Central Asia
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Xinjiang
In 2024, Central Asia witnessed a sharp increase in its nationals’ involvement in terrorist plots and major attacks from the Middle East to Asia to Europe. While no attack occurred in any Central Asian Republic (CAR), several individuals were arrested in connection with militant organisations who were either recruiting, channelling funds or planning attacks inside the countries. On the other hand, jihadist groups across the ideological spectrum boosted their propaganda narratives targeting Central Asian countries, inciting attacks in Central Asia and beyond. In 2024, two major points of concern for all CARs were the repatriation of militants’ families from Syria and the possible spillover of instability from Afghanistan, which they tried to address politically and diplomatically. However, the widespread hysteria sparked by the Crocus City Hall attack might jeopardise the security situation both in Central Asian countries as well as for the Central Asian migrant diaspora abroad.
Trends
IS and ISK’s Extended Focus on Central Asian Militants
In 2024, the Islamic State (IS) and its branch in Central and South Asia, the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK), increasingly relied on a dispersed and loose network of cells and individuals from Central Asian Republics (CARs) to carry out attacks in the region and beyond. The string of plots and attacks witnessed in 2024 was a continuation of a surge in the use of Tajik nationals by ISK in attacks conducted throughout 2023.[1] Generally, a combination of social factors – including anti-Islamic regulations adopted in Central Asia, the exposure of Central Asian individuals and diaspora to the allure of ISK propaganda, as well as external developments such as the Taliban’s crackdown on ISK cells in Afghanistan and the latter’s relations with Central Asian countries – have intersected with ISK’s international aspirations, providing the latter with a new tactic.
In 2024, ISK carried out several attacks in Afghanistan from Central Asian countries. For instance, on January 14, Muhammad Qasim Khalid, the Afghan Taliban governor of Nimroz, survived an attempted suicide attack by an ISK element of Tajik descent.[2] This was the first attempt of the year by ISK Tajik members to move into Nimroz and carry out attacks; in April, two Tajik citizens were arrested near the Iran-Afghanistan border while entering Afghanistan.[3] On March 21, 2024, a suicide attack by an Uzbek national at the Kabul Bank in Kandahar marked the second suicide attack claimed by ISK in the city. By exploiting Central Asian militants to conduct its operations in Afghanistan, ISK aims to counter the Taliban’s narrative that the group has no ground operatives in the country. ISK indoctrinates Central Asian individuals by arguing that since they cannot practise Islam in their countries of origin, and jihad and martyrdom are the pillars of religion (according to ISK’s own interpretation), they are thus required to perform their so-called religious obligation in Afghanistan by carrying out attacks, as it is most likely for them to strike in Afghanistan rather than in Central Asia.
However, in 2024, IS and ISK progressively expanded the use of Central Asian nationals for attacks beyond the Khorasan region, pointing to a new phase of external operations by the latter. A case in point was IS’ suicide attack in Kerman, Iran, on January 3 during a procession held to commemorate the deceased Iranian General Qassem Soleimani.[4] While an IS-linked cell in Iran claimed the attack, Iranian investigators concluded that one of the two bombers and the attack’s mastermind were Tajik nationals who had travelled to Afghanistan via Turkey, where the bomber received training and instructions.[5] Subsequently, Iran launched a major crackdown on ISK elements in the country, unveiling a network between Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan that involved Afghan and Tajik nationals.[6]
On January 28, two armed individuals entered the Santa Maria Church in Istanbul, killing one Turkish citizen. As the Islamic State – Turkish Province claimed the attack, the two perpetrators were subsequently tracked down and arrested by Turkish authorities.[7] The attackers, Amirjon Khaliqov and David Tanduev, were Tajik and Russian nationals, respectively, with connections to the broader network involved in the Kerman suicide bombing.[8] Between January and February, Turkey conducted a series of crackdowns on IS cells in the country, leading to the arrest of more than 150 individuals, many originally from Central Asia.[9] Subsequently, between March and April, Turkey launched a second round of arrests, identifying more than 200 individuals as potential IS members; again, the majority of the suspects were of Central Asian origin.[10] Some of the arrestees were later listed as prominent ISK members linked to the group’s extended network between Central Asia, the Caucasus and Turkey.[11]
The March 16 Crocus City Hall attack in Russia marked a new phase of intermittent plots by IS. The attack – which left more than 150 people dead – was carried out by a four-member IS cell of Tajik citizens.[12] Though IS claimed the attack, ISK is believed to be connected to some extent.[13] Furthermore, in the aftermath of the attack, Russian authorities arrested a total of 18 Central Asians, mostly Tajiks, connected to the attack.[14] Though the Russian authorities have been tight-lipped about the investigations into the Crocus City Hall attack, the existence of an extended IS network from Europe, Russia and Central Asia has been discovered.[15] A publication by ISK media affiliate, Al-Hadid Media, argued that ISK leader Shahab al-Muhajir directly planned and coordinated the attack in Moscow after ISK established contact with the Central Asian militants.[16]
In contrast to attacks being carried out internationally, no major incidents were observed in Central Asia. Based on information collected by security forces as well as propaganda and biographies published by ISK, the majority of ISK’s Central Asian militants were indoctrinated and recruited abroad in Russia and Turkey, where they came into contact with veterans of IS wars in Syria or militants from the Caucasus and Central Asia. However, it is also possible that ISK might have directed Central Asian militants to redirect their attention within their countries of origin, hence opening a new front.
