Philippines
The terrorism threat in the Philippines has decreased significantly since 2020. The frequency of attacks in the country has reduced and there were no major attacks conducted by the communist and Islamist terrorist groups over this period. From the declaration of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)-free zones in the restive Mindanao region, to the paralysis of the Dawlah Islamiyah-Maute Group (DIMG), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has made significant progress in their counter terrorism and peace-building efforts in Mindanao, southern Philippines. This has been achieved through three primary strategies: 1) leadership decapitation; 2) encouraging surrender; and 3) territorial denial.
Trends
Decline of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
In September 2023, the entire administrative region of Sulu in the southern Philippines was declared an ASG-free zone. Over the following year, the AFP’s efforts to reduce the ASG’s presence in the region’s communities then expanded into neighbouring Basilan. Both areas were longtime hotbeds of activity for the Islamic State (IS)-linked group, who had for decades terrorised the southern Philippines with kidnappings, beheadings and, more recently, a spate of bombings. Essentially, three critical policies by the AFP have contributed to the weakening of the ASG and its splinters, which has in turn led to them being squeezed out of their longtime strongholds.
First, the government’s Executive Order 70 (EO70), implemented in 2018, allowed for terrorists to surrender to the authorities. In exchange for surrendering their arms and actionable intelligence, the authorities committed to providing them with protection, financial support and an opportunity to reintegrate into society. EO70 was first implemented to demobilise the communist terrorist groups (CTGs) who have waged a decades-long insurgency and was subsequently adopted to demobilise other local terrorist groups (LTGs) in the Philippines. However, unlike in recent years, the number of ASG surrenders between 2018 and 2019 was negligible. Back then, the ASG went by the slogan “no surrender” and escalated the conflict in Sulu instead.
Second, the AFP embarked on a leadership decapitation campaign against the ASG’s key leaders. In particular, the killing of Hajan Sawadjaan, the leader of an IS-aligned ASG splinter, led to the number of surrenders increasing significantly. For example, 110 persons were reported as having surrendered in the months following the passing of Sawadjaan in July 2020.[1] The ASG did not recover from this setback. AFP forces subsequently continued their targeted strikes against successive leaders of ASG-linked groups, including Furuji Indama (October 2020), Mannul Sawadjaan (November 2020), Pasil Bayali (October 2023)[2] and Mundi Sawadjaan (December 2023). These relentless assaults from the AFP left the ASG’s splinters leaderless and demoralised.
An added blow to the ASG has been the extensive community engagement efforts executed by local government units (LGUs) within the Sulu and Basilan region, in collaboration with the AFP. Many acronyms have been used to describe the various local efforts, like PAVE[3] and BRAVE.[4] However, one of the most significant efforts on the ground has been the “Balik Barangay” (return home) programme, which was first launched in Sulu.[5]
After the 2019 heavy fighting between the AFP and ASG forces in Patikul, Sulu, many Tausugs, one of the largest ethnic Muslim groups in Mindanao, evacuated their homes and moved into temporary shelters. Balik Barangay was an initiative by LGUs and the AFP to bring displaced Tausugs back to their home villages. The Balik Barangay campaign has allowed the AFP to achieve two key objectives: 1) to win the hearts and minds of the local Tausug communities; and 2) to squeeze the ASG out of the occupied villages. Despite the animosity between the locals and the military, assurances to bring them back to their villages paved the path towards cooperation. The locals depended on the military to provide them with security as they migrated back to their home villages. In turn, displaced ASG forces fled out of the villages and into the mountains.
Through these three policies, the AFP has been able to demobilise the ASG from its rank and file, paralyse the ASG’s leadership, and win the hearts and minds of the local communities. The operationally and psychologically weakened ASG has therefore been unable to contest the AFP’s territorial advances, resulting in the territorial squeeze out of Sulu and some parts of Basilan.
