Terrorism Financing in Southeast Asia: Transformations, Continuities and Challenges
Over the past two decades, there have been transformations and continuities in relation to the fund-raising, fund-moving and fund-using tactics used by terrorist groups in Southeast Asia. Whilst significant progress has been made in the region’s counter-terrorist financing regime, violent extremists remain adept at exploiting a spectrum of channels, including charities, close associates and digital platforms, to finance their future activities.
Next month (October) marks two decades since the 2002 Bali bombings, the largest terrorist attack recorded in Southeast Asia to date.[i] Since the bomb blasts, Islamist-linked terrorism has become a major regional security concern. Indonesia, in particular, is today both a source and a target of transnational terrorism. The Bali attacks, and several other Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)-linked bombings in subsequent years, have revealed close links between JI and the international terror group, Al-Qaeda (AQ), ranging from finances and leadership to operational support.
For terrorist groups around the region, terrorism financing (TF) remains a lifeblood, enabling them to fund their networks and operations. There are typically three stages of TF: raising, moving and using funds. Funds can be gleaned from criminal activities, but also through legitimate means such as members’ salaries, entrepreneurial ventures and donations raised through charities.[ii]
From preparation to execution, JI relied on both legitimate and criminal activities, including robberies, to finance the Bali bombings. In terms of licit sources, the main funding came from AQ via their network of regional facilitators and money couriers. Intelligence officials and terrorism experts estimated in 2002 that Hambali, the then operational head of JI, had amassed as much as US$500,000 for the group’s operations.[iii]
A previous in-depth study conducted by the author on the Bali bombings plot revealed that JI had also conducted a series of robberies to finance the Bali attacks, as well as the 2003 J.W. Marriott hotel bombing and operations in Poso.[iv] In one instance, Imam Samudra, one of the Bali suicide bombers, led a cell of JI operatives to rob a jewellery store named Elita Indah in Serang, Java, two months prior. The loot was then sold and the money used to purchase chemical substances and other materials for the bombs.[v]
The funds were mainly dispersed by cash – a preferred tactic of terrorists given it is less detectable by the authorities – to the group’s networks. Wan Min bin Wan Mat, the then JI treasurer based in Malaysia, and his colleague Azmi, took up the role of money couriers and transferred US$35,000 (funds which were provided by AQ) from overseas to Muklas and Imam Samudra, the key perpetrators of the Bali attacks. Domestically, the heist group also distributed their bounty by cash to Imam Samudra. All the funds accumulated were used to finance the bomb-making process, transportation, accommodation and firearms, and also to provide safehouses after the attacks.[vi]
Since then, particularly with the rise of the Islamic State (IS) in 2014,[vii] most cases of terrorism in Indonesia and the wider region have been attributable to the pro-IS camp, rather than JI. The latter has not waged militant jihad for several years, and is currently in the stages of dakwah (religious outreach for recruitment) and i’dad (preparation for jihad). Both groups, however, continue to raise, move and use funds for both operational and organisational activities.
In response to the TF threat, the Indonesian government, along with its regional counterparts such as Singapore, the Philippines and Malaysia, has over the years developed a comprehensive counter-terrorism (CT) strategy, which includes the passing of various laws[viii] to disrupt terrorists’ money flows. The more stringent Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) regime implemented around the region, coupled with various regional and international collaborations with banks and other financial institutions, has meant the authorities are now better equipped to deal with TF as compared to 20 years ago.
Yet the threat continues to evolve, and terrorists have adopted new ways to finance their operations and organisational needs. This article examines the extent to which various Indonesian-based terrorists, including those with linkages to other Southeast Asian networks, have been modifying their tactics of raising, moving and using funds in the two decades since the 2002 Bali bombings. It will then assess the responses of governments in the region, as well as highlight the ongoing challenges to mitigating the risks posed by TF.
