India
In 2024, India’s threat landscape varied significantly, depending on the types of conflict actors involved. Despite India’s claim of reduced insurgent activity, violent incidents concentrated within the Hindu-dominated Jammu region of Indian Kashmir surged, even after the loss of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in assembly elections in October 2024. Nonetheless, violent incidents were lower compared to previous periods of tension, such as the early 2000s and mid-2010s. Similarly, jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and the Islamic State (IS) failed to gain traction during 2024, continuing with their inability to garner support in India despite propaganda to recruit Indians. While a few cells of these groups were disrupted by the Indian security agencies, their irrelevance was evident through their lack of operations and major threat profiles. As a final point, Hindu extremist activities remained at a high level, with several incidents of hate speech against Muslims before the Indian general election (May 2024) leading to several mob lynching incidents in the July-October period.
Trends
Kashmir
2024 marked five years since the ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) revoked Jammu and Kashmir’s special status, splitting the region into two separate states and downgrading Kashmir to a union territory. Part of the stated reason for taking such steps was to reduce insurgency in the region, which has long witnessed armed rebellions and skirmishes to gain independence.[1] However, despite Prime Minister Narendra Modi claiming that the infrastructure of Kashmir-focused insurgent organisations had been dismantled and that there was a marked reduction in violent incidents from a peak of 222 incidents in 2014 to a low of 23 attacks in 2024,[2] tensions are far from over. In fact, 2024 witnessed the emergence of a new trend where insurgent groups targeted the Hindu-majority region of Jammu at a proportionally greater rate than attacks in the Muslim-majority Kashmir. These incidents included several attacks on combatants and non-combatants. Notably, most of these attacks took place in northern Jammu, where Hindus are in a minority, though in larger proportions than in Kashmir.[3]
In addition, following assembly elections in the region in September and October of 2024 (where the BJP lost to the National Conference party), there were further rashes of attacks in the region.[4] Thus, while there may have been some hopes for peace with the loss of the BJP, the situation continues to be unstable. One prominent attack resulted in the death of several construction workers building an infrastructure project which was key to better connectivity of military troops in the region.[5]
Jihadist Groups
For India, 2024 saw the 10-year anniversary of the formation of Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and the Islamic State (IS). Both groups have largely been unsuccessful in launching attacks within India, barring a few minor incidents. In June, AQIS regained prominence when a group of individuals, suspected of being influenced by the group, were arrested in the northern state of Jharkhand. According to police officials, AQIS was planning to “revive the caliphate” and perpetrate terrorist attacks across India. While the revival of the caliphate is a questionable intention given the scope of reviving such a vast political institution, the group was also found to be in possession of several arms and ammunition, thus raising their threat profile. According to the police, these individuals had also received weapons training in India, thereby demonstrating AQIS is still recruiting in India offline.[6]
Troublingly for India, AQIS released a statement in its official magazine praising the fall of Bangladesh’s former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, a key ally of India, who resigned abruptly in the wake of student protests. This is particularly concerning for India since Sheikh Hasina’s cooperation led to the crackdown on several insurgent groups, such as Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), operating along the India-Bangladesh border.[7] After her fall, India is still observing the aftermath. Without a strong joint border protection strategy in place, the country could see more insurgents infiltrating the border and launching attacks. Furthermore, the release of the ABT’s former leader Jashimuddin Rahmani, who had previously plotted and launched attacks on India, was also a concerning development.
IS, however, had a far smaller footprint than AQIS in India during 2024. The group did employ anti-India rhetoric in its magazines, such as the Voice of Khorasan and Serat ul Haq (Path of Righteousness), much of which has also been translated into other Indian languages, such as Malayalam.[8] While a few Sri Lankans who had pledged allegiance to IS were arrested in India, no significant activity linked to the group was observed.[9] This could be because of extensive action conducted towards the end of December 2023, when the National Investigation Agency (NIA) claimed to have dismantled all remaining IS cells in the country.[10]
Hindu Right-Wing Extremism
The 2024 general election, which resulted in a loss of seats for the BJP, led to the formation of a coalition government at the centre. Following the BJP’s less-than-impressive electoral performance, many observers thought that this would curb the confidence of Hindu right-wing groups. However, as several incidents and trends demonstrated, this was not the case. First, despite a lull in incidents of cow vigilantism, there was an uptick in cases beginning in June 2024, whereby several Muslims in the northern part of India were lynched on suspicions of illegally transporting beef.[11] One incident in New Delhi involved cow vigilantes mistaking a Hindu boy for a Muslim and shooting him for allegedly carrying beef. They later apologised after realising that he was not a Muslim.[12] Dozens of these incidents took place in India from June 2024 onwards, demonstrating that this issue still carries a strong potential for anti-Muslim violence. As argued by political commentators like Apoorvanand Jha, the increased incidences of violence could denote the Hindu right wing’s frustrations towards Muslims for voting against the BJP.[13]
Another trend that emerged in 2024 was the spread of significant anti-Muslim propaganda in Bangladesh, primarily propagated online by Indian right-wing groups. Several accounts in India were accused of spreading fake news regarding Muslim atrocities against Hindus in Bangladesh following Sheikh Hasina’s ouster.[14] Although this disinformation was subsequently corrected by several fact-checking websites, it was not enough to prevent retaliatory attacks on Muslims in India by right-wing vigilantes.[15] At least a few retaliatory attacks for perceived injustices against Bangladeshi Hindus were recorded, where well-known vigilantes attacked slum dwellers, having mistakenly identified them as Bangladeshis.
