Key Trends in Digital Extremism 2024: The Resilience and Expansion of Jihadist and Far-Right Movements
In 2024, violent extremist narratives and networks continued to expand and persist online, despite efforts by tech companies to implement robust moderation frameworks. Terrorist and extremist groups from both the militant jihadist and far-right milieus have increasingly relied on interdependent strategies of decentralisation and diversification, to evade threat detection mechanisms while maximising message reception.
Strategic Decentralisation and Diversification
Militant jihadist groups online have continued to capitalise on geopolitical and domestic upheaval to reinforce their ideological narratives. The ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict has fuelled propaganda by Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS), with the former aligning itself with Hamas’ “Operation Flood of Al-Aqsa”, and the latter exploiting the conflict to advance its narratives and inspire lone-wolf attacks. Decentralised unofficial affiliates have proven critical in expanding propaganda dissemination for AQ and IS. These supporters have continued reinforcement and circulation of extremist messaging amidst online moderation, by evading detection and circumventing takedowns.
In Southeast Asia, conservative Islamist groups harbouring sympathies for extremist ideologies have also capitalised on mainstream discontent, pushing narratives that further entrench social division and exclusivism. These groups have continued to call for the overthrow of Western democratic systems and the installation of a transnational Islamic caliphate, highlighting a dangerous overlap with extremist narratives.[1]
Far-right extremism (FRE) has also continued to proliferate across the digital sphere, including in Southeast Asia. Contentious actors are increasingly difficult to identify, yet maintain easy access to vast online audiences. They have cultivated communities united by prejudices and have used them to foment violence. Additionally, international links between various far-right movements online have promoted on-ground violence during times of political upheaval.[2]
Across the board, Islamist and FRE groups have demonstrated success with their use of borderline content to propagandise across mainstream social media platforms. This has been reinforced by regional affiliates working to localise narratives, maximising their reach and appeal.[3]
Ongoing Israel-Hamas War: A Catalyst for Propaganda
In 2024, AQ and IS exploited the Israel-Hamas conflict to disseminate their ideologies and incite violence.[4] AQ has emerged as a key source of propaganda surrounding the conflict,[5] with branches across various continents aligning themselves with Hamas. This follows the group’s publicised support for Hamas in late 2023. For instance, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s media section, Al-Malahem, has released videos discussing the significance of engaging in jihad to defend Islam, inciting attacks against perceived enemies of Islam. AQ propagandists have also consistently rehashed the “Flood of Al-Aqsa” and “O Al-Aqsa, we are coming” slogans in their online content. AQ’s de-facto chief Sayf al-Adl has also published a series of essays which has been circulated online, detailing plans for capitalising on the Israel-Hamas war. In it, he encouraged AQ affiliates and followers to exploit military conscription in their own nations, execute assaults on Western targets and enhance collaboration among jihadists worldwide.[6]
Due to ideological differences, IS has not explicitly aligned itself with Hamas. The conflict has nevertheless afforded IS new opportunities to advance its “us versus them” narrative. In late January 2024, a pro-IS film titled The State was disseminated online, extolling the establishment of IS and honouring individuals like Omar bin Hussein Al-Hadid, who embodied IS’ opposition to Western influence.[7] While the video did not directly mention the Israel-Hamas war, it should be noted that in 2015, an IS military unit emerged in Gaza calling itself the “Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade”.[8] The video was likely an attempt to revive a sense of affiliation to IS given that the Gaza-based brigade has been dormant since a series of attacks in September 2015.[9] In March 2024, images and videos of a Palestinian pro-IS citizen named Ezzaddin Baalusha were also circulated online, including a photoshoot of Baalusha posing with the IS flag, pledging allegiance to IS.[10]
The conflict has also sparked online discussions in Southeast Asia, with many users in the region expressing sympathies for Hamas and viewing the group as a legitimate resistance movement.[11] Some have espoused anti-Semitic rhetoric, while other users have called for the vilification of Israeli delegates and the cutting off of diplomatic relations with the country.[12] Netizens from these nations have been engaging in aggressive doxing[13] of pro-Israeli social media accounts, including personnel of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF).[14] Some Malaysian netizens have also employed anti-Semitic tropes as well as Malay supremacist narratives. Conversely, there were also Islamophobic sentiments expressed by internet users within the region, highlighting the conflation between pro-Palestinian sentiments and the Islamic faith.[15]
Islamic State (IS)
IS propaganda has grown more decentralised and diverse despite the group’s hierarchal structure in recent years. IS leadership continues to establish the tone for its global agenda via editorials and speeches, but most propaganda emanates from a diverse network of independent yet interrelated content creators. This decentralisation strategy has allowed propaganda dissemination to circumvent counter terrorism initiatives.