Targeting Terrorist Financing and Resourcing
International efforts to establish legally binding standards and to criminalise TF can be traced back to the establishment of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism by the United Nations in 1999. Articles 1[ix] and 2[x] of the Convention provide the definitions of funds used to finance terrorist activities and persons or organisations involved in TF activities, respectively.[xi]
In addition, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), as the international regulator, sets standards and promotes effective implementation among member countries of legal, regulatory and operational measures to combat money laundering, TF and other activities deemed harmful to the international financial system. Various countries, including those in the region, have adopted the FATF standards into national legislation, according to their particular circumstances.[xii]
In the regional context, the implementation of more stringent controls over the international financial system to combat TF and money laundering, has partly contributed to the reduced scale of the terrorist threat in recent years, with few major terrorist incidents recorded since the 2002 Bali attacks. However, money flows linked to terrorist groups remain significant, with groups turning to other funding sources and methods to circumvent the increased scrutiny of states.
Previous research published by this author in January 2022 illustrates that,[xiii] in general, terrorists continue to modify their fund-raising techniques through both legal and illegal means. Illegal activities include drug businesses, robberies and cybercrime. In one instance, Fadli Sadama, a prominent terrorist believed to have ties with JI as well as Malaysian jihadists and the Patani United Liberation Organisation in Thailand, had since 2003 organised illegal drug dealers into distributor networks and sold drugs, likely shabu-shabu (the local street name for crystal meth) and ganja (a kind of cannabis).
The proceeds from these ventures were likely utilised to buy firearms from Thailand and Aceh, Indonesia, to support the JI network led by Imam Samudra.[xiv] In 2016, investigations also revealed that a terrorist network managed by Bahraini Agam and Rio Priyatna Wibawa, who were affiliated with the IS-aligned Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) network, had set up a drug business to produce and market methamphetamine-type drugs. The drug proceeds were earmarked to finance bomb attacks in 120 offices of the Regional People’s Representative Council around the country.[xv]
The nexus between TF and criminal activity has also persisted in the form of heists. In various incidents between 2003 and 2019, terrorists targeted banks like Lippo Bank and CIMB Niaga in Medan,[xvi] phone stores in Poso[xvii] and jewellery stores in Java.[xviii] The largest robberies were executed by a cell led by Abu Roban, who had links with the prominent JI leader, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, and the latter’s network, the Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT). Investigations also revealed that the crime proceeds from the heists were channelled to the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) group in Poso.[xix]
Over the past decade, more tech-savvy terrorists have also tapped on various digital channels to engage in cybercrime, including hacking, to fund their operations. In 2011, Cahya Fitrianta and Rizki Gunawan worked with an extremist hacker to raise funds for the MIT Poso group. The trio hacked a multi-level marketing currency trading website by penetrating members’ accounts and selling the members’ “currency”.[xx] Rizki Gunawan would subsequently admit to having raised up to Rp 4,000,000,000 (US$267,219.75) through these activities.[xxi]
At the height of IS’ so-called caliphate in 2016, a prominent Indonesian jihadist, Bahrun Naim, who had forged close links with IS Central from his base in Syria, wrote manuals on his websites providing basic training for cybercrimes such as hacking and carding. The manuals also included advice on fund-moving techniques involving various new digital payment methods, such as PayPal, Western Union and cryptocurrencies.[xxii] Yet, while Naim encouraged his followers to develop technical skills and harness new technologies to fund their violent activities, the scale of usage of these channels has been limited to tech-savvy militants.