New Propaganda Offensive
It is difficult to assess whether the deployment of Central Asian nationals for operations abroad is a systematic strategy framed by IS/ISK or, rather, the consequence of the availability of manpower from Central Asia. However, it has been observed that IS and ISK are increasingly focusing on external operations, both in terms of organised campaigns as well as individual propaganda campaigns that have intensified the production of content in Central Asian languages.[17]
A substantial surge in propaganda output and communication channels from Central Asian militants, particularly in the Tajik, Uzbek and Russian languages, was observed in 2024. While propaganda production targeting Central Asian constituencies has been on the rise since 2022, in 2024, IS and ISK stepped up the quality of the products.[18] For instance, after the Crocus City Hall attack, ISK published its first-ever Tajik-language magazine, the Voice of Khorasan, focusing on Tajikistan and Russia.[19] In June, the organisation published a second issue, this time featuring articles not only in Tajik but also in Cyrillic Uzbek and Russian, stating that the Crocus City Hall attack had been carried out in revenge for the IS female members held in prison in Syria.[20] The fact that the Uzbek language was written in the Cyrillic rather than the Latin alphabet suggests that the intended target was the Uzbek population living in Afghanistan rather than Uzbekistan, as the latter prefers using the Latin alphabet. Additionally, the language expansion of the magazine from purely Tajik to three languages is in line with ISK’s regional and international aspirations.
ISK also published a book entirely dedicated to Tajikistan, first in the Pashto language and then translated into Tajik. The book specifically instructed Tajik religious scholars to side with ISK, otherwise the group would consider them enemies.[21] The group has continued to publish other booklets in Pashto and Tajik, focusing on political figures in Central Asia and Russia in order to intersect with local political and social discussions.[22] Moreover, criticism against CARs and Russia was connected to Afghanistan, arguing that while ISK is striving to establish a so-called caliphate, the Taliban are building diplomatic relations with historical enemies of religion – as interpreted by Central Asian militants – referring to Russia. ISK’s publications narrated how Russia conquered Central Asia and then Afghanistan. ISK sees Afghanistan as the preferable destination for conducting attacks, in light of past spectacular ISK operations and the Taliban’s crackdown on ISK.
However, ISK also exploited its Central Asian – and specifically Tajik – base of support to challenge prominent religious scholars from Central Asia, opening a new front of ideological battles and potential destabilisation in the region due to sectarian frictions. ISK criticised both non-militant scholars, such as Tajik Hoji Mirzo Ibronov, who has always opposed IS, as well as rival, anti-state, jihadist scholars, such as Uzbek Abdulloh Zufor and Sadiq Somorqondi.[23] However, a major rift of infighting between hardcore pro-ISK members and individuals inclined towards IS ideology was sparked after the Crocus City Hall attack. In its aftermath and during the Russian security services’ crackdown on Tajik nationals, influential regional scholar Abu Muhammad Madani published a series of videos criticising ISK for the attack, arguing that given the fact it had caused the deaths of innocent civilians, it was an inside job by the Russian and Tajik services.[24] Abu Muhammad Madani is an anti-state, pro-jihad scholar who enjoys a good reputation among ISK’s Uzbek and Tajik supporters due to his anti-state sermons. However, after his comments on the Moscow attack, ISK published two booklets in the Tajik and Persian languages declaring the death penalty on him, igniting a polarising debate among ISK’s followers.[25]
However, most ISK-linked Telegram channels and Facebook accounts display cross publications and messages in the Tajik, Uzbek (Cyrillic and Latin), Russian and Persian languages. Critically, several publications revealed that IS and ISK members were radicalised and recruited in Russia and Istanbul, then instructed to either carry out attacks in Russia or Afghanistan, or provide other services to the organisation, such as collecting funds or managing emigration to the Khorasan region. In some of these publications, it was narrated that the CAR militants recruited in Turkey and Russia came into close connection with ISK because of the latter’s virulent propaganda against Central Asian states for their alleged suppression of freedom of religion. At the same time, ISK laments that in Central Asia, perceived un-Islamic practices are fuelled by Russia and Turkey, hence arguing that CAR militants are obliged to uphold religion by carrying out attacks.[26] As a consequence, this transnational connection passes through online communication channels, since these Uzbek- and Tajik-language channels frequently share propaganda content in the Russian and Turkish languages, specifically from ISK mouthpiece Al-Azaim Media.[27] Often, propaganda operations embed the fund-raising efforts of IS’ Central Asian affiliates who are connected to Russia and Europe. For instance, ISK Tajik and Uzbek channels frequently share coordinates to bitcoin and crypto wallets to Russian and German accounts tasked with collecting money for purposely providing benefits to IS families in Syrian detention camps.[28] Soon after the Crocus City Hall attack, more than two thousand dollars were withdrawn by one of such wallets and transferred to the cards of some of the perpetrators.[29]
Central Asian Countries Face Potential Instability and Growth of Domestic Threats
While Central Asia has remained a relatively untouched area by terrorism and militancy compared to neighbouring countries – such as Afghanistan, Iran and Russia – in 2024, several new developments have compelled Central Asian countries to frame and adopt new joint policies for regional security.