Declining But Still Important: The Ministry of Media Bureau and the Provincial Media Offices
IS’ so-called Ministry of Media Bureau has exhibited further decline in its propaganda efforts, particularly in Iraq and Syria. The Al-Furqan Foundation for Media Production, IS’ oldest media branch, has declined significantly. Since IS’ loss of physical ground, Al-Furqan has been restricted to releasing audio speeches of its leaders. Its last video release was in April 2019, featuring the first IS “caliph”, Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi.[16] The IS spokesperson known solely by his nom de guerre, Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari, has only delivered a total of three audio speeches since his first public statement in August 2023. Two of these were released in 2024.
Al-Amaq Agency, the production in charge of managing news linked to IS’ global expansion and military activities, has published a total of 47 updates in video and bulletin formats since October 2023 (see Figure 1). It should be noted that Al-Amaq reporting often uses first-hand videos or images provided by or attained from IS fighters during skirmishes or before attacks.
Furthermore, IS’ “provincial” media offices, which are tasked with producing web content in compliance with IS’ bureaucratic norms and are required to report to the central media bureau,[17] have also exhibited a decline, particularly in the Middle East. IS provinces in Africa remain the primary source of propaganda, producing a total of 114 photo reports (see Figure 2).[18]
al-Naba editorials remain the only consistent and direct source of top-down communication from IS leaders. These articles frequently use impassioned language to reinforce IS’ goal of establishing a self-styled Sunni caliphate. Beyond its traditional focus on the West and Jews, central IS propaganda in 2024 has repeatedly focused on targeting Shia-majority Iran. For example, following the Hamas incursion on October 7, al-Naba issued eight editorials specifically about Iran and Shiite adherents.[19] IS refers to Iran as “Shia Rafida”, a derogatory epithet used to label Shia adherents as heretics, and accuses the country of being deceitful and making false promises to Palestinians. IS has described Iran’s struggle with Israel as “theatrical”, with the goal of preserving political capital rather than bringing about substantive change.[20] IS continues to seek a segregationist agenda to sustain its cause and to weaken the Shia majority country’s influence. By vilifying Iran, IS hopes to increase its appeal to Sunni Muslims, heightening sectarian tensions.
Additionally, the regular infographic featured in al-Naba, which highlights attacks conducted in various IS provinces, also indicated considerable momentum in the African provinces as compared to the others (see Figure 3).[21]
Expansion Through Unofficial Outfits
Unofficial productions by IS supporters – commonly known as Al-Ansar – have emerged as the main vitalising force in IS propaganda. Such content constantly reshapes and recreates central IS propaganda to correspond with local contexts and has played a crucial role in reaching a wider audience. In March 2023, the establishment of the Fursan al-Tarjuma (Knights of Translation) brought together various IS media entities working in different languages.[22] The latest incorporation to this umbrella organisation was the Tamkin Malay Media Foundation in late April 2024, although analysis indicates that the Tamkin Malay’s activity was short-lived.[23]
Additionally, the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK)’s propaganda wing, the Al-Azaim Media Foundation, has produced an extensive volume of pro-IS content. Though regarded as unofficial, Al-Azaim publishes a monthly e-magazine, the Voice of Khorasan, in English and Pashto, focusing on anti-Taliban sentiments while frequently addressing Muslims in South Asia. In March 2024, the outfit started producing content in Turkish, underscoring its proactive outreach.[24] Materials created by Al-Azaim are stored in a repository website accessible through Telegram bot registration.[25] Moreover, the alleged takedown of Al-Raud and I’lam, two prominent IS propaganda repositories, since July 2024[26] has created a vacuum that has been filled by unofficial outfits like Al-Azaim. The archival website has become an essential alternative for users looking for IS materials online.
In terms of narratives, unofficial IS propagandists continue to creatively reproduce official IS media, primarily in poster format, to capitalise on mainstream and local grievances. For instance, these supporters created posters that prominently featured Palestinian icons and included excerpts from al-Naba editorials or speeches of IS leaders, all of which emphasised conquering Palestine and vilifying Jews.[27] With the emergence of Fursan al-Tarjuma, there has also been evidence that different media agencies are focusing on recirculating propaganda in a wide range of languages.[28]
Pro-IS Sentiments in Southeast Asia: Leveraging Regional Grievances
Online IS sympathisers in Southeast Asia have continued to leverage the ongoing Israel-Hamas war as well as domestic issues to demonise existing modes of secular democratic governance and to fortify the perceived legitimacy of IS’ ideology.
