Global Threat Landscape in 2024
This overview will selectively draw upon the detailed regional analyses in the current volume, to cover the following three broad themes: significant global developments and trends; notable operational trends and developments; and, finally, the enduring salience of a holistic, integrated approach in dealing with violent extremism.
Significant Global Developments and Trends
Israel’s War with the “Axis of Resistance” and the Wider Repercussions
By the first anniversary of the October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, the strongly right-wing government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had aggressively taken the fight to the so-called Axis of Resistance (AOR) forces backed by Iran. Apart from Hamas in Gaza, the AOR comprises other armed groups such as Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, the Houthis based in Yemen and “various Shi’ite Muslim armed groups in Iraq and Syria”.[1] Despite numerous strategic AOR leadership losses at the hands of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), the armed groups remained resilient. Hence, rocket and drone attacks by Hamas, Hezbollah and their Houthi AOR allies “have yet to subside in the wake of these key losses” despite “continued Israeli assaults on both groups”.[2] Nevertheless, the IDF’s leadership decapitation strategy clearly weakened AOR “command structures”, prompting suggestions that the Axis “faces an unclear future”.[3] Reinforcing this sense of an Axis under significant stress was the sudden collapse in early December of the AOR-affiliated Assad regime in Syria, in the face of an onslaught spearheaded by a rebel coalition led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – a jihadist group previously linked with both Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS). At the time of writing, this was a fast-evolving situation warranting close watching in 2025.[4]
Beyond Syria, the wider psychological effect of the IDF attacks on Hamas and Hezbollah was the further sharpening of anti-Israel sentiment in the larger Muslim world. Both groups saw “their messaging and their worldviews mainstreamed in the wake of the conflict”.[5] The Israel-AOR conflict certainly sparked considerable online debate in Southeast Asia, “with many users in the region expressing sympathies for Hamas” as a “legitimate resistance movement”; the conflict also fuelled both “anti-Semitic tropes” and “Islamophobic sentiments”.[6] In Singapore, a 33-year-old former public servant was hauled up by the authorities for actively participating in several pro-AOR online forums and promoting “violence against Jews and Israelis”.[7]
The Resilient Global and Regional Challenge of the Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda (AQ)
In 2024, the resilient global and regional challenge posed by both IS and its older Sunni Islamist ideological rival AQ was apparent. Both networks experienced “strategic successes” in Central Asia and in Sub-Saharan Africa, with AQ restarting training camps in Taliban-run Afghanistan. At the same time, IS launched “persistent attacks across the Sahel and West Africa”.[8] The expansion of IS across Africa highlighted its capacity for “strategic adaptation” and its ability to “leverage local conflicts and weak governance to consolidate power”.[9] While targeted strikes by the United States (US), Turkey and Iraq may “have likely tempered” some IS capabilities in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region,[10] on the whole, there was still a noticeable “uptick in IS attacks in Syria since March 2024”.[11]
The Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK)
Notably, the IS affiliate operating in Afghanistan, the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK), concerningly expanded its international operational footprint. ISK remained active in Afghanistan itself, engaging in small but bloody guerrilla attacks against what it considers an apostate Taliban regime, as well as in assassinations, particularly of Shia civilians. ISK seemed keen to “generate, through the media, the impression of a powerful organisation that can hit anywhere”.[12] While most ISK-linked attacks since 2015 have targeted Afghanistan and Pakistan, it has also more recently “conducted attacks in Moscow, Iran and Turkey”.[13] Additionally, the thwarted terror plots in India in May 2024 suggest additional evidence of ISK’s transnational aspirations.[14] Operational coordination between IS and ISK was also observed in the Crocus City Hall attack in Russia in March 2024, which killed 150 civilians. While ISK did not explicitly claim the attack, internal sources confirmed that “it was involved alongside the central organisation of IS”.[15] Closer ISK cooperation with the IS central structure – and other branches of IS, such as “the Turkish, Syrian and Iraqi branches” – is thus another concerning trend. Thus far, ISK’s international operations have been directed by “IS central, which presumably has little interest in ISK gaining autonomy”.[16]
The Central Asian Factor
ISK and IS notably attempted to recruit Central Asians for operations both within and beyond Afghanistan. ISK carried out several attacks within Afghanistan using its Central Asian fighters.[17] At the same time, for external attacks outside Afghanistan, ISK relied on Central Asian members based in Turkey and “on Central Asian cells that it coordinates with remotely from north-eastern Afghanistan”.[18] In early 2024, for instance, Tehran uncovered a major ISK network in the country, spanning Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, involving Afghans and Tajiks. In 2024, Central Asian nationals – largely Uzbeks and Tajiks – were “responsible for some of the major terrorist attacks carried out in multiple countries in the Middle East, Asia and Europe, most of them claimed by IS and also ISK.[19] The aforementioned March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack in Russia was executed by a “four-member IS cell of Tajik citizens”.[20]
The IS Footprint in Africa and South and Southeast Asia
In 2024, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) maintained a potent presence in north-eastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin. The Islamic State Sahel Province (IS-Sahel) reportedly intensified efforts to consolidate its strength in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, while the Islamic State Sinai Province (IS-SP) launched attacks on Egyptian security forces. In essence, the emergence of these IS provinces demonstrated a “strategic shift from centralised operations in the Middle East to more decentralised, localised insurgencies across Africa”, where IS embedded itself in the region by “integrating with or absorbing pre-existing groups and exploiting regional instabilities”.[21]
