Indonesia Annual Threat Assessment
As in previous years, the overall threat posed by Indonesia’s terrorist organisations declined in 2024. Notably, the number of reported terrorist plots dropped compared to 2023. While there were seven plots recorded in 2023, only three were planned in 2024.[i] Additionally, for the second consecutive year, Indonesia experienced zero terrorist attacks – signalling the decreased operational capability of these organisations. However, Indonesia’s terrorism landscape is undergoing significant changes. While the organisational dynamics of pro-Islamic State (IS) groups like Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) remained consistent in 2024, other groups experienced significant shifts with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Indonesia’s largest pro-Al-Qaeda (AQ) group, declaring its dissolution in mid-2024, and police investigations uncovering international networks of another pro-AQ group, Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS).
Trends in Organisational Dynamics and Plots
Jemaah Islamiyah
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)’s operational capacities continued to weaken in 2024 – despite its persistent attempts to rebuild. This was largely the result of two factors. The first was Indonesia’s counter terrorist operations’ increased focus on JI. Notably, in the past three years, JI members have increasingly become the Special Detachment (Detasemen Khusus, or Densus) 88’s primary target of arrests. In 2022, for example, JI members represented 36.3 percent of all arrested terrorist suspects. In 2023, this number increased to 37.4 percent and, in 2024, it increased again to 51.3 percent. While the number of JI members arrested in 2024 was small (19) compared to previous years, they mostly came from Central Java and Central Sulawesi – two JI strongholds that have historically been important to the organisation’s recruitment and training programmes. Significantly, the individuals arrested also held crucial positions in JI’s structure, including in the dakwah (preaching), recruitment, training and fund-raising divisions.[ii]
The second factor that resulted in JI’s weakened operational capacity was its senior leader’s announcement in late June 2024 that the organisation was “ready to disband”. Made by JI senior member Abu Rusydan, the announcement also stated that JI intends to “return to the Republic of Indonesia”, become actively involved in promoting the country’s independence, abide by all the nation’s laws, and ensure its madrassas’ teaching materials are free from tatharuf (extremism). The significance of these statements was bolstered by the fact that 16 other JI seniors were listed as having approved and supported the decision. These included two former JI emirs (leaders), Para Wijayanto and Mbah Zarkasih, and the head of Tim Lajnah (JI’s contingency leadership structure)[iii] Arif Siswanto and member Dr Sholahuddin.[iv]
Following this announcement, JI leaders conducted several concrete actions to indicate their commitment to the organisation’s disbandment. Beginning from late July, for example, JI seniors cooperated with Densus 88 to hold over 35 seminars aimed at explaining the reason for disbandment to other members. As a result, over 4,000 JI members declared their support for the disbandment and pledged loyalty to the Indonesian Republic.[v] Additionally, in early September, former JI seniors reiterated their call for members to surrender any hidden firearms. By mid-September, JI members from North Lombok, Central Java and Central Sulawesi handed over a total of six firearms, including one M-16 assault rifle; seven crossbows; over 900 rounds of ammunition; and over 4 kilogrammes worth of explosive chemicals.[vi]
Jamaah Ansharut Daulah and Other Pro-Islamic State Groups
Both Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), Indonesia’s largest pro-Islamic State (IS) organisation, and other pro-IS individuals, have made little headway in rebuilding their operational capacities following the mass arrests of key leaders in 2018.[vii] Continuing with the trends of the past five years, police arrests indicate that pro-IS networks in Indonesia still largely comprise of decentralised cells, with activities being unilaterally conducted by insulated local units that may consist of only one or two individuals. As a result, the number of arrested pro-IS individuals decreased relative to members of other terrorist organisations. Notably, in 2023, pro-IS individuals comprised 43.5 percent of all arrested terrorist suspects. In 2024, with just 11 pro-IS individuals arrested, they made up only 27.5 percent of all arrested terrorist suspects.