In Indonesia, tensions across the Muslim-majority state escalated in July 2024 when a delegation from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the country’s largest Islamic organisation, met with Israeli President Isaac Herzog in an unsanctioned meeting.[29] Indonesian IS supporters condemned the incident via Facebook and depicted the traditionally moderate NU as complicit in the Israel-Hamas war. These supporters shared narratives suggesting that NU is closely associated with the Jewish and Catholic religious establishments as their “souls” are inherently corrupt.[30] Comments on these posts were explicitly violent, with users calling for the necks of NU members to be slit, and others declaring the group as munafik (traitors) who deserve to be “crushed” by God’s will.[31] Notably, some conservative Islamists who call for the establishment of the khilafah (caliphate) through peaceful means also denounced the actions of the NU delegation, claiming that the group had committed apostasy. In August 2024, IS supporters also capitalised on public agitation in response to proposed legislative revisions to regional election laws.[32] Narratives opposing the validity of democratic governance were reiterated, while hadiths (Prophetic traditions) were employed to persuade netizens that those who support secular nationalism are effectively apostates.
In Malaysia, the sale of socks bearing the word “Allah” at a KK Super Mart in March 2024 went viral on social media and generated inflammatory reactions from the Malay-Muslim community. The controversy resulted in violence, including petrol bomb attacks on three KK Super Mart franchises.[33] Pro-IS netizens leveraged the incident to assert that “enemy groups” would continue to defile Islam in the absence of a caliphate.[34] They also employed violent imagery to promote a divide between Muslims and non-Muslims, with one user stating that with the khilafah, non-Muslims would not dare to insult Islam as the “sword will surely land on their necks”.[35]
The salience of anti-establishment sentiments within both countries is concerning, as political discontentment can easily be manipulated by terrorist groups to increase their appeal and influence.
Counter-Deplatforming Efforts and IS’ Response
IS actors online have, in 2024, demonstrated a variety of techniques to evade mainstream platforms’ content moderation efforts. One common tactic involves manipulating textual content by intentionally misspelling words, combining letters and numbers, and using emoji codebooks.[36] These strategies are designed to confuse AI-based filters that are primarily trained in English and struggle to accurately identify extremist content in other languages.[37]
IS has also been adept at manipulating audiovisual media content. By blurring or obscuring faces and locations in photographs and videos, IS can circumvent AI facial recognition and geolocation identification. This allows the group to disseminate sensitive content without being detected.[38]
In response to increased pressure from law enforcement authorities, IS actors have also refined their approach to online platforms. The I’lam website, prior to its recent takedown, exhibited increasing sophistication in its domain mirroring tactics, frequently changing its domains to avoid bans. IS propagandists have also been adept in registering multiple domains for websites, making sure that if one is taken down, the site can rapidly switch to another.[39] Despite repeated deplatforming attempts, repository sites like I’lam and Al-Raud managed to retain a persistent internet presence due to such foresight. However, the recent takedown of Al-Raud and I’lam has had a significant impact on the group’s online activities. Reports suggest that internal infighting and suspicions among IS propaganda officials may have contributed to these disruptions.[40]
Offline Impact
Numerous individuals inspired by IS propaganda have either attempted or carried out attacks in various countries. In June 2023, there was an upsurge in online chatter among IS supporters driven by a campaign called “Supporting Ribat and Jihad”. The campaign aimed to mobilise support for media jihad and defend IS’ online platforms, in response to intensified moderation and takedowns. While the objective of this campaign was clearly focused on online resilience, the campaign potentially inspired supporters to launch physical attacks in Europe, such as the lone-actor attacks in Brussels,[41] Germany[42] and Moscow,[43] as well as failed attempts in Vienna[44] and Paris.[45]
Al-Qaeda (AQ)
While IS maintains a more extensive and sophisticated digital ecosystem, AQ has remained resilient within the online domain primarily through its “open-source jihad” strategy, relying on “tried-and-tested” social platforms such as Telegram, Facebook and Chirpwire to consistently push out large volumes of content.[46] Hence, IS-affiliated channels attract a higher number of unique visitors online per month, but AQ has largely been able to better preserve its online presence in contrast to IS. For instance, a coordinated effort by Europol and participating governments launched in June 2024 wiped out over 2.1 terabytes of IS online content, yet AQ websites associated with Al-Shabaab, AQAP and relevant archive forums remained virtually untouched.[47]
On its propaganda front, AQ’s media apparatus has been persistent in the wake of the Israel-Hamas war. As-Sahab Media, the primary propaganda arm of Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), has continued to produce materials in multiple languages, including English, Bengali, Urdu and Arabic. AQAP has also increased its media output. A study conducted by VOX-Pol indicated that between January 21 to March 21, 2023, all AQ branches produced a total of 54 materials disseminated online.[48] Conversely, from October 2023 to October 2024, AQAP media outlets, namely Al-Malahem and Ansar Shariah Correspondent, produced 118 materials in various formats, while continuing to provide updates on its military operations (see Figure 4).[49]
In addition, an emerging unofficial production, Al-Aqsa Media, has been producing materials in the Turkish language. Since its inception in late July 2024, the agency has released a series of “Tweets” posters, featuring the logos of Al-Malahem and AQ’s Inspire magazine.
