Thailand
The level of violence in Thailand’s Deep South in 2024 saw a slight uptick compared with the previous year. As of September, 475 incidents were recorded, resulting in 93 deaths and 272 injuries. Deaths accruing from soft targets were twice as high as hard targets. There were 73 explosions, including three car bombs. The military also continued to press charges against Malay-Muslim activists engaged in activities deemed as threats to national security. Separately, the peace dialogue between Bangkok and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (Patani Malay National Revolutionary Front, or BRN) resumed in February with discussions on the “Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace (JCPP)”, a draft framework that both sides agreed to use as a basis for future discussions – though the BRN also proposed a parallel draft. The abrupt change of prime minister in August could also strike a serious blow to the peace dialogue, as it enables the hawkish elements in government circles to gain more dominance. Taken together, the prospects for the peace process appear to be dim, and the BRN has stated that it will return to armed conflict if the negotiations fail.
State of the Conflict in Thailand’s Deep South
2024 marked the third decade of a renewed violent insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces. Since 2004, over 22,700 violent incidents have been recorded, resulting in more than 7,600 deaths and 14,000 injuries (as of September 2024), according to the Deep South Watch. Since the launch of a formal peace dialogue in 2013, the number of violent incidents and casualties has significantly declined. Compared with 2023, however, there was a slight increase in attacks and casualties last year. From January to September 2024, 475 incidents were recorded, leaving 93 deaths and 272 injuries. The monthly average of violence and casualty rates was also higher than in 2023, during which 481 violent incidents took place, leaving 116 dead and 217 injured.[1]
Indiscriminate attacks affecting civilians continued in 2024, albeit at a significantly lower rate than a decade ago. Among the victims classified from January to September, soft targets (unarmed civilians) accounted for 67 deaths and 124 injuries, slightly higher than hard targets (armed combatants), which contributed 25 deaths and 148 injuries. During the same period, there were 73 explosions, including three car bombs. On June 30, a car bomb exploded in front of a residential block near a police station in Yala’s Bannang Sata district, killing a Muslim teacher who was riding by on a motorcycle. Sixteen people, including six police officers, were also injured.[2] On September 29, a car bomb exploded in the border district of Tak Bai in Narathiwat, injuring two soldiers and causing damage to nearby houses. Deputy Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai said that it was “possible” the incident was linked to the Tak Bai court case (see below).[3]
Women and children aged under 18 were among the victims of violent attacks; women accounted for seven deaths and 24 injuries, and children two deaths and 30 injuries. Buddhists were also proportionally more targeted than Muslims. The former constitute about 20 percent of the population of the three southernmost provinces.[4]
A wave of cross-province coordinated attacks during the holy month of Ramadan demonstrated the resilience and continued presence of BRN fighters on the ground. These fighters are usually “invisible”, as the BRN does not have a demarcated military base and fighters have blended themselves in with villagers. On March 22, 44 coordinated bombing and arson attacks took place, targeting convenience stores, petrol stations and public infrastructure across Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Songkhla provinces, resulting in the death of a Myanmar migrant worker.[5] Coordinated attacks are primarily aimed at demonstrating the capacity and boosting the morale of militants rather than causing casualties. Violence often spikes during the Ramadan period, as fighters are encouraged to double their efforts in waging the struggle against the Thai “colonialists”.
The southernmost region has been under a state of exception for more than two decades, with the enforcement of martial law and an emergency decree. This has enabled security forces to operate with little judicial checks and balances. Martial law authorises the military to detain suspects for up to seven days without a court warrant. On October 18, the cabinet approved the 78th extension of the state of emergency in the conflict zone from October 20, 2024, until January 19, 2025. The emergency decree remains imposed in 18 out of 33 districts in the three southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat.[6] Additionally, the emergency decree grants security forces the authority to hold suspects for up to 30 days without formal charges. The security forces have frequently exploited these two special laws to extend detentions of suspected insurgents for as long as 37 days.