The two main developments involving Central Asian countries are related to the issue of repatriation of IS members and families still held in Syria and the potential destabilisation from Afghanistan. The latter concern includes not only the growing transregional threat of ISK, but also the hosting of Central Asian militant organisations affiliated with the Taliban who aspire to become insurgent forces in Central Asia.
Uzbekistan
Central Asian countries already repatriated more than two thousand IS members – mostly women and children – between 2023 and 2024, setting up rehabilitation centres in accordance with their internal legislations.[30] In May 2024, Uzbekistan hosted the first meeting of the Regional Expert Council on Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Returnees from Conflict Zones in Central Asia.[31] In July, the Regional Expert Council held its first working session in Tashkent, focusing its agenda on legal and judicial issues, psychosocial support and countering terrorist narratives while engaging civil society.[32] In September, Uzbekistan also hosted the joint conference of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (RATS SCO) and the Commonwealth of Independent States Anti-Terrorism Center (CIS ATC).[33]
At the domestic level, the aftermath of the Crocus City Hall attack and the widespread hysteria in Russia targeting Central Asian nationals also spread to Uzbekistan, leading to several crackdowns on Uzbek nationals suspected of terrorist links. On April 7, Tashkent police arrested 50 individuals in 45 different searches.[34] In the same period, Uzbekistan issued a series of warnings to parents against sending children to Islamic madrassas abroad, and enacted several restrictive measures targeting imams in the country by restricting their foreign tours.[35] Uzbek citizens were also detained abroad for alleged links to IS; in April, the United States (US) security forces arrested an Uzbek national who had entered the country in 2022 and was applying as an asylum seeker.[36] In August, Russian authorities arrested an individual from Central Asia who was recruiting young Uzbek citizens online, possibly linked to the broader network of ISK.[37]
Tajikistan
By far, Tajikistan has been the Central Asian country most exposed to terrorism and its repercussions, both diplomatically and internally. The Crocus City Hall attack signalled a watershed moment for the country and the perception of Tajikistan’s neighbours, especially Russia. While Tajikistan is not the only Central Asian country that suffered from the xenophobic backlash of the Crocus City Hall attack, it has faced the brunt of a series of discriminatory policies, expulsions and police raids targeting Tajik immigrants, which has damaged Russia-Tajikistan ties.[38]
Internally, in the first six months of 2024, Tajikistan arrested around 226 people in connection with terrorist organisations, mostly IS and Jamaat Ansarullah (Tajik Taliban) militants, and security forces detected three cases of terrorist plots and two of attempted terrorism in Khatlon province, the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region and the directly administered districts. Testifying to the widespread financial network linked to militant organisations, during the same period, 95 cases of terrorist funding for a total of 500 Somoni (US$47,000) were registered.[39] Arrests were conducted across the country; for instance, in Vanj district of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, 27 people were arrested for alleged links to Jamaat Ansarullah, while in Sughd province, 130 people were detained for alleged links with terrorist organisations.[40]
Additionally, 44 Tajik citizens were arrested abroad in coordination with Interpol and local authorities; 22 of these had already been repatriated by August 2024.[41] For instance, in June, the US authorities arrested eight Tajik citizens who had entered the US at different times through its southern border for alleged links with ISK.[42] In April, meanwhile, Italian authorities arrested a Tajik citizen whose preventive incarceration was later confirmed due to his involvement in funding activities for ISK.[43]
Tajikistan has inaugurated a new plan for 2024-2028 aimed at rehabilitating the families of former IS affiliates who were held captive in Syria, around 300 of whom have been repatriated by Tajikistan.[44] Tajikistan’s Ministry of Interior has also assured that under new legislation – which guarantees amnesty to citizens who had travelled to conflict zones and joined militant organisations, provided that they did not commit any crimes – militants might be reintegrated into society if they “sincerely repent and voluntarily return”.[45]
A potential catalyst for a new radicalisation process is the new dress code inaugurated by Tajikistan, which has virtually banned some Islamic attires, such as the hijab.[46] While the new piece of legislation has not been entirely enforced and is subject to different interpretations, such as only prohibiting full facial veils, militant organisations across the jihadist spectrum have criticised the move, attempting to capitalise on it for recruitment and publicity. For instance, Jamaat Ansarullah and ISK have released different items of propaganda, while top pro-Al-Qaeda (AQ) ideologue Mufti Abu Zar al-Burmi issued a message in the Uzbek language criticising the decision.[47] Hence, even though the new legislation might have only rhetorical goals, it might serve as a catalyst for militants to reinforce their narratives.
Finally, while there was no reported cross-border attack from Afghanistan into Tajikistan from either ISK or Jamaat Ansarullah, the latter has continued to publish online videos of some of its militants in open areas in Afghanistan, such as Kabul city and Parwan province.[48] Even though Jamaat Ansarullah holds no official position within power structures in the state, with the Afghan Taliban carefully keeping the group under surveillance, its militants enjoy relatively free movement.
