Bangladesh
In 2024, a Bangladeshi university students’ uprising, resulting in the ouster of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, created a power vacuum that triggered numerous jailbreaks and the escape of several high-profile militants. During this turbulent political transition, key members of various terrorist organisations were also released on bail, threatening a reactivation of dormant militants, boosting fresh recruitment efforts and inciting new attacks. The interim government of Dr Muhammad Yunus now confronts the urgent challenge of upholding law and order amid a weakened and demoralised police force, while the Islamist militant groups aim to re-establish their networks and ramp up their activities. A coordinated response from the government, intelligence agencies, law enforcement and civil society is crucial to address this growing threat and restore stability.
Trends
Political Violence, Regime Change, Law and Order
In 2024, Bangladesh underwent a period of significant upheaval, marked by widespread protests, political turmoil and a crisis within the police force. Bangladesh experienced significant upheaval, highlighted by widespread protests over a contentious civil service job quota system. These demonstrations, primarily led by university students, quickly escalated into violent confrontations with law enforcement institutions, reflecting broader dissatisfaction with the government. This unrest played a pivotal role in the downfall of Sheikh Hasina’s administration, which had been in power for 15 years, marking a turning point in the country’s political landscape.[1]
While the Sheikh Hasina government carried out some major infrastructure projects and made strides to maintain a zero-tolerance policy against militancy, it faced mounting public criticism for authoritarianism, corruption, cronyism, youth unemployment and economic mismanagement. Efforts by the Sheikh Hasina regime to suppress dissent by deploying the police and paramilitary forces backfired, inciting public anger.[2]
Police actions resulted in over 700 demonstrator deaths, leading to students’ retaliatory attacks on police stations and vehicles, and instances of property destruction and looting. During the riots, more than 44 police personnel lost their lives,[3] reflecting the growing state-society conflict. There were also reports about the alleged involvement of over 150 militants from Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) in violence during the quota reform protests in Dhaka.[4]
The unrest also led to jailbreaks, allowing both common criminals and terrorists to escape, including notable terrorist leaders who are now operating openly. At least 98 militants reportedly escaped from prison. Since the government was toppled on August 5, as many as 43 high-profile militants have been granted bail.[5] Of these, most notable are Ansar al Islam (AAI)’s leader Jasimuddin Rahmani and Harkatul Jihad al Islami-Bangladesh (HuJI-B)’s leader Atik Ullah – further straining the already fragile security situation.
After Sheikh Hasina’s ousting, Bangladesh’s police faced low morale and public distrust. Many officers are now in hiding due to fears of backlash from protesters, with nearly 800 officers absent from their jobs and attacks on police stations limiting operations. The Inspector General of Police Md Mainul Islam has acknowledged significant operational challenges and lost resources, with numerous cases filed against officers, including high-ranking officials. The interim government is urging the police to rebuild public trust and improve effectiveness.[6] The decline has hampered law enforcement and counter terrorism efforts.
Separately, reports of mob attacks against religious minorities such as Hindus, Buddhists and Ahmadi Muslims[7] have also been reported in the wake of Sheikh Hasina’s ouster.[8] The ongoing political violence highlights the urgent need for security reforms to restore stability and public trust.
Global Jihadists’ Efforts to Exploit Bangladesh’s Political Turmoil
In 2024, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK) have strategically released statements to exploit the political turmoil in Bangladesh. For instance, AQIS’ leader Osama Mahmood lauded the resistance against corruption and secularism, advocating for an Islamic system and unity against oppression. This rhetoric aims to resonate with individuals dissatisfied with current political conditions, encouraging them to unite under a narrative of resistance against perceived oppression. Meanwhile, ISK’s statement promoted preparations for conflict with India, highlighting the divine rewards for such efforts. Additionally, the Islamic State (IS)’s al-Naba newsletter published an editorial in September calling for a “genuine Islamic revival” in Bangladesh. It stressed the importance of establishing governance based on Islamic law (shariah) instead of secular frameworks, critiquing past failures to achieve this aim. The editorial urged Bangladeshi youth to focus on ideological education, reject tyranny and take collective action against injustices.[9]
AQIS and ISK’s strategic messaging have taken a deep interest in political developments in Bangladesh with a view to exploit the turmoil. This rhetoric comes at a time when Bangladesh is also witnessing a revival of jihadist militancy. Hence, this could resonate with disaffected individuals, including militants who are currently evading capture, potentially drawing them towards the ideological allure of global terrorist networks.
Revival of Jihadist Militancy
Ansar al Islam
AAI, also known as the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) or Al-Qaeda Bangladesh, remains a significant security threat in Bangladesh. As other militant groups weaken, AAI has expanded its operations through secretive networks nationwide. The group has successfully evaded capture due to its decentralised cell structure and by recruiting tech-savvy youth.[10] Recruiting tech-savvy youth enables AAI to enhance its operational efficiency, expand its reach through digital networks and evade law enforcement more effectively. Several key leaders of the group are still at large and continue to remain active. According to the Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime Unit of the Dhaka Metropolitan Police, AAI is acquiring weapons, including semi-automatic .22 rifles.[11] Though Bangladeshi authorities arrested 15 AAI operatives[12] and recovered a significant quantity of firearms in 2024, the successful prison escapes and the release of the group’s key leaders have undermined counter terrorism efforts.