The military has also continued to press charges against Malay-Muslim activists engaged in activities deemed as threats to national security. In January, nine activists were charged for incitement and partaking in clandestine activities. The military stated that the charges were related to the gathering of Malay Muslims in traditional Malay dress to mark the 2022 Hari Raya celebrations, during which the offenders were involved in the display of BRN flags and the reading of a poem. These acts were interpreted by the authorities as a call for young Malay Muslims to sacrifice their lives to fight for independence. From 2018 to 2024, there were at least 14 legal cases lodged against Malay-Muslim activists in the Deep South. Human rights activists view these legal cases as strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP), aimed at silencing dissenting voices.[7]
In August, the Senate passed a law proposed by the House of Representatives to nullify the Order of the Chief of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) No. 14/2016, paving the way for the resurrection of the Advisory Council of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC).[8] Set up under the Southern Border Provinces Administration Act B.E. 2553 (2010), the Advisory Council was suspended by the NCPO’s Order for a decade following the country’s 2014 military coup. It comprises representatives from various social groups and has served as a platform for people to voice their opinions and concerns to the SBPAC, which is a central agency coordinating government works on development and justice in the southernmost region. This development is expected to enhance public participation in addressing problems in the Deep South.
An ad-hoc committee, set up by the House of Representatives in October 2023 to explore ways to enhance the peace process in southern Thailand, is expected to provide recommendations to Parliament by late 2024. This is an attempt to enhance the role of the legislative in pushing forward the peace process. Lawmakers could potentially play an important role in supporting the peace process, but their engagement has been limited, particularly since the 2014 coup. The 35-member ad-hoc committee, comprising members of parliament, academics and civil society organisations (CSOs), is likely to present a progressive view focusing on addressing the conflict’s root causes and enhancing the peace process as a core mechanism for conflict resolution.[9]
In 2024, attempts to ensure legal accountability for the 2004 Tak Bai protest failed, undermining confidence in some quarters in the judicial system and reaffirming the perceived culture of impunity in Thailand. In August, the Narathiwat Criminal Court accepted a lawsuit filed by the families of 48 victims of the Tak Bai incident, just 63 days before the expiry of the statute of limitations. On October 25, 2004, thousands of protesters had demonstrated in front of a police station in Narathiwat’s border district of Tak Bai. Seven protesters were killed by gunfire at the protest site and 78 more were suffocated to death as they were piled on top of one another in military trucks during transport to a detention site. An arrest warrant was later issued for six defendants as they failed to appear at a scheduled preliminary hearing.[10]
The Court issued a summons for General Pisarn Wattanawongkiri, a former commander of the Fourth Army Region and previously a member of the House of Representatives with the ruling Pheu Thai Party. It later issued an arrest warrant, but the retired general had reportedly travelled abroad for medical treatment.[11] On October 14, General Pisarn resigned from the Pheu Thai Party amid mounting pressure for the party to bring its member to justice.[12] The Office of the Attorney General also charged six soldiers and two civilians for their roles in the Tak Bai crackdown in a separate case in September. The offenders included General Chalermchai Wirunphet, who was then commander of the Fifth Infantry Division, which supervised the transportation of the protesters.[13] The statute of limitations for the legal cases to proceed expired on October 25 without any of the suspects being taken into custody.[14]
Peace Dialogue Under the Pheu Thai-Led Government
The dynamics of the southern conflict have significantly evolved since the launch of the peace dialogue in 2013, facilitated by Malaysia under the then Yingluck Shinawatra government. The battle has over the past decade increasingly shifted from the military to political terrain.[15] The peace dialogue continued under the post-coup government led by coup leader-turned-prime minister General Prayut Chan-ocha, although discussions did not produce any substantial results. The BRN refused to take part in the military-led peace talks and, hence, Majlis Syura Patani (MARA Patani) – the then newly formed umbrella grouping of the liberation movement – took its place as a dialogue partner in the peace talks.[16] While a few BRN members joined MARA Patani, they did not receive a clear mandate from the BRN leadership, which significantly undermined the umbrella organisation’s legitimacy.[17]
Dubious about MARA Patani’s ability to control fighters on the ground, the National Security Council (NSC) began to hold backchannel talks with the BRN, later known as the “Berlin Initiative”, in 2018 in parallel with the Kuala Lumpur-facilitated process.[18] After General Prayut won a second term in the 2019 general election, the BRN decided to return to the dialogue table. The Berlin Initiative developed into the “General Principles of the Peace Dialogue Process” (GPDP), which was formally agreed upon by Bangkok and the BRN during a formal meeting facilitated by Malaysia on March 31 to April 1, 2022. The GPDP outlined three substantive matters: 1) the reduction of violence; 2) public consultation; and 3) the search for a political solution. The Thai peace dialogue panel subsequently proposed a dialogue framework called the “Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace” (JCPP) in February 2023, which focused on the reduction of violence and public consultation. The consultation was expected to cover six key areas: 1) form of governance; 2) recognition of the Patani community, identities and cultures; 3) human rights, justice and legal matters; 4) economic development; 5) education; and 6) others.
