrassa Communication Forum (FKPP), designed to coordinate and standardise the curriculum of JI madrassas. See Verdict of Para Wijayanto, p. 46.
[58] Institute for the Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah,” IPAC Report No. 36 (2017), p. 4, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/04/IPAC_Report_36.pdf.
[59] Alif Satria, “How Bali Bombings Group Infiltrated Indonesian Institutions to Resurrect Itself,” Benar News, November 24, 2021, https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/column-bali-bombing-group-rebuilds-11242021153457.html.
[60] IPAC, “Update on Indonesian Pro-ISIS Prisoners,” p. 3.
[61] Sumpter, “Countering Violent Extremism,” pp. 125-126.
[62] These subjects have been the focus on RAN PE’s Pillar 1 Focus 3 on “Improving the Effectiveness of the Campaign Against Extremism”; Pillar 1 Focus 4 on “Improving the Resilience of Vulnerable Groups”; and Pillar 1 Focus 7 on “In-Prison Deradicalisation”. See Ministry of Law and Human Rights of the Republic of Indonesia, Presidential Decree No. 7/2021 on the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism That Leads to Terrorism 2020-2024 (Jakarta: State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia, January 2021), http://peraturan.go.id/common/dokumen/terjemah/2021/Perpres%207%202021%20English.pdf.
[63] Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema’ah Islamiyah, trans. by Dave McRae (Sydney, NSW: New South Publishing, 2013), pp. 171-172.
[64] Kevin Fernandez and Greg Lopez, “Terror Threat in Malaysia: Warning Signs,” RSIS Commentary No. 152 (2019), p. 3, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/CO19152.pdf.
[65] The Jakarta Post, “Indonesian couple with ties to JAD behind Jolo church attack: Police,” July 24, 2019, https://www.thejakartapost.com/seasia/2019/07/24/indonesian-couple-with-ties-to-jad-behind-jolo-church-attack-police.html; Ana P. Santos, “Who Were the Indonesian Husband and Wife Behind Jolo Bombing?” Rappler, January 14, 2020, https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/who-were-indonesian-husband-and-wife-behind-jolo-bombing.
[66] Kusumasari Ayuningtyas, “Indonesia confirms 5 citizens linked to funding IS efforts to recruit teens,” Benar News, May 10, 2022, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/terror-financing-05102022150556.html.
[67] Prashanth Prameswaran, “Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines Consider Expanding Sulu Sea Trilateral Patrols,” The Diplomat, April 19, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/indonesia-malaysia-philippines-consider-expanding-sulu-sea-trilateral-patrols/.
[68] David M. Jones and Michael L. R. Smith, “Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order,” International Security Vol. 32, No. 1 (2007), pp. 170-171, https://www.jstor.org/stable/30129804.
[69] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Protecting the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas from Abu Sayyaf Attacks,” IPAC Report, No. 53 (2019), pp. 17-18, https://www.cseashawaii.org/2019/01/ipac-report-53-protecting-the-sulu-sulawesi-seas-from-abu-sayyaf-attacks/.