Three other legal methods of fund-raising utilised by terrorist groups in Indonesia include: a) charities and donations from sympathisers; b) legitimate businesses; and c) self-funding via member donations. Charities have become the most popular fund-raising technique used by terrorist groups, including JI, IS and other affiliated networks.[xxiii] A JI-affiliated group in Palembang, for example, had since 2006 collected voluntary contributions from individuals and organisations via methods ranging from cash collected through donation boxes in mosques, to financial proposals from companies and organisations purporting to support religious activities as a cover.[xxiv] The use of charity boxes persisted until last year, when the Indonesian police seized more than 20,000 charity boxes linked to JI networks at convenience stores, restaurants, mosques and other public places.[xxv]
Besides sporadic charity activities, terrorist groups have also institutionalised donation programmes through various other organisations. The latter were intentionally established to accommodate fund-raising activities for humanitarian and religious causes, including natural disasters and preaching, and used as a cover to escape the government’s oversight and monitoring. For example, terrorist groups generally affiliated with JAD have set up religious foundations and Islamic microfinance institutions called Baitul Maal to collect voluntary contributions from members, supporters and the wider public, with the intention of supporting terrorist activities.[xxvi]
Additionally, terrorists have developed legitimate businesses as another channel of fund-raising. Travel agencies, electronic stores and herbal medicine sales are among the types of businesses run by terrorist groups. One example is a substantial palm oil plantation business owned by Para Wijayanto, who was JI’s leader for a decade until his arrest in June 2019.[xxvii]
Among Indonesian nationals who joined IS or other international groups as Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), self-funding is a significant source of funds. These include the proceeds from selling personal assets, savings, salaries and withdrawing funds from insurance policies.[xxviii] In 2020, Ade Ale Sapari, a young man who had pledged his allegiance to IS, obtained money from five online moneylending companies in Indonesia and utilised the funds to purchase airsoft guns and ammunition through an online e-commerce platform.[xxix]
In terms of fund-using, the money collected is primarily used for the operational and organisational purposes of the group. Operational activities can include funding for accommodation, bomb-making materials, transportation, weapons and smuggling. Organisational expenses range from money spent on military training, recruitment, propaganda and radicalisation efforts, to the provision of salaries for members and social services for their families as part of sustaining terrorist generations and organisations. Lastly, social service support encompasses health and welfare incentives and business loans obtained through Baitul Maal.[xxx]
Countering Terrorist Financing: Challenges and Vulnerabilities
In order to better detect and address TF, countries in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, have developed more robust CFT policies to investigate and prosecute terrorist financing offences since the 2002 Bali bombings.[xxxi] More stringent CFT regimes, such as the Indonesian Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU),[xxxii] were established to improve financial regulations for customer identification and monitoring procedures; strengthen the implementation of cross-border cash courier mechanisms; conduct patrols along porous borders; and increase regional and international cooperation.
In order to comply with FATF recommendations, Indonesia, for example, has also applied the ‘assets freezing without delay’ policy as spelled out in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373, by issuing a list of Suspected Terrorists and Terrorist Organisations. The policy mandates that financial service providers be able to identify names of individual terrorists and organisations, and work together with law enforcement in seizing and confiscating their assets.[xxxiii]
Countries in the region have also recognised the importance of enhancing financial intelligence capabilities in tackling terrorism. Domestic and international collaborations are important in this regard, predominantly in the area of intelligence information exchanges. Examples at the regional level include the establishment of a regional task force on financial intelligence sharing and analysis of terrorist financing – known as the Financial Intelligence Consultative Group (FICG) – which serves as a multilateral forum for Asia Pacific countries to share information regionally. Through the timely sharing of intelligence, the forum offers an early alert mechanism to detect extremist networks and disrupt potential attack plots.
However, there are several challenges that governments continue to face in countering TF. The first relates to the inherent difficulties in identifying and clamping down on the evolving fund-raising, moving and using tactics employed by regional terror networks. A major challenge has been the shift in fund-moving tactics employed by terrorist groups, from international to domestic networks. Compared to the period prior to the Bali attacks, cross-border cash movements have become less identifiable given the absence of transaction records, while domestic peer-to-peer networks have been increasingly relied upon by regional terrorists for moving funds.
Among Indonesian terrorist networks, a notable trend in recent years has been the increasing use of third-party accounts, including those of relatives, friends, employees and neighbours to send and receive terrorist funds via bank transfers. Previous research also demonstrates the increasing number of women involved in TF, including terrorists’ wives or widows.[xxxiv] Besides initiating fund-raising activities among group members, terrorist networks also generate charity programmes that are predominantly promoted on online platforms.