Following the 2023 general election, the Pheu Thai Party managed to form a coalition government led by property tycoon-turned-politician Srettha Thavisin. The prime minister appointed Chatchai Bangchuad, the then NSC’s deputy secretary-general, to head the peace dialogue panel. He is the first civilian to hold the post, as the previous heads were all army generals. Apart from the NSC, the dialogue panel comprises representatives from five government agencies, i.e., the SBPAC, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Justice Ministry and the military-led Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC).[19]
The peace talks resumed in early February 2024 with discussions on the JCPP, yet it had a rocky start. In late February 2024, a draft JCPP document was leaked apparently by the BRN to the media, and the group at the same time presented a parallel draft.[20] Patani Notes, an alternative media platform running on Facebook, compared the two versions of the proposed plan of the peace process.[21] Conflicting details around what the BRN called “reduction of armed action” and the Thai peace dialogue panel referred to as a “reduction of violence” was a notable point of contention.[22] Whereas the draft JCPP only proposed to remove checkpoints on main roads and revoke the state of emergency in districts in which security situations had improved, the BRN called for a more drastic scale-down of military operations, such as the removal of all checkpoints and the revocation of all security laws in the conflict areas. Nevertheless, both sides agreed on setting up an independent monitoring team.[23] The BRN’s proposal of a parallel draft came as a surprise to the Thai peace dialogue panel, which stated that the JCPP had been jointly developed by both parties over approximately a year.[24] A source close to the BRN said that the group’s leaders, who only learned about the draft JCPP later, had disagreed with some points in the draft and, hence, wanted to propose alternatives.[25] Both sides later agreed to use the two drafts as a basis for further discussion.
The leaked draft JCPP has provoked sustained criticisms on the trajectory of the peace dialogue by hawkish elements on the Thai side. Prominent hardliners have, for example, publicly opposed the signing of the JCPP, charging that the BRN has used the peace dialogue to push forward its political agenda and delegitimise the Thai government. They have added that following the path laid out in the JCPP would put Bangkok at a disadvantage, which could lead to a loss of control over some territory or, worse still, secession.[26]
The heated controversy over the draft JCPP prompted the four independent observers of the peace dialogue – one Thai and three international – to issue a statement in early March to reaffirm that the Thai government and the BRN have engaged in substantive discussions and are seeking political solutions in accordance with “the will of the Patani community”, within the framework of the unitary state of Thailand and according to the Thai constitution.[27] Nevertheless, the hawkish view is increasingly gaining ground, particularly within ruling Pheu Thai Party circles.[28]
There was also a change of facilitator for the peace dialogue in July 2024, amid criticism over the harsh approach taken by General Zulkifli Zainal Abidin.[29] Kuala Lumpur appointed Mohd Rabin Basir, former director general of the Malaysian National Security Council, as the new facilitator.[30] This took place a few days after the meeting of the Joint Technical Committee in June, after which General Zulkifli, the then facilitator, issued a statement expressing positive sentiments that the JCPP might soon be endorsed by both sides.[31] However, his role as the facilitator ended shortly afterwards.
On August 14, the Constitutional Court dismissed former Premier Srettha for ethical violations in connection with his appointment of Pichit Chuenban as a minister attached to the Prime Minister’s Office. Pichit had been charged for bribery in 2008. The House of Representatives on August 16 voted for Paetongtarn Shinawatra, the youngest daughter of former Prime Minister Thaksin, to become the 31st prime minister of Thailand. Phumtham, the deputy prime minister, has been tasked to take charge of key government agencies, namely the NSC, SBPAC and ISOC.