Paralysis of the Dawlah Islamiyah-Maute Group (DIMG)
The DIMG has also suffered significantly in recent years. After a four-year pursuit, DIMG leader Abu Zacariah was killed by the AFP in June 2023.[6] According to the Al-Faris Media group (the unofficial IS media centre in the Philippines), the DIMG blamed local Maranao (a native ethnic Muslim group in Lanao province) for providing local authorities with a tip-off on Abu Zacariah’s location, and vowed vengeance by attacking Marawi. While there were attempts to retaliate against the Maranao community, they were not sustained.
Notably, the December 2023 bombing of the Mindanao State University (MSU)’s gymnasium, which killed four people, was an attempt to retaliate against the Maranao community.[7] Notwithstanding this, analysts would acknowledge that the terrorism threat in Lanao has subsided significantly since 2019. With the loss of Abu Zacariah, the remnants of the DIMG are leaderless and directionless. The heavy military pressure asserted on the group has driven the remnants of the DIMG into hiding.
Beyond military action, the rehabilitation of Marawi City is an area of concern. After the five-month-long armed conflict in 2017 that led to widespread destruction, the Philippine government established the Task Force Bangon Marawi (TFBM) to oversee the recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation of the city. In the seven years since its enactment, the TFBM built sports facilities and an exhibition hall. However, many of the homes destroyed during the Marawi Siege in 2017 have still not been rebuilt. Moreover, living conditions in the temporary shelters remain abysmal. While residents of the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps dotted around the region are not at risk of radicalisation, they continue to suffer from a lack of basic necessities such as water, electricity and internet access.
There have been significant challenges in the reconstruction of homes in Marawi after the conflict. First, the authorities have had to deconflict claims around landownership by the residents.[8] Second, there were significant challenges in convincing local Maranaos to allow the TFBM to demolish existing properties in order to build new homes, amidst fears that the government would reclaim their land after the demolition. Finally, the TFBM’s reconstruction work was hindered by the COVID-19 pandemic because of safe distancing measures and budget cuts. Additionally, the TFBM was dissolved in March 2024, while policy changes by the Marawi Compensation Board (MSB) resulted in a reduction in the amount of money promised to property owners who had lost their homes.[9]
Demobilisation of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF)
Today, the BIFF is the largest Islamist terrorist group in Mindanao, primarily because of its appeal to the local Maguindanao population – a significantly larger population compared to the Maranao, Tausug and Yakan people who are also native to the region.
The BIFF also suffers from high rates of surrender through EO70, primarily from the Bongos and Karialan factions.[10] Similar to the ASG and the DIMG, the AFP’s strategy against the BIFF has also focused on leadership decapitation to demoralise the group, including the killing of leaders Hassan Salahuddin (October 2021)[11] and Kagi Karialan (April 2024).[12] Nevertheless, unlike the other Islamist terror groups operating in Mindanao, the BIFF is not leaderless. Emarudin Kulaw (alias Alpha King) has been identified as a potential leader of the BIFF.[13] Not much is known about Alpha King as there have been no significant activities attributed to him.
BIFF militants who surrender are housed in an AFP camp, while the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) processes the profile of each individual. However, there are significant complications in profiling the BIFF members. As both the BIFF and the MILF share the same support base (i.e., the Maguindanao people), the affiliation of a militant is often unclear. Moreover, there is potential for deception among some members of the public, who, despite having no affiliation to militancy, still choose to surrender to the authorities for the financial incentives provided to surrendered militias. Therefore, the Bangsamoro authorities have developed the “Joint AFP PNP Intelligence Certification” (JAPIC) to verify the membership of surrendered militias.[14]
After the profiling and sentencing of militants are completed, reintegration programmes are then offered to the surrendered personnel (returnees). These include vocational training and financial aid to allow them a fresh start in life. Shelter is provided to the returnees, and the AFP, the Philippines National Police (PNP) and the MILF jointly monitor the returnee population. However, there are problems with the provision of shelter. Due to pre-existing landownership rights, it is difficult to find space to develop shelters, particularly in the Maguindanao region.[15] This presents a challenge for the authorities in upholding their commitment to reintegrating surrendered BIFF members.