In Bangladesh, the Islamic State Bengal, or Neo-JMB, remained a key threat in 2024, “notwithstanding disruptions to its operations, especially since the 2016 Dhaka Holey Artisan Bakery attack”.[22] A key reason was the ouster of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who resigned abruptly in the wake of student protests.[23] Sheikh Hasina’s cooperation had helped Indian security forces crack down on IS-linked Bangladeshi militant groups operating along the India-Bangladesh border.[24] IS’ strategic intentions for Bangladesh were made very clear in a September 2024 editorial in its al-Naba newsletter, which called for the establishment in Bangladesh of “governance based on Islamic law”, while urging “Bangladeshi youth” to “reject tyranny and take collective action against injustices.[25]
In Indonesia, Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), Indonesia’s largest pro-IS network, and “other pro-IS individuals” remained unable to decisively rebuild “their operational capacities following the mass arrests of key leaders in 2018”.[26] Pro-IS networks in Indonesia still largely took the form of “decentralised cells, with activities being unilaterally conducted by insulated local units” comprising one or two individuals.[27] Given the discussion above, it is worth noting that in recent times, IS-related Central Asian jihadist signatures have been detected in Southeast Asia. In March 2023, Indonesian authorities detained four Uzbek citizens associated with the Syria-based Katibat al-Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ). While KTJ is linked to AQ, these four Uzbeks had “met with an Indonesian ISIS sympathiser” who suggested they become religious teachers to encourage individuals to travel abroad to support IS. Given the growing global IS-Central Asian nexus, potential further IS-Central Asian jihadist activity in Southeast Asia is not improbable.[28]
AQ’s African and South and Southeast Asian Affiliates
In 2024, the AQ-affiliated Al-Shabaab continued to “exert control over parts of south and central Somalia”, despite ongoing counter terrorism efforts by Somali forces and international allies. At the same time, another AQ affiliate, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM), a “prominent jihadist group” based in Mali and operating in Burkina Faso and Niger, remained active. These AQ affiliates successfully exploited “political grievances” and “local clan dynamics” to remain resilient.[29]
Since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, the country has once again become a sanctuary for terrorist strikes against its neighbours.[30] The Taliban regime has provided sanctuaries to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other like-minded militant groups to plan and execute attacks inside Pakistan, in a quest to create a “Taliban-like theocracy” there.[31] In this connection, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) was “almost exclusively busy supporting the TTP in Pakistan” by providing advisors and training.[32] AQIS did not confine its focus to Pakistan, either. While not successful in launching attacks within India “barring a few minor incidents”,[33] AQIS – like IS – paid close attention to the ouster of Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, whose security cooperation with the Indian authorities had helped curtail the operations along the India-Bangladesh border of the AQ-linked Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT).[34] Notably, AQIS leader Usama Mahmood heralded the fall of Sheikh Hasina, lauding the “resistance against corruption and secularism”, while “advocating for an Islamic system and unity against oppression”.[35] Going into 2025, the political and security situation in Bangladesh bears watching for signs of deeper exploitation by both IS and AQIS.
In Indonesia, Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS), a pro-AQ splinter group of Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), “re-emerged on Indonesia’s threat horizon in 2024” after JAS member Yudi Lukito Kurniawan was arrested in late August 2024. Kurniawan was reportedly affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, which he had visited in January 2014. Significantly, during his Yemen visit, Kurniawan “claimed to have received an order from a senior AQAP figure to target the Singapore stock exchange building”.[36] In short, AQAP considered Singapore as a proxy for the “distant enemy” – that is, the US and its allies. JAS is a small network that has not been implicated in violent actions in the 10 years of its existence. That said, the “strong community base” enjoyed by JAS, its ties with AQAP and speculation that it is “still sending members abroad for jihad”, raises questions about its true nature.[37]
2024 was also marked by the surprising public announcement in late June by senior leaders of the Indonesia-based, transnational AQ-oriented Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network, of their decision to disband the organisation. Some analysts have expressed wariness about JI’s motives,[38] and in any case, much depends on whether JI members would embrace the decision and whether there would be violent splinter cells forming in a show of rank-and-file defiance. That said, “multiple respected JI figures have also supported the decision” and “between July and September, over 4,000 JI members declared their support for the seniors’ decision to disband”.[39] In any case, given JI’s demonstrated resilience and its ability to adapt to changing political and security circumstances, the JI disbandment issue bears close monitoring going forward.
The Intensifying Extreme Right Challenge
The extreme right as a movement espouses “at least three of the following five features: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and strong state advocacy”, while the far right can be regarded as referring to the “political manifestation of the extreme right”.[40] Put slightly differently, extreme-right social movements are generally rooted in the “definitional foundations of othering, nativism and authoritarianism”.[41] The year 2024 clearly evinced the intensifying mainstreaming of extreme-right ideologies – expressed in both the electoral success of far-right political parties and an uptick in extreme right-fuelled violence against minorities.