Having the key government agencies under the supervision of one political leader, which was lacking in the Srettha government, seems to be a positive development in terms of streamlining government policies. Nevertheless, Phumtham seems to be influenced by the hawkish advisors around him, including security experts and former generals of the “Red Beret” Special Warfare Command who previously worked in the Deep South.[32] The mandate of the Thai peace dialogue panel led by Chatchai automatically ended following Srettha’s removal, and it is likely that the new peace dialogue panel could comprise more security-minded hardliners.[33] According to a senior NSC official, the talks will be reconvened and a new peace dialogue panel set up. However, it remains unclear whether the JCPP will remain as a central framework for negotiations in light of the recent criticisms.[34]
Outlook
The ruling Pheu Thai Party, which initiated the formal peace dialogue in 2013, seemingly lacks both an adequate understanding of and the will to use the peace process as a means to achieve a negotiated political settlement. Due largely to the missteps made in the Tak Bai crackdown in 2004, the Thaksin-allied political parties have never regained popularity in the southernmost provinces. The low-intensity conflict in the country’s Deep South may not currently pose a serious threat to the Thai state and it is thus not at the forefront of the government’s priorities.
Considering these factors, the prospects for the peace dialogue appear to be dim. The lack of a meaningful peace process could plunge the southernmost region into a state of intensifying armed conflict. The Paetongtarn government appears to be swayed by hawkish advisors seeking to pursue a hardline approach to crush the BRN militarily and politically. If a new peace dialogue panel is set up and led by security-minded hardliners, the talks are likely to focus more on reducing physical violence rather than addressing the root causes of the conflict. This was the approach taken during the post-coup government, particularly when General Aksara Kerdphol led the peace dialogue panel, during which the BRN refused to participate in the talks. If the BRN rejects the opportunity to take part this time around, violent confrontations would likely increase.[35]
Fears of secession have arguably been blown out of proportion. The fact that the BRN has agreed to engage in the peace dialogue under the framework of the Thai constitution, which stipulates that Thailand is an indivisible unitary state, arguably demonstrates the BRN’s willingness to make some concessions. The BRN aspires for recognition of the cultural, linguistic and ethnic identities of the Patani community, freedom to uphold and practise their religious beliefs, ability to manage the region’s natural resources and freedom from political intimidation.[36] A form of self-governance that addresses these concerns can be negotiated under the framework of a unitary state.
Global research has shown that ending secessionist conflicts through a negotiated settlement is more sustainable than military suppression or political co-optation. Curtailing political space for defiant Malay-Muslim minorities and the refusal to genuinely address the root causes of the conflict will only prolong, if not exacerbate, the long-standing problems. To achieve a political solution through a peace process, a determined political will is required of the country’s leaders, and this is inextricably linked to the democratisation process in Thailand.
About the Author
Rungrawee Chalermsripinyorat (PhD) is a lecturer at the Institute for Peace Studies, Prince of Songkla University (Hat Yai Campus), Thailand. She obtained a PhD from the Australian National University. Her areas of research interest and expertise include Thailand’s southern insurgency, ethnic conflicts, peace processes, religion, and conflict in Southeast Asia. Dhiramedhist Lueng Ubon is an MA student at the Institute for Peace Studies, Prince of Songkla University.
Citations
[1] Data obtained from Deep South Watch, November 4, 2024.
[2] Abdullah Benjakat, “Govt Pickup Used as Yala Car Bomb,” Bangkok Post, July 1, 2024, https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2820865/govt-pickup-used-as-yala-car-bomb.
[3] Abdullah Benjakat and Saritdet Marukatat, “Tak Bai Bomb Possibly Linked to Massacre Court Case: Phumtham,” Bangkok Post, September 30, 2024, https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2874932/tak-bai-bomb-possibly-linked-to-massacre-court-case-phumtham.
[4] There were 135 Buddhist victims, including 33 deaths and 102 injuries. Muslim casualties totalled 185, including 47 deaths and 138 injuries. Data obtained from Deep South Watch, September 17, 2024.