There was also an attempt to revive AQ’s notorious Inspire magazine on December 30, 2023, when Al-Malahem released a 45-minute video titled “What America and the West Does Not Expect” with the Inspire logo. The video highlighted the supposed ongoing war against Islam by the West and called on Muslims worldwide to rise up against the perceived enemy. It also included a detailed bomb-making tutorial using pentaerythritol tetranitrate.[50]
Far-Right Extremism (FRE): Online Cross-Pollination and Real-World Impact
In 2024, Western FRE[51] actors and groups continued to mobilise on digital platforms, exploiting the anonymity and reach these spaces offer. Scholars have observed that Western far-right groups have increased their production of “grey-area” content on mainstream social media, with the aim of broadening their audiences and increasing support for FRE movements.[52] This, for instance, was evident in the riots that erupted across the United Kingdom (UK) in August, where social media served as a catalyst, enabling various FRE actors to mobilise support through the dissemination of anti-immigrant and Islamophobic misinformation.[53] Scholars have also increasingly recognised that FRE is a globally interconnected phenomenon, shaped by local contexts while sharing overlapping ideas, narratives and activities.[54] Although FRE movements may manifest differently across regions, they are generally rooted in the “definitional foundations of othering, nativism, and authoritarianism”.[55] This shared root is particularly significant in light of the global interconnectedness of the online sphere.
Recent incidents highlight such interconnections. For instance, an 18-year-old Turkish youth sporting neo-Nazi symbols was arrested for conducting a mass stabbing in Eskişehir, north-western Turkey – an act reminiscent of previous lone-actor attacks in the West.[56] Analysis of his manifesto revealed references to various FRE ideologies, including militant accelerationism and anarcho-primitivism.[57] Furthermore, in South America, FRE influencers in Argentina and Brazil have been observed mirroring the tactics of United States (US)-based FRE figures and groups by using conspiracy theories and misinformation to promote extremist views on social media.[58]
Meanwhile, in South and Southeast Asia, the rising influence and tangible impact of regional FRE – evident in the continued digital activism of pro-Hindutva communities and the increasing visibility of FRE online communities across Southeast Asia[59] – underscore its growing security significance in the region.
Hindutva’s Continued Weaponisation of Hate Speech and Disinformation
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s weakened mandate in the 2024 general election – where the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) secured a majority only through coalition partners – highlights the limits of the party’s divisive Hindutva rhetoric.[60] Yet, pro-Hindutva online communities have remained active, illustrating that Hindutva as a movement transcends BJP’s political confines.[61] In particular, these online communities have continued to mobilise on both mainstream and encrypted platforms, surveilling, targeting and policing perceived adversaries, with occasionally violent spillovers into public spaces.
A key instance of such mobilisation occurred during the inauguration of the Ram Mandir on January 22, 2024, constructed on the controversial site of the Babri Masjid. In the lead-up to and aftermath of the inauguration, online discourse celebrated Hindu civilisational supremacy while targeting detractors for not supporting the ceremony.[62] Additionally, calls were circulated to “reclaim” 40,000 temples which were allegedly converted into mosques during Mughal rule, often veiled with implicit threats of violence.[63]
Such online mobilisation has also extended to international issues perceived as relevant to the Hindu Rashtra (Hindu Nation). For instance, following the ousting of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on August 5, 2024, violence against Bangladeshi Hindus for their affiliation with the Awami League was seized upon by pro-Hindutva online communities.[64] They employed doctored footage and recycled images to frame the violence as part of a broader Hindu “genocide” perpetrated by “Islamists”.[65] This victimhood narrative heightened fears among Bangladesh’s Hindu community and posed additional challenges for Muhammad Yunus’ caretaker regime.[66] Notably, these genocide claims were also rehashed by Western FRE figures such as Tommy Robinson.[67] Such connections between pro-Hindutva and Western FRE were also evident during the riots in the UK, where an “alliance” formed as both groups mobilised digitally around shared Islamophobic and anti-immigrant sentiments, using misinformation to incite further violence. [68]
On less regulated platforms like the IndiaChan imageboard, pro-Hindutva extremists have propagated and normalised overt calls for violence and genocide.[69] Following the inauguration of the Ram Mandir, multiple posts advocated for the violent reclamation of Hindu sites and featured memes depicting saffron-clad Hindutva militants armed with AK-47 assault rifles.[70] Hindutva-aligned Telegram channels have also engaged in online intimidation, using doxing to coerce “anti-Hindus”.[71] They also exacerbated communal tensions during conflicts like the Mira Road clashes in Mumbai,[72] by explicitly encouraging users to commit acts of violence against the so-called “Jihadi Mob”.[73]
Southeast Asia’s Patchwork of Far-Right Extremist Online Ecosystems
In 2024, Southeast Asia witnessed multiple real-world manifestations of far-right ideologies. These included the disinformation-induced xenophobic attacks on Rohingya refugees in Indonesia,[74] the vigilante arson attacks and death threats sparked by Malaysia’s “Allah” socks controversy,[75] and the case of a “self-radicalised” 16-year-old Chinese Singaporean who identified as a white supremacist and planned to carry out attacks abroad.[76] Underlying these incidents was the role of FRE online communities in disseminating and normalising disinformation, violent hate speech and promoting nativist narratives across various social media platforms.
