Malaysia
Malaysia experienced an uptick in terrorism-related activity in 2024, the highest since 2020. In May, the country experienced its second successful Islamic State (IS)-related attack since 2016. Following the attack, there was a wave of IS-related arrests and several plots were subsequently uncovered. The uptick in IS-related activity highlights the group’s persistent threat to the country and wider region.
Domestic Threat Landscape
Heightened Terrorist Activity
On May 17, 2024, Malaysia suffered its second Islamic State (IS)-related attack after the 2016 Movida Bar bombing. The pre-dawn attack was carried out by 21-year-old Radin Luqman, who attacked a police station in Ulu Tiram, Johor.[1] Luqman stabbed a police officer to death, before confiscating the latter’s weapon and fatally shooting another cop. He was killed in an ensuing firefight with a third police officer.
Luqman and his family, comprising his mother, two sisters and brother, were found to have been radicalised by his father, Radin Imran. Imran had previously been investigated for his links to Indonesian terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), before pledging his allegiance to IS in 2014.[2] The entire family of five was arrested and charged with terrorism offences in June.
Imran, the patriarch of the family, was charged with encouraging terrorist acts by promoting IS’ violent ideology among his family, storing four homemade air rifles for IS activities, pledging loyalty to IS and possessing a book written by Aman Abdurrahman, the former leader of Indonesian pro-IS group Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD).[3] Luqman’s brother, Radin Romyullah, 34, was charged for pledging allegiance to IS and possessing IS-related materials on a hard drive. Meanwhile, the three female family members – Luqman’s mother and two sisters – were charged with deliberately omitting to provide information regarding crimes related to terrorism.[4]
The attack was followed by a wave of IS-related arrests. comprising multi-state operations and arrests of at least 20 people. Among these, six men and two women linked to IS were apprehended for threatening attacks against the King of Malaysia, the prime minister and other dignitaries, including members of the police.[5] The eight suspects were aged between 25-70 and came from different socioeconomic backgrounds, including a housewife, a construction worker and a former university lecturer.[6]
Another case of interest was the arrest of 28-year-old factory operator, Aabid Zarkasi. He was charged with the possession and preparation of explosive materials with the intent of carrying out attacks as well as the possession of IS-related propaganda.[7] Zarkasi had previously been arrested and jailed in 2018 for the possession of IS-related materials.[8]
At least 13 (including the Ulu Tiram attacker’s family) of the reported terrorism arrests involved the possession of IS-related materials.[9] This seemed to be the most common offence among the recent wave of arrests. Another interesting trend from the recent arrests was that of recidivists. At least six of the cases involved repeat offenders – four had previously been arrested and jailed for links to IS, while two, including Radin Imran, were suspected to have been former members of JI.[10]
The recent uptick in IS-related terrorism cases in Malaysia is a noteworthy trend. Most of the cases, including the Ulu Tiram attack, seemed to involve self-radicalised individuals who were inspired by the group’s ideology. This trend is similar to previous years; the only difference being the fact that individuals arrested in the past had been radicalised via social media by high-profile Malaysian fighters linked to IS in Iraq and Syria when the group was active there. While recent cases highlight the continuing importance of social media as a mode of extremist influence, especially for individuals looking for radical direction, the role of kinship and peer networks also remain key radicalisation drivers in Malaysia.
IS Returnees
There are currently more than 40 Malaysian nationals known to reside in Syria. The Malaysian government maintains an open-door policy towards repatriation and continues to engage in efforts to repatriate Malaysians from the theatre.[11] However, the Malaysian government faces several challenges. The first is the unwillingness of some individuals who are in Syria to return. This may be due to fear of arrest and prosecution upon return. The second is the fact that the Malaysian government does not recognise the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who oversee the refugee camps like al-Hol and al-Roj. This adds a diplomatic complication to the process of repatriation.
The threat posed by returning foreign fighters, particularly those who have had militant training and experience, is substantial. Refugee camps in Syria such as al-Hol and al-Roj, where most of the individuals formerly linked to IS are being held, currently suffer from poor conditions and abuse.[12] The camps are also said to be hotbeds for radicalisation, particularly among children.[13]
IS in Syria and Iraq remains resilient, with its fighting capacity estimated at between 3,000-5,000 members in January 2024 and an uptick in IS attacks in Syria since March 2024.[14] The presence of former IS members there who may have been operational and may have the potential to import expertise and networks to Malaysia to carry out attacks is of concern and must be dealt with carefully. Also, in this regard, the threat of radicalisation among the spouses and children of Malaysian former IS fighters who were in Syria and Iraq and other terrorist detainees remains a cause for concern.