Similar to 2023, most pro-IS individuals who were arrested were unaffiliated to any organisation. Notably, out of the 11 pro-IS individuals arrested in 2024, only five were affiliated with JAD. Two of these JAD members were arrested in Bima, West Nusa Tenggara, in early September. One was a regional emir responsible for organising physical training and halaqah units (Quranic study circles) for members in Bima, West Sumbawa and Lombok.[viii] The second suspect was responsible for JAD cadre recruitment and physical training.[ix] Another cluster of three was arrested in Central Java in early November. One was arrested in Kudus, Central Java, and was suspected to have planned attacks. Another member was arrested in Karanganyar, Central Java, for spreading online propaganda for JAD. The last member was arrested in Demak, Central Java, for leading a JAD Quranic study circle.[x]
Besides JAD affiliates, six other pro-IS individuals were detained in unrelated arrests in Karawang, West Java; Kota Batu, East Java; Solo, Central Java; West Jakarta, Jakarta; and Bekasi, West Java, in 2024. Four of the suspects had made improvised explosive devices (IEDs), seemingly in preparation for an attack, though not in coordination with one another. The police reported that one suspect had planned a double suicide bombing against worship houses in Kota Batu, East Java. Another pro-IS suspect was arrested in Bekasi, West Java, after the police found his online comment which simply stated “Bomb!” in response to a post about Pope Francis’ visit to Istiqlal Mosque in September 2024.[xi] This latter arrest was made alongside six other arrests linked to Pope Francis’ visit. Importantly, the police reported that the suspects had no links to one another, and, besides the IS supporter, the remaining were not reported to be affiliated to a group.[xii]
Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah
Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS), a pro-Al-Qaeda (AQ) splinter group of Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), re-emerged on Indonesia’s threat horizon in 2024 after member Yudi Lukito Kurniawan was arrested in Gorontalo City, Gorontalo, in late August.[xiii] Indonesian police reported that Kurniawan was affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, where he had travelled to in January 2014.[xiv] While in Yemen, Kurniawan claimed to have received an order from a senior AQAP figure to target the Singapore stock exchange building as a form of attack against the “distant enemy”, referring to the United States (US) and its allies.[xv] The plot, however, was ultimately unsuccessful as he was deported by Singaporean authorities to Batam when he attempted to enter Singapore in 2015 via sea.
Kurniawan’s arrest followed the capture of seven JAS members in 2023, whom investigations revealed were linked to foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) activity in Yemen and Syria.[xvi] In response to these arrests, JAS released public statements denying they were involved in any form of terrorism.[xvii] However, a recent report by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) confirmed that at least seven JAS members, including Kurniawan, had travelled to Yemen in 2014 to train with AQAP, and that JAS had also facilitated other training contingents’ travels to Syria in 2014 and 2015.[xviii] It is important to note, however, that despite the existence of JAS’ global jihad programme, in practice, these international travels appeared to be driven more by the members’ desire to train as opposed to a top-down organisational initiative. Indeed, most JAS members who travelled to Yemen and Syria had nominated themselves to go.[xix]
While JAS does not pose as big a threat as other Islamist militant groups in Indonesia due to its smaller network size and lower propensity for conducting attacks – the arrests over the past year were the first instances of violent activity connected to JAS in its 10 years of existence – its strong community base and relationships with terrorist networks abroad indicate a need to continue monitoring the group’s future direction. Indeed, while JAS continues to claim that they are a non-violent Islamist organisation committed to social services, there has been speculation that JAS is still sending members abroad for jihad.[xx] JAS’ humanitarian organisation, Medis dan Aksi Kemanusiaan (Me-Dan), which was previously used as a cover for FTF travels, also remains active on social media platforms.[xxi]
Counter Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism
Counter Terrorism Developments
Indonesia’s counter terrorism capacities remained consistently high in 2024, as demonstrated by the absence of any successful terrorist attack throughout the year. However, the annual number of terrorist suspects arrested in Indonesia in 2024 was the lowest of the past five years. Whereas 131 terrorist suspects were apprehended in 2023, already reflecting a 47.1 percent decrease from the number of arrested terrorist suspects in 2022, only 40 terrorist suspects were arrested from January to November 2024. This marked a 69.4 percent decrease compared to 2023 and an 88.1 percent decrease from 2021, in which the highest number of arrests of the past five years occurred. These arrests largely targeted members of JI, constituting 47.5 percent of all arrests, as well as pro-IS individuals, accounting for 27.5 percent of all arrests.