Rehabilitation and Reintegration
Overall, much has been done to demobilise militants in Mindanao. Alongside efforts to demobilise militants in Mindanao, there are highly localised efforts to rehabilitate and reintegrate the surrendered militants. Today, the implementation of the government’s National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (NAP P/CVE) is highly decentralised in the Philippines. The AFP and the PNP work closely with LGUs to implement localised policies to reintegrate surrendered militants. The inclusion of LGUs as security partners is a significant shift from the military-centric approach that the Philippines practised for many years.
One of the key reasons for this decentralised approach to rehabilitation and reintegration is the recruitment mechanisms of Islamist terrorist groups in Mindanao. The recruitment of militias is highly correlated with their ethnolinguistic communities.[16] Therefore, a localised approach would allow actors to consider the socio-cultural nuances in the implementation of national policies. Hence, even the implementation of common national initiatives is highly dependent on local community actors. The AFP, the PNP and LGUs also engage local and international civil society organisations (CSOs) to offer localised expertise in various aspects of rehabilitation and reintegration.
One of the key practices of the Philippines’ whole-of-nation efforts to reintegrate former combatants is to avoid referring to them as “former combatants”, “former violent extremists” or “former terrorists”.[17] This is to reduce the opportunity for structural stigmatisation from the community. Instead, the community has adopted terms like “returnees” or “rescued friends” to destigmatise the process of reintegration while preserving the dignity of the surrendered personnel. Ultimately, the goal is to provide returnees with the opportunity to start their lives afresh. Nevertheless, there are locals who oppose this initiative as they have questioned the genuineness of the surrenders, claiming that returnees surrender only because of the financial incentives provided by the Philippine government.
Spotlight on the Bangsamoro Election 2025
A crucial event of significance is the upcoming Bangsamoro parliamentary election in 2025. Today, the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP), which is the political party representing the MILF, runs the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA).[18] Sixteen local political parties have registered to contest in the first Bangsamoro election upon the completion of the BTA’s term in 2025. [19]
The UBJP is now confronted with the realities on the ground. In particular, it remains to be seen how the party maintains political power amidst the complex dynamics between feuding clans and political dynasties.[20] Locals have criticised the UBJP for being a party that only represents the Maguindanao, not the entire Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). With a stronghold in Cotabato City and the broader Maguindanao region, it is unlikely for the UBJP to win seats from areas where ethnic Maguindanao are not the majority. Moreover, there is a political alliance between traditional politicians campaigning on ethnic grounds. Notably, the BARMM Grand Coalition (BGC), comprising groups from various regions of BARMM,[21] has declared its intention to contest against the UBJP to run the BARMM.[22] The BGC has endorsed Sulu’s governor, Sakur Tan, to be the chief minister of BARMM. Overall, the UBJP will face a tough election in 2025.
While these parties have committed to uphold a peaceful election in 2025,[23] Sidney Jones, a seasoned observer, notes that “violence is a near certainty” in elections within the Philippines.[24] This is because political clans are likely to deploy “guns, goons, and gold” to coerce or compensate their potential voters into supporting them, as seen at the non-partisan barangay elections in 2023.[25]
Not the End of Structural and Organised Violence
While the threat outlook for terrorism has reduced significantly, it does not mean the end of structural and organised violence in the Philippines. The Philippines continues to suffer from inter-clan wars, rido (revenge culture) and organised crime. The accessibility of guns on the black market and the densely forested terrain allows illicit organisations to operate comfortably within Mindanao. Hence, despite the declaration of ASG-free areas in Basilan, bombings continue to occur occasionally.[26]
The reduction of terrorism in Mindanao also does not signify the end of terrorism in the Philippines. Certainly, the security agencies have succeeded in reducing the threat of terrorism, and there is little expectation for the ASG or the DIMG to re-emerge as a significant force in the foreseeable future, as during the height of their activities between 2014 and 2019. However, the population of Mindanao continues to suffer from poor living conditions, which can be exploited for political mobilisation and radicalisation propaganda. In the immediate term, it is the domestic environment which will impact the future trajectory of Islamist radicalisation and terrorism in the Philippines.[27]
About the Author
Kenneth Yeo is an Associate Research Fellow with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].