East Malaysia – Sabah
Terrorist activity in Sabah remains low. The activity of groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), JAD and Darul Islam Sabah (DIS), who previously operated in Sabah, remains muted. This is largely due to the degradation of pro-IS groups in the southern Philippines, such as the ASG, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and the Dawlah Islamiyah-Maute Group (DIMG).[15] Pro-IS groups in the southern Philippines have suffered from significant militant surrenders and have been weakened as a result of counter terrorism efforts by the Filipino security services.[16]
Separatist groups such as the Royal Sulu Force (RSF), however, remain a concern. The RSF is linked to the Sulu Sultanate based in the southern Philippines, who claim that parts of Sabah belong to them. The group was involved in the Lahad Datu invasion in 2013, when they laid siege on the district for slightly over a month. One of its founders, Fuad A. Kiram, was declared a terrorist by the Malaysian government in 2023.[17]
Since 2019, Malaysia has continued to face several claims from Filipino citizens asserting themselves as heirs of the Sulu Sultanate amid claims that parts of the land belong to them.[18] These claims have led to legal cases in countries such as France, Spain, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.[19] In 2023, a French court and the International Court of Justice in the Hague ruled in favour of the Malaysian state putting a tentative end to the Filipinos’ claims on the land.[20] However, several legal appeals by the Sulus are still ongoing.
Sabah continues to suffer from cross-border criminal activities such as illegal immigration and cross-border smuggling of goods such as oil, contraband, drugs and firearms.[21] This is due to the porous maritime borders it shares with Indonesia and the Philippines. These borders pose a significant challenge for security services to monitor and patrol due to the landscape. The possibility of linkages forming between criminal and terrorist networks is present and needs to monitored closely.[22]
Online Radicalisation
Social media continues to play a key role in the radicalisation of some Malaysians. At least six cases out of the 2024 wave of arrests involved the use of social media, particularly Facebook.[23] For example, Muhammad Sani Mahdi Sahar was charged with supporting IS via his Facebook account and for the possession of IS-related materials.[24] He had already been arrested and jailed twice previously for the possession of IS-related materials in 2016 and 2018.[25]
Similarly, a 57-year-old woman named Fauziahanim Abdullah was found to have been in possession of IS-related materials on her handphone and pendrive, having declared support for the group on Instagram.[26] While mainstream platforms such as Facebook have remained the primary online social media used by Malaysians linked with extremism, alternative platforms such as Rocket.Chat, TamTam, Threema, Hoop and Element have also been used actively by IS and its supporters, and thus warrant attention.[27]
Responses
The Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) has remained vigilant and proactive in dealing with the heightened terrorist activity in the region. Following the Ulu Tiram case, the RMP carried out several nationwide operations which led to the arrests of several suspects and the thwarting of terrorist plots in the country. These included an operation to arrest eight individuals who had threatened attacks against the King, the prime minister and other dignitaries, spanning several states including Johor, Kelantan, Penang and Selangor. Another operation saw more than 20 individuals linked to IS from various states including Kuala Lumpur, Johor, Selangor and Perak being nabbed.[28] Apart from these two multi-state operations, several individual operations were carried out, leading to the arrests of several individuals linked to IS, as mentioned above.
On the country’s east coast, the Malaysian security services, particularly the Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM), remain vigilant in dealing with the maritime terrorist and cross-border crime threat. ESSCOM’s Operasi Sanggah resulted in the arrest and deportation of 233 illegal immigrants and the seizure of contraband and drugs amounting to RM15 million and RM3.3 million, respectively.[29] ESSCOM is also planning to incorporate advanced technological equipment such as drones, speedboats, long-distance cameras, and sensor and radar systems to improve its surveillance capabilities in the region.[30] Additionally, the government is working on constructing several new control posts in Sabah to control illegal immigration and tighten border control.[31]
The Malaysian government has also collaborated with international partners on the issue of counter terrorism. In April 2024, the European Union (EU) delegation to Malaysia, in collaboration with the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), a constituent unit under the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, conducted a cross-thematic training seminar on counter terrorism and maritime security, specifically designed for security practitioners operating in the tri-border area (TBA) between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.[32] The main aim of the seminar was to further EU-Malaysia collaboration on security, defence and counter terrorism, and encourage cooperation.[33]
Outlook
Recent developments in Malaysia bring to light several noteworthy trends. First is the threat of self-radicalised, “isolated actors”.[34] These can be individuals or small cells who are inspired by a group’s ideology and who carry out attacks independently as opposed to being centrally directed by the group. They may or may not have limited links – either physical or virtual – to other extremists who may assist them in the planning of attacks. However, the execution of attacks is largely independent.