This reduction in the number of arrests targeting terrorist suspects, however, does not necessarily signal a weakening of Indonesia’s counter terrorism capacities. Not only have existing operations, as mentioned above, successfully prevented all terrorist attacks throughout 2024, the authorities also managed to arrest individuals who held key positions in their respective networks and organisations. While counter terrorism operations only managed to arrest 19 JI members, for example, more than half of those arrested held important roles within the structure of JI’s Eastern Qodimah (regional subdivision) – including fund-raising, firearms procurement, training and assisting in the hiding of fugitive senior members.[xxii] Similarly, while counter terrorism operations only arrested two JAD members in 2024, one of them was responsible for recruitment and the other was a cell leader responsible for organising the group’s activities.[xxiii]
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Developments
In 2024, Indonesia completed the first term of it National Action Plan Against Extremism (RAN PE), covering the 2020-2024 period.[xxiv] A notable outcome of RAN PE has been the decentralisation of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) policies, as eight provinces – East Java, Central Java, West Java, Banten, Aceh, Lampung, South Kalimantan and Central Sulawesi – and eight districts[xxv] established Regional Action Plans for Preventing Extremism (RAD PE), while other areas are in the process of developing them.[xxvi] Information sharing and coordination between P/CVE stakeholders has also been boosted through the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT)’s online platform, the Indonesia Knowledge Hub (I-KHub).[xxvii] While these developments mark a significant improvement in the formulation and enforcement of P/CVE policies, programmes still face the challenges of being de-prioritised, uncoordinated and under-resourced.[xxviii] Civil society organisations (CSOs) have filled in some of the gaps in P/CVE infrastructure with over 440 initiatives between 2020 and 2022, underlining the “whole-of-government” and “whole-of-society” principles in Indonesia’s P/CVE approach. [xxix]
One upcoming challenge for P/CVE will be managing the return of Indonesians affiliated with FTFs – one of BNPT’s priorities for 2024.[xxx] Indonesia had implemented a moratorium on ex-ISI repatriation from Syria in 2020, but plans to recommence repatriation began in 2023 with the issuance of the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs’ Ministerial Decree No. 90/2023, which established a task force for managing overseas Indonesians associated with FTFs. The task force, which is led by the head of BNPT and includes 13 other ministerial-level bodies,[xxxi] is reportedly preparing to first repatriate children under 18, women and elderly men.[xxxii] The task force has formed subdivisions in line with the three phases of repatriation: Before Border, At Border and After Border, which largely represent the respective processes of data verification, individual screening, and finally law enforcement, rehabilitation and reintegration. Once repatriated, individuals are screened at the border for medical and psychological conditions as well as their degree of radicalisation. Confirmed participants of violence and terrorism are imprisoned, while others go to rehabilitation centres for up to one year. [xxxiii]
Outlook
Risk of JI Splinters
While JI’s senior members’ decision to disband is a welcome development, its long-term impact largely depends on whether the organisation’s members acquiesce. Most JI members, particularly those recruited during Para Wijayanto’s leadership, would likely support the decision as they would have had to undergo strict disciplinary programmes which would habituate them to follow the central leadership’s orders.[xxxiv] This is made more likely by the fact that multiple respected JI figures have also supported the decision.[xxxv] Indeed, as noted above, between July and September, over 4,000 JI members declared their support for the seniors’ decision to disband.[xxxvi] Moreover, senior JI figure Abu Rusydan also stated that JI’s four main divisions, namely, Tajhiz (logistics and training), ALWI (intelligence), Forum Komunikasi Pondok Pesantren (education) and 3T (dakwah), have also expressed support for the disbandment.[xxxvii]
There is, however, still a risk of some dissenting JI senior members disagreeing with the decision and splintering off. Notably, splinters are more likely to be formed by experienced group members, as splintering is a risky endeavour that militants would only choose to do if they believe they would be successful.[xxxviii] In the past, JI splinters were formed by high-ranking individuals, such as Al-Qaeda in the Malay Archipelago, which was formed by top recruiter and strategist, Noordin M Top.[xxxix] More recently, JI factions were also all initiated by senior members such as Imaruddin, who led a faction of his own to plan attacks against Chinese-Indonesian stores.[xl] Indeed, there have been some reports of members not wanting to disband in West Nusa Tenggara and South Sumatra.[xli] In Central Java, senior JI figure Usman bin Sef said the response has been 95 percent positive[xlii] – indicating some residual discontent with the disbandment move.