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan carried out several waves of arrests against individuals linked to terrorist organisations, particularly following the Crocus City Hall attack. In February, Kazakh security forces launched a vast security operation covering eight provinces; in total, 49 searches were conducted, which led to the arrests of 23 people suspected of links to extremist organisations, most of whom were linked to IS.[49] Subsequently, between May and June, two more operations in different provinces, including the capital, led to the arrests of nine Kazakh citizens involved in the production and dissemination of propaganda materials in the country.[50] Again, in July, in another operation across four provinces, four Kazakh citizens and one foreigner were detained for possessing weapons and militant propaganda.[51] Finally, in late August, another foreigner and five Kazakh citizens were arrested in connection with terrorist activities in the capital.[52]
Compared to the trend in 2023, Kazakhstan, for now, seems to have effectively boosted security measures, registering a decrease in the number of plots and arrests.[53] Furthermore, authorities also prevented 151 foreigners with ties to extremist organisations from entering the country in coordination with regional neighbours.[54]
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan experienced an unprecedented wave of arrests and the discovery of terrorist plots in the country, a trend that had been developing since 2023.[55] Before the start of 2024, Kyrgyz authorities dismantled a plot involving ISK-linked Kyrgyz nationals to strike the city of Jalal-Abad with a series of coordinated bombings during the New Year’s celebrations.[56] In June, Kyrgyz authorities uncovered a major plot in Bishkek, leading to the arrest of 15 IS-linked suspects. According to investigations, an ISK commander in Afghanistan recruited the cell’s leader online, following instructions to recruit young Kyrgyz in the country to carry out an attack.[57] A month later, Kyrgyz security forces dismantled a cell that had been planning to carry out several coordinated attacks in the country. The five-man team was found in possession of large quantities of weapons, ammunition and drones. They also had a duplicate of a military ID of a member of parliament, highlighting their intention to attack key institutions.[58] Pictures published by the State Committee for National Security showed several books relating to religious ideology; the Committee stated that the group was following “religious ideology with fanaticism”.[59]
Similar to other Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan set up a new action plan within the Ministry of Interior to prevent the spread of extremist ideologies, specifically in the online realm, stretching to 2027.[60]
In addition to the dismantling of militant cells, Kyrgyzstan continued crackdowns on other banned religious organisations, including Hizb ut-Tahrir and Yakyn Inkar (considered a Tablighi Jamaat offshoot), banned in 2003 and 2018, respectively. Several arrests were carried out throughout the country targeting individuals involved in criminal activities – such as the forgery of official documents and IDs – as well as ordinary people following conservative religious movements.[61] These actions have been part of Kyrgyzstan’s attempts to exercise direct control over the practice of religion within the country, which has encountered resistance from the more traditionalist fringes of society.
Finally, Kyrgyzstan followed Kazakhstan’s example by removing the Afghan Taliban from its list of banned organisations. In June 2024, Kazakhstan removed the Taliban regime from its terrorist list based on the understanding of the importance of developing economic and security cooperation.[62] Similarly, Kyrgyzstan took the same decision to strengthen regional stability and cooperation.[63] This follows the enhanced cooperation between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, pointing to the common interest among the three Central Asian countries in developing trade and strengthening security against terrorism.
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan has no recent history of attacks or destructive plots within the country. However, after the Crocus City Hall attack, it was reported that Turkmenistan tightened control over religious centres and people attending them.[64] At the same time, like the rest of CARs, Turkmen migrant workers have also been facing harassment in Russia, as they are sometimes suspected of being linked to terrorist organisations, without any proof.[65]
Xinjiang
The situation in Xinjiang remained generally stable during 2024, with China inaugurating a new phase of counter terrorism measures focused on “social stability” in the autonomous province.[66]
However, the anti-state Uyghur jihadist organisation, the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), remains active in the Idlib area of Syria and in Afghanistan, although in hiding. Throughout the year, TIP’s deputy leader, Ustad Abdul Salam, continued to publish different audio messages, from the importance of jihad to criticism of China’s government over the treatment of the Uyghur population.[67] On June 16, on the occasion of Eid, TIP’s chief Abdul Haq also issued an audio message congratulating TIP militants, their families and the Uyghur people, while also reaffirming the importance of continuing a long-term struggle against China.[68] In 2024, TIP also went through an important reformation concerning its Syrian branch. On March 24, Abdul Haq, together with the Central Shura Commission, issued a statement arguing that while TIP had been established in Afghanistan, the group has now achieved a full-fledged organisational branch in Syria, acknowledging Abu Omar Kawthar as the Syrian branch’s head and appointing Shaykh Touba and Zahid Qari as deputies, with the latter also being the military commander of the group in Syria. The statement also reaffirmed the group’s commitment to fight for the “liberation” of Turkistan from Syria and Afghanistan.[69]
While the Afghan branch and its central leadership have been shy of appearing online since 2022, the Syrian branch publishes daily pictures and videos of its members in Idlib and neighbouring areas, performing various activities from military training and operations against Damascus’ troops, to engaging the local population in social activities, openly displaying its top cadres.
Xinjiang also remains a key topic of discussion among other jihadist factions as well as jihadist ideologues. In 2024, ISK dedicated several issues of its English- and Pashto-language magazines, the Voice of Khorasan and Khorasan Ghag, to criticising the Afghan Taliban’s relations with China over the treatment of Uyghur people in Xinjiang.[70] Separately, pro-AQ jihadist ideologue Mufti Abu Zar al-Burmi also delivered a sermon in the Uzbek language in June, addressing the Uyghur population in Xinjiang and the rest of Central Asia.[71]
Outlook
From a global perspective, Central Asia is rapidly becoming a regional and international hotspot for jihadist recruitment and funding activities. There is a distinct divide between the security situation in Central Asian countries and the disproportionate involvement of Central Asian individuals in terrorist attacks and activities abroad.