An example of this is the Ulu Tiram case. The attacker and his family can be considered an isolated cell which was self-radicalised. There has been no evidence thus far that they were in touch with other extremists. The family was found to have kept to themselves and were cut off from other members of the public.[35]
The Ulu Tiram case also brings to light the continued regional threat of family radicalisation. This has been seen in several cases in Indonesia, particularly the 2018 Surabaya bombings.[36] More specifically, the Ulu Tiram case witnessed the radicalisation of an entire family network where both parents and children were radicalised. The exact operational roles of the father, Radin Imran, and the other family members in the attack are unclear at the moment. However, Imran’s actions of spreading IS’ ideology to his family may have had a direct or indirect impact on the attacker Radin Luqman’s actions.
The recent developments also highlight the threat of recidivists. At least six of the reported terrorism cases in 2024 (including the Ulu Tiram case) involved recidivists.[37] Several individuals were previously charged and jailed for terrorism offences, including Mohammad Aabid Zarkasi and Muhammad Sani, as mentioned above. Most of the recidivist cases involved individuals who were previously jailed for either possessing IS-related materials or pledging allegiance to IS.
However, two cases also involved the shifting of allegiance of individuals formerly linked with JI to IS. One was Radin Imran, the father of the Ulu Tiram attacker, who had previously been affiliated with JI. The other involved a 70-year-old former lecturer who was arrested in July 2024. He was charged for possessing IS-related materials, promoting IS ideology and allowing his house to be used as a facility to support terrorist acts.[38] He is believed to have previously been linked to Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) in the early 2000s.[39]
Social media continues to play an important role in the terrorism landscape in Malaysia. The platforms on which extremist activity has been detected thus far are Facebook, Telegram and Instagram. Almost half of the reported cases (six out of 13) involved the use of social media.[40] Social media has been crucial in the radicalisation of Malaysians in the recent past. During the height of IS between 2012-2019, most of the recruitment, travel facilitation and attack planning by Malaysians were carried out by charismatic fellow Malaysians based in Syria and Iraq through social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and Telegram.[41] The current trends show that social media remains an effective radicalisation driver among Malaysians.
On the whole, while the recent increase in terrorist activity cannot necessarily be viewed as a revival or re-emergence of IS in the country, it proves that the threat of IS remains pertinent and is one that must be monitored closely. Persistent detection and disruption actions by the authorities must be complemented by rehabilitation efforts and resources to break the cycle of radicalisation within families and reduce recidivist tendencies. In this respect, Malaysia continues to engage in a holistic counter terrorism strategy that involves various measures, including the monitoring of social media, former detainees and transnational activities in order to keep the terrorist threat at bay.
About the Author
Rueben Dass is a Senior Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].
Citations
[1] Mohd Farhaan Shah, “Ulu Tiram Attack: Slain Suspect’s Family Members Face Nine Charges Including Supporting Terrorism,” The Star, June 19, 2024, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2024/06/19/ulu-tiram-attack-slain-suspect039s-family-members-face-a-total-of-nine-charges-including-supporting-terrorism.
[2] Farik Zolkepli, “Ulu Tiram Attack: Suspect Not JI Member, Initial Link Made Due to Father’s Past, Says IGP,” The Star, May 18, 2024, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2024/05/18/ulu-tiram-attack-attacker-not-a-jemaah-islamiah-member-says-igp.
[3] Shah, “Ulu Tiram Attack.”
[4] Ibid.
[5] Austin Camoens, “Eight Arrested Over IS-Linked Threats Against King, PM,” New Straits Times, June 24, 2024, https://www.nst.com.my/news/crime-courts/2024/06/1067761/updated-eight-arrested-over-linked-threats-against-king-pm.
