Pakistan
As 2024 ended, Pakistan grappled with two active conflicts in the restive Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces as insurgent and militant groups enhanced their operational capabilities and geographical reach through alliance-making, nuanced propaganda warfare and exploitation of governance deficit. Though terrorist attacks continued to surge for the fourth consecutive year in Pakistan,[1] their lethality in 2024 was the most striking feature.[2] In response, the Pakistani state’s counter terrorism policies have failed to inspire public confidence, critical for the success of any counter terrorism campaign. Nonetheless, Pakistan revamped its internal security framework under the Azm-e-Istehkam strategy to focus on both the kinetic and non-kinetic aspects of counter terrorism.[3] Without improving governance, bridging the yawning state-society gulf and addressing the challenge of Pakistani militant groups’ sanctuaries in Afghanistan and Iran, the ongoing counter terrorism operations will bring only temporary respite from violence, not lasting peace.
Trends
For the fourth consecutive year, terrorist incidents and fatalities surged in Pakistan with 1,005 violent incidents[4] causing 1,524 casualties until October 15, 2024.[5] This figure for the same period in 2023 was 748 attacks with 1,202 fatalities.[6] The most concerning aspect of terrorist attacks in 2024 was their lethality, as could be seen from the fatalities, which surged compared to the previous year.[7] Most terrorist attacks were concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, where the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) are active, among other groups. The rise in terrorist attacks in Pakistan started with the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021 and has continued unabated since then.[8] The Taliban have provided sanctuaries to the TTP and other like-minded militant groups to plan, prepare and execute attacks inside Pakistan, negatively impacting Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.[9]
In 2024, Pakistan intermittently engaged in border skirmishes with Iran and Afghanistan over cross-border terrorist attacks. For instance, in January, Iran and Pakistan launched tit-for-tat missile strikes on each other’s territory against alleged terrorist hideouts.[10] For years, Pakistan has tolerated the presence of the anti-Iran, Sunni-Baloch militant group Jaish-ul-Adl in Balochistan.[11] In retaliation, Iran has allowed Pakistani Baloch separatist groups to operate from its Sunni-Baloch-majority Sistan-Balochistan province.[12] Likewise, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border was closed several times in 2024 due to the TTP’s cross-border attacks.[13] Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions peaked in March following Pakistani airstrikes against TTP hideouts in Paktika and Khost provinces.[14] In retaliation, the Taliban hit back with mortars and artillery fire, targeting Pakistani security checkposts along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.[15]
Alarmingly, the TTP has set up checkposts on highways in several southern districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,[16] gathering toll taxes from trade trucks and shipping containers, collecting public donations as well as forcing businesses to pay extortions.[17] As the Pakistani state’s writ is slipping in southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, terrorist groups are filling the governance gaps to win the hearts and minds of local populations. The TTP’s decision to limit its attacks to security forces and law enforcement agencies and spare civilians exemplifies this.[18] At any rate, a hostile neighbourhood tolerating Pakistani militant groups’ presence, porous borders with active irredentist movements, a growing state-society gap and the easy availability of weapons, have created a conducive environment for Pakistani terrorist groups to grow in size and influence.[19]
TTP’s Mergers, Inter-Group Alliances and Coordinated Attacks
Since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, Pakistani jihadist groups have managed their internal differences and disputes to merge, ally and launch joint attacks. Since July 2020, as many as 62 militant factions have pledged oaths of allegiance to TTP chief Nur Wali Mehsud, adding to the group’s operational and organisational strength.[20] In 2024, around 14 militant groups pledged their loyalties to TTP, including eight from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, three from Balochistan, two from Sindh and one from Punjab.[21] Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Newly Merged Districts (NMDs) are considered the TTP’s strongholds; however, six of the 14 allegiances have come from other provinces, indicating the group’s reach beyond its traditional strongholds.[22] The most significant of these allegiances was the merger with anti-Shia militant group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi’s Naeem Bukhari faction from Karachi.[23] The Naeem Bukhari faction is notorious for targeting the Shia community in Karachi and its union with the TTP will undermine Karachi’s uneasy peace achieved after the military operation concluded in 2016, ending two decades of ethnic and sectarian violence.[24]