Inter-Organisational Terrorist Cooperation
The Abu Oemar network discovered in 2023 and investigated last year revealed the development of a multi-organisational terrorist network that had planned to attack Indonesia’s 2024 presidential election. In total, the network consisted of 194 members spread across 14 halaqah units in West Java, Jakarta and Banten. Most of the members were affiliated with an array of extremist milieus, including non-violent radical Islamic organisations like Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) as well as actual terrorist groups such as Darul Islam (DI), Khilafatul Muslimin (KM), Fikroh Abu Hamzah (FAH) and Anshor Daulah (AD) – the latter being the name used to reference pro-IS individuals who are unaffiliated to JAD. Interestingly, membership affiliations were often mixed within a single halaqah. Indeed, six of the 14 halaqah had members from more than one terrorist organisation.[xliii]
This development has highlighted the potential risk of cross-organisational terrorist cooperation in Indonesia. Indeed, the multi-affiliate nature of Abu Oemar’s network – notably consisting of both pro-IS groups such as AD and anti-IS groups such as DI – is rare. The last instance of such cooperation was seen in 2011 with Tanzim Aceh, when members from various terrorist organisations such as JI, Mujahidin KOMPAK and DI, along with militant Islamic groups like the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, or FPI), came together in Aceh for a year-long military training programme.[xliv] Moreover, the network’s diverse affiliations was only made possible due to Abu Oemar’s charismatic personality and his extensive social ties, which crossed traditional organisational boundaries.[xlv] That said, Abu Oemar’s network does highlight that such cross-organisational cooperation is possible under specific circumstances and thus should be closely monitored.
Repatriation
In May 2024, BNPT formally submitted a proposal to President Joko Widodo to recommence repatriation of around 400 Indonesian citizens residing in the Syrian camps.[xlvi] As of now, no decision has been announced by the President. Possibly hampering the policy implementation is a change in leadership in BNPT – former head Rycko Amelza Dahniel retired in September 2024 and was replaced by Eddy Hartono.[xlvii]
There are two main challenges concerning the repatriation process. The first, related to the Before Border phase, is verifying the data of Indonesians stuck in Syria, as many no longer have identity documents.[xlviii] The second is ensuring there is sufficient space and capability for the returnees’ deradicalisation and rehabilitation, as the centre in charge of the After Border process has not yet been determined.[xlix] One option is the Handayani Center, which, together with the Protection House and Trauma Center (RPTC), was responsible for the rehabilitation of IS returnees in the past. However, officials have voiced concerns that the Handayani Center is not equipped to handle highly radicalised individuals.[l] Back in 2017, two individuals rehabilitated at Handayani, Khalid Abu Bakar and Anggi, joined JAD groups to plot attacks shortly after their release.[li] An integrated policy which brings in the rehabilitation expertise of more experienced agencies, such as BNPT’s Deradicalisation Center or CSOs that are part of the C-SAVE (Civil Society Against Violent Extremism) Indonesia network, is thus needed.[lii]
About the Authors
Alif Satria and Adlini Ilma Ghaisany Sjah are Associate Research Fellows with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. They can be reached at [email protected] and [email protected], respectively.
Thumbnail photo by Krisna Azie on Unsplash
Citations
[i] Alif Satria, “Indonesia,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2024), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/counter-terrorist-trends-and-analyses-ctta-volume-16-issue-01/.
[ii] Adlini Ilma Ghaisany Sjah, “Central Sulawesi and Central Java Continue to be JI Strongholds,” The Diplomat, June 14, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/06/central-sulawesi-and-central-java-continue-to-be-ji-strongholds/.
[iii] Tim Lajnah is a contingency JI leadership structure established by Arif Siswanto following the arrest of Para Wijayanto. The team’s main responsibility is to appoint a new leader and act as a caretaker of the organisation until such a leader is appointed.
[iv] Arif Siswanto was mentioned in the video under his alias Abu Mahmudah.
[v] Rizky Armanda, “Breaking News: Seratusan Eks Anggota Jamaah Islamiyah di Riau Deklarasi Pembubaran, Kembali ke NKRI,” Tribun Pekanbaru, September 26, 2024, https://pekanbaru.tribunnews.com/2024/09/26/breaking-news-seratusan-eks-anggota-jamaah-islamiyah-di-riau-deklarasi-pembubaran-kembali-ke-nkri.
