Reintegrating Extremists in Southeast Asia: Lessons in Deradicalisation and Rehabilitation
Introduction
Terrorist activity in Southeast Asia remained on the decline in 2024, following sustained counter terrorism (CT) efforts by regional governments. In the Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)’s operational capability has been significantly weakened following years-long security operations that have targeted senior and experienced leaders. Indonesia has also not suffered any terror incidents in the past two years, with the authorities taking pre-emptive CT operations against various terrorist elements.[1] The most significant development in Indonesia was the announcement of the dissolution of one of its most notorious terror groups, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).
Singapore reported three cases of arrests of self-radicalised individuals in 2024, highlighting a low-grade but persistent threat from online radicalisation. Lastly, a minor uptick in extremist activity was observed in Malaysia. Malaysia suffered its second successful Islamic State (IS)-related terror attack since 2016 in May, when a self-radicalised individual attacked a police station in Ulu Tiram, Johor, killing two police officers. This was followed by a wave of preventive arrests by the Malaysian security services. Overall, however, there remains an existing but muted threat environment compared to the years preceding 2019, during the height of IS activity.
This shows that regional terrorist elements remain resilient and adaptive, and retain the capacity to conduct attacks. As such, Southeast Asian governments and non-governmental organisations continue to engage in deradicalisation and rehabilitation efforts to prevent radicalisation and to assist former terrorism detainees’ reintegration into society. This article looks at how the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore are tackling the issues of radicalisation and rehabilitation. Overall, a whole-of-society approach and community-based initiatives are emphasised across the various regional programmes, which seek to address the deeper issues fuelling radicalisation, such as economic inequality, social exclusion and the influence of international terror networks.
The Philippines
The Philippines’ approach to rehabilitation and reintegration is based on a collaborative effort involving various stakeholders, including the detainees, their families and several government agencies. It stems from the country’s long history of internal conflict, with the Mindanao region being a significant focal point.[2]
The 2017 Marawi Siege emphasised the importance of rehabilitation efforts in the Philippines. The siege, which was led by IS-affiliated militants, devastated the city and displaced thousands. It highlighted the urgent need for comprehensive deradicalisation and reintegration programmes for those apprehended by the authorities. These programmes are part of the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (NAP P/CVE), which involves government agencies, civil society organisations (CSOs) and religious institutions.[3]
Local governments and civil society play an important role in the reintegration of former combatants in the southern Philippines. In Basilan, through the Program Against Violent Extremism (PAVE), former combatants have access to public goods, community engagement and financial assistance in exchange for surrendering.[4] During the initial stage of its implementation in 2018, more than 100 ASG members joined PAVE.[5] Similarly, Sulu’s local reintegration initiative led to over 200 ASG members surrendering between 2019 and 2022.[6] Across the southern Philippines, over 1,600 combatants from groups such as the ASG, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and the Dawlah Islamiyah-Maute Group (DIMG) surrendered to the government between 2018 and 2023, with all returnees profiled and sentenced before entering the local rehabilitation programme.[7]
Despite efforts by local governments and civil society to reintegrate former combatants, concerns persist within local communities. Local communities can in some circumstances be apprehensive of rehabilitated individuals, as many are unfamiliar with the reintegration process and may feel that their safety is being compromised. Additionally, victims and survivors of violence, particularly those affected by the ASG and the DIMG, may struggle to accept former militants associated with those groups. Families of fallen victims, most of whom are still grieving, have expressed resistance to reintegration efforts, creating tension with local authorities trying to foster reconciliation.[8] This creates a significant challenge for the authorities which can only be overcome by increasing public awareness and engagement with local communities.
Malaysia
The national deradicalisation programme in Malaysia is aimed at addressing the root cause of radicalism, which is the misconstrued understanding of religious ideologies perpetrated by extremists.[9] One of the main components of the deradicalisation and rehabilitation programme is the Religious Rehabilitation Programme (RRP), which aims to correct detainees’ “political and religious misconceptions” while in detention. After their release, detainees are assisted by various entities for their reintegration into society.[10]
The RRP is divided into four stages. The first stage involves an ideological assessment of the detainees by religious counsellors from the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (known as JAKIM). The second stage involves interaction with the detainees, where concepts such as jihad, hijrah (emigration) and martyrdom are discussed. The third stage involves correcting their understanding of those concepts and instilling the right and proper belief system in the detainees.[11]
In September 2024, the Malaysian government launched the Malaysian Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (MyPCVE).[12] The programme takes a holistic approach in tackling violent extremist ideologies. The strategy is built upon four pillars, namely, prevention, enforcement, rehabilitation and reinforcement.[13] It consists of a mix of hard and soft strategies, and emphasises multi-stakeholder and inter-agency cooperation.[14]
There are several challenges faced by the government in reintegrating detainees into society. These are often socioeconomic and psychosocial in nature. Some former detainees find themselves estranged from their loved ones and return to severely disrupted personal lives.[15] The loss of income during their detention often results in financial strain, which further affects their relationships and personal ties.[16] In this regard, terrorism detainees also face significant challenges in seeking employment post-release.[17]
In overcoming these challenges, government agencies including the Department of Social Welfare Malaysia and the Prisons Department have been providing social and financial support to former detainees to start small-scale businesses to help them begin a life post-release. Local police officers are also tasked with establishing regular contact with them and ensuring that their well-being is taken care of.[18]
Indonesia
Indonesia’s deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes have progressed considerably, moving from ad-hoc initiatives led separately by the government and CSOs to a more institutionalised, collaborative approach between sectors, ministries and civil society.