Response
One of the security challenges in Jammu is the lack of sufficient army troops. Because much of the army has been redeployed to areas bordering China since the 2020 India-China border skirmishes, the Indian army has faced difficulties in managing the insurgent attacks in Jammu.[16] Reportedly, this is partly due to a level of laxity among the armed forces in Kashmir, since historically fewer attacks have occurred in the region.[17]
Despite the abovementioned gaps, the army has adopted several tactics to engage with the insurgents in the region. First, it has attempted to redeploy troops to the region to boost manpower. Second, it has begun to arm villagers in various parts of Jammu. This initiative is named the Village Defense Guards (VDG), and is an established strategy that was first adopted in the 1990s.[18] However, there are concerns that these groups may abuse their authority, given that around 220 cases were filed against such groups in the past for human rights violations, murder, rape and violently settling family disputes. As such, this strategy may deter militants in the future, but its benefits may be outweighed by the potential problems if villagers were to engage in violence among themselves.
Due to the jihadist groups’ presence in India, the NIA and other security organisations are constantly monitoring their developments in the country. This is reflected in the multiple arrests of Sri Lankan IS members and AQIS operatives across North India. It is also likely that the intelligence agencies will be keeping a close eye on the India-Bangladesh border to ensure that groups like the ABT and JMB do not take advantage of the weakened border security to make inroads into India.
Hindu right-wing extremists are often not provided the same level of attention by government authorities as Kashmiri insurgents or jihadist groups. For most observers, BJP leaders have played a role in fanning anti-Muslim hatred and emboldening Hindu right-wing groups. Several watchdogs pointed to the rising levels of hate speech before the 2024 general election, which ultimately led to post-election violence.[19] Some arrests have taken place in a few of the lynching incidents.[20] However, the fact that many of the vigilantes themselves recorded the lynching incidents demonstrates their confidence in avoiding arrests for their crimes. Despite this, it is essential for the government to ensure that these groups are arrested, given that they have the potential to perpetrate crimes affecting the very basis of India’s law and order.
Outlook
Regardless of the reduction in violent incidents in Kashmir, the government’s claims of normalcy are questionable given the persistence of violent incidents. These attacks are not a military issue but rather a political response to the disenfranchisement of the region, the high unemployment rate (18 percent as opposed to the national average of eight percent) and several mega-infrastructure projects which threaten village geographies. Government excesses in governing the region (through force) have increased the trust deficit between India and the local population.[21] While a military response may help stem the flow of attacks, without addressing these genuine grievances politically, the government cannot hope to completely curb militancy in Jammu and Kashmir. With the National Conference (NC) party coming to power after the October 2024 assembly elections,[22] it remains to be seen how much its governance can influence the situation positively. If the Kashmiri people feel that the NC is able to accord them some rights, there may be a reduction in attacks over time. However, if they feel like the Indian central government is still casting a shadow over Kashmiri local politics, the chances of attacks may be higher.
Groups like IS and AQIS are largely defunct in India, regardless of the media attention given to them. Despite some propaganda noise created by AQIS and IS, the groups have little operational strength due to Muslims’ rejection of these groups’ underlying ideology as well as the strong ability of the Indian government to neutralise cells inspired or created by them. In all likelihood, the trajectory of these groups will continue to remain the same unless a significant event changes the current security equilibrium. The main area of threat, however, will likely be any militant group entering India from across the Bangladesh border, since this can set the stage to restore some level of jihadist activity in India. This potential will likely be curbed by strong measures taken by the Indian government, resulting from decades of experience of dealing with such groups.
It is unlikely that India will also see major decreases in Islamophobic incidents by Hindu right-wing groups given the government’s ability to capitalise on the polarisation resulting from these groups’ actions. Given the consistent pattern of hate speech directed at Muslims by BJP politicians, it is probable that these trends will continue in the near future.
About the Author
Mohammed Sinan Siyech is a doctoral scholar from the University of Edinburgh. He also teaches politics at King’s College and the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London. He was previously a Senior Analyst at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He has written and taught extensively on security and politics in South Asia and the Middle East.
Citations
[1] Iymon Majid, “Violence and insurgency in Kashmir: Understanding the Micropolitics,” India Review, Vol. 21, No. 4 (2022), pp. 576-598.