In 2024, the TTP also overcame its differences with other like-minded jihadist groups to combine their militant campaigns for creating a Taliban-like theocracy in Pakistan. In March, the TTP resolved differences with one of its most lethal factions, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), which left the group after growing suspicions that Nur Wali had been involved in its chief Omar Khalid Khorasani’s killing.[25] As JuA was re-absorbed into the TTP, its representation increased from two to three. JuA’s incumbent head Omar Mukarram Khorasani was appointed as head of the TTP’s north military commission, Mufti Sarbakaf Mohmand was given a key position in the political commission, while Dr Haqyar was included in the Rahbari Shua (Consultative Council, the TTP’s top decision-making body).[26]
Concurrently, the TTP has also enhanced inter-group cooperation with the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group (HGBG) and Lashkar-e-Islam (LI), using these alliances as a force multiplier against Pakistani security forces.[27] The TTP carried out several joint attacks with HGBG and LI in the NMDs. Inter-group alliances and mergers enhance terrorist groups’ lethality and longevity: the more a terrorist group is allied, the longer the shelf life and the greater the lethality.[28]
Use of Drones and Artificial Intelligence for Attacks and Propaganda
Though Pakistani terrorist groups have been using social media to radicalise, recruit and fund-raise, the use of drones for attacks and artificial intelligence (AI) for propaganda dissemination has been non-existent.[29] In 2024, however, both developments were observed, albeit at an incipient stage. By and large, Pakistani terrorist groups have been reluctant to use emerging technologies due to the easy availability of lethal weapons, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), assault rifles and rocket launchers, which are more effective in advancing their ideological and strategic goals.[30] A combination of three factors has undergirded Pakistani terrorist groups’ apathy towards emerging technologies: 1) utility; 2) accessibility; and 3) a safe place to experiment with technologies and expertise. With the employability of drones to drop small payloads and AI for propaganda bulletins, a significant psychological threshold has been crossed. Despite its symbolic nature, this development will excite and embolden Gen Z militants to further experiment with emerging technologies and add them to terrorists’ operational toolkit in the future.
In September, Pakistani security forces discovered six attacks over a period of two months in North Waziristan district, involving quadcopter-borne IEDs to target military facilities and transport. HGBG militants tied explosive-filled bottles weighing 400-700 grammes each and laced with nails and ball bearings to commercially available quadcopters and detonated them with grenades.[31] Though these attacks were insignificant in terms of their physical impact, the psychological impact is tremendous for two reasons. First, the successful execution of the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) hitting targets with small payloads will pave the way to increasing the payload and lethality. Second, it will attract young radicals with engineering and technological backgrounds to terrorist groups, potentially accelerating the process of embracing new emerging technologies in the future. However, it bears mention that Pakistani terrorist groups have limited finances, hence it will not be easy to purchase commercially available high-end drones. Financial limitations compel them to adopt risk-averse behaviours to ensure high returns on low investments.
Similarly, the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK) employed generative AI to claim attacks across Afghanistan, while imitating layouts of mainstream Pakistani news channels. This was done after the Islamic State (IS)’s move to claim the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow through an AI-generated video. Using the title of Khorasan TV, ISK took credit for the Bamyan attack in May which killed six people, including three foreign tourists.[32] In the AI-generated video, a humanoid posing as a news anchor dressed in Western attire read a Pashto-language bulletin.[33] The video was shared in private channels of the Teleguard, a highly encrypted Swiss messaging app which offers uncompromising data protection. Since then, ISK has produced nine more AI-generated videos with requests of producing similar news broadcasts in Urdu and Persian languages.[34]
Though ISK’s AI-generated videos are full of technical glitches, the group will gradually enhance the production quality. The most striking feature of ISK’s AI-generated propaganda was its neutral tone and unbiased language. Instead of using offensive expletives to describe its opponents, such as “Crusader, infidels, Zionists, Mushrikeen and Rafidah”, the group used non-offensive language.[35] At the same time, instead of describing its deceased militants as “martyrs” or “soldiers of the caliphate”, it called them dead or killed. Through neutral language, ISK is using hybridisation tactics to exploit platform moderation gaps to amplify visibility, ensure longer shelf life and wider dissemination on larger social media platforms like Facebook, Instagram, X and TikTok. Socially, these platforms are more active and offer unparalleled opportunities for disseminating propaganda compared to encrypted platforms.[36]