In 2013, the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) published the “Deradicalisation Blueprint” for convicted terrorists, which focuses on neutralising radical ideologies through interdisciplinary efforts involving law, psychology, religion and social culture.[19] Targeting former terrorists, including prominent figures such as Ali Imron, Aman Abdurrahman and Para Wijayanto, the programme first identifies the individual’s ideological commitment, then provides rehabilitation and re-education to “develop moderate understandings and attitudes” among the detainees and their families, and finally reintegrates the detainees into society upon completion of their sentences.[20]
Ex-convicts play a crucial role in engaging current inmates, fostering credibility and rehabilitation. This approach, combined with socioeconomic support, reduces recidivism and builds trust between communities and the state.
CSOs in Indonesia play an active role in the reintegration of former terrorists. One such example is the Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian. This organisation focuses on providing life skills and business opportunities for extremists who have decided to disengage from extremist groups and violence.[21] Some examples include initiatives to start cafes and restaurants or engage in craftwork such as t-shirt printing.
Indonesia also has a specialised deradicalisation programme for children, catering to children who have been exposed to radicalism, children affiliated with terrorists through family ties and children who have directly engaged in extremist activities.[22] Such customisation to the different profiles and backgrounds of extremists during rehabilitation is important as Indonesia readies itself to repatriate children and women from Syria.
Overall, though Indonesia’s deradicalisation programmes have improved significantly, challenges remain as many participants are unwilling to participate in programmes or only do so to deceive the authorities, a practice known as taqiyyah.[23] Moreover, some programmes are often run ineffectively due to lack of expertise, overlapping initiatives and resource constraints.[24]
Singapore
Singapore adopts a whole-of-society approach involving the government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community stakeholders in its rehabilitation programme.[25] The approach to the rehabilitation and reintegration process in Singapore is three-pronged, consisting of three main stakeholders: the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) specialising in religious interventions; the inter-agency Aftercare Group (ACG) focusing on social interventions; and experts from the Ministry of Home Affairs managing psychological interventions.[26] This holistic process is targeted at the hearts and minds of those who were formerly indoctrinated and facilitates their successful reintegration into society.
The RRG was formed to develop a comprehensive rehabilitation and reintegration programme. Community engagement is a vital pillar of the RRG’s work to ensure that members of society remain engaged, well-informed on social and religious matters, and opposed to extremist and radical ideologies.[27] The organisation has initiated both offline and online platforms for dialogue with the community to fulfil four key objectives. These consist of informing the community about the threat of radical ideologies, assuring the community of the need to counter these ideologies, preventing the spread of extremist thought and encouraging collaborative efforts to counter extremism.
There are five key points pertaining to the importance of reintegrating rehabilitated individuals into society. These include the prevention of recidivism, mitigating further radicalisation, building resilience to violent extremism, facilitating acceptance and trust from the community, and instilling a sense of appreciation. This can be achieved through fostering a strong sense of identity where there is no dissonance between personal beliefs and one’s role as a contributing member of society. There is also a need to embody a contextualised understanding of Islam, given Singapore’s status as a secular and pluralistic country where diverse communities coexist.
The rehabilitation and reintegration of radicalised offenders in Singapore requires a multidisciplinary approach that relies on strong coordination and collaboration across various stakeholders. Countering violent extremism (CVE) programmes in Singapore remain a key aspect of community engagement, while families and close friends act as the first line of defence against extremism and radicalisation.[28]
Increasingly in Singapore and around the region, youth radicalisation and the complexities of reintegrating youth into society have been highlighted in recent years. As some policymakers and practitioners have observed, an increasingly complex internet environment has introduced new challenges. Many youth today are reliant on bite-sized online content that is easy and fast to consume, typically in the form of short videos or reels on social media platforms such as TikTok, Instagram, Facebook and YouTube. As extremist elements consolidate their outreach efforts on social media, youth who struggle with identity and interpersonal relationships are particularly vulnerable to such radical content. In response, community stakeholders such as the RRG have launched their own content through the same platforms to counter radical ideologies and teach more responsible social media use.[29] These developments will require greater attention by the authorities going forward.