In mid-March 2024, the “Allah” socks controversy sparked the online mobilisation of Malay-Muslim ethno-religious nationalists,[77] including political figures who framed the incident as a deliberate act of disrespect by minority groups, particularly Malaysian Chinese, towards the Malay-Muslim majority.[78] While frustration over the insensitivity was anticipated, the excessively inflammatory and divisive reactions that followed – including derogatory references to minority groups as kafir (unbelievers), implicit threats against them by invoking the “rightful” Malay-Muslim ownership of the land and calls for further arson attacks – highlights the enduring influence of Ketuanan Melayu (Malay-Muslim supremacy) ideology.[79]
Beneath the surface of such mainstream political FRE, a variety of regional extreme-right online subcultures thrive. These subcultures draw inspiration from and adapt the aesthetics, narratives and modus operandi of Western FRE meme subcultures.[80] For example, the Austronesian supremacist community[81] on platforms like TikTok has effectively adopted the Western FRE playbook, using memes as a strategic online tool to disseminate extremist propaganda.[82] They infuse these viral memes with localised interpretations of Western FRE narratives, such as employing the Great Replacement conspiracy theory to demonise local Rohingya refugees and other perceived non-indigenous communities, justifying calls for “Total Rohingya Deaths” or “Total Chinese Deaths”.[83]
Notably, these regional FRE subcultures are far from monolithic; they draw inspiration from a multitude of influences, often sharing a common disdain for liberal democratic values. Within the aforementioned Austronesian supremacist community itself, there exists a hybridised subgroup that draws influence from both far-right and Islamist extremism.[84] Additionally, on Chan imageboard sites like Endchan – notorious for its role in facilitating and promoting FRE discourse[85] – regional FRE users have been observed creating threads that not only advocate Javanese and Austronesian supremacism, but also promote incel and libertarian right beliefs.[86] In these threads, some users have asserted that feminism is part of a destructive Jewish conspiracy aimed at undermining the traditional role of women, while others have called for the legalisation of personal firearms in Indonesia, with one user even sharing blueprints for a 3D-printed gun.[87]
Outlook
As threat actors employ increasingly sophisticated tactics, monitoring and threat identification have inevitably become more difficult. Convoluted ecosystems of extremist-related materials are masked by strategic evasion techniques, designed to circumvent automated threat detection algorithms. Meanwhile, extremist actors continue to further splinter and decentralise their activities, complicating identification and takedowns.
Tech companies must continue to work with security practitioners to facilitate knowledge-sharing across their platforms, especially regarding the latest tactics employed by threat actors. It is particularly important to refine incidence response evaluation alongside the evolving threat landscape and implement meaningful transparency frameworks within the tech industry.[88]
It also remains vital for policymakers to triage global and domestic issues that may aggravate intercommunal tensions and potentially contribute to extremist narratives. Policy interventions should ensure that guardrails are in place at the societal level, to inhibit online extremism and corresponding expressions of violence. As such, initiatives centred on building social cohesion and religious tolerance should be critical considerations.
About the Authors
Ahmad Helmi Bin Mohamad Hasbi and Nurrisha Ismail are Senior Research Analysts and Saddiq Basha is a Research Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. They can be reached at [email protected], [email protected] and [email protected], respectively.
Thumbnail photo by Markus Spiske on Unsplash
Citations
[1] ICPVTR internal monitoring.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Gaza War Has Jump-Started a Weakened Al-Qaeda,” The Washington Institute, October 4, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/gaza-war-has-jump-started-weakened-al-qaeda.
[5] Rohan Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda’s Stance in the Gaza War,” RSIS Commentary, No. 26 (2024), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/al-qaedas-stance-in-the-gaza-war/.
[6] Zelin, “The Gaza War.”
[7] ICPVTR internal monitoring.
[8] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “New Salafi Jihadi Group in Gaza: The Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade,” Jihad Intel, June 2, 2015, https://jihadintel.meforum.org/164/new-salafi-jihadi-group-in-gaza-the-sheikh-omar.