Baloch Insurgency’s Evolution from Defensive to Offensive Warfare
2024 marked a critical shift in the Baloch insurgency’s operational tactics from defensive to offensive guerrilla warfare, equally matched by robust information warfare.[37] If previous years had witnessed reactive attacks from Baloch insurgents on power pylons, cellular towers, railway tracks and gas pipelines, in 2024 they stormed security checkposts, military camps and other high-profile targets, such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)’s projects, in multiple coordinated attacks.[38] Furthermore, the insurgents, particularly the BLA’s Majeed Brigade, are expanding the conflict beyond Balochistan to Pakistan’s financial capital of Karachi.[39] The Baloch insurgents are taking the war to major Pakistani cities to draw attention to ethnic grievances, socio-economic marginalisation and the exclusion of Balochs from the province’s development under the CPEC’s framework.[40]
The BLA’s two high-profile attacks in 2024 underscore the shift from defensive to offensive guerrilla warfare. On August 26, BLA militants launched multiple coordinated attacks in Balochistan’s 10 different districts, coinciding with the 18th death anniversary of notable Baloch politician Nawab Akbar Bugti.[41] Before launching the attack, the BLA blocked Balochistan’s main entry and exit points and blew up the only railway bridge linking the province to the rest of Pakistan. Following that, BLA militants searched public transport on Balochistan’s main highways and killed ethnic Punjabi drivers and passengers.[42] Concurrently, seven BLA suicide bombers, including female bomber Mahal Baloch, stormed a military camp in Lasbela district.[43] Strikingly, the BLA was able to overwhelm the Pakistani state’s security apparatus for 12 hours for the first time in two decades, killing over 70 people. Since the main highways were blocked, security reinforcements arrived late.
Separately, in October, the BLA’s suicide squad, the Majeed Brigade, targeted a convoy of Chinese engineers outside Karachi’s Jinnah International Airport using a car bomb. The Majeed Brigade used 80-85 kilogrammes of commercial explosives to target the vehicular convoy of Chinese engineers. The BLA not only had insider information about the arrival time and route of the Chinese engineers, but it also successfully breached a high-security zone to carry out the attack.[44] In its statement of claim, the BLA warned China to leave Balochistan or face more such attacks in the future. The BLA has been targeting Chinese interests and nationals in Karachi since 2018, including attacks on the Chinese consulate in 2018, the Pakistan Stock Exchange in 2020 and Karachi University’s Confucius Centre in 2022.[45]
Three factors undergird the Baloch insurgency’s evolution from a low-intensity to a high-intensity conflict.
First, as Baloch tribal chiefs have become less relevant due to their arrogant attitudes, disdain for lower cadres and use of the conflict for political and financial benefits, middle-class insurgent leaders like the BLA’s chief Bashir Zeb and the Baloch Liberation Front’s supremo Dr Allah Nazar have become the insurgency’s pivotal figures.[46] In 2002, when the current and fifth wave of insurgency began, its centre of gravity was in north-eastern Balochistan, where tribal structures are strong. However, with time, it has moved to the southern coastal belt of Makran region, where the educated and middle class reside.[47] The state’s mishandling of the Baloch conflict and local youth’s alienation from the political process due to stolen public mandate and imposition of handpicked governments, have pushed educated Baloch youth towards the insurgency.[48]
Second, social media’s advent has accelerated and decentralised the flow of information, undermining the state’s monopoly in controlling Balochistan’s political narrative. The insurgents and other Baloch societal segments have effectively used social media to articulate their narrative and draw international attention to their grievances. At the same time, social media has also allowed young Balochs inside and outside Pakistan to mobilise and organise better.[49] Through the exchange of ideas and stories of their relative deprivation, they have forged bonds which transcend tribal divides, birthing a more radical form of Baloch nationalism which espouses separatism.[50] Furthermore, radical Baloch nationalists endorse more extreme forms of violence like suicide terrorism.[51] Even women have joined the insurgency in combat roles. Prior to this, women were performing secondary roles as nurturers, caregivers, propagandists, recruiters and social media activists for the insurgency. But now they have assumed more primary roles as suicide bombers.[52]
Third, the inter-group coordination between different Baloch insurgent groups since 2018 also accounts for the insurgency’s growing lethality and resilience. The Baloch insurgents have forged alliances, such as the Baloch Raji Ajio Sangar, to coordinate their efforts, firepower and human resources in order to sustain the insurgent campaign and make it strategically impactful.[53] Ethnically similar groups with shared notions of an ideal polity which operate in geographically contiguous conflict zones against a common adversary have aligned to maximise gains and minimise losses.