[6] Ibid.
[7] “Factory Operator Charged with Possession of Terrorism-Related Items,” New Straits Times, June 11, 2024, https://www.nst.com.my/news/crime-courts/2024/06/1062190/factory-operator-charged-possession-terrorism-related-items-watch.
[8] Nurbaiti Hamdan, “Man Gets Two Years’ Jail for Possessing IS-Related Items,” The Star, November 28, 2018, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2018/11/28/man-gets-two-years-jail-for-possessing-is-related-items.
[9] Based on data collected by the author.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ahmad El-Muhamaddy, Managing the Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Their Families: Malaysian Experience (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2023).
[12] Bernd Debusmann Jr, “US Repatriates 11 Americans and Six Canadian Children from Syria,” BBC News, May 8, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68971030.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Devorah Margolin and Camille Jablonski, “Five Years After the Caliphate, Too Much Remains the Same in Northeast Syria,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch 3847, March 19, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/five-years-after-caliphate-too-much-remains-same-northeast-syria.
[15] Kenneth Yeo, “Hungry and Tired: The Decline of Militancy in Mindanao,” The Strategist, June 11, 2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/hungry-and-tired-the-decline-of-militancy-in-mindanao/.
[16] Jacob Zenn, “Brief: Maritime Threat Posed by Abu Sayyaf Curtailed by Philippine Counter-Piracy Efforts,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2024), https://jamestown.org/program/brief-maritime-threat-posed-by-abu-sayyaf-curtailed-by-philippine-counter-piracy-efforts/.
[17] Mohd Iskandar Ibrahim, “Fuad A Kiram Dikenal Pasti Pengasas Entiti Pengganas Royal Sulu Force – Khairul Dzaimee,” Berita Harian, April 11, 2023, https://www.bharian.com.my/berita/nasional/2023/04/1088767/fuad-kiram-dikenal-pasti-pengasas-entiti-pengganas-royal-sulu-force.
[18] Jason Santos, “Azalina Hopes for More Decisive Action on Sulu Claims Case,” The Vibes, June 24, 2024, https://www.thevibes.com/articles/news/102513/azalina-hopes-for-more-decisive-action-on-sulu-claims-case.
[19] Ibid.
[20] “Sulu Case: French Court Ends So-Called Heirs’ Claims over Malaysia’s Diplomatic Assets, Says Azalina,” The Star, November 9, 2023, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2023/11/09/sulu-case-malaysia-ends-purported-sulu-heirs039-claims-on-m039sian-assets-in-france-says-azalina; “Malaysia Hails ‘Victory’ in Row with Sulu Sultan’s Filipino Heirs,” Al Jazeera, June 7, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/7/malaysia-wins-decisive-victory-in-row-with-sulu-sultans-heirs.
[21] “Esscom Vows to Reduce Cross-Border Crimes,” The Star, March 14, 2024, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2024/03/14/esscom-vows-to-reduce-cross-border-crimes.
[22] Khatijah Jistoh, “ESSCOM Boldly Confronts Security Challenges To Ensure Nation Stays Peaceful, Safe,” BERNAMA, September 6, 2024, https://www.bernama.com/en/news.php?id=2337467.
[23] Based on data collected by the author.
[24] Alias Abd Rani, “’Oyen Ucuk’ Didakwa Lagi Kes SOSMA, Kini 3 Pertuduhan Sokong IS,” Berita Harian, June 13, 2024, https://www.bharian.com.my/berita/kes/2024/06/1258181/oyen-ucuk-didakwa-lagi-kes-sosma-kini-3-pertuduhan-sokong.
[25] “Malaysia Man Gets 18 Months in Jail for Having ISIS Clips”, The Straits Times, March 25, 2016, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysia-man-gets-18-months-in-jail-for-having-isis-clips; Diyanatul Atiqah Zakarya, “’Oyen Ucuk’ Didakwa Kali Ketiga, Sokong Pengganas IS,” Kosmo, June 13, 2024, https://www.kosmo.com.my/2024/06/13/oyen-ucuk-didakwa-kali-ketiga-sokong-pengganas-is/.
[26] Dawn Chan, “Unemployed Woman Charged with Supporting, Possessing Islamic State Items,” New Straits Times, July 19, 2024, https://www.nst.com.my/news/crime-courts/2024/07/1078743/unemployed-woman-charged-supporting-possessing-islamic-state-items.