These platforms publicise various humanitarian assistance and religious events, and encourage the public to pledge their support by donating money to the individual bank accounts featured prominently on online posters. In many instances, these are suspected to be the accounts of treasurers who manage the finances of terrorist organisations and use non-profit organisations as a front.[xxxv] Furthermore, financial regulators have also identified that terrorist groups misuse money remittance services as fund-moving channels, particularly in accommodating international incoming and outgoing transfers.[xxxvi]
A second challenge pertains to the potential misuse by terrorists of emerging digital payment systems and platforms. To address this, the existing regional cooperation framework, established under the Southeast Asia Working Group that was initiated in 2018, has been conducting programmes that focus on the documentation of IS-affiliated networks in the Asia Pacific region, as well as carrying out regional risk assessments of red flag indicators in relation to terrorist financing risks. In addition, the framework sets out the scope for establishing a secure information-sharing platform prototype, a regional course for financial intelligence analysts and an intelligence analyst exchange programme.
However, greater focus should be given to tackling emerging risks in new digital payment systems. In October 2018, the Abu Ahmed Foundation, an Indonesia-based extremist charity which supports the AQ-linked rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria, conducted fund-raising using cryptocurrency.[xxxvii] Limitations in financial regulations and procedures, law enforcement and international cooperation are vulnerabilities in relation to digital payment systems,[xxxviii] and could be increasingly exploited by terrorists as alternative fund-moving systems to avoid detection. Insufficient regulations in most jurisdictions over cryptocurrencies pose a significant risk with regard to TF.[xxxix]
A third challenge concerns the continued exploitation of charities by pro-AQ and pro-IS elements due to the unregulated charity landscape, particularly in Indonesia. As mentioned previously, terrorist groups are adept at creating narratives to elicit public donations, using humanitarian or religious causes as a cover. Given such causes have found resonance among sections of the Indonesian population, the increasing spread of these narratives could impede the implementation of CFT policies, particularly in addressing the abuse of charities for terrorism purposes.
Therefore, it is important to leverage public-private partnership frameworks, while also working closely with communities, in identifying and countering TF narratives, particularly when it comes to humanitarian and religious activities. Such partnerships can, to some extent, bridge the existing gap in prevention and law enforcement strategies. They can potentially complement the government’s ‘top-down’ approach by, for example, generating creative alternatives through public campaigns that target vulnerable groups and grassroots communities, including migrant workers, women and the diaspora.
Fourthly, the growing trend of lone-wolf terrorism and self-radicalisation has led to a surge in self-funded TF activities using small amounts of money, which can easily evade existing financial controls. While the Bali bombings have generated early warning mechanisms and regulatory capacity-building which focus on large fund transfers for potential TF purposes, it has become challenging to ferret out small fund transfers used for terrorist activities by lone individuals or unlinked radical cells. To address this additional TF complexity, law enforcement agencies will need to increase their investigative resources in order to list potential solo terrorists.
Despite the absence of major lethal terrorist attacks in the region since the 2002 Bali bombings, there remains significant scope to improve existing CFT frameworks. As TF networks are dynamic, and terrorists are continuously responding to developments in legislation, policy and procedures, technology and social trends, it is vital to leverage financial regulations and procedures, law enforcement, regional and international collaborations, and community partners. Policy transformations are also necessary to resolve unaddressed issues, including the growing exploitation of close female associates and charities for TF purposes, and the inadequate safeguards over emerging technologies such as cryptocurrencies and other digital transactions.
About the Author:
Sylvia Laksmi is an academic and tutor at the Australian National University (ANU) and the University of Sydney respectively, as well as a research associate at consultancy firm Centinel Singapore. She can be contacted at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Eduardo Soares on Unsplash
[i] On October 12, 2002, a network of JI operatives orchestrated bomb attacks at two locations, Sari Club and Paddy’s Irish Bar, in the tourist hotspot of Bali, Indonesia. The tragedy killed hundreds of people from 21 countries, including 88 Australians, 38 Indonesians and 28 Britons. See “The 12 October 2002 Bali Bombing Plot,” BBC News, October 11, 2012, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19881138.
[ii] “What is Terrorism Financing?” Bank Negara Malaysia, 2022, https://amlcft.bnm.gov.my/what-is-terrorism-financing.
[iii] Matt Cianflone et al., “Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack: An In-Depth Investigation Into the 2002 Bali, Indonesia, Bombings,” (working paper, Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, 2007), p. 118, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/50173/07_Bali.pdf.