In 2024, Central Asian nationals – especially from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan – were responsible for some of the major terrorist attacks carried out in multiple countries in the Middle East, Asia and Europe, most of them claimed by IS. At the same time, Central Asian militant organisations have been consolidating their narratives and organisational structures. In Afghanistan, Jamaat Ansarullah operates under the strict control of the Afghan Taliban, but remains free to move around the country, conduct its activities and boost its propaganda narratives. On the other hand, in Syria, TIP has been expanding its organisational structure after receiving direct orders from the central branch in Afghanistan. In the same areas in Syria, a plethora of other Central Asian jihadist mercenary groups, such as the Central Asian Malhama Tactical, the Uzbek Katibat al-Tawhid wal Jihad and Muhojir Tactical, the Uyghur Yurtugh Tactical and the Kazakh/Tajik Musafeer Tactical, could acquire access to sophisticated weapons and boost their financing.[72]
In contrast, no major attack occurred in any Central Asian country. However, over the past three years, the threat of instability due to terrorist plots in Central Asian countries has been increasing. The year 2024 saw the detection and dismantling of multiple major attempts and cells, leading to several arrests. There is the potential risk that the panic sparked by the Crocus City Hall attack, coupled with the tightened security measures adopted by Central Asian countries and the persistent propaganda produced by militant organisations, might present the opportunity for individuals who harbour hostile sentiments against Central Asian governments to carry out a successful attack, possibly with the assistance of ISK.
About the Author
Riccardo Valle is a researcher focused on militancy and jihadism in the Afghanistan and Pakistan region. He is the co-founder of The Khorasan Diary, an online news and research platform on asymmetric conflict, and can be reached at [email protected].
Citations
[1] Raffaello Pantucci, “Central Asia,” in Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2024), pp. 79-86.
[2] Moqim Mehran, “Suicide Attack Targets Taliban Governor’s Office in Nimruz Province, Causes Explosion,” Hasht-e-Subah, January 14, 2024, https://8am.media/eng/suicide-attack-targets-taliban-governors-office-in-nimruz-province-causes-explosion/; Ibn Sufyan (@IbnSufyan313), “The suicide bomber from his looks a foreigner, most likely Tajik, although his identity is under process…,” X, January 14, 2024, https://x.com/IbnSufyan313/status/1746582162453725544
[3] “Arrest of Two Tajik Daesh Members on the Border of Iran and Afghanistan,” Entekhab, April 23, 2024, https://shorturl.at/ZYm32.
[4] “Heinous: World Reacts to Twin Blasts that Kill Dozens in Iran,” Al Jazeera, January 3, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/3/heinous-world-reacts-to-twin-blasts-that-kill-dozens-in-iran.
[5] “Manhunt for Kerman Terror Attack Elements Expands Abroad: Iran Intelligence Ministry,” Tasnim News Agency, January 11, 2024, https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2024/01/11/3021346/manhunt-for-kerman-terror-attack-elements-expands-abroad-iran-intelligence-ministry.
[6] “The Third Notification of the Ministry of Information About the Terrorist Incident in Kerman; The Arrest and Death of a Number of ISIS Leaders,” Tabnak, January 19, 2024, https://shorturl.at/gq5xI.
[7] “Türkiye Arrests ISIS Members, Including Foreigners, in 2 Security Operations,” Asharq al-Awsat, February 21, 2024, https://english.aawsat.com/world/4868021-t%C3%BCrkiye-arrests-isis-members-including-foreigners-2-security-operations%C2%A0.
[8] Riccardo Valle and Cagatay Cebe, “How and Why ISIS-K Has Resurged in Turkey,” Al-Monitor, February 19, 2024, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/02/how-and-why-isis-k-has-resurged-turkey.
[9] Utku Simsek, Mustafa Unal Uysal and Yavuz Emrah Sever, “Daesh/ISIS terror Suspect Wanted on Red Notice Nabbed in Central Türkiye,” Anadolu Agency, February 8, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/daesh-isis-terror-suspect-wanted-on-red-notice-nabbed-in-central-turkiye/3131751.
[10] Peter Smith, Levent Kemal and Lucas Webber, “Islamic State Khorasan’s Westward Network Expansion into Iran, Turkey, and Europe,” The Diplomat, April 30, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/04/islamic-state-khorasans-westward-network-expansion-into-iran-turkey-and-europe/.
[11] “Treasury Targets ISIS-Linked Human Smuggling Network in Coordinated Action with Türkiye,” United States Department of the Treasury, June 14, 2024, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2406.
[12] “Moscow Court Arrests Tenth Defendant in Crocus Attack Case: He Is Accused of Paying Rent for Terrorist Attack Participants,” Currenttime, April 1, 2024, https://www.currenttime.tv/a/krokus-arest-figuranta/32886613.html.