TTP-ISK’s War of Words
The TTP-ISK’s well-managed rivalry underwent a subtle shift in 2024, centred around Deobandi versus Salafi beliefs and local versus global jihad arguments.[54] Though ISK includes two splinter factions, among others, of the TTP from Orakzai and Bajaur districts, until recently, both militant groups had tolerated each other and managed their ideological rivalry. The TTP is pro-Taliban – the latter of which has been at loggerheads with ISK and has killed several of ISK’s top leaders in Afghanistan – and pledges its oath of allegiance to the Taliban’s Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada.[55] Meanwhile, ISK has been attacking the Taliban’s ideological legitimacy in its propaganda campaigns and has killed several Taliban leaders for deviating from the path of “true jihad” by striking a deal with the United States (Doha Agreement 2020) to regain power in Afghanistan.[56] The TTP has found itself in the middle of this heated antagonism, but has adopted a pragmatic approach.
In late May, a member of the TTP’s leadership council Qari Shoaib Bajauri criticised ISK in a video posted on X, for accepting extreme and deviant elements of the TTP, Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Afghan Taliban.[57] While clarifying the TTP’s stance on ISK, he underscored that the former has no covert agreement (ceasefire) or partnership with the latter. He said, “TTP is not at war with ISK to avoid opening another front”, and emphasised that the group is focusing on its primary goal of establishing a Taliban-like theocracy in Pakistan.[58]
In retaliation, ISK issued a 47-minute audio statement on June 2 dismissing any cooperation with the TTP, while calling it a “tribal Deobandi local militia” which has restricted its militant campaign to Pakistan and does not have a global agenda.[59] It bears mention that since 2018, the TTP has announced that it does not have any agenda beyond Pakistan. Furthermore, ISK alleged that the Taliban controls the TTP’s ideological posture and operational trajectory in Pakistan, a reference to two Taliban-facilitated, short-lived ceasefires between Pakistan and the TTP in 2021 and 2022. ISK also framed the TTP as a proxy of pro-democracy religious-political parties, such as Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazal (JUIF), in Pakistan. In various statements, the TTP has reached out to Pakistan’s religious-political parties to forge a unified front for establishing a shariah system in Pakistan.
On July 24, ISK published another 71-minute audio release targeting the TTP’s former deputy leader Sheikh Khalid Haqqani’s past stance of questioning IS’ claim to a self-styled caliphate owing to its lack of territorial control and disapproval from the ulema (religious scholars), jihadist groups and the ummah (Muslim countries).[60] In retaliation, ISK termed Haqqani as an “uneducated cleric” who lacked religious knowledge and dismissed his criticisms as unfounded. ISK questioned the TTP’s oath of allegiance to Haibatullah whom it called a deviant controlling a small corrupt emirate in Afghanistan. In sum, ISK’s propaganda publications, such as the Pashto magazine Khorasan Ghag, routinely criticise the TTP for its restricted approach to jihadism, subservience to the Taliban, and soft stance towards pro-democratic Pakistani religious-political parties and the Shia community.
The TTP-ISK’s evolving antagonism brings into sharp focus the shifting alliances and rivalries of Pakistan’s fluid threat landscape. Though both groups have avoided targeting each other on the battlefield, the growing tit-for-tat propaganda war can degenerate into armed clashes very soon. Critically, ideological animosities lie at the heart of ongoing militant tussles for retaining legitimacy, gaining ascendance and discrediting rival militant groups.