[2] “Jammu and Kashmir Voter Turnout Improves After Terror Attacks Drop to 23 in 2024, From 222 in 2014,” The Economic Times, September 30, 2024, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/elections/assembly-elections/jammu-kashmir/jammu-and-kashmir-voter-turnout-improves-after-terror-attacks-drop-to-23-in-2024-from-222-in-2014/articleshow/113807649.cms.
[3] “‘New Wave’: Why Suspected Rebel Attacks Are Rising in Kashmir’s Jammu Area,” Al Jazeera, August 1, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/1/new-wave-why-suspected-rebel-attacks-are-spiking-in-kashmirs-jammu-area.
[4] Mir Ehsan, “2 Soldiers Among 4 Killed in Terror Attack on Army Trucks in Jammu and Kashmir,” Hindustan Times, October 25, 2024, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/4-killed-in-terror-attack-on-army-trucks-in-jk-101729796118156.html.
[5] Bashaarat Masood, “What Is the Z-Morh Project in Kashmir, Where 7 Were Killed by Militants?” The Indian Express, October 23, 2024, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/what-is-the-z-morh-project-kashmir-attack-9630983/.
[6] Ajit Kumar Singh, “India: Global Terror and Failure to Launch – Analysis,” The Eurasia Review, August 26, 2024, https://www.eurasiareview.com/26082024-india-global-terror-and-failure-to-launch-analysis/.
[7] Shuriah Niazi, “India, Bangladesh Vow to Jointly Combat Terrorism, Extremism,” Anadolu Agency, September 7, 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/india-bangladesh-vow-to-jointly-combat-terrorism-extremism/2679000.
[8] Mona Thakkar, “ISKP and Digital Propaganda: An Escalating Anti-India Media Warfare,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology (GNET) Insights, May 22, 2024, https://gnet-research.org/2024/05/22/iskp-and-digital-propaganda-an-escalating-anti-india-media-warfare/.
[9] Kabir Taneja, “The Curious Case of Pro-ISIS Movements Between India and Sri Lanka,” Observer Research Foundation, June 13, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-curious-case-of-pro-isis-movements-between-india-and-sri-lanka.
[10] Animesh Roul, “NIA Dismantles Remaining Islamic State Cells in India,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 22, No. 4 (2024), https://jamestown.org/program/nia-dismantles-remaining-islamic-state-cells-in-india/.
[11] Nadim Asrar, “What Killing of Hindu Teen by India Cow Vigilantes Tells Us About Modi 3.0,” Al Jazeera, September 6, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/6/what-killing-of-hindu-teen-by-india-cow-vigilantes-tells-us-about-modi-3-0.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Haris Zargar, “India: Why Muslim Lynchings Continue Unabated in Modi’s Third Term,” Middle East Eye, August 12, 2024, https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/india-modi-third-time-muslim-lynchings-continue-unabated-why.
[14] Abdul Basit, “Agent Provocateurs: Online Hindutva Groups’ Misinformation Campaign Amid Bangladesh’s Political Crisis,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology (GNET), October 8, 2024, https://gnet-research.org/2024/10/08/agent-provocateurs-online-hindutva-groups-misinformation-campaign-amid-bangladeshs-political-crisis/.
[15] Alishan Jafri, “Hindutva Group Attacks Muslims in Ghaziabad Shanties to Avenge Anti-Hindu Violence in Bangladesh,” The Wire, August 10, 2024, https://thewire.in/communalism/hindutva-group-attacks-muslims-in-ghaziabads-shanties-to-avenge-anti-hindu-violence-in-bangladesh.
[16] Al Jazeera, “’New Wave: Why Suspected Rebel Attacks Are Rising in Kashmir’s Jammu Area.”
[17] Ibid.
[18] ‘Why India’s Revival of Civil Militias in Kashmir Is Raising Fears’, Al Jazeera, March 13, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/13/why-indias-revival-of-civil-militias-in-kashmir-is-raising-fears.
[19] “India: Hate Speech Fueled Modi’s Election Campaign,” Human Rights Watch, August 14, 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/08/14/india-hate-speech-fueled-modis-election-campaign.
[20] “Five Arrested in Haryana for Lynching Man on Suspicion of Eating Beef,” Hindustan Times, August 31, 2024, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/five-arrested-in-haryana-for-lynching-man-on-suspicion-of-eating-beef-101725097855875.html.
[21] Anuradha Bhasin, “Kashmir, Five Years On,” Foreign Policy, September 19, 2024.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/09/19/india-kashmir-pakistan-china-narendra-modi-terrorism/.
[22] Fahad Shah, “The Party Promising Kashmiri Statehood Wins an Election,” The Nation, October 22, 2024, https://www.thenation.com/article/world/jammu-kashmir-national-conference-election-autonomy/.