While the centrist coalition led by the European People’s Party (EPP) won the European Union (EU)’s parliamentary election in June 2024, equally apparent was “a significant rise in support for far-right parties and coalitions, which collectively gained a third of the seats in the EU Parliament”.[42] Far-right parties also did well at the national level. In Austria, for instance, the “far-right Freedom Party” won “the largest percentage of vote shares” in the September election, while the “far-right Alternative for Germany” secured victory in the “eastern German state of Thuringia” and did well in other East German states. Notably, “far-right politicians and groups in the West” have largely backed Russian President Vladimir Putin, viewing him as a “strong and conservative leader”, while also decrying their “governments’ support for Ukraine in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war”.[43]
Intensifying societal mainstreaming of white supremacist extreme-right ideologies also fuelled a worrying uptick in violence: throughout 2024, “neo-Nazi groups and other white supremacists engaged in a stream of violence”, mainly in Europe and the US, targeting Jewish communities, Muslims, non-whites and migrants.[44] Worryingly, newer groups emerged, like the Active Club in the United Kingdom (UK), a “neo-Nazi and white supremacist militia-like group” that attempted to ally with the like-minded Rise Above Movement to possibly prepare for “organised violence”.[45]
The 2024 general election in India resulted in a lukewarm performance by the far-right “Hindu nationalist” Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), compelling the “formation of a coalition government at the centre”.[46] The BJP’s electoral travails did not curb wider Hindutva extreme right-fuelled violence, however. From June 2024, there was an uptick of “cow vigilantism” incidents, in which Hindutva mobs lynched Muslims in the northern part of India “on suspicions of illegally transporting beef”.[47] The increased Islamophobic violence in the wake of the election was possibly due to “the Hindu right wing’s frustrations towards Muslims for voting against the BJP”.[48] Judging from the “consistent pattern of hate speech directed at Muslims by BJP politicians”, the coming year is unlikely to see a decline in Hindutva extreme right-inspired anti-Muslim violence.[49]
The Social Media Factor
Throughout the year, Islamist and extreme-right groups propagandised across “mainstream social media platforms”, while regional affiliates attempted to “localise narratives, maximising their reach and appeal”.[50] In the Islamist extremist space, IS maintained an “extensive and sophisticated digital ecosystem”, while AQ employed an “open-source jihad” strategy, relying on established platforms such as “Telegram, Facebook, and Chirpwire” to constantly push out large volumes of content.[51] The ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict continued to fuel propaganda by AQ and IS. IS, in particular, exploited the conflict to promote “its narratives and inspire lone-wolf attacks”.[52] IS supporters “emerged as the main vitalising force in IS propaganda”, constantly adapting “central IS propaganda to correspond with local contexts” to reach a wider audience.[53] For instance, in Malaysia, “mainstream platforms such as Facebook” remained the “primary online social media” used by Malaysian Islamist extremists, but “alternative platforms such as Rocket.Chat, TamTam, Threema, Hoop and Element” were also actively employed by “IS and its supporters”.[54]
Notable was the emerging importance of artificial intelligence (AI) in the Islamist extremist social media space. IS reportedly used AI-generated videos to radicalise its followers and may also be using “AI-powered chatbots for recruitment”.[55] Certainly, “ISK’s AI-generated videos are full of technical glitches”, but its propaganda came across as neutral and unbiased. For example, rather than “using offensive expletives to describe its opponents”, ISK deliberately employed “non-offensive language”.[56] Through the use of such neutral language, ISK sought to “exploit platform moderation gaps” to enhance its online presence, ensuring “longer shelf-life and wider dissemination on larger social media platforms like Facebook, Instagram, X and TikTok”.[57]
AI was also employed in the white supremacist extreme-right social media space, with “generative AI” being used by some groups “for purposes like propaganda and image creation, and to formulate recruitment methods”.[58] Observers have commented more generally that “Western far-right groups have increased their production of ‘grey-area’ content on mainstream social media”, so as to broaden their audience and increase support.[59] The effectiveness of this tactic was seen in August, when “decentralised Telegram channels” were used to disseminate anti-immigrant and Islamophobic content, inspiring riots in over 20 cities across the UK. This came after a mass stabbing attack in the town of Southport, in which three young girls were killed. The rioters were enraged by online disinformation about the identity of the attacker, including falsehoods that he was an asylum seeker.[60]
In India, despite the ruling BJP’s electoral travails, Hindutva extreme-right online communities remained active, “illustrating that Hindutva as a movement transcends BJP’s political confines”.[61] Hindutva Islamophobic online chatter fed upon anti-Muslim violence. For instance, following the ousting of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August, violence against Bangladeshi Hindus for their support of Hasina’s Awami League party was exploited by pro-Hindutva online communities. The latter “doctored footage and recycled images to frame the violence” as part of a “broader Hindu ‘genocide’ perpetrated by ‘Islamists’”.[62] Notably, pro-Hindutva and Western white supremacist online connections were forged during the August 2024 riots in the UK, as “both groups mobilised digitally around shared Islamophobic and anti-immigrant sentiments, using misinformation to incite further violence”.[63]
The inter-mixing – and localisation – of extreme-right ideological strands was evidenced in Asia in 2024. For example, the Austronesian supremacist community[64] on TikTok adapted “the Western far-right extremism (FRE) playbook”, localising interpretations of “Western FRE narratives” – such as the Great Replacement conspiracy theory – to “demonise local Rohingya refugees and other perceived non-indigenous communities”, promoting calls for “Total Rohingya Deaths” or “Total Chinese Deaths”.[65] The Austronesian supremacist online community is hardly monolithic, as within its ranks is a “hybridised subgroup that draws influence from both far-right and Islamist extremism”.[66] This ideological inter-mixing of online extreme right and Islamist extremist narratives, and their geographical localisation, is a phenomenon worth watching.
The Grey Zone: Non-Violent Islamist Extremism
In 2024, as previously, subtle evidence of a continuing blurring of lines between putatively constitutional, non-violent Islamist political parties/civil society groups and violent Islamist actors, remained apparent.