[13] Riccardo Valle and Cagatay Cebe, “From Russia to Iran and Turkey: Understanding Rise, Narrative of ISIS-K,” Al-Monitor, March 30, 2024, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/03/russia-iran-and-turkey-understanding-rise-narrative-isis-k.
[14] “Court Arrests 18 People in Crocus Terror Attack Case,” Lenta.ru, June 1, 2024, https://lenta.ru/news/2024/06/01/sud-arestoval-18-chelovek-po-delu-o-terakte-v-krokuse/.
[15] “Rosfinmonitoring Reported the Involvement of an International Team in the Terrorist Attack at Crocus,” Lenta.ru, July 16, 2024, https://lenta.ru/news/2024/07/16/rosfinmonitoring-soobschil-o-prichastnosti-internatsionalnoy-komandy-k-teraktu-v-krokuse/.
[16] “The Dream of Kafir Dost and the Militia,” Al-Hadid Media, August 2024, pp. 32-33.
[17] “Al-Naba Newsletter,” No. 450, July 4, 2024, https://jihadology.net/2024/07/04/new-issue-of-the-islamic-states-newsletter-al-naba-450/.
[18] Amira Jadoon et al., “From Tajikistan to Moscow and Iran: Mapping the Local and Transnational Threat of Islamic State Khorasan,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 17, No. 5 (2024), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/from-tajikistan-to-moscow-and-iran-mapping-the-local-and-transnational-threat-of-islamic-state-khorasan/.
[19] “TKD MONITORING: ISKP Magazine (Sadoi Khuroson) Issue 1,” The Khorasan Diary, March 29, 2024, https://thekhorasandiary.com/en/2024/03/29/tkd-monitoring-iskp-magazine-sadoi-khuroson-issue-1.
[20] “TKD MONITORING: ISKP Magazine (Sadoi Khuroson) Issue 2,” The Khorasan Diary, June 27, 2024, https://thekhorasandiary.com/en/2024/06/27/tkd-monitoring-iskp-magazine-sadoi-khuroson-issue-2.
[21] “TKD MONITORING: ISKP Publishes First Ever Book on Tajikistan Seeking to Attract New Recruits,” The Khorasan Diary, March 7, 2024, https://thekhorasandiary.com/en/2024/03/07/tkd-monitoring-iskp-publishes-first-ever-book-on-tajikistan-seeking-to-attract-new-recruits.
[22] “TKD MONITORING: Pro-ISKP Mubarizeen Media Discusses Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Their Governments,” The Khorasan Diary, June 10, 2024, https://thekhorasandiary.com/en/2024/06/10/tkd-monitoring-pro-iskp-mubarizeen-media-discusses-tajikistan-uzbekistan-and-their-governments.
[23] Towheed TV, “Inviters to Hell,” Episodes 2 and 8, Telegram, May 14; Idlib Bahori, “What is the Verdict of Sadiq Samarkandi and Abdullah Zufar?” Telegram.
[24] Jadoon et al., “From Tajikistan to Moscow and Iran.”
[25] Ibid.
[26] Xuroson Ovozi, “New Immigrant Jafar,” Telegram, March 4, 2024; Xuroson Ovozi, “New Immigrant Zubayr,” Telegram, February 23, 2024.
[27] Valle and Cebe, “How and Why ISIS-K.”
[28] Mona Thakkar and Anne Speckhard, “Islamic State’s Global Financial Networks: Cryptocurrency and European Bank Transfers Fund Detained IS Women and Incarcerated IS Fighters in Syria, Furthering Militant Objectives,” ICSVE, May 17, 2024, https://icsve.org/islamic-states-global-financial-networks-cryptocurrency-and-european-bank-transfers-fund-detained-is-women-and-incarcerated-is-fighters-in-syria-furthering-militant-objectives/.
[29] Ivashkiv Olena, “Media Outlets Find Crypto Wallet of ISIS Tajikistan Wing Used to Transfer Payment for Terrorist Attack in Moscow Oblast,” Ukrainska Pravda, March 29, 2024, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/03/29/7448665/.
[30] Alouddin Komilov, “How Central Asia Approaches Repatriation and Reintegration from Middle East War Zones,” The Diplomat, June 18, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/06/how-central-asia-approaches-repatriation-and-reintegration-from-middle-east-war-zones/.
[31] United Nations Uzbekistan, “First Meeting of the Regional Expert Council in Central Asia on the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Returnees to Be Held in Tashkent,” press release, May 9, 2024, https://uzbekistan.un.org/en/268577-first-meeting-regional-expert-council-central-asia-rehabilitation-and-reintegration.
[32] “Representatives of the Regional Expert Council Discussed Work Plans for 2024-2025,” ISRS, July 26, 2024, https://isrs.uz/en/yangiliklar/sostoalos-pervoe-zasedanie-rabocih-grupp-regionalnogo-ekspertnogo-soveta-po-voprosam-reabilitacii-i-reintegracii.
[33] “Mirziyoyev’s Remarks RATS SCO and ATC CIS Joint Conference,” The Tashkent Times, September 5, 2024, https://tashkenttimes.uz/national/13633-mirziyoyev-s-remarks-rats-sco-and-atc-cis-joint-conference.
[34] “Tashkent Police Arrest 50 Individuals on Suspicion of Extremism and Terrorism,” Kun.uz, April 8, 2024, https://kun.uz/en/news/2024/04/08/tashkent-police-arrest-50-individuals-on-suspicion-of-extremism-and-terrorism.