State Response
Confronted with an array of asymmetric militant threats, Pakistan announced a new counter terrorism strategy, Azm-e-Istehkam (Resolve for Stability), in June by revamping the erstwhile National Action Plan, a 20-point counter terrorism roadmap, to focus on kinetic and non-kinetic domains.[61] In August, the government also allocated Rs 60 billion (around US$216 million) for Azm-e-Istehkam.[62] The announcement of a new counter terrorism strategy raised suspicions about an impending military offensive in the NMDs. Consequently, large protest rallies in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa decried Azm-e-Istehkam, fearing the mass displacement of people in anticipation of another military operation.[63]
The protests compelled the government to clarify that the new counter terrorism strategy was aimed at aligning existing efforts through improved institutional and inter-agency coordination.[64] Instead of launching a new operation, Azm-e-Istehkam will expedite the ongoing intelligence-based operations. Concurrently, it will pay equal attention to counter ideology efforts, improve governance and foster a culture of tolerance, peaceful coexistence and diversity.[65] Nonetheless, people’s lack of trust in the government’s security policies points to the growing state-society gap in the NMDs, which has allowed the TTP and other groups to sustain their recruitment and militant campaigns.
In August, the National Counter Terrorism Authority issued a notification to label the TTP as “Fitna al Khawarij” (conflict of seceders, or those beyond the pale of Islam) to delegitimise the group.[66] Though terminologies are critical in shaping political and religious discourses against militant groups, the credibility of those shaping such narratives is equally critical. Due to a lack of governance, never-ending political strife and an economic meltdown, the Pakistani state lacks the credibility necessary to control the narratives, especially in the presence of social and digital media platforms. Likewise, Pakistan also banned HGBG and the Majeed Brigade as terrorist organisations.[67] In Pakistan’s fluid and volatile threat landscape, proscriptions are ineffective because terrorist groups raise funds through the informal economy and do not own physical assets. At best, bans serve a tactical purpose.
Outlook
Pakistan is facing two active insurgencies in its north and south-western peripheries, which share borders with Afghanistan and Iran. The TTP and other like-minded groups’ militant campaigns have been given a new lease of life since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, enjoying a safe haven under the latter’s ideological umbrella. Meanwhile, the ethno-separatist insurgency in Balochistan is rooted in decades of ethnic discrimination, political exclusion and socio-economic marginalisation. Baloch insurgents operate out of Iran’s Sunni-majority Sistan-Balochistan province where the majority of the population is ethnic Baloch. To navigate this complex security landscape, Pakistan will have to combine its security, political and diplomatic efforts for lasting peace. At the political level, addressing the genuine grievances of the Baloch and Pashtun communities will be essential to isolate the militant groups. Diplomatically, Islamabad will have to engage Tehran and Kabul to address the issue of external sanctuaries, without which local security efforts will only deliver short-term respite from violence, not lasting peace.
About the Author
Abdul Basit is a Senior Associate Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].
Citations
[1] Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2024 (Sydney: Institute for Economics & Peace, 2024), p. 22, https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GTI-2024-web-290224.pdf.
[2] Haroon Janjua, “Pakistan: Why Are Militant Attacks on the Rise?” Deutsche Welle, September 12, 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/pakistan-why-are-militant-attacks-on-the-rise/a-70197380.
[3] Abid Hussain, “’Azm-e-Istehkam’: Can New Pakistani Military Operation Curb Armed Attacks?” Al Jazeera, June 24, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/24/azm-e-istehkam-can-new-pakistani-military-operation-curb-armed-attacks.
[4] “Datasheet – Pakistan: Number of Terrorism Related Incidents Year Wise,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2024, https://www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/incidents-data/pakistan.
[5] “Datasheet – Pakistan: Yearly Fatalities,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2024, https://www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/fatalities/pakistan.
[6] Ibid.
[7] South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Datasheet – Pakistan: Number of Terrorism Related Incidents Year Wise.”
[8] Ayaz Gul, “UN: Afghan Taliban Increase Support for Anti-Pakistan TTP Terrorists,” VoA, July 11, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/un-afghan-taliban-increase-support-for-anti-pakistan-ttp-terrorists/7694324.html.
[9] Bill Roggio, “Analysis: The ‘Bonds Are Close’ as the Pakistani Taliban Benefits From Its Afghan Safe Javen,” FDD’s Long War Journal, July 6, 2024, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/07/analysis-the-bonds-are-close-as-the-pakistani-taliban-benefits-from-its-afghan-safe-haven.php.