Policy Recommendations
Successful reintegration programmes should focus on several components with the aim of providing former terrorist detainees with the tools and support necessary to rebuild their lives and become productive members of society. First is psychological and religious support. Many individuals involved in terrorism have experienced a certain level of trauma or manipulation leading to their radicalisation.[30] A mixture of psychological and religious support would help them reinterpret religious texts, reject radical ideologies and promote mental healing from past trauma.
Second, education and vocational training are essential in helping former terrorist detainees reintegrate into society. Many individuals who turn to terrorism do so due to a lack of economic opportunities and a sense of disenfranchisement.[31] By equipping them with essential life skills, reintegration programmes can reduce the appeal of extremist ideologies.
Community acceptance is also a vital component of successful reintegration.[32] Programmes that foster community engagement help former terrorists rebuild trust and establish a sense of belonging. These programmes should focus on building relationships, offering mentorship and involving community leaders to create a supportive environment. This community-centric approach helps prevent recidivism by addressing the social isolation and alienation that leads to radicalisation.
Familial and social networks should also be incorporated into reintegration programmes. Programmes that engage families can help rebuild trust and provide a strong support system for former terrorists. This approach not only facilitates the reintegration process, but also strengthens community ties and reduces the stigma associated with former terrorists. Finally, ongoing monitoring and support are key in ensuring continuity and preventing recidivism.
Conclusion
Continued geopolitical volatility, particularly in the Middle East and centred around the Israel-Hamas conflict, must be monitored closely for its attendant impact around the region. Terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and their affiliates are actively attempting to manipulate these conflicts into drivers of radicalisation targeted at vulnerable communities through various means, including social media. The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) adds another layer of complexity, with the rise of AI-generated videos and propaganda produced by terrorist groups with the aim of radicalising sympathisers.[33] There are also concerns that these groups may be using AI-powered chatbots for recruitment.[34]
Thus, governments must remain vigilant and ensure that a robust preventive framework remains in place. This includes continued efforts at deradicalisation and rehabilitation. In this regard, investing in community-based deradicalisation and rehabilitation strategies, backed by continuous research and support, is essential in the fight against terrorism in Southeast Asia. One issue that has been highlighted by some regional practitioners in recent years is the need for more effective risk assessment tools for radicalised individuals and metrics for measuring behavioural change following rehabilitation. Through more targeted resource investments, addressing the root causes of radicalisation and fostering inclusive environments, these programmes offer a promising path toward long-term stability and security in the region.
About the Authors
Mohamed Feisal is a Research Fellow and Ahmad Saiful Rijal is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. Both are also counsellors with the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG). They can be reached at [email protected] and [email protected], respectively.
Citations
[1] Internal Security Department, Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report 2024 (Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs, 2024), https://www.mha.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/sttar-2024.pdf.
[2] Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy, Policy Brief: Deradicalization Initiatives in Conflict Areas in the Philippines (Quezon City: Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy, 2024), https://www.pcid.com.ph/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Deradicalization-initiatives-in-conflict-areas-in-the-Philippines.pdf.
[3] Ann Bajo, “Rethinking Philippine Counterterrorism Strategy After the Marawi Siege,” Fulcrum, June 11, 2024, https://fulcrum.sg/rethinking-philippine-counterterrorism-strategy-after-the-marawi-siege/.
[4] Teofila Garcia Jr, “ARMM Launches Program vs. Violent Extremism,” Philippine News Agency, April 17, 2018, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1032269.
[5] Ibid.
[6] “Addressing Islamist Militancy in the Southern Philippines,” International Crisis Group, Report No. 323, March 18, 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/addressing-islamist-militancy-southern-philippines.
[7] Nurhati Tangging and Kenneth Yeo, “Reintegrating Former Terrorist Combatants in Mindanao,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2023), p. 31.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, “Malaysia’s Policy on Counter Terrorism and Deradicalisation Strategy,” Journal of Public Security and Safety, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2016), https://www.moha.gov.my/images/terkini/WORD.ARTIKEL-TPM-JURNAL-VOL.6-2016.pdf.
[10] Mohd Mizan Bin Mohammad Aslam, “Deradicalization Programs for SOSMA, POTA, and POCA Detainees in Malaysia,” Middle East Institute, June 23, 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/deradicalization-programs-sosma-pota-and-poca-detainees-malaysia#_ftnref1.
[11] Mohd Irwan Syazli Saidin and Kartini Aboo Talib Khalid, “Combating Daesh: Insights Into Malaysia’s Counter-Terrorism Experience and the Deradicalisation of Former Detainees,” Religions, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2023), p. 367, https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14030367.