In Central Asia, authorities in Kyrgyzstan mounted crackdowns on not merely militant cells, but also members of officially proscribed, ostensibly non-violent religious organisations, including Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) and Yakyn Inkar – related to the Tablighi Jamaat Islamic missionary movement, which originated in India but whose members have sometimes been implicated in violent extremist activity elsewhere.[67] In Kyrgyzstan itself, arrests were made not just of individuals implicated in criminal activities, but also of “ordinary people following conservative religious movements”.[68] In a drive to deal with religious extremism, Kyrgyzstan authorities appeared to some observers to desire “direct control over the practice of religion within the country”, unsurprisingly sparking “resistance from the more traditionalist fringes of society” – illustrating the political complexities of dealing with the non-violent extremism phenomenon.[69]
In Bangladesh, HT, despite being banned, re-emerged in 2024, “actively conducting rallies and recruiting students from prestigious schools and colleges amid significant political changes”, as mentioned earlier.[70] Linked to HT chapters overseas, including in Southeast Asia, HT in Bangladesh has been “trying to infiltrate the bureaucracy and military and, more recently, civil society”, causing anxiety amongst law enforcement officials concerned about the group’s strategy of stealthily subverting various societal and public sectors to ultimately “establish a so-called caliphate governed by shariah law”, discarding the democratic system as “un-Islamic”.[71]
In Southeast Asia, some conservative Islamist groups, though operationally non-violent, nonetheless harboured “sympathies for extremist ideologies” and exploited “mainstream discontent”, pushing narratives fostering “social division and exclusivism”.[72] Concerningly, such groups called for “the overthrow of Western democratic systems and the installation of a transnational Islamic caliphate” – evincing a “dangerous overlap with extremist narratives”.[73] In Indonesia, for instance, while the AQ-oriented JAS continued to portray itself as a “non–violent Islamist organisation committed to social services”, there was “speculation” that JAS was still sending its members abroad for jihad.[74] Additionally, the so-called Abu Oemar network that had planned to attack the 2024 Indonesian presidential election, did not comprise just individuals from “actual terrorist groups” such as Darul Islam and pro-IS elements, but tellingly also “non-violent radical Islamic organisations like Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)”.[75]
Notable Operational Trends/Developments
In terms of more narrowly focused operational trends and developments, as in the previous year, three key themes continued to stand out in the 2024 survey.
A Wide Range of Attack Modalities and Targets
As previously, threat and armed groups employed a very wide variety of attack modalities against a range of diverse targets.
In Pakistan, for instance, the TTP-allied Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group (HGBG) targeted military facilities and transport, while the TTP itself limited its attacks to security forces and law enforcement agencies and made an effort to “spare civilians”.[76] Meanwhile, Pakistan’s Baloch insurgents “stormed security checkposts, military camps and other high-profile targets” including China-Pakistan Economic Corridor-related projects, in multiple coordinated attacks, while also searching public transport on Balochistan’s main highways to target “ethnic Punjabi drivers and passengers”.[77] The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) warned China to leave Balochistan or face additional attacks, continuing a trend of targeting Chinese nationals and interests in Karachi since 2018. Attack modalities included the use by the HGBG of explosive-laden commercially available quadcopters as well as the use of suicide bombings by the BLA.[78] In India, meanwhile, a “new trend” was observed where “insurgent groups targeted the Hindu-majority region of Jammu at a proportionally greater rate than attacks in the Muslim-majority Kashmir”, targeting both combatants and non-combatants.[79]
In Borno State in Nigeria in June, Boko Haram – from which ISWAP split in 2016 – “targeted high-profile civilian locations” including “wedding ceremonies, a funeral and a hospital”, employing female suicide bombers in coordinated attacks.[80] Meanwhile, IS-Sahel attacks reflected a “strategic modus operandi” that included “ambushes on military convoys, assaults on outposts and kidnappings”.[81] IS-SP targeted Egyptian military and police forces as well as pipelines supplying natural gas to Israel and Jordan – highlighting a penchant for attacking both military and economic assets. Al-Shabaab and JNIM, meanwhile, attacked both military and civilian targets.[82]
Indonesian pro-IS elements were discovered to have planned a “double suicide bombing against worship houses” in East Java, while another pro-IS suspect arrested in West Java was detained following an online comment which stated “Bomb!” in relation to Pope Francis’ visit to Jakarta’s Istiqlal Mosque in September.[83] In Malaysia, a police station in Ulu Tiram, Johor, was targeted by a lone male individual radicalised by IS ideology, who knifed to death one officer, seized his weapon and shot dead a second policeman, before being shot dead himself. Another six men and two women linked to IS were arrested for threatening “the King of Malaysia, the prime minister and other dignitaries, including members of the police”.[84] In the Thai Deep South, civilians – including women and children – were targets of Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) insurgent attacks, where Buddhists were “proportionally more targeted” than Muslims.[85] In March, the BRN mounted 44 coordinated bombing and arson attacks targeting “convenience stores, petrol stations and public infrastructure across Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Songkhla provinces”.[86]