[35] Faranjis Najibullah, “Uzbekistan Cracks Down On ‘Religious Extremism’ in Aftermath of Moscow Terror Attack,” Radio Free Europe, April 13, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-crackdown-muslims-crocus-attack/32904040.html.
[36] “Asylum Seeker Was Suspected Isis Member Who Lived in the US for Two Years After Crossing Border,” GBN, May 2, 2024, https://www.gbnews.com/news/us/asylum-seeker-suspected-isis-member-us-border.
[37] “Russian Authorities Detain Foreign National for Recruiting Citizens of Uzbekistan into Terrorist Ranks,” Kun.uz, August 21, 2024, https://kun.uz/en/news/2024/08/21/russian-authorities-detain-foreign-national-for-recruiting-citizens-of-uzbekistan-into-terrorist-ranks.
[38] “The Riot Police Didn’t Even Check the Documents, They Immediately Started to Destroy Everything,” Radio Free Europe, August 29, 2024, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/33098253.html; “Migration Raids in Khabarovsk,” Radio Free Europe, August 28, 2024, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/33096563.html.
[39] “UPDATED. 3 Acts of Terrorism and 2 Cases of Attempted Terrorism Were Detected in Tajikistan Within Half a Year,” Asia Plus, August 8, 2024, https://asiaplustj.info/tj/news/tajikistan/laworder/20240808/dar-toikiston-davomi-nim-sol-3-amali-terrorist-va-2-olati-siasd-ba-terrorizm-oshkor-shudaast.
[40] “General Alamshozada on the Prevention of 3 Terrorist Acts…,” Bomdod, August 8, 2024, https://www.bomdod.com/2024/08/08/general-alamshozoda-dar-borai-peshgiri-shudani-3-amali-terroristi-bozdoshti-27-sokini-jazgulom-va-afvi-1589-jangjui-tojik-video/ ; “110 Cases Against 130 People: The Increase in Cases Related to Terrorism and Extremism in Sughd,” Asia Plus, August 30, 2024, https://asiaplustj.info/tj/news/tajikistan/laworder/20240830/110-parvanda-nisbati-130-nafar-afzoishi-parvandaoi-vobasta-ba-terrorizmu-ekstremizm-dar-sud.
[41] Bomdod, “General Alamshozada.”
[42] “Intel Brief: Islamic State Khorasan Determined to Attack in U.S.,” The Soufan Center, June 19, 2024, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-june-19/.
[43] “Ricicla Auto Rubate Per Isis, Nuovo Arresto Per Il Tagiko Considerato “Un Membro Dell’Isis,” Il Fatto Quotidiano, September 3, 2024, https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2024/09/03/ricicla-auto-rubate-per-isis-nuovo-arresto-per-il-tagiko-considerato-un-membro-dellisis/7679260/.
[44] “Integration of Former Terrorists and Extremists with Society: They Want to Adopt a Special Program in Tajikistan,” Asia Plus, June 3, 2024, https://asiaplustj.info/news/tajikistan/security/20240603/amgiroii-sobi-terroristonu-ekstremiston-bo-omea-dar-toikiston-mehoand-barnomai-mahsus-abul-kunand.
[45] “Ministry of Internal Affairs: If Citizens Voluntarily Refuse to Participate in the Activities of Extremist and Terrorist Groups, They Will Be Released from Criminal Responsibility,” Khovar, August 8, 2024, https://khovar.tj/2024/08/vazorati-kor-oi-dohil-dar-surati1-ihtiyoran-dast-kashidani-sha-rvandon-az-ishtirok-dar-faoliyati-gur-oi-ekstremistivu-terrorist-on-o-az-avobgarii-inoyat-ozod-karda-meshavand/.
[46] “Emomali Rahmon Signed a Law Banning “Clothing That Is Alien to National Culture,” Radio Free Europe, June 21, 2024, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/emomali-rahmon-podpisal-zakon-predusmatrivayuschiy-zapret-chuzhdoy-natsionaljnoy-kuljture-odezhdy-/33003469.html.
[47] Risolat Media, “Message for Sisters,” Telegram, June 18, 2024; Movarounnahr, “The Enemies of Hijab Are Hypocrites,” Telegram, May 28, 2024; Mufti Abu Zar Azzam Studio, “Message to Tajikistan on Hijab,” Telegram, May 2024.
[48] Monitoring of Telegram channel “Sadoi Mujahid” affiliated with Jamaat Ansarullah.
[49] “KNB Announced the “Neutralization” of Groups in Eight Regions of Kazakhstan,” Radio Free Europe, February 19, 2024, https://rus.azattyq.org/a/32825552.html.
[50] “The KNB Made Arrests in Astana and Pavlodar,” Tengri News, May 5, 2024, https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/knb-proizvel-zaderjaniya-v-astane-i-pavlodare-534361/; “Four Suspects in Terrorism Propaganda Detained in Turkestan Region,” Vlast.kz, June 27, 2024, https://vlast.kz/novosti/60762-v-turkestanskoj-oblasti-zaderzany-cetvero-podozrevaemyh-v-propagande-terrorizma.html.