[vi] Gita Irawan, “EKSKLUSIF: Eks Bos Jamaah Islamiyah Ungkap Bahan Peledak dan DPO Telah Diserahkan ke Densus 88,” TribunNews, September 16, 2024, https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2024/09/16/eksklusif-eks-bos-jamaah-islamiyah-ungkap-bahan-peledak-dan-dpo-telah-diserahkan-ke-densus-88.
[vii] Satria, “Indonesia.”
[viii] Arnol Saudila, “Densus 88 Antiteror Polri Tangkap Dua Teroris JAD Bima,” Radio Republik Indonesia, September 7, 2024, https://www.rri.co.id/nabire/kriminalitas/964067/densus-88-antiteror-polri-tangkap-dua-teroris-jad-bima.
[ix] Ibid.
[x] Dede Leni Mardianti, “Densus 88 Sebut Terduga Teroris JAD yang Ditangkap Kemungkinan Bertambah,” Tempo, November 6, 2024, https://www.tempo.co/arsip/densus-88-sebut-terduga-teroris-jad-yang-ditangkap-kemungkinan-bertambah-1164877.
[xi] The complete comment was “..BBBOOOΜΜΜ…!!!” See Ady Anugrahadi, “Amankan 7 Terduga Pelaku Teror Saat Paus Fransiskus Datang, Densus 88 Temukan Logo ISIS,” Liputan 6, September 6, 2024, https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/5695443/amankan-7-terduga-pelaku-teror-saat-paus-fransiskus-datang-densus-88-temukan-logo-isis.
[xii] Kiki Safitri and Dani Prabowo, “Fakta Penangkapan 7 Pelaku Teror Paus Fransiskus: Bergerak Sendiri, Ditangkap di Lokasi Berbeda,” Kompas, September 6, 2024, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/09/06/23101521/fakta-penangkapan-7-pelaku-teror-paus-fransiskus-bergerak-sendiri-ditangkap.
[xiii] Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, “Indonesia Arrests Terrorist Who Had Planned to Attack Singapore in 2014,” The Straits Times, September 5, 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-arrests-terrorist-who-had-planned-to-attack-singapore-in-2014.
[xiv] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Indonesians with Al-Qaeda in Yemen,” IPAC Report, No. 95 (2024), p. 8.
[xv] Soeriaatmadja, “Indonesia Arrests Terrorist”; Stefani Wijaya, “Indonesian Terror Suspect YLK Targeted Singapore Stock Exchange in 2014,” The Jakarta Globe, September 3, 2024, https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesian-terror-suspect-ylk-targeted-singapore-stock-exchange-in-2014.
[xvi] “Polri Ungkap 142 Tersangka Teroris JAD, JAS, JI dan NII di Tahun 2023,” Media Hub Humas Polri, December 20, 2023, https://mediahub.polri.go.id/image/detail/33978-polri-ungkap-142-tersangka-teroris-jad-jas-ji-dan-nii-di-tahun-2023; Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Indonesians with Al-Qaeda.”
[xvii] “Press Release: Tersangka Terorisme yang Ditangkap di Gorontalo Bukan Anggota Jamaah Ansharu Syariah,” Jamaah Ansharu Syariah, September 7, 2024, https://ansharusyariah.com/press-release-tersangka-terorisme-yang-ditangkap-di-gorontalo-bukan-anggota-jamaah-ansharu-syariah/.
[xviii] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Indonesians with Al-Qaeda,” pp. 8-9.
[xix] ICPVTR internal report.
[xx] Noor Huda Ismail, “Disbandment of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Impact on Militant Groups,” RSIS Commentary, No. 129 (2024), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/disbandment-of-jemaah-islamiyah-the-impact-on-militant-groups/.
[xxi] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Indonesians with Al-Qaeda,” p. 9; Forum Me-Dan’s Facebook page has 3,600 followers and the last post was on August 28, 2024.
[xxii] “Densus 88 Kembali Tangkap 2 Terduga Teroris Terkait Kasus di Solo Raya,” CNN Indonesia, January 31, 2024, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20240131115905-12-1056637/densus-88-kembali-tangkap-2-terduga-teroris-terkait-kasus-di-solo-raya.
[xxiii] Saudila, “Densus 88 Antiteror.”