In Myanmar, local People’s Defence Force (PDF) militias – mostly under the direction of the National Unity Government (NUG) – continued to attack ruling military junta troops, employing guerrilla warfare tactics, including improvised explosive device (IED) bombings and drone attacks – with the latter emerging as “a key factor in the Myanmar conflict”.[87] Additionally, the anti-junta resistance forces “continued to produce and use 3D-printed firearms in 2024”, largely for training purposes as well as in raids to “obtain commercial firearms”.[88] In the coming year, 3D-printing may well be further used by the anti-junta groups to manufacture bomblets for drone attacks as well as parts for IEDs.[89]
Youth and Family Networks
A second key operational trend that stood out was the continuing salience of youth and family networks in terrorist plots. In Bangladesh, Ansar al Islam (AAI) – also known as the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) or Al-Qaeda Bangladesh – remained resilient despite security force pressure, not just because of its decentralised cell structure, but also “by recruiting tech-savvy youth” to help it stay ahead of the authorities.[90] Meanwhile, HT in Bangladesh expanded its outreach “to include younger demographics, prompting worries about the group’s influence on youth”.[91] In Southeast Asia, including in Singapore, “youth radicalisation” remained a key challenge.[92] In June 2024, a 14-year-old boy became the youngest individual to be issued a Restriction Order (RO) under Singapore’s Internal Security Act (ISA). This case, together with other recent cases of youth radicalisation, reinforced the need to “better identify, deter and rehabilitate radicalised youth”.[93] A further layer of complexity was added in early 2024, when it was announced that an RO had been imposed on a Singaporean Chinese teenager, who – counterintuitively – self-identified as a white supremacist and sought to conduct attacks overseas to further this cause.[94]
Finally, the aforementioned Ulu Tiram case in May 2024 squarely highlighted the “continued regional threat of family radicalisation”, a phenomenon also seen in several Indonesian cases, “particularly the 2018 Surabaya bombings”.[95] What was striking about the Ulu Tiram episode was the “radicalisation of an entire family network where both parents and children were radicalised” into the violent IS ideology.[96] The drivers of family radicalisation deserve closer analysis going forward.
The Lone Actor Threat
A third key operational trend that persisted in 2024 was that of lone-actor incidents. The ongoing Gaza conflict was exploited by both IS and AQ to “inspire lone actors” via their “numerous official and unofficial propaganda arms”.[97] Similarly, in the wake of the October 2023 Hamas attacks in Israel, AQAP’s leadership called for “lone-actor attacks in the West, and specifically the US”, declaring the Hamas attacks to be as significant as “the 9/11 attacks”.[98] IS, likewise, in March, in response to the Gaza conflict, called upon its “lone lions” to “strive intensely to target the Crusaders and Jews in every place”.[99] In Bangladesh, the pro-IS Neo-JMB were busy on social media promoting “lone-actor attacks”.[100]
Throughout the year, six “pro-IS individuals” were detained in “unrelated” arrests in Indonesia.[101] Four of these individuals had made IEDs, though “not in coordination with one another”, and were found to have “no links to one another” – hinting strongly that they were likely lone actors.[102] In Malaysia, “most” of the cases in 2024 were IS-inspired, involving “self-radicalised individuals”.[103]
The Enduring Need for a Holistic, Integrated Approach in Dealing with Violent Extremism
Finally, the year’s developments showed once again that a judicious mix of hard and soft approaches, involving calibrated application of force together with serious efforts to address the underlying conditions that drive violent extremism, remained crucial.
The “Hard” Approach: Strengths and Limitations
Legislation/Policy Measures
Legal and administrative policy measures remained pertinent in 2024. Some were relatively constructive. For instance, the EU banned The Base, a US neo-Nazi group with an active overseas presence. The Base seeks the violent replacement of the US government with “a white ethno-state” and is banned in other Western countries, but the EU ban in 2024 was the “largest in terms of geographical coverage”.[104] The Base is the “first far-right entity to be banned by the EU”, underscoring growing official recognition of the “threat posed by such groups”.[105] German lawmakers, meanwhile, intensified efforts to ban the “partially right-wing extremist Alternative for Germany” party[106] – which has been accused of entertaining a “willingness to use violence” amongst its members.[107]
In August, Thai legislators passed a law facilitating the restoration of the Advisory Council of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC). Set up in 2010 under the Southern Border Provinces Administration Act of that year, the Advisory Council had comprised representatives from various social groups and had served as a platform for people to voice their grievances to the SBPAC – a central agency that coordinated government projects promoting development and justice in the Thai Deep South. The Advisory Council, however, was suspended for a decade after the 2014 military coup. The return of the Council could therefore hopefully “enhance public participation in addressing problems in the Deep South”.[108]
Conversely, other legal/policy measures seemed less helpful. Tajikistan, for example, inaugurated a “new dress code which virtually banned some Islamic attires, such as the hijab”. While this new legislation was not fully enforced, it was exploited by AQ and ISK, “transforming the new law into a potential catalyst for a new radicalisation process”.[109]
Counter Terrorist Operational Capabilities
The importance of effective counter terrorist operational capacities was further reinforced in 2024. In India, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) claimed to have dismantled “all remaining IS cells” in the country, and hence, “no significant activity linked to the group was observed”.[110] Conversely, a lack of sufficient Indian military force in Jammu to effectively deal with insurgent activities was observed. This was because “much of the army” had been “redeployed to areas bordering China since the 2020 India-China border skirmishes”.[111] To rectify matters, apart from redeploying more troops back to Jammu, Indian forces revitalised the Village Defense Guards (VDG), a strategy first tried in the 1990s. Concerns were raised, however, about possible “human rights violations” by these non-professional VDG militia.[112]