[12] “Malaysia Launches Action Plan to Tackle Violent Extremism, PM Anwar Calls for Early Intervention,” Malay Mail, September 30, 2024, https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2024/09/30/malaysia-launches-action-plan-to-tackle-violent-extremism-pm-anwar-calls-for-early-intervention/152162.
[13] Malaysia Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (MyPCVE) 2024-2028 (Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Home Affairs Malaysia, 2024).
[14] Ibid.
[15] Aizat Shamsuddin, Mukhriz Mat Rus and Debbie Affianty, Reintegrating Former Security Detainees in Malaysia: The Challenges & Opportunities (Kuala Lumpur: INITIATE.MY, 2024), https://initiate.my/download/policy-brief-issue-5-2024/.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Afzal Izzaz Zahari et al., “Challenges to Reintegration: A Case Study of Violent Extremist Detainees and Their Reintegration into Malaysian Society,” Safer Communities, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2024), pp. 1-22.
[18] Ahmad El-Muhammady, Managing the Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Their Families: Malaysian Experience (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2023), https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/2023-01/El-Muhammady%20Malaysian%20FTFs.pdf.
[19] Lakshmi Priya Vijayan, “Counterterrorism and Deradicalisation: The Indonesian Way,” Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, July 13, 2023, https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Counterterrorism-and-Deradicalisation-The-Indonesian-Way-lpvijayan-130723.
[20] Cameron Sumpter, “Indonesia’s De-Radicalisation Blueprint,” The Interpreter, February 5, 2016, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-s-de-radicalisation-blueprint.
[21] Ilyas Mohammed, “Critical Reflections on De-Radicalisation in Indonesia,” Otoritas: Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2020), pp. 43-57, https://journal.unismuh.ac.id/index.php/Otoritas/article/view/3097/3072.
[22] ICPVTR internal report.
[23] V. Arianti and Unaesah Rahmah, “Indonesia,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2022), p. 17.
[24] Alif Satria, “Two Decades of Counterterrorism in Indonesia: Successful Developments and Future Challenges,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 14, No. 5 (2022), p. 10.
[25] Andrew Wong, “Community Support Key to Dealing with Roots of Terror Threats in Singapore: SM Teo,” The Straits Times, September 28, 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/community-support-key-to-dealing-with-roots-of-terror-threats-in-singapore-sm-teo.
[26] Shashi Jayakumar, Deradicalisation in Singapore: Past, Present and Future (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 2020), https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ICSR-Report-Deradicalisation-in-Singapore-Past-Present-and-Future.pdf.
[27] Mohamed Bin Ali, “The Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG): A Community-Government Partnership in Fighting Terrorism,” in Majulah!: 50 Years of Malay/Muslim Community in Singapore, eds. Zainul Abidin Rasheed and Norshahril Saat (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2016), pp. 243-55.
[28] “Heart of the Matter: Family Is ‘First Line of Defence’ Against Radicalisation Among Youths,” Channel News Asia, March 4, 2023, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/radicalisation-youths-roblox-islamic-state-family-heart-matter-3321516.
[29] “DPM Lawrence Wong at the Religious Rehabilitation Group’s 18th Annual Retreat,” Prime Minister’s Office Singapore, June 21, 2023, https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/DPM-Lawrence-Wong-at-the-Religious-Rehabilitation-Groups-18th-Annual-Retreat-June-2023.
[30] Edward D. Barker and Heidi Riley, The Role of Trauma and Mental Health in Violent Extremism (London: King’s College London, 2022), https://www.xcept-research.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/2022-07-19_FINAL_Briefing-note-Trauma-Jul19.pdf.
[31] Mario Arturo Ruiz Estrada, Donghyun Park and Alam Khan, “The Impact of Terrorism on Economic Performance: The Case of Turkey,” Economic Analysis and Policy, Vol. 60 (2018), p. 78.
[32] Gordon Clubb et al., “Combating the Terrorist Stigma: Communicating Rehabilitation and Reducing Barriers to Reintegration,” Terrorism and Political Violence (2024), p. 2.
[33] Pranshu Verma, “These ISIS News Anchors Are AI Fakes. Their Propaganda Is Real,” The Washington Post, May 17, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/05/17/ai-isis-propaganda/.
[34] Catherin Schaer, “How Extremist Groups Like ‘Islamic State’ Are Using AI,” Deutsche Welle, October 7, 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/how-extremist-groups-like-islamic-state-are-using-ai/a-69609398; “Terrorist Groups Looking to AI to Enhance Propaganda and Recruitment Efforts,” The Soufan Center, October 3, 2024, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-october-3/.