[10] Asif Shahzad and Gibran Naiyyar Peshimam, “Pakistan Fires Retaliatory Strike at Iran, Stoking Regional Tension,” Reuters, January 19, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/pakistan-has-conducted-strikes-inside-iran-afp-report-2024-01-18/.
[11] Farhan Zahid, “Jaish al-Adl’s Reemergence Threatens Iran-Pakistan Relations,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 15, No. 4 (2017), https://jamestown.org/program/jaish-al-adls-reemergence-threatens-iran-pakistan-relations/.
[12] For details on Iran-Pakistan tensions, see “Experts React: What’s Really Going on With Pakistan and Iran Exchanging Attacks?” Atlantic Council, January 18, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-whats-really-going-on-with-pakistan-and-iran-exchanging-attacks/.
[13] Abubakar Siddique, “From Allies To Enemies: Relations Between Afghan Taliban And Pakistan Hit Rock Bottom,” Radio Free Europe, August 15, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-pakistan-taliban-ttp-terrorism/33078685.html.
[14] Tahir Khan et al., “Pakistan Carried Out Intelligence-Based Anti-Terrorist Operations in Afghanistan, FO Confirms,” Dawn, March 18, 2024, https://www.dawn.com/news/1822274.
[15] “Taliban Says It Strikes Back After Deadly Pakistani Strikes,” Radio Free Europe, March 18, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-pakistan-airstrikes-bomb/32865938.html.
[16] Ramzan Semab, “Video Showing TTP ‘Highway Check-Post’ Goes Viral,“ The Express Tribune, June 6, 2024, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2470002/video-showing-ttp-highway-check-post-goes-viral.
[17] Aihtesham Khan, “Terrorism, Extortion Cloud the Local Economy in K-P,” The Express Tribune, September 30, 2024, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2499544/terrorism-extortion-cloud-the-local-economy-in-k-p/.
[18] Shahzad Akhtar and Zahid Shahab Ahmed, “Understanding the Resurgence of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflicts, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2023), pp. 285-306.
[19] Abdul Basit and Zahid Shahab Ahmed, “The Persistence of Terrorism in Pakistan: An Analysis of Domestic and Regional Factors,” in Terrorism, Security and Development in South Asia: National, Regional and Global Implications, eds. M Raymond Izarali and Dalbir Ahlawat (London: Routledge, 2021), pp. 157-173.
[20] Khyber Scoop (@KhyberScoop), “KS Monitoring: A militant group led by Umari, hailing from Miranshah, North Wazrisitan District has pledged allegiance to TTP Chief Noor Wali Mehsud and merged with TTP,” X, September 25, 2024, https://x.com/KhyberScoop/status/1838847253437424062.
[21] Based on the author’s own research and monitoring of social and mainstream media.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Zia Ur Rehman, “Merging Shadows: The Quiet Shift In Karachi’s Militant Landscape,” The Friday Times, September 17, 2024, https://thefridaytimes.com/17-Sep-2024/merging-shadows-the-quiet-shift-in-karachi-s-militant-landscape.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Iftikhar Firdous, “Deciphering the TTP’s Strategy To Revive in Punjab,” The Khorasan Diary, May 7, 2024, https://thekhorasandiary.com/en/2024/05/07/deciphering-the-ttps-strategy-to-revive-in-punjab.
[26] Abdul Sayed, “The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has announced the reconciliation of the Jamat-ul-Ahrar (JuA) faction,” X, March 11, 2024.
[27] Abdul Basit, “Terrorism’s Persistence in the Newly Merged Districts (NMDs): An Examination of Inter-Group Militant Cooperation and Rivalries,” Pakistan Journal of Terrorism Research, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2024), pp. 1-32, https://nacta.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/PJTR-Vol-6-Issue-1-January-June-2024-1.pdf.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Abdul Basit and Rueben Dass, “Tech and Terror: Why Have Drones Not Penetrated the Afghanistan-Pakistan Militant Landscape?” Global Network on Extremism & Technology (GNET), April 29, 2024, https://gnet-research.org/2024/04/29/tech-and-terror-why-have-drones-not-penetrated-the-afghanistan-pakistan-militant-landscape/.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Iftikhar Firdous, “TKD Exclusive: Pakistani Officials Believe Pakistani Taliban Have Developed ‘Nascent’ Drone Technology,” The Khorasan Diary, September 29, 2024, https://thekhorasandiary.com/en/2024/09/25/tkd-exclusive-pakistani-officials-believe-pakistani-taliban-has-developed-%27nascent%27-drone-technology.