[iv] Sylvia Windya Laksmi, “An Analysis of Government Capabilities in Countering Terrorist Financing in Indonesia,” (PhD diss., Australian National University, 2022), https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/258466/1/Full%20Thesis%20Sylvia%20Laksmi%202022.pdf.
[v] Verdict of Ali Imron Bin H. Nurhasyim alias Alik alias Toha alias Mulyadi alias Zaid, Denpasar District Court, 2003, No. 317/Pid. B/2003/PN. Dps.
[vi] Zachary Abuza, “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah
Islamiyah,” Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 25, No. 2 (August 2003), p. 172, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798639.
[vii] Islamist extremist groups in Indonesia can be broadly categorised into those that support IS, such as the Jamaah Ansharut Daulah and its affiliate networks, and those that support AQ, such as JI.
[viii] The Indonesian government included TF as a predicate crime to money laundering under Law Number 15 Year 2002 Concerning Money Laundering Crime as Amended by Law Number 25 Year 2003. Laws criminalising TF were continuously amended until the Anti-Terrorist Financing Law No. 9 was enacted in 2013.
[ix] Article 1 of the 1999 UN Convention refers to funds as assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable; and legal documents or instruments evidencing title to or interest in assets such as bank cheques, money orders, letters of credit, shares, bonds etc.
[x] Article 2 of the 1999 UN Convention describes as criminalisable any person who directly or indirectly provides or collects funds with the intention or in the knowledge that they will be used, in full or in part, to carry out an act which constitutes an offence, or an act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, for the purpose of intimidating a population, or compelling a government to do or to abstain from doing any act.
[xi] International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, New York, 1999, United Nations Treaty Series Vol. 2178, No. 38349, pp. 229-241, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202178/v2178.pdf.
[xii] Countries, for example, must ensure laws cover all types of wilful TF activity. These can include the financing of terrorist acts, organisations and individuals, as well as the financing of the travel of foreign terrorist fighters. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Guidance on Criminalising Terrorist Financing: Recommendation 5 (Paris, FATF, October 2016), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-Criminalising-Terrorist-Financing.pdf.
[xiii] The study examined how terrorists acquired funding for their activities, including for operations, management and recruitment. In addition, it assessed the financial flows of terrorist networks in Indonesia before and after the issuance of the Indonesian Anti-Terrorist Financing Law in 2013. The research identifies that post-Bali bombings, terrorist financing networks have become more adaptable and have adjusted to the changes in the government’s legislation, policy and procedures. They have also adeptly exploited technology advances and social trends. See Laksmi, “An Analysis of Government Capabilities in Countering Terrorist Financing in Indonesia.”
[xiv] Adi Suhendi, “Perjalanan Teroris Fadli Sadama: Bertemu Imam Samudra Hingga Bisnis Narkoba,” TribunNews, December 5, 2013, https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2013/12/05/perjalanan-teroris-fadli-sadama-bertemu-imam-samudra-hingga-bisnis-narkoba.
[xv] Laksmi, “An Analysis of Government Capabilities in Countering Terrorist Financing in Indonesia,” p. 264.
[xvi] “Perampokan Bank Lippo di Medan Direkonstruksi,” Liputan 6, July 13, 2003, https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/58317/perampokan-bank-lippo-di-medan-direkonstruksi; Aditia Maruli Radja, “Kapolri: Perampokan Bank CIMB Niaga Terkait Terorisme,” ANTARA News, September 20, 2010, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/221381/kapolri-perampokan-bank-cimb-niaga-terkait-terorisme.
[xvii] Yoanes Litha, “Polisi: Perampokan di Poso didalangi Kelompok Teroris,” VoA Indonesia, July 17, 2013, https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/polisi-perampokan-di-poso-didalangi-kelompok-teroris/1703396.html.
[xviii] Dian Maharani, “Teroris di Batang Terlibat Perampokan Toko Emas Tambora,” Kompas, May 8, 2013, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/05/08/18431421/~Nasional; Dwi Bowo Raharjo, “Terduga Teroris Mencuri di Toko Emas untuk Mencari Dana Pembuatan Bom,” Suara News, August 26, 2019, https://www.suara.com/news/2019/08/26/135559/terduga-teroris-mencuri-di-toko-emas-untuk-mencari-dana-pembuatan-bom.