[27] Bridget Johnson, “ISIS Cyber Group Launches Cloud, Chat Platforms to ‘Close Ranks’ Online,” Homeland Security Today, April 6, 2021, https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/cybersecurity/isis-cyber-group-launches-cloud-chat-platforms-to-close-ranks-online/.
[28] Camoens, “Eight Arrested Over IS-Linked Threats against King, PM”; “Polis M’sia Tangkap Lebih 20 Individu Disyaki Penyokong ISIS, Berita Malaysia,” Berita Harian Singapura, June 24, 2024, https://www.beritaharian.sg/malaysia/polis-msia-tangkap-lebih-20-individu-disyaki-penyokong-isis.
[29] Olivia Miwil, “Esscom Boosts Confidence with ‘Show of Presence’ Strategy,” New Straits Times, September 1, 2024, https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2024/09/1099649/esscom-boosts-confidence-show-presence-strategy; Stephanie Lee, “Esscom Raids Squatter Colonies in Sandakan,” The Star, August 24, 2024, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2024/08/24/esscom-raids-squatter-colonies-in-sandakan.
[30] Olivia Miwil, “Esscom Helps Keep Threats at Bay,” New Straits Times, August 31, 2024, https://www.nst.com.my/news/crime-courts/2024/08/1099112/esscom-helps-keep-threats-bay; “Use of Latest Technology Important to Enhance Security Level in ESSzone,” Borneo Post Online, August 17, 2024, https://www.theborneopost.com/2024/08/17/use-of-latest-technology-important-to-enhance-security-level-in-esszone/.
[31] Olivia Miwil, “Esscom Plays Crucial Role to Ensure Safety in Sabah, Says CM,” New Straits Times, April 24, 2024, https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2024/04/1042225/esscom-plays-crucial-role-ensure-safety-sabah-says-cm.
[32] “First EU-Malaysia Maritime Counterterrorism Training for Security Practitioners in Sabah, Followed by EU Delegation Visit to ESSCOM,” Enhancing Security Cooperation in and with Asia (ESIWA), April 25, 2024, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/Press%20release%20-%20Sabah%20Maritime%20CT%20training.pdf.
[33] Olivia Miwil, “Furthering EU-Malaysia Collaboration in Security and Defence,” New Straits Times, April 25, 2024, https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2024/04/1042608/furthering-eu-malaysia-collaboration-security-and-defence.
[34] Rueben Dass, “The IS Resurgence in Malaysia: Assessing the Threat and Implications,” The Diplomat, July 3, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/07/the-is-resurgence-in-malaysia-assessing-the-threat-and-implications/.
[35] Charles Ramendran and Junaid Ibrahim, “Ulu Tiram Attacker’s Family Isolated Themselves Due to Beliefs, Says Home Minister,” The Star, May 23, 2024, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2024/05/23/ulu-tiram-attacker039s-family-isolated-themselves-due-to-beliefs-says-home-minister.
[36] Rueben Ananthan Santhana Dass, “The Use of Family Networks in Suicide Terrorism: A Case Study of the 2018 Surabaya Attacks,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2021), pp. 173-191, https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2021.1906932.
[37] Based on data collected by the author.
[38] Remar Nordin, “Former Lecturer, Contractor Charged in Johor with Possessing Islamic State Materials,” The Star, July 21, 2024, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2024/07/21/former-lecturer-contractor-charged-in-johor-with-possessing-islamic-state-materials.
[39] Leong Kar Yen, “KMM Does Not Exist, Militant Group Suspect Tells Suhakam,” Malaysiakini, June 18, 2002, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/11834. KMM was known to have an indirect affiliation to JI. For more information, see Mohd Mizan Mohammad Aslam, “A Critical Study of Kumpulan Militan Malaysia, Its Wider Connections in the Region and the Implications of Radical Islam for the Stability of Southeast Asia” (PhD thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 2009), https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/41339479.pdf.
[40] Based on data collected by the author.
[41] Rueben Dass and Jasminder Singh, “Pathways to the Caliphate: Mapping Malaysian Foreign Fighter Networks in Iraq and Syria from 2012-2019,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 35, No. 7 (2022), pp. 1-34, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2022.2059352.