[32] Mona Thakkar and Anne Speckhard, “ISIS Supporters Harness the Power of AI to Ramp Up Propaganda on Facebook, X and TikTok,” Homeland Security Today, July 15, 2024, https://www.hstoday.us/featured/is-iskp-supporters-harness-generative-ai-for-propaganda-dissemination/.
[33] Sirwan Kajjo, “IS Turns to Artificial Intelligence for Advanced Propaganda Amid Territorial Defeats,” VoA, May 23, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/is-turns-to-artificial-intelligence-for-advanced-propaganda-amid-territorial-defeats/7624397.html.
[34] Iftikhar Firdous, “ISKP Begins Publishing Pashto News Bulletins Using Artificial Intelligence,” The Khorasan Diary, May 21, 2024, https://thekhorasandiary.com/en/2024/05/21/iskp-begins-publishing-pashto-news-bulletins-using-artificial-intelligence.
[35] “ISKP: Use of Generative AI Presenters to Create Newscasts,” Afghan Witness, June 19, 2024, https://www.afghanwitness.org/reports/iskp%3A-use-of-generative-ai-presenters-to-create-newscasts.
[36] Mariam Shah, “The Digital Weaponry of Radicalisation: AI and the Recruitment Nexus,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology (GNET), July 4, 2024, https://gnet-research.org/2024/07/04/the-digital-weaponry-of-radicalisation-ai-and-the-recruitment-nexus/.
[37] Mickey Kupecz, “Pakistan’s Baloch Insurgency: History, Conflict Drivers, and Regional Implications,” The International Affairs Review, May 16, 2024, https://www.iar-gwu.org/print-archive/8er0x982v5pj129srhre98ex6u8v8n.
[38] Kiyya Baloch, “Baluch Militancy’s Newest and Most Lethal Phase in Pakistan,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 20, No. 18 (2022), https://jamestown.org/program/baluch-militancys-newest-and-most-lethal-phase-in-pakistan/.
[39] Zeeshan Ahmed, “Calculated Chaos: What’s Driving the Surge in Baloch Terror Attacks?” T-Magazine – The Express Tribune, October 13, 2024, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2502399/calculated-chaos-whats-driving-the-surge-in-baloch-terror-attacks.
[40] Muhammad Amir Rana, “A Radical Shift in Insurgency,” Dawn, October 13, 2024, https://www.dawn.com/news/1864895.
[41] “More Than 70 Killed in Multiple Armed Attacks in Pakistan’s Balochistan,” Al Jazeera, October 7, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/26/at-least-38-killed-in-multiple-armed-attacks-in-pakistans-balochistan.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Saleem Shahid, “Balochistan Plunges Deeper Into Militancy Vortex,” Dawn, August 27, 2024, https://www.dawn.com/news/1855006.
[44] “Majeed Brigade and ZIRAB Unit Behind Karachi Attack, Over 20 Killed, Says BLA,” The Balochistan Post, October 7, 2024, https://thebalochistanpost.net/2024/10/majeed-brigade-and-zirab-unit-behind-karachi-attack-over-20-killed-says-bla/.
[45] Arpan Rai, “Why Chinese Workers Are Under Attack From Militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” The Independent, October 7, 2024, https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/south-asia/karachi-airport-blast-chinese-workers-pakistan-afghanistan-b2625058.html.
[46] Seema Khan and Costas Laoutides, “Trapped Between Religion and Ethnicity: Identity Politics Against the Baloch in Iran and Pakistan,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflicts, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2024), pp. 164-184, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17467586.2024.2356508; Mahvish Ahmad, “Balochistan: Middle-Class Rebellion,” Dawn, June 5, 2012, https://www.dawn.com/news/723987/balochistan-middle-class-rebellion.
[47] Hari Prasad and Wil Sahar Patrick, “Pakistan Faces Rising Separatist Insurgency in Balochistan,” New Lines Institute, January 24, 2023, https://newlinesinstitute.org/nonstate-actors/pakistan-faces-rising-separatist-insurgency-in-balochistan/.