[xix] Abu Roban, who had been on the police’s most wanted list prior to being killed in a raid in May 2013, organised multiple robberies of mobile phone stores, jewellery stores, post offices and local banks. Farouk Arnaz, “Kelompok Abu Roban Rampok 10 Tempat,” BeritaSatu, May 14, 2013, https://www.beritasatu.com/archive/113603/kelompok-abu-roban-rampok-10-tempat; Hadi Suprapto, “Kisah Abu Roban, Si Teroris Spesialis Pencari Dana,” Viva News, May 10, 2013, https://www.viva.co.id/ragam/fokus/411895-kisah-abu-roban-si-teroris-spesialis-pencari-dana.
[xx] Al Amin, “Hacker Anggota Teroris Hadapi Vonis di PN Jakbar,” Merdeka News, February 5, 2013, https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/hacker-anggota-teroris-hadapi-divonis-di-pn-jakbar.html; Nov, “Alumni Unair Didakwa Terorisme dan Pencucian Uang,” Hukum Online, September 27, 2012, https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/a/alumni-unair-didakwa-terorisme-dan-pencucian-uang-lt50645baf2ee80.
[xxi] Indonesian National Police, Case Interview Report on Behalf of Rizki Gunawan alias Umar Amirudin alias Udin alias Ronny Setiawan, pp. 40 – 44.
[xxii] Rohan Gunaratna, “Death of Bahrun Naim: Mastermind of Terror in Southeast Asia,” RSIS Commentary No. 161 (2018), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/CO18161.pdf; V. Arianti, “Cybercrime: Financing Terrorism in Indonesia,” RSIS Commentary No. 159 (2019), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/CO19159.pdf.
[xxiii] The more stringent policies in the financial industry which limit terrorist capabilities in generating funds, as well as the rising numbers of terrorist arrests, have led to an unprecedented demand for financial support by terrorist organisations and families, including those whose husbands have been killed by the police. By targeting sections of the Muslim majority in Indonesia and other parts of Southeast Asia, terrorists have found traction in raising financial donations by using humanitarian and religious issues as a cover.
[xxiv] Sylvia Windya Laksmi, “Dinamika Pendanaan Organisasi Teror: Analisis Perubahan Pola Pendanaan Terorisme di Indonesia,” (Master’s thesis, University of Indonesia, 2012), pp. 65-66, https://lib.ui.ac.id/file?file=digital/20300281-T30490-Sylvia%20Windya%20Laksmi.pdf.
[xxv] Katharina Reny Lestari, “Indonesian Police Seize Terror-Financing Charity Boxes,” UCA News, August 18, 2021, https://www.ucanews.com/news/indonesian-police-seize-terror-financing-charity-boxes/93773; Ronna Nirmala, “Indonesian Police Snare 50 Jemaah Islamiyah Suspects in Past Month,” Benar News, March 24, 2021, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/id-terrorism-jemaah-03242021124134.html; “Densus 88 Sita 791 Kotak Amal dari Lembaga Amal Kelompok Teroris di Lampung,” Liputan 6, November 3, 2021, https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/4701494/densus-88-sita-791-kotak-amal-dari-lembaga-amal-kelompok-teroris-di-lampung.