Citations
[1] Jim Gomez, “Army Chief: Militant Leader Likely Killed in Philippines,” The Associated Press, August 25, 2020, https://apnews.com/general-news-d4595e2a569618d3f7abb3dd10aa30f7.
[2] “Death of ASG Leader Leads to Surrender of 14 followers,” SunStar, October 5, 2023, https://www.sunstar.com.ph/zamboanga/local-news/death-of-asg-leader-leads-to-surrender-of-14-followers.
[3] Maja Halilovic Pastuovic et al., Preventing and Addressing Violent Extremism: A Conceptual Framework (Berlin: Trinity College Dublin and Berghof Foundation¸ 2021), https://www.pave-project.eu/publications/PAVE_870769_Preventing_and_Adressing_Violent_Extremism_A_Conceptual_Framework.pdf; “Advancing and Sustaining the Gains of Good Governance (BasilanProvince) 2022,” Galing Pook, YouTube video, February 8, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C5IgAyNABtg; “Basilan Program Helps Reintegrate Rebel Returnees | The Final Word,” NewsWatch Plus PH, YouTube video, December 16, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3VSVL1bJUM4.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Abdul-Mughni A. Adju, Masnona S. Asiri and Charisma S. Ututalum, “Effects of Balik Barangay Program to the Livelihood, Peace and Order, Public Safety, and Education in Patikul, Sulu,” Environment and Social Psychology, Vol. 9, No. 7 (2024).
[6] Bianca Dava, “ISIS-Southeast Asia Leader Killed in Marawi: Military,” ABS-CBN News, June 14, 2023, https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/06/14/23/isis-southeast-asia-leader-killed-in-marawi-military.
[7] Joel Guinto and Virma Simonette, “Mindanao: Four Killed in Explosion at Catholic Mass in Philippines”, BBC News, December 3, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67604592.
[8] The Maranao people traditionally live in communities of large extended families and do not delineate landownership cleanly between their extended families. As a result, a significant amount of time has been spent deconflicting landownership claims between family members.
[9] Froilan Gallardo, “Compensation Board Struggles as Marawi Siege Claims Exceed Budget,” Rappler, August 7, 2023, https://www.rappler.com/philippines/mindanao/marawi-compensation-board-struggles-funds-residents-claims-exceed-budget/.
[10] There are three original factions of the BIFF, led by Ismael Abubakar (Commander Bongos), Mohiden Alimodin Animbang (Kagi Karialan) and Esmael Abdulmalik (Abu Turaife). Only the Turaife faction pledged allegiance to the Islamic State.
[11] “Philippine Govt Forces Kill Top IS Militant, Wife in Mindanao Raid,” Benar News, October 29, 2021, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/philippine/militant-killed-10292021134428.html.
[12] Drema Quitayen Bravo and Edwin O. Fernandez, “12 Militants Killed in Philippines’ Maguindanao del Sur,” Asia News Network, April 24, 2024, https://asianews.network/12-militants-killed-in-philippines-maguindanao-del-sur/.
[13] Anti-Terrorism Council (Philippines), Designating the 20 Individuals Affiliated with the Local Terrorist Groups, which are Designated under Anti-Terrorism Council Resolution No. 13 (2020), as Terrorists (Manila: Anti-Terrorism Council, 2021), https://atc.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/SGD_ATC-Resolution-No.-20_Designating-20-LTG-Affiliated-Individuals.pdf.
[14] Surrendered militias are not free from prosecution. Instead, pro bono lawyers from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)’s chapter in Mindanao would attempt to reduce their sentences in return for their cooperation with the authorities. Department of National Defense (Philippines), Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Administrative Order No. 10, s. 2018 (A.O. No. 10, s. 2018) as Amended By Administrative Order No. 25, s. 2020 (A.O. No. 25, s. 2020) (Quezon City: Department of National Defense, 2021), https://law.upd.edu.ph/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Revised-IRR-Administrative-Order-No-10-Series-of-2018-as-Amended.pdf.