[xxiv] “Implementasi RAN PE Pertama Berjalan Baik, BNPT Berikan Apresiasi Kepada Pemangku Kepentingan Dalam RAN PE Awards 2024,” Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT), August 20, 2024, https://www.bnpt.go.id/implementasi-ran-pe-pertama-berjalan-baik-bnpt-berikan-apresiasi-kepada-pemangku-kepentingan-dalam-ran-pe-awards-2024.
[xxv] This includes the Central Lampung district, Lampung; Surakarta city, Central Java; Bandung city, West Java; Bandung district, West Java; Garut city, West Java; Bogor district, West Java; Purwakarta district, West Java; and Sukoharjo district, Central Java.
[xxvi] Laporan RAN PE 2023 (Jakarta: Sekretariat Bersama RAN PE, 2023), p. 4, https://base.api.ikhub.org/assets/Organisasi/5fb83920-7bb0-4248-8b2a-3ab1164fea06/files/Sekretariat_Bersama_RAN_PE-Laporan_RAN_PE_2023.pdf.
[xxvii] Cameron Sumpter, “Decentralising and Coordinating P/CVE through the Indonesia Knowledge Hub (I-KHub),” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 16, No. 4 (2024), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/ctta-newsarticle/decentralising-and-coordinating-p-cve-through-the-indonesia-knowledge-hub-i-khub/.
[xxviii] Ibid.
[xxix] Utami Nurhasanah, “K-Hub PCVE Outlook #1: Melacak Dampak OMS PCVE di Indonesia,” KHub, 2023, https://khub.id/outlook/melacakdampak.
[xxx] “BNPT Ungkap Komitmen Lindungi Perempuan, Anak, dan Remaja di Rakernas 2024,” Kompas TV, February 20, 2024, https://www.kompas.tv/advertorial/487034/bnpt-ungkap-komitmen-lindungi-perempuan-anak-dan-remaja-di-rakernas-2024.
[xxxi] The 13 ministries/agencies are the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Law and Human Rights Ministry, the Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection Ministry, the Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces, the Attorney-General, the Head of Police, the Head of the State Intelligence Agency, the Head of PPATK and the Secretary-General of LPSK.
[xxxii] Julie Chernov Hwang, “Failure Is Not an Option: Indonesia’s Repatriation Program,” The Soufan Center Intelbrief, August 22, 2024, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-august-22/.
[xxxiii] Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT), 7 Program Prioritas Tahun 2024 (Bogor: BNPT, 2024), p. 27, https://base.api.ikhub.org/assets/Organisasi/34edee04-2bb4-4e0a-93fa-dacc076e0665/files/Badan_Nasional_Penanggulangan_Terorisme-E-Book_7_Program_Prioritas_BNPT.pdf; Chernov Hwang, “Failure Is Not an Option.”
[xxxiv] Alif Satria, “Indonesian Terrorist Group Jemaah Islamiyah Lays Down Arms,” East Asia Forum, September 13, 2024, https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/09/13/indonesian-terrorist-group-jemaah-islamiyah-lays-down-arms/.
[xxxv] Reza Gustav Pradana, “Tobat Massal Ratusan Anggota JI di Kabupaten Semarang, Pernah Latihan Militer di Timur Tengah,” TribunBanyumas, September 13, 2024, https://banyumas.tribunnews.com/2024/09/13/tobat-massal-ratusan-anggota-ji-di-kabupaten-semarang-pernah-latihan-militer-di-timur-tengah; Mutia Yuantisya, “Petinggi dan Ratusan Anggota Jamaah Islamiyah Ikrar Kembali Setia ke NKRI,” Tempo, September 8, 2024, https://video.tempo.co/read/39303/petinggi-dan-ratusan-anggota-jamaah-islamiyah-ikrar-kembali-setia-ke-nkri.
[xxxvi] Armanda, “Breaking News: Seratusan.”
[xxxvii] Gita Irawan, “Eksklusif Eks Pendiri Jamaah Islamiyah: 4 Organisasi Besar di Bawah Pusat Terhubung ke Densus 88,” TribunNews, September 17, 2024, https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2024/09/17/ekslusif-eks-pendiri-jamaah-islamiyah-4-organisasi-besar-di-bawah-pusat-terhubung-ke-densus-88; Fariz Fardianto, “Ikut Arahan Senior, Ratusan Anggota Alwi Jamaah Islamiyah Bubarkan Diri,” IDN Times Jateng, September 12, 2024, https://jateng.idntimes.com/news/jateng/fariz-fardianto/ikut-arahan-senior-ratusan-anggota-alwi-jamaah-islamiyah-bubarkan-diri.