[48] Sarah Zaman, “Why Pakistan’s Balochistan Remains Restive,” VoA, August 30, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/why-pakistan-s-balochistan-remains-restive/7765694.html.
[49] Sajid Aziz, “Virtual Battlegrounds: Understanding the Online Campaign of Baloch Separatist Groups in Pakistan,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology (GNET) Insights, April 2, 2024, https://gnet-research.org/2024/04/02/virtual-battlegrounds-understanding-the-online-campaign-of-baloch-separatist-groups-in-pakistan/.
[50] Shakoor Ahmad Wani, “The New Baloch Militancy: Drivers and Dynamics,” India Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 3 (2021), pp. 4479-4500, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09749284211027253.
[51] Vaishali Jaipal, “The Changing Face of Baloch Activism,” Observer Research Foundation, May 9, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-changing-face-of-baloch-activism.
[52] Abdul Basit, “Women Suicide Bombers and the Changing Trajectories of Pakistan’s Baloch Insurgency,” New Lines Magazine, December 14, 2023, https://newlinesmag.com/argument/women-suicide-bombers-and-the-changing-trajectories-of-pakistans-baloch-insurgency/.
[53] Adnan Amir, “Pakistani Separatist Groups Unite to Target China’s Belt and Road,” Nikkei Asia, August 1, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/Pakistani-separatist-groups-unite-to-target-China-s-Belt-and-Road.
[54] Iftikhar Firdous (@IftikharFirdous), “ISKP Opens Up Front Against TTP,” X, June 23, 2024, https://x.com/IftikharFirdous/status/1804787022650904585.
[55] Mona Thakkar and Vidyut S, “TTP’s Alliance With the Afghan Taliban: In ISKP’s Crosshairs,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology (GNET) Insights, September 20, 2024, https://gnet-research.org/2024/09/20/ttps-alliance-with-the-afghan-taliban-in-iskps-crosshairs/.
[56] Soumya Awasthi, “Digital Battleground: ISKP vs. Taliban,” Observer Research Foundation, April 8, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/digital-battleground-iskp-vs-taliban.
[57] Afghan Analyst (@AfghanAnalyst2), “TTP Clarifies Stance on Islamic State Group in Af-Pak Region,” X, May 25, 2024, https://x.com/AfghanAnalyst2/status/1794349643112792085.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Pak Afghan Affairs (@Pak_AfgAffairs), “from groups, including the #TTP, Afghan #Taliban & Al-Qaeda,” X, June 2, 2024, https://x.com/Pak_AfgAffairs/status/1797182135477871001.
[60] Abdul Sayed, “Al-Azaim Media of ISKP has severely criticized Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in a recent 71-minute audio statemen,” X, July 24, 2024.
[61] “Govt Approves ‘Operation Azm-e-Istehkam’ to Eliminate Terrorism,” Ministry of Information and Broadcasting – Government of Pakistan, June 23, 2024, https://www.moib.gov.pk/News/62472.
[62] Shahbaz Rana, “Rs60 Billion Approved for Operation Azm-e-Istehkam,” The Express Tribune, August 22, 2024, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2490199/rs60-billion-approved-for-operation-azm-e-istehkam.
[63] “Rallies, Jirgas in KP Oppose Azm-i-Istehkam Military Offensive,” Dawn, July 1, 2024, https://www.dawn.com/news/1843029.
[64] Ikram Junaidi , Saleem Shahid and Umer Farooq, “Azm-i-Istehkam Is No Large-Scale Military Op,” Dawn, June 25, 2024, https://www.dawn.com/news/1841822.
[65] Zia Ur Rehman, “What Makes Azm-i-Istehkam Different From Operations Past?” Dawn, July 30, 2024, https://www.dawn.com/news/1848738/what-makes-azm-i-istehkam-different-from-operations-past.
[66] “Pakistan Labels TTP as ‘Fitna al-Khawarij’ to Expose Its True Ideology,” The Express Tribune, August 1, 2024, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2484659/pakistan-labels-ttp-as-fitna-al-khawarij-to-expose-its-true-ideology.
[67] Iftikhar A. Khan, “Govt Proscribes Gul Bahadur Group, Majeed Brigade,” Dawn, August 1, 2024, https://www.dawn.com/news/1849349.