[9] Global Terrorism Database, GTD ID: “201509010063,” “201509180032,” “201509180033,” 201509290001,” https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=1&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&perpetrator=40489&charttype=line&chart=overtime&ob=GTDID&od=desc&expanded=yes#results-table.
[10] Paolo Ganino, “(Photos & Video) Palestinian Resident of Gaza Circulates a Photoshoot, Featuring His Pledge of Allegiance to the Islamic State (IS), Palestinian Territories, Gaza Strip – 25 March 2024,” TRAC, March 25, 2024, https://trackingterrorism.org/chatter/palestinian-photoshoot-allegiance-the-islamic-state-is-gaza-trac/.
[11] ICPVTR internal monitoring.
[12] Subhas Nair, ”Singapore Must End Diplomatic Relations with Israel,” Change.org, November 5, 2023, https://www.change.org/p/singapore-must-end-diplomatic-relations-with-israel; see also “Petition Calls for Singapore to End Diplomatic Ties with Israel in Light of ‘Genocide’ at Gaza,” Gutzy, November 7, 2023, https://gutzy.asia/2023/11/07/petition-calls-for-singapore-to-end-diplomatic-ties-with-israel-in-light-of-genocide-at-gaza/.
[13] Refers to the practice of publicly revealing private information about a person or entity, often with malicious intent.
[14] Rhea Yasmine Alis Haizan, “Some Netizens in Southeast Asia Form Groups of Cyber Warriors to Dox Israeli Soldiers, Cyberbully Opponents,” Channel News Asia, December 2, 2023, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/southeast-asia-social-media-online-activism-dox-israel-hamas-war-palestinians-3958491.
[15] ICPVTR internal monitoring.
[16] “In the Hospitality of Amir Al-Mu’minin,” Furqan Media Foundation, April 29, 2019; see also Haroro J. Ingram, Craig Whiteside and Charlie Winter, “The Guerrilla ‘Caliph’: Speeches That Bookend the Islamic State’s ‘Caliphate’ Era,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 12, No. 5 (2019), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/guerrilla-caliph-speeches-bookend-islamic-states-caliphate-era/.
[17] Laura Wakeford and Laura Smith, “Islamic State’s Propaganda and Social Media: Dissemination, Support, and Resilience,” in ISIS Propaganda: A Full-Spectrum Extremist Message, eds. Stephane J. Baele, Katharine A. Boyd and Travis G. Coan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 155-187.
[18] ICPVTR internal monitoring.
[19] “Al-Naba Newsletter,” No. 425, January 11, 2024; No. 429, February 8, 2024; No. 439, April 18, 2024; No. 444, May 23, 2024; No. 452, July 18, 2024); No. 454, August 1, 2024; No. 459, September 5, 2024; and No. 462 (2024).
[20] “Al-Naba Newsletter,” No. 439, April 18, 2024.
[21] “Al-Naba Newsletter,” No. 451, July 11, 2024.
[22] Lucas Webber and Daniele Garofalo, “Fursan Al-Tarjuma Carries the Torch of Islamic State’s Media Jihad,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology (GNET), June 5, 2024, https://gnet-research.org/2023/06/05/fursan-al-tarjuma-carries-the-torch-of-islamic-states-media-jihad.
[23] Benjamin Mok, “Strategic Shift or Short-Lived Endeavour: Islamic State’s Media Strategy in Southeast Asia,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology (GNET), October 2, 2024, https://gnet-research.org/2024/10/02/strategic-shift-or-short-lived-endeavour-at-tamkin-malay-media-foundation-and-islamic-states-media-strategy-in-southeast-asia/.
[24] ICPVTR internal monitoring.
[25] Refers to the software application that interacts with users through the Telegram messaging app. It is able to perform various tasks like providing information or automating processes.
[26] Steven Humphrys, “Analysis: IS Online Supporters and the Infighting Talk That Won’t Go Away,” BBC Monitoring, August 13, 2024, https://monitoring.stage.bbc.co.uk/product/b00023y0.
[27] ICPVTR internal monitoring.
[28] Mok, “Strategic Shift.”
[29] Amy Sood, “Tone-Deaf: Indonesia’s Largest Islamic Group Apologises After Members Meet Israel Leader,” South China Morning Post, July 18, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3270841/tone-deaf-indonesias-largest-islamic-group-apologises-after-members-meet-israel-leader.
[30] ICPVTR internal monitoring.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Nick Marsh and Viriya Singgih, “Indonesia Election Law Changes Spark Mass Protests,” BBC News, August 22, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c8er13zy1gxo.
[33] Hadi Azmi, “Third Malaysian KK Super Mart Store Petrol Bombed as ‘Allah Socks’ Row Rages On,” South China Morning Post, April 2, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/people/article/3257541/third-malaysian-kk-super-mart-store-petrol-bombed-allah-socks-row-rages.