[xxxviii] Kaitlyn Robinson and Iris Malone, “Militant Splinter Groups and the Use of Violence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 68, No. 2-3 (2024), pp. 9-10.
[xxxix] Ibid., p. 26; Zachary Abuza, “JI’s Moneyman and Top Recruiter: A Profile of Noordin Mohammad Top,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Focus, Vol. 3, No. 29 (2006), https://jamestown.org/program/jis-moneyman-and-top-recruiter-a-profile-of-noordin-mohammad-top/.
[xl] Verdict of Usman Bin Sef alias Fahim alias Sobron alias Abu Umar Bin Hedar, West Jakarta District Court, 2022, No. 950/Pid.Sus/2021/PN Jkt.Brt, pp. 10-12; Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Decline of ISIS in Indonesia and the Emergence of New Cells,” IPAC Report, No. 69 (2021), pp. 16-19.
[xli] Mutia Yuantisya, “Eks Pimpinan Jamaah Islamiyah Akui Ada Anggota yang Menolak Bubarkan Diri dan Kembali ke NKRI,” Tempo, September 9, 2024, https://satu.tempo.co/hukum/eks-pimpinan-jamaah-islamiyah-akui-ada-anggota-yang-menolak-bubarkan-diri-dan-kembali-ke-nkri-42180; M Imam Pramana, “56 Mantan Anggota Jamaah Islamiyah di Sumsel Ikrar ke NKRI,” ANTARA News, September 20, 2024, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/4346995/56-mantan-anggota-jamaah-islamiyah-di-sumsel-ikrar-ke-nkri.
[xlii] Merawati Sunantri, “Jamaah Islamiyah Klaten Resmi Bubar, 500 Anggota Gelar Deklarasi,” Suara Merdeka Solo, August 12, 2024, https://solo.suaramerdeka.com/solo-raya/0513320506/jamaah-islamiyah-klaten-resmi-bubar-500-anggota-gelar-deklarasi.
[xliii] Based on ICPVTR research.
[xliv] Julie Chernov Hwang and Kirsten E Schulze, “Indonesian Jihadi Training Camps: Home and Away,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2024), p. 12; International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh,” Asia Report, No. 189 (2010), p. 7.
[xlv] Yandi M Rofiyandi, “Silsilah Pelaku Teror Solo,” Tempo, September 4, 2012.
[xlvi] The exact number of Indonesians in Syria’s IS camps vary between reports. The Deputy for BNPT’s Law Enforcement Division Police Inspector General Ibnu Suhaendra mentioned in May 2024 that there were 375 verified Indonesians in Syria’s IS camps. A report from academic Julie Chernov Hwang mentioned in August 2024 that there were at least 493 Indonesian in Syria’s al-Hol and al-Roj camps. See Rio Feisal, “BNPT Sebut Telah Usulkan Repatriasi WNI Terasosiasi FTF ke Presiden,” ANTARA News, May 16, 2024, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/4106856/bnpt-sebut-telah-usulkan-repatriasi-wni-terasosiasi-ftf-ke-presiden; Chernov Hwang, “Failure Is Not an Option.”
[xlvii] Kiki Safitri and Ihsanuddin, “Resmi Jabat Kepala BNPT, Ini Profil Irjen Eddy Hartono,” Kompas, September 11, 2024, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/09/11/09561591/resmi-jabat-kepala-bnpt-ini-profil-irjen-eddy-hartono.
[xlviii] Chernov Hwang, “Failure Is Not an Option.”
[xlix] Ibid.
[l] Humas Sentra Handayani Jakarta, “Sentra Handayani dan BNPT Persiapkan Repatriasi Anak Korban Radikalisme di Camp Suriah,” Kementerian Sosial Republik Indonesia, October 25, 2023, https://kemensos.go.id/sentra-handayani-dan-bnpt-persiapkan-repatriasi-anak-korban-radikalisme-di-camp-suriah.
[li] IPAC, “Managing Indonesia’s Pro-ISIS Deportees,” IPAC Report, No. 47 (2018), p. 11.
[lii] Chernov Hwang, “Failure Is Not an Option.”