[5] Mariyam Ahmad, “Coordinated Bombings, Arson Attacks Hit Thai South,” Benar News, March 22, 2024, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/thai/thai-deep-south-hit-bombings-arson-03222024053516.html.
[6] “Summary of the News of the Cabinet Meeting,” Royal Thai Government, October 15, 2024, https://www.thaigov.go.th/news/contents/details/89130.
[7] See Jaringan Mangsa Dari Undang-Undang Darurat (JASAD), “An Open Letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Member States of the United Nations Human Rights Council,” Facebook, January 6, 2024, https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=756020049898711.
[8] “Sowo Phan Rang Kotmai Loek Khamsang Huana Khosocho yup Khanakammakan Borihan Chaidaen tai Klap pai Chai Sapha Thiprueksa Thaen [Senate Passes Draft Law to Repeal NCPO Chief’s Order, Dissolving the Southern Border Advisory Committee and Reinstating the Advisory Council],” Prachatai, August 13, 2024, https://prachatai.com/journal/2024/08/110333.
[9] The author is a member of the ad hoc committee. See also Don Pathan, “Expect Parliamentary Sub-Committee to Make Bold Peace Recommendations for Thai Deep South,” Benar News, June 17, 2024, https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/parliamentary-sub-committee-peace-thai-deep-south-06172024124329.html.
[10] “Thai Court Issues Warrants for Former Security Personnel Over Deaths of 85 Demonstrators,” Reuters, September 12, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thai-court-issues-warrants-former-security-personnel-over-deaths-85-2024-09-12.
[11] “Thanai Phon-aek Phisan Raksa Tua Tangprathet Mai Chua Cha Nam Tua Khuen San su Khadi Tak Bai Dai Mai [Lawyer Says Gen Pisarn Receiving Treatment Abroad, Unclear If He Would Fight Tak Bai Case in Court],” Matichon Daily, September 13, 2024, https://www.matichon.co.th/politics/news_4789860.
[12] “Pisan Quits Pheu Thai to Escape Arrest, Interpol Help May Be Sought,” The Nation, October 15, 2024. https://www.nationthailand.com/news/politics/40042377.
[13] Nontarat Phaicharoen, “Thailand to Charge 8 Suspects in a Tak Bai Case as Deadline Nears,” Benar News, September 18, 2024, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/thai/new-tak-bai-suspects-09182024161500.html.
[14] Zsombor Peter, “Hopes for Justice Expire 20 Years After Thailand’s Tak Bai Massacre,” VoA, October 25, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/hopes-for-justice-expire-20-years-after-thailand-s-tak-bai-massacre/7839297.html.
[15] The 2013 peace talk was the first time that the Thai government and the BRN agreed to have a formal peace dialogue facilitated by Malaysia. Nevertheless, the 10-month-long peace talk was disrupted after Yingluck Shinawatra was forced to step down, followed by a military coup in May 2014.
[16] MARA Patani (Majlis Syura Patani, or Patani Consultative Council) is an umbrella organisation comprising four liberation movements – Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani (Patani Islamic Liberation Front, or BIPP), Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani (Patani Islamic Mujahideen Movement, or GMIP) and a few BRN members.
[17] The peace dialogue in this period mainly focused on ending physical violence and there was little discussion on addressing the root causes of the conflict. The joint technical team successfully drafted a plan to set up “safety zones” in the southernmost provinces; however, it never materialised as Bangkok refused to ink an agreement to endorse this initiative, fearing the document could be used by the BRN to seek international support to pave the way for secession.
[18] The Berlin Initiative, facilitated by a Europe-based international organisation, produced a general framework of the peace dialogue, which laid the groundwork for future talks.
[19] It was the first time since the 2014 coup that the SBPAC took part in the peace dialogue. During a decade of military rule, this civilian agency was significantly weakened and put under the ISOC’s control.
[20] Some parts of the leaked JCPP were posted on the Facebook page of Tichila Phutthasaraphan, a TPBS reporter. See Thichila Phutthasaraphan, “JCPP Plan to Solve Unrest in Three Southern Border Provinces,” Facebook, February 17, 2024, https://www.facebook.com/tichila.phutthasaraphan/posts/pfbid02TSYnL6P1ebRx2qizX7C85tsGFSqshuwsRW493nHfJZ1H2X9AmB7i2R7YtujkUA9Jl.