Effective counter terrorist capabilities were also evident in Indonesia. Not only were terrorist attacks successfully prevented throughout 2024, but the authorities also “managed to arrest individuals who held key positions in their respective networks and organisations”.[113] For instance, while only 19 JI members were arrested in 2024, more than half of them had held strategic roles within the JI network. Similarly, while only two JAD members were arrested in 2024, one was a key recruiter and the other a cell leader.[114]
Moreover, following the May 2024 Ulu Tiram attack, the Royal Malaysian Police successfully executed nationwide raids which thwarted several terrorist plots in the country.[115] Meanwhile, the Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM) effectively managed the maritime terrorist and cross-border crime threat, and was also exploring integrating “advanced technological equipment” including “drones, speedboats, long-distance cameras, and sensor and radar systems” to improve its regional surveillance coverage.[116]
Meanwhile, the Singapore Police Force, the Singapore Civil Defence Force and the Singapore Armed Forces continued to mount “regular joint counter terrorism exercises to test and strengthen operational readiness in the event of a terror attack”, while, like Malaysia, the Singaporean authorities also invested in technology to further enhance the state’s counter terrorist capabilities. For instance, to strengthen border security, in May, automated immigration lanes were introduced at Singapore’s Changi Airport, allowing immigration officers to “run data analytics and conduct risk assessments on inbound travellers” and flag high-risk individuals for further checks before entry is permitted.[117] In the southern Philippines, the declaration of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)-free zones in Mindanao and the “paralysis” of the Dawlah Islamiyah-Maute Group, pointed to the operational effectiveness of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The AFP achieved these successes through a judicious combination of leadership decapitation, encouraging surrender and territorial denial.[118]
Operational shortcomings were also observed, unfortunately. Despite US military aid to support counter terrorism efforts in Africa, operations in the Sahel remained “severely hindered by insufficient military resources and logistical support”.[119] Bangladesh’s “response to terrorism and extremism” was also negatively impacted during the year’s political upheaval and a “breakdown of law and order” – a situation necessitating the diversion of “law enforcement efforts toward restoring stability”.[120] Unsurprisingly, terrorist groups scaled up their activities. Additionally, overcrowded jails, security lapses and the absence of rehabilitation initiatives created “an environment conducive to radicalisation”.[121]
“Softer” Approaches Needed As Well
As in previous surveys, the importance of meshing the abovementioned “harder”, including kinetic, elements of national power, with “softer” measures dealing with the underlying conditions that give rise to violent extremist attacks, was clear throughout 2024.
Holistic National Action Plans
Pakistan recognised the above point, announcing a new more holistic counter terrorism strategy in June by revamping its erstwhile National Action Plan “to focus on kinetic and non-kinetic domains”.[122] The new strategy will combine “ongoing intelligence-based operations” with “counter ideology efforts [to] improve governance and foster a culture of tolerance, peaceful co-existence and diversity”.[123] Moreover, Kyrgyzstan, similar to other Central Asian countries, “set up a new action plan” within the Interior Ministry to “prevent the spread of extremist ideologies, specifically in the online realm, stretching to 2027”.[124]
Indonesia, meanwhile, completed the first five years of its own National Action Plan Against Extremism. A notable outcome was the “decentralisation of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) policies”, as eight provinces and eight districts established more geographically focused Regional Action Plans for Preventing Extremism. Civil society organisations also “filled in some of the gaps in P/CVE infrastructure”, underscoring the “’whole-of-government’ and ‘whole-of-society’ principles in Indonesia’s P/CVE approach”.[125] The Malaysian Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (MyPCVE) was also launched in September.[126] MyPCVE takes a “holistic approach in tackling violent extremist ideologies” and comprises a “mix of hard and soft strategies” that emphasise “multi-stakeholder and inter-agency cooperation”.[127]
Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes
The year underscored the importance of successful rehabilitation and reintegration programmes. These should aim to provide “former terrorist detainees with the tools and support necessary to rebuild their lives and become productive members of society”.[128] The 2024 survey of several regions in this volume confirm that several elements should be involved. First is psychological and religious support, as many individuals involved in terrorism have experienced some form of trauma or manipulation leading to their radicalisation. Second, educational and vocational training is needed to assist former terrorist detainees in reintegrating into society. Third, community acceptance is also a key component of effective reintegration, as a “community-centric approach” can help prevent recidivism by “addressing the social isolation and alienation” that fuels radicalisation.[129] Finally, familial and social networks should also be brought into rehabilitation efforts, as engaging families can help “rebuild trust” and “provide a strong support system for former terrorists”.[130]
Addressing Medium- to Longer-Term Structural Grievances
Finally, the 2024 survey reinforced once again the recurring theme that addressing underlying political and socioeconomic structural grievances simply has to be part of the overall mix in dealing with the terrorism/extremism challenge.