[34] ICPVTR internal monitoring.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Attila Gulyás, Márton Demeter and Janos Besenyő, “The Lernaean Hydra on the Internet: Deplatformization-Resistant Media Ecosystem of the Islamic State,” Media, War & Conflict, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2024), pp. 310-333.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Humphrys, “Analysis: IS Online.”
[41] Alexandra Brzozowski, “Two Dead in Brussels Terrorist Attack with Gunman at Large,” Euractiv, October 17, 2023, https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/two-dead-in-brussels-terrorist-attack/.
[42] Jaroslav Lukiv, “Man Surrenders and Confesses to Germany Stabbing Attack,” BBC News, August 25, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crlr2z23ykno.
[43] Mariya Knight, Anna Chernova and Darya Tarasova, “ISIS Claims Responsibility for Attack at Moscow-Area Concert Venue That Left at Least 60 Dead,” CNN, March 24, 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/22/europe/crocus-moscow-shooting/index.html.
[44] Mia Alberti, “Iraqi Teen Arrested in Vienna After Taylor Swift Terror Attack Plot Thwarted,” CNN, August 9, 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/09/europe/taylor-swift-plot-vienna-iraqi-detained-intl/index.html.
[45] ”France Says It Foiled Three Plots to Attack Paris Olympics,” Al Jazeera, September 11, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/11/france-says-it-foiled-three-plots-to-attack-paris-olympics.
[46] Moustafa Ayad, “From Message Boards to TikTok: Al-Qaeda’s Two Decades of Internet Exploitation,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, September 13, 2024, https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/from-message-boards-to-tiktok-al-qaedas-two-decades-of-internet-exploitation/.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Stuart Macdonald and Sean McCafferty, Online Jihadist Propaganda Dissemination Strategies (Dublin: VOX-Pol, 2024), https://voxpol.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/DCU-PN0752-Online-Jihadist-WEB-240305.pdf.
[49] ICPVTR internal monitoring.
[50] Ibid.
[51]Drawing on Andrea Pirro’s definition, the term “far right” is used here as a catch-all term encompassing both the “(populist) radical right” and the “extreme right”, given the increasingly porous boundaries and connections between the two. Both share a common foundation of nativism and authoritarianism, but differ in their approach to democracy: the radical right is illiberal democratic, while the extreme right is explicitly anti-democratic. For more, see Andrea L. P. Pirro, “Far Right: The Significance of an Umbrella Concept,” Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2023), pp.101-112, https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12860.
[52] William Allchorn, “Global Far-Right Extremist Exploitation of Artificial Intelligence and Alt-Tech,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2024), p. 13.
[53] Mariam Shah, “Fanning the Flames: Online Misinformation and Far-Right Violence in the UK,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology (GNET), August 28, 2024, https://gnet-research.org/2024/08/28/fanning-the-flames-online-misinformation-and-far-right-violence-in-the-uk/; Martin Lindsay and Calum Grewar, “Social Media Misinformation Fanned Riot Flames, in North East,” BBC News, August 9, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c70jz2r4lp0o.
[54] Claudia Wallner and Jessica White, Global Violent Right-Wing Extremism: Mapping the Threat and Response in the Western Balkans, Turkey, and South Africa (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2022), p. 42, https://ctmorse.wpenginepowered.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/global-vrwe-threat-and-response-mapping_think-piece_-final-17022022.pdf.
[55] Ibid.
[56] “Far-Right Extremism Is Also a Growing Problem Throughout the Global South,” The Soufan Center, August 30, 2024, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-august-30/.
[57] Arthur Bradley, “Dead Society: Tracing the Online Dimension of a Militant Accelerationist-Inspired Attack in Turkey,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology (GNET), August 16, 2024, https://gnet-research.org/2024/08/16/dead-society-tracing-the-online-dimension-of-a-militant-accelerationist-inspired-attack-in-turkey/.
[58] Ariel Goldstein, “The Hate Ministries: Far-Right Social Media Extremism in Argentina and Brazil,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology (GNET), July 9, 2024, https://gnet-research.org/2024/07/09/the-hate-ministries-far-right-social-media-extremism-in-argentina-and-brazil/.
[59] Saddiq Basha, “The Creeping Influence of the Extreme Right’s Meme Subculture in Southeast Asia’s TikTok Community,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology (GNET), April 8, 2024, https://gnet-research.org/2024/04/08/the-creeping-influence-of-the-extreme-rights-meme-subculture-in-southeast-asias-tiktok-community/; Suyin Chia and Daniel Teoh, Trends & Dynamics of Far-Right Extremism in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: INITIATE.MY, 2024), https://initiate.my/trends-dynamics-of-far-right-extremism-in-malaysia/.