[51] “The KNB Detained Radicals in 4 Regions: Among Them a Participant in the Military Actions,” Tengri News, July 12, 2024, https://tengrinews.kz/crime/knb-zaderjal-radikalov-4-regionah-sredi-uchastnik-boevyih-541106/.
[52] “Terrorism Suspects Detained in Three Regions and Almaty,” Kazakhstan Today, September 3, 2024, https://www.kt.kz/rus/crime/v_treh_oblastyah_i_almaty_zaderzhali_podozrevaemyh_v_1377968439.html.
[53] For data on the year 2023, see “Who Has Been Held Responsible for Extremism and Terrorism in the Republic of Kazakhstan?” Ranking.kz, March 2024, https://ranking.kz/reviews/regions/kogo-v-rk-privlekali-k-otvetstvennosti-za-ekstremizm-i-terrorizm.html.
[54] “26 People Convicted of Terrorism and Extremism in Kazakhstan Since the Beginning of the Year,” KazTag, June 12, 2024, https://kaztag.kz/ru/news/26-chelovek-osudili-s-nachala-goda-za-terrorizm-i-ekstremizm-v-kazakhstane-01.
[55] Pantucci, “Central Asia.”
[56] “Kyrgyzstan Foils Terror Attack Attempt,” Xinhua Net, December 28, 2023, https://english.news.cn/asiapacific/20231228/80675a8c1b904ecea91500ca51a5449c/c.html.
[57] “Suspects of Recruiting Youth for ISIS Detained in Bishkek (Photos and Videos),” Kaktus Media, June 14, 2024, https://kaktus.media/doc/503307_v_bishkeke_zaderjali_podozrevaemyh_v_verbovke_molodeji_dlia_ig_foto_i_video.html.
[58] “The State Committee for National Security Confirmed that the Suspects in the Preparation of the Seizure of Power Had a Military ID of a Member of the Parliament and Reported That They Were Preparing Riots,” Radio Free Europe, July 6, 2024, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/33024363.html.
[59] Kyrgyzstan State Committee for National Security (@gknb.official), Instagram, July 5, 2024, https://www.instagram.com/p/C9CO8dENC2y/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&igsh=MzRlODBiNWFlZA%3D%3D.
[60] “How Kyrgyzstan Plans to Combat Extremism and Terrorism,” VB.kg, March 28, 2024, https://www.vb.kg/doc/436082_kak_v_kyrgyzstane_planiryut_borotsia_s_ekstremizmom_i_terrorizmom.html.
[61] “Foreign Extremists Illegally Obtained Kyrgyz Citizenship. The State Committee for National Security Conducted Searches,” Kaktus Media, July 5, 2024, https://kaktus.media/doc/504659_ekstremisty_inostrancy_nezakonno_polychali_grajdanstvo_kyrgyzstana._gknb_provel_obyski.html; “SCNS: Six People Renounced Extremist Ideology of Yakyn Inkar,” 24.kg, August 29, 2024, https://24.kg/english/303419_scns_six_people_renounced_extremist_ideology_of_yakyn_inkar/.
[62] “Kazakhstan Removed the ‘Taliban’ from the List of Banned Organizations,” Radio Free Europe, June 3, 2024, https://www.azattyk.org/a/32977351.html.
[63] “Under What Conditions Does Bishkek Cooperate with the Taliban?” Radio Free Europe, September 4, 2024, https://www.azattyk.org/a/kyrgyzstan-talibandy-kara-tizmeden-chygardy/33109145.html.
[64] “Turkmen Police Increase Pressure on Religious Muslims,” Radio Free Europe, March 25, 2024, https://rus.azathabar.com/a/turkmenskaya-politsiya-usilila-davlenie-na-religioznyh-musulman-/32876623.html.
[65] “Security Forces Conducted Another Raid Among Migrants in the Volgograd Region, the Regional FSB Reports,” Novosti Volgograd, September 2, 2024, https://novostivolgograda.ru/news/2024-09-02/ufsb-ustroilo-oblavu-na-terroristov-sredi-migrantov-v-volgograde-5183146.
[66] “Senior CPC Official Highlights Counter-Terrorism, Social Stability in Xinjiang,” Xinhua Net, May 26, 2024, https://english.news.cn/20240526/d057540f9bf3428d9593bd403539d918/c.html.
[67] Ustad Abdul Salam, “Let’s Be Among Those Who Join Us for the Liberation of East Turkistan,” Telegram, May 9, 2024.
[68] Abdul Haq Turkistani, “Happy Eid 1445,” Telegram, June 16, 2024.
[69] “Decision by Central Shura Council Commission of the Turkistan Islamic Party Issued to Our Group’s Branch in Al-Sham,” Telegram, March 24, 2024; United Nations Security Council, Thirty-Fourth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2734 (2024) Concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, S/2024/556, July 22, 2024.
[70] See, for example, the Voice of Khorasan, No. 35 (2024); Khorasan Ghag, No. 33 (2024).
[71] Mufti Abu Zar Azzam Studio, “Oppressed Turkistan,” Telegram, June 2024.
[72] “Militant Enterprises: The Jihadist Private Military Companies of Northwest Syria,” Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, May 9, 2024, https://syriaaccountability.org/militant-enterprises-the-jihadist-private-military-companies-of-northwest-syria/.