[xxvi] Examples include the Azzam Dakwah Center, Infaq Dakwah Center, Baitul Maal Al Ummah, Baitul Maal Tamwil (also referred to as Al Islah or Al Izzah), Anfiqu Center, Gerakan Sehari Seribu, Aseer Cruee Center, Gubuk Sedekah Amal Ummah, RIS Al Amin, Baitul Mal Al Muuqin, Baitul Maal FKAM (Forum Komunikasi Aktivis Mesjid), Lembaga Amil Zakat Baitul Mal Abdurrahman bin Auf, and Yayasan Amal Syam Abadi (Syam Organiser). See Sylvia Windya Laksmi, “Nexus Between Charities and Terrorist Financing in Indonesia,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Vol. 11, No. 7 (September 2019), p. 7, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26778274; “9 Lembaga Amal Pendukung Terorisme,” Centre for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies, January 26, 2020, https://www.radicalismstudies.org/1451/2020/01/reports/special-reports-and-analysis/9-lembaga-amal-pendukung-terorisme.html; Wakos Reza Gautama, “Lewat Kotak Amal LAZ BM ABA, JI Kumpulkan Miliaran Rupiah Setiap Tahun,” Lampung Suara, November 26, 2021, https://lampung.suara.com/read/2021/11/26/062000/lewat-kotak-amal-laz-bm-aba-ji-kumpulkan-miliaran-rupiah-setiap-tahun.
[xxvii] Sylvia Laksmi, “How do Terrorists Fund Their Activities? Some Do It Legally,” The Conversation, July 12, 2019, https://theconversation.com/how-do-terrorists-fund-their-activities-some-do-it-legally-119926.
[xxviii] Laksmi, “An Analysis of Government Capabilities in Countering Terrorist Financing in Indonesia,” p. 297.
[xxix] Verdict of Adi Ale Sapari, East Jakarta District Court, 2020, No. 600/Pid.Sus/2020/PN. Jkt. Tim.
[xxx] Laksmi, “An Analysis of Government Capabilities in Countering Terrorist Financing in Indonesia.”
[xxxi] From 2013-2018, Indonesia prosecuted 55 cases and obtained convictions in all of them. Of these, 44 cases since 2014 involved the following TF activities: terrorist financier (6 cases); collecting funds (16 cases); movement of funds (19 cases); and use of funds (3 cases). See Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures Indonesia: Mutual Evaluation Report (Sydney: APG, 2018), p. 60, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer-fsrb/APG-Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Indonesia.pdf.
[xxxii] In 2002, the government established a Financial Intelligence Unit, the Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan, or INTRAC, or PPATK), a focal point of which is the coordination and implementation of the AML/CFT regime in Indonesia.
[xxxiii] “DTTOT & Proliferasi WMD,” Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center, September 26, 2016, https://www.ppatk.go.id/link/read/23/dttot-proliferasi-wmd.html.
[xxxiv] Sylvia Laksmi, “A More Effective Counterterrorism Strategy for Indonesian Women by Acknowledging Their Motivations and Tactical Contributions,” Stratsea, December 14, 2020, https://stratsea.com/a-more-effective-counterterrorism-strategy-for-indonesian-women-by-acknowledging-their-motivations-and-tactical-contributions/.
[xxxv] This finding is excerpted from case studies presented in the author’s research. See Laksmi, “An Analysis of Government Capabilities in Countering Terrorist Financing in Indonesia,” pp. 252, 258, 260 and 275.
[xxxvi] Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, “Trial of Terrorist in Jakarta Sheds Light on Arms Trail From Southern Philippines in Indonesia,” The Straits Times, February 2, 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/tracing-the-arms-trail-into-indonesia.
[xxxvii] The charity had encouraged supporters to donate via cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, Dash and Verge. See V. Arianti and Kenneth Yeo Yaoren, “How Terrorists Use Cryptocurrency in Southeast Asia,” The Diplomat, June 30, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/how-terrorists-use-cryptocurrency-in-southeast-asia/.
[xxxviii] Indonesia is reportedly the third-highest adopter of financial technology (fintech) in the world; see Intan Nurmala Sari, “Indonesia Pengguna Fintech Tertinggi Ketiga di Dunia,” Katadata Indonesia, June 22, 2021, https://katadata.co.id/intannirmala/digital/60d1c95ea19bb/indonesia-pengguna-fintech-tertinggi-ketiga-di-dunia. The growth of fintech startups in Indonesia has been estimated at 78 percent since 2019, and continues to grow rapidly; see “Important Points That You Need to Know About Fintech in Indonesia,” Cekindo, July 12, 2022, https://www.cekindo.com/blog/fintech-indonesia.
[xxxix] Laksmi, “An Analysis of Government Capabilities in Countering Terrorist Financing in Indonesia,” p. 409.