[60] Chietigj Bajpaee, “India’s Shock Election Result Is a Loss for Modi but a Win for Democracy,” Chatham House, June 6, 2024, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/06/indias-shock-election-result-loss-modi-win-democracy.
[61] Kiran Vinod Bhatia and Payal Arora, “Clip the Blue Bird: Discursive Strategies of Hindutva Digital Mobilization against Twitter in India,” The Information Society, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2024), p. 241, https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2024.2327852.
[62] ICPVTR internal monitoring.
[63] Siddharth Venkataramakrishnan, “Hindu Nationalists Push Conspiracy Theories and Misinformation Ahead of Elections,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, April 15, 2024, https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/hindu-nationalists-push-conspiracy-theories-and-misinformation-ahead-of-elections/.
[64] Nazneen Mohsina and Roshni Kapur, “Disinformation About Attacks on Minorities Threaten Stabilization Efforts in Bangladesh,” The Diplomat, August 26, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/08/disinformation-about-attacks-on-minorities-threaten-stabilization-efforts-in-bangladesh/.
[65] Ibid.; Abdul Basit, “Agent Provocateurs: Online Hindutva Groups’ Misinformation Campaign Amid Bangladesh’s Political Crisis,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology (GNET), October 8, 2024, https://gnet-research.org/2024/10/08/agent-provocateurs-online-hindutva-groups-misinformation-campaign-amid-bangladeshs-political-crisis/.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Rajiv Sinha, “Hindu Supremacists and White Supremacists Have One Thing in Common for Now: Islamophobia,” The Wire, September 17, 2024, https://thewire.in/communalism/hindutva-white-supremacists-islamophobia; Shah, “Fanning the Flames.”
[69] For more on Hindutva’s extreme-right online subculture, see Benjamin Mok, “Exploring Hindutva Online Subculture,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2022), pp. 9-16.
[70] ICPVTR internal monitoring.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Coinciding with the consecration of the Ram Mandir, the Mira Road clashes began on January 23 when several young men blared loud music and chanted “Jai Sri Ram” in an area with a sizeable Muslim community, resulting in rising tensions. Over the following three days, fuelled by social media misinformation and provocation, violence spread as Hindutva mobs vandalised shops, vehicles and homes, escalating hostilities between the Hindu and Muslim communities. For more on the Mira Road clashes, see Sukanya Shantha, “‘Police Didn’t Stop the Mob’: Shopkeepers, Injured Recount Hindutva Violence at Mumbai’s Mira Road,” The Wire, January 25, 2024, https://thewire.in/communalism/police-didnt-stop-the-mob-shopkeepers-injured-recount-hindutva-violence-at-mumbais-mira-road.
[73] ICPVTR internal monitoring.
[74] Pizaro Gozali Idrus, “Angry Indonesians in Aceh Again Storm a Shelter, Push Rohingya Out,” Benar News, March 27, 2024, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/acehnese-again-storm-rohingya-shelter-03272024143138.html.
[75] Aizat Shamsuddin, “KK Mart Debacle: Blasphemy, Boycott and Violence,” INITIATE.MY, April 3, 2024, https://initiate.my/kk-mart-debacle-blasphemy-boycott-violence/.
[76] Jean Iau, “Self-Radicalised S’porean, 16, Who Identified as White Supremacist, given Restriction Order under ISA,” The Straits Times, January 24, 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/self-radicalised-s-porean-16-who-identified-as-white-supremacist-given-restriction-order-under-isa.
[77] Chia and Teoh, Trends & Dynamics.
[78] Shamsuddin, “KK Mart Debacle.”
[79] ICPVTR internal monitoring.
[80] Jonathan Suseno Sarwono, “Yup, Another Far-Right Classic: The Propagation of Far-Right Content on TikTok in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology (GNET), November 8, 2023, https://gnet-research.org/2023/11/08/yup-another-far-right-classic-the-propagation-of-far-right-content-on-tiktok-in-malaysia-indonesia-and-the-philippines/.
[81] The Austronesian supremacist community advocates for the ethnic superiority of Austronesians – an ethno-linguistic group comprising significant populations in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore.
[82] Sarwono, “Yup, Another Far-Right Classic”; Basha, “The Creeping Influence.”
[83] Ibid.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Florence Keen, Guillermo Suarez-Tangil and Blyth Crawford, Memetic Irony and the Promotion of Violence Within Chan Cultures (London: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, 2020), https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/memetic-irony-and-the-promotion-of-violence-within-chan-cultures/.
[86] ICPVTR internal monitoring.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Tom Thorley, Social Media and Its Impact On Terrorism and Violent Extremism in the Next 2-5 Years (Washington, D.C.: Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, 2023), pp. 1-11, https://gifct.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/GIFCT-23WG-0823-SocialMedia-1.1.pdf.