[15] Dahlia Simangan, “Challenges and Prospects for Urban Peacebuilding in Post-Siege Marawi City, Philippines: People, Places, Practices,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs (2024), https://doi.org/10.1177/18681034241251864.
[16] Kenneth Yeo, “Geography, Governance, Guns: Characterising Islamist Terrorist Sanctuaries in Maritime Southeast Asia (2014-2021),” Asian Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2023), https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2022.2132854.
[17] Nurhati Tangging and Kenneth Yeo, “Reintegrating Former Terrorist Combatants in Mindanao,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2023), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/counter-terrorist-trends-and-analyses-ctta-volume-15-issue-03/.
[18] The BTA is the interim local government of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM).
[19] Sherrie Ann Torres, “16 local parties, 1,500 Sectoral Groups Eye 2025 Bangsamoro Polls,” ABS-CBN News, July 2, 2024. https://news.abs-cbn.com/regions/2024/7/2/16-local-parties-1-500-sectoral-groups-eye-2025-bangsamoro-polls-1729.
[20] Georgi Engelbrecht, “Ballots and Bullets in the Bangsamoro,” International Crisis Group, June 20, 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/ballots-and-bullets-bangsamoro.
[21] The BGC is a coalition of the most powerful parties in the major regions of BARMM, representing the major ethnic groups in the region. The coalition includes the Sulu-Tausug: Salaam Party; Basilan-Yakan: Bangsamoro People’s Party (BPP); Cotabato City-Maguindanao: Al-Ittihad-Ungaya Sa Kawagib Nu Bangsamoro (Al-Ittigad-UKB); and Lanao-Maranao: Serbisyong Inklusibo Alyansang Progresibo Party (SIAP).
[22] Luisa Cabato, “BARMM Grand Coalition Endorses Sulu Governor Sakur Tan as Chief Minister,” INQUIRER.net, May 19, 2024, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1942165/barmm-grand-coalition-on-sulu-governor-sakur-tan.
[23] Filane Mikee Cervantes, “BARMM Political Parties Form Alliance to Ensure Peaceful 2025 Polls.” Philippine News Agency, April 25, 2024, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1223472.
[24] Sidney Jones, “The 2025 Bangsamoro Elections: An Anti-Climax Waiting to Happen?” Up Sa Halalan, April 23, 2024, https://halalan.up.edu.ph/the-2025-bangsamoro-elections-an-anti-climax-waiting-to-happen/.
[25] Ibid.; Georgi Engelbrecht, “Philippines: Bangsamoro’s Village Elections Point to a Long Path to Peace,” International Crisis Group, February 16, 2024, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/philippines-bangsamoros-village-elections-point-long-path-peace; “Return of the 3 Gs?” INQUIRER.net, April 23, 2022, https://opinion.inquirer.net/152313/return-of-the-3-gs.
[26] Teofilo P. Garcia Jr., “Bomb Goes Off in Lamitan Hours After Mayor Declares City Abu Sayyaf-Free,” Rappler, June 19, 2024, https://www.rappler.com/philippines/mindanao/bomb-goes-off-lamitan-basilan-after-abu-sayyaf-free-declaration/.
[27] This is not to understate the potential impact of external events or developments on the activities or behaviours of Filipino radical groups. For example, there has been widespread advocacy for the Palestinians arising from the suffering caused by the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. Nur Misuari, the leader of the MILF, has expressed solidarity with the Palestinian people, claiming that “we are like the Palestinians, while the Philippines are like the Israeli”. Yet, despite support for the Palestinian cause in Muslim Mindanao, this has not manifested into terrorist activities thus far. This is primarily because active terrorist groups in the Philippines have been severely weakened by the AFP, and narratives emerging from terrorist-linked channels in the Philippines have generally focused on internal struggles and have yet to exploit the Palestinian struggle for their own purposes. As such, the Palestinian plight has been featured in civil advocacy but not terrorism thus far.