In Pakistan, to illustrate, the “ethno-separatist insurgency in Balochistan is rooted in decades of ethnic discrimination, political exclusion and socio-economic marginalisation”.[131] Hence, addressing the “genuine grievances” of the Baloch community would be “essential to isolate the militant groups”.[132] In India, the violence in Kashmir is “not a military issue but a political response to the disenfranchisement of the region”, the high unemployment rate and several big infrastructure projects threatening “village geographies”.[133] Moreover, Indian government “excesses” in governing the region through force have “increased the trust deficit between India and the local population”.[134]
In Bangladesh, while the Sheikh Hasina government before its ouster had mounted “some major infrastructure projects and made strides to maintain a zero-tolerance policy against militancy”, the public had called it out for “authoritarianism, corruption, cronyism, youth unemployment and economic mismanagement”.[135] Worse, efforts by her regime to forcibly suppress dissent by “deploying the police and paramilitary forces” was a strategy that backfired, inciting public rage.[136] In Africa, without a “comprehensive approach” addressing not just “immediate security concerns” but also “underlying socioeconomic grievances”, the Islamist terrorism challenge on that continent is “likely to persist and even escalate, posing profound implications for regional and global security”.[137]
In the Thai Deep South in 2024, “attempts to ensure legal accountability for the 2004 Tak Bai protest failed”, undermining the credibility of the judicial system and “reaffirming the perceived culture of impunity in Thailand” amongst southern Thai Muslims.[138] More fundamentally, the BRN’s aspiration for “recognition of the cultural, linguistic and ethnic identities of the Patani community, freedom to uphold and practise their religious beliefs, ability to manage the region’s natural resources and freedom from political intimidation” – demands which resonate in the Deep South – can be achieved through some form of “self-governance” within the framework of the unitary Thai state.[139] However, if the new Paetongtarn Shinawatra government remains “swayed by hawkish advisors” seeking to “crush the BRN militarily and politically”, any new peace talks would unlikely be geared toward “addressing the root causes of the conflict”.[140] In the southern Philippines, despite the steadily improving security situation, “many of the homes destroyed during the Marawi Siege in 2017 have still not been rebuilt”, while “living conditions in the temporary shelters remain abysmal”.[141] Such conditions can readily be “exploited” for extremist propaganda purposes, impacting the “future trajectory of Islamist radicalisation and terrorism in the Philippines”.[142]
Finally, in the coming year, addressing underlying structural factors are needed to deal not just with the Islamist extremist challenge. While “hard responses are used to control the threat” of the extreme right in the West, “underlying grievances” such as “lack of employment, the rising cost of living, demographic changes owing to rapid immigration” as well as “evolving value systems” that conservative groups find difficult to accept,[143] will also be equally important to address. This would be all the more so given the clear political swing towards the far right in Western countries in 2024 – exemplified most clearly by Donald Trump’s victory in the November 2024 US presidential election. Tellingly, Trump’s impending return to the White House in January 2025 has been “hailed from the streets of European capitals to nationalist circles in India”.[144]
About the Author
Kumar Ramakrishna is the Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He was previously Head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) and is currently its Research Advisor. He can be reached at [email protected].
Thumbnail photo by Vladislav Klapin on Unsplash
Citations
[1] “What is Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’?” Reuters, August 5, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-irans-axis-resistance-2024-08-05/.
[2] See Moustafa Ayad, “Assessing the Gaza War’s Impact on Salafi-Jihadist Messaging in MENA, Following Resistance Axis Losses,” in this volume.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Mina Al-Lami, “From Syrian Jihadist Leader to Rebel Politician: How Abu Mohammed Al-Jolani Reinvented Himself,” BBC News, December 9, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0q0w1g8zqvo.amp.
[5] Ibid.
[6] See Ahmad Helmi bin Mohamad Hasbi, Nurrisha Ismail and Saddiq Basha, “Key Trends in Digital Extremism 2024: The Resilience and Expansion of Jihadist and Far-Right Movements,” in this volume.
[7] See Kalicharan Veera Singam and Abigail Leong, “Singapore,” in this volume.
[8] Ayad, “Assessing the Gaza War’s Impact.”
[9] See Atta Barkindo, “Africa,” in this volume.
[10] Ayad, “Assessing the Gaza War’s Impact.”
[11] See Rueben Dass, “Malaysia,” in this volume.
[12] See Antonio Giustozzi, “Afghanistan,” in this volume.
[13] See Amresh Gunasingham, “Sri Lanka,” in this volume.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Giustozzi, “Afghanistan.”
[16] Ibid.
[17] See Riccardo Valle, “Central Asia,” in this volume.
[18] Giustozzi, “Afghanistan.”
[19] Valle, “Central Asia.”
[20] Ibid.
[21] Barkindo, “Africa.”
[22] See Iftekharul Bashar, “Bangladesh,” in this volume.
[23] See Mohammed Sinan Siyech, “India,” in this volume.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Bashar, “Bangladesh.”
[26] See Alif Satria and Adlini Ilma Ghaisany Sjah, “Indonesia,” in this volume.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Alif Satria, “Indonesia,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2024), pp. 12-13.
[29] Barkindo, “Africa.”
[30] Ayaz Gul, “UN: Afghan Taliban Increase Support for Anti-Pakistan TTP Terrorists,” VoA, July 11, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/un-afghan-taliban-increase-support-for-anti-pakistan-ttp-terrorists/7694324.html.
[31] See Abdul Basit, “Pakistan,” in this volume.
[32] Giustozzi, “Afghanistan.”
[33] Siyech, “India.”
[34] Ibid.
[35] Bashar, “Bangladesh.”
[36] Satria and Sjah, “Indonesia.”
[37] Noor Huda Ismail, “Disbandment of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Impact on Militant Groups,” RSIS Commentary, No. 129 (2024), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/disbandment-of-jemaah-islamiyah-the-impact-on-militant-groups/.
[38] Kumar Ramakrishna, “The Dissolution of Jemaah Islamiyah: Genuine Change or Tactical Switch?” RSIS Commentary, No. 105 (2024), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/the-dissolution-of-jemaah-islamiyah-genuine-change-or-tactical-switch/. See also Noor Ismail, “Is the Dissolution of Jemaah Islamiyah a Victory or a Strategic Deception?” East Asia Forum, September 14, 2024, https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/09/14/is-the-dissolution-of-jemaah-islamiyah-a-victory-or-a-strategic-deception/.