[21] Patani NOTES, “Rao Ru Arai Bang Chak Rang JCPP Rue Ro Damaep Santiphap (1) [What Do We Learn from the Draft JCPP or Peace Roadmap (1)],” Facebook, February 24, 2024, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid031cNvK2vg9fMjoMvMrzf1vTXSk4JzzZeEq3K3fgxjeWR21QJ2ZVXWEwZVyJs7Epz1l&id=100046305528363.
[22] Another major point of difference is the geographical area to be covered under this framework. While the draft JCPP covers the three southernmost provinces and four Muslim-majority districts in Songkhla, the BRN version proposed adding Sadao district in Songkhla and Satun province.
[23] Patani NOTES, “What Do We Learn from the Draft JCPP.”
[24] Personal communication with a source inside the Thai peace dialogue panel, March 2, 2024.
[25] Personal communication with a source close to the BRN, July 22, 2024.
[26] Hardliners have also claimed that the BRN has infiltrated the Thai state apparatus and have advocated for curtailing freedoms in the political space. See “Surachart Tuean Khana Phutkhui Onhat – Yomchamnon [Surachart Warns Peace Dialogue Panel Amateurish – Surrender],” Isra News Agency, February 24, 2024, https://www.isranews.org/article/south-slide/126557-surachartchatchai.html; Surachart Bamrungsuk, “BRN Lang JCPP [BRN After JCPP],” Matichon Weekly, July 10, 2024, https://www.matichonweekly.com/columnist/surachart-bamrungsuk.
[27] Patani NOTES, “Public Statement on the Peace Dialogue Process in Southern Thailand,” Facebook, March 3, 2024, https://www.facebook.com/story.php/?story_fbid=1025680472318794&id=100046305528363. The statement was signed by Jonathan Powell, Mark Tamthai, Siri Skare and Bernd Mutzelburg.
[28] Interview with a source inside the Thai peace dialogue panel, September 25, 2024; Personal communication with a source inside the Pheu Thai Party, September 25, 2024.
[29] Personal communication with members of the Thai peace dialogue panel and sources close to the BRN, May-June 2024.
[30] “Ex-MKN Dg Mohd Rabin Is New Malaysian Facilitator for Southern Thailand Peace Talks,” BERNAMA, July 5, 2024, https://www.bernama.com/en/news.php?id=2314748.
[31] Gen Zulkifli explained that the three substantive issues, namely, cessation of hostilities or reduction of violence, public consultation and discussions toward realising a political solution, would be endorsed by both parties in August, which could pave the way for the endorsement of the JCPP in September. See Majlis Keselamatan Negara, “Press Statement, National Security Council, Prime Minister Department,” Facebook, June 25, 2024, https://web.facebook.com/photo?fbid=791458176409210&set=pcb.791446716410356.
[32] Interview with a source inside the Thai peace dialogue panel, September 25, 2024.
[33] Interview with a source inside the Thai peace dialogue panel, September 25, 2024.
[34] Interview with a senior official of the National Security Council, October 24, 2024.
[35] In an interview with local media platform Wartani in August 2024, Ustaz Muhammad Syamsu, a BRN representative in the peace talks, stated that “if the negotiation could not resolve the conflict, we will continue with the war”. See Wartani, “Khaochai Rueang JCPP Nai Kan Cheracha Santiphap Patani [Understanding JCPP in the Patani Peace Process],” Facebook, August 10, 2024, https://www.facebook.com/share/v/dsZxepr72SPnaM6S/.
[36] “Pemerintahan Sendiri Hak Komuniti Patani Dan Kemerdekaan Hak Perjuangan Bangsa [Self-Governance Is the Right of Patani Community and Independence Is the Right of National Struggle],” Surat, No. 138 (September 2024), pp. 6-7. A Thai translation of this article which was published in Surat, a journal representing the views of Patani liberation movement, is available at https://www.facebook.com/TheMotive2020/posts/pfbid02rvA9wxnvjzs5Tr4Qey1x1WYDffZMKFQk6tbRY3UAuXxP1RD4d9QrcN8w8axcnoWCl.