[39] Satria and Sjah, “Indonesia.”
[40] Julia Ebner, Going Dark: The Secret Social Lives of Extremists (London: Bloomsbury, 2020), p. 288.
[41] Claudia Wallner and Jessica White, Global Violent Right-Wing Extremism: Mapping the Threat and Response in the Western Balkans, Turkey, and South Africa (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2022), p. 42, https://ctmorse.wpenginepowered.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/global-vrwe-threat-and-response-mapping_think-piece_-final-17022022.pdf.
[42] See Kalicharan Veera Singam, “Assessing the Extreme Right in the West in 2024,” in this volume.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Siyech, “India.”
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Hasbi et al., “Key Trends in Digital Extremism.”
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Dass, “Malaysia.”
[55] See Mohamed Feisal Mohamed Hassan and Ahmad Saiful Rijal Hassan, “Reintegrating Extremists in Southeast Asia: Lessons in Deradicalisation and Rehabilitation,” in this volume.
[56] Basit, “Pakistan.”
[57] Ibid.
[58] Singam, “Assessing the Extreme Right.”
[59] Hasbi et al., “Key Trends in Digital Extremism.”
[60] Singam, “Assessing the Extreme Right.”
[61] Hasbi et al., “Key Trends in Digital Extremism.”
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid.
[64] The Austronesian supremacist community advocates for the ethnic superiority of Austronesians – an ethno-linguistic group comprising significant populations in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore. See also Saddiq Basha, “The Creeping Influence of the Extreme Right’s Meme Subculture in Southeast Asia’s TikTok Community,” Global Network on Extremism & Technology, April 8, 2024, https://gnet-research.org/2024/04/08/the-creeping-influence-of-the-extreme-rights-meme-subculture-in-southeast-asias-tiktok-community/.
[65] Hasbi et al., “Key Trends in Digital Extremism.”
[66] Ibid.
[67] Giovanni Giacolone, “The Tablighi Jamaat in Europe,” Trends Research & Advisory, August 22, 2023, https://trendsresearch.org/publication/the-tablighi-jamaat-in-europe/.
[68] Valle, “Central Asia.”
[69] Ibid.
[70] Bashar, “Bangladesh.”
[71] Ibid.
[72] Hasbi et al, “Key Trends in Digital Extremism.”
[73] Ibid.
[74] Satria and Sjah, “Indonesia.”
[75] Ibid.
[76] Basit, “Pakistan.”
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Siyech, “India.”
[80] Barkindo, “Africa.”
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Satria and Sjah, “Indonesia.”
[84] Dass, “Malaysia.”
[85] See Rungrawee Chalermsripinyorat, “Thailand,” in this volume.
[86] Ibid.
[87] See Benjamin Mok and Iftekharul Bashar, “Myanmar,” in this volume.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Mahmudul Hasan, “8 Years of Holey Artisan Attack: Ansar Al Islam Still Active,” The Daily Star, July 1, 2024, https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/pi4wsmcc72.
[91] Bashar, “Bangladesh.”
[92] Hassan and Hassan, “Reintegrating Extremists in Southeast Asia.”
[93] Singam and Leong, “Singapore.”
[94] Ibid.
[95] Dass, “Malaysia.”
[96] Ibid.
[97] Ayad, “Assessing the Gaza War’s Impact.”
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Bashar, “Bangladesh.”
[101] Satria and Sjah, “Indonesia.”
[102] Ibid.
[103] Dass, “Malaysia.”
[104] Singam, “Assessing the Extreme Right.“
[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Marcel Fürstenau, “Germany’s Far-Right AfD Under Mounting Pressure,” Deutsche Welle, May 14, 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-far-right-afd-under-mounting-pressure/a-69078624.
[108] Chalermsripinyorat, “Thailand.”
[109] Valle, “Central Asia.”
[110] Siyech, “India.”
[111] Ibid.
[112] Ibid.
[113] Satria and Sjah, “Indonesia.”
[114] Ibid.
[115] Dass, “Malaysia.”
[116] Ibid.
[117] Singam and Leong, “Singapore.”
[118] See Kenneth Yeo, “Philippines,” in this volume.
[119] Barkindo, “Africa.”
[120] Bashar, “Bangladesh.”
[121] Ibid.
[122] Basit, “Pakistan.”
[123] Ibid.
[124] Valle, “Central Asia.”
[125] Satria and Sjah, “Indonesia.”
[126] Dass, “Malaysia.”
[127] Ibid.
[128] Hassan and Hassan, “Reintegrating Extremists in Southeast Asia.”
[129] Ibid.
[130] Ibid.
[131] Basit, “Pakistan.”
[132] Ibid.
[133] Siyech, “India.”
[134] Ibid.
[135] Bashar, “Bangladesh.”
[136] Ibid.
[137] Barkindo, “Africa.”
[138] Chalermsripinyorat, “Thailand.”
[139] Ibid.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Yeo, “Philippines.”
[142] Ibid.
[143] Singam, “Assessing the Extreme Right.”
[144] Ashok Swain, “Trump Victory Energises Global Far-Right, Will Accelerate Anti-Democratic Trend”, Scroll.in, November 23, 2024, https://scroll.in/article/1075467/trump-victory-energises-global-far-right-will-accelerate-anti-democratic-trend.