Throughout 2024, recruitment remained AAI’s primary focus, having targeted youth and tech-savvy individuals since its ban in March 2017. The organisation leverages a strong online presence, using encrypted communications and social media to spread its ideology.[13] Reports indicate revitalised activities funded by local and foreign sources, including supporters from Malaysia and the United States.[14] Recent fund-raising efforts, disguised as charitable initiatives, have raised concerns over misleading campaigns aimed at financing its operations.[15]
In 2024, after the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s administration, Jasimuddin Rahmani, the group’s chief, was released on bail, raising alarm among counter terrorism officials.[16] Following his release, Rahmani threatened India with consequences if it intervened in Bangladesh. Rahmani warned that Indian actions could invite support from China and revive separatist movements across India, including in Kashmir, Punjab, West Bengal and Northeast India. [17]
In another key development, a new militant group called As-Shahadat has emerged in Bangladesh, linked to the banned AAI. The group is inspired by the Taliban’s rise in Afghanistan and adheres to Al-Qaeda (AQ)’s extremist ideology, focusing on recruiting madrassa students.[18] As-Shahadat reportedly has over 100 members.[19] Since May 2024, Bangladesh’s Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) has arrested several As-Shahadat members in Dhaka, Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar. The group has targeted regions like Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar, Jessore, Satkhira and areas around Dhaka for training activities.[20] As-Shahadat has also extended its operations to neighbouring India, particularly in West Bengal, where recruits have been identified.[21] The group’s main goal is to establish an Islamic caliphate in Bangladesh and to recruit members by distorting religious teachings and exploiting global Muslim persecution narratives. They have circulated extremist pamphlets, videos of Muslim persecution and speeches of leaders via WhatsApp, Telegram and BiP groups.[22] Although it has not yet carried out attacks, its growing network and cross-border activities underscore the increasing threat it poses.
Islamic State Bengal/Neo-JMB
The so-called Islamic State Bengal, or Neo-JMB, remains a key threat to Bangladesh’s security, particularly due to its intent to carry out attacks. This is notwithstanding disruptions to its operations, especially since the 2016 Dhaka Holey Artisan Bakery attack. Law enforcement efforts have successfully disrupted many of Neo-JMB’s activities, including the 2021 Narayanganj traffic police box improvised explosive device (IED) case where all the perpetrators were arrested and their operational capabilities neutralised. However, the group is still active and is attempting to reorganise, with many members remaining at large due to difficulties in identification.[23]
According to police sources, at least five factions of Neo-JMB are active with several hundred members. However, they have not been able to achieve capabilities like conducting operations.[24] At present, the group is maintaining a low profile and attempting to reorganise under its new leader Abu Bakar following the arrest of former leader Mahadi Hasan in Turkey. The group is also recruiting new members while maintaining links with former affiliates – 315 militants were granted bail in 2023, 70 of whom are linked to Neo-JMB.[25]
Furthermore, the group is promoting radical content on social media, such as circulating manuals to make IEDs, promoting lone-actor attacks and recruiting tech-savvy youth. Internal factors like growing radicalisation and external factors such as the continued ascendence of ISK contribute to the ongoing threat.
Neo-JMB is reportedly using cell phones smuggled into prisons to coordinate operations. A police intelligence report indicates that members, including leader Abu Bakar, are communicating with jailed militants through encrypted messaging apps, facilitated by corrupt prison guards.[26]
Financially, Neo-JMB is diversifying its funding through foreign donations and agricultural ventures, reflecting a shift toward self-sustainability amid logistical constraints.[27] The group has also received funds from the proceeds of a construction business owned by Abu Bakar.[28] While its operational capacity has decreased, the group still expresses intent to conduct attacks, particularly around significant events. Ongoing communications with larger jihadist networks, including ISK,[29] emphasise the need for sustained vigilance and proactive counter terrorism efforts to prevent any resurgence.
Hizb ut-Tahrir
In 2024, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), a banned extremist organisation, re-emerged in Bangladesh, actively conducting rallies and recruiting students from prestigious schools and colleges amid significant political changes.
HT allegedly receives funding from overseas and maintains close ties with HT chapters in several countries, including in Southeast Asia. HT has been operating in Bangladesh, particularly on university campuses, since 2002 and had gained prominence by 2008. The group has been trying to infiltrate the bureaucracy, military and, more recently, civil society. HT’s propaganda arm, Alwakia TV, also broadcasts in Bengali.
After the recent unrest, HT has been more visible, holding rallies despite proscription in 2009 due to its extremist ideology.[30] The group has claimed that its members took part in the mass anti-Sheikh Hasina protests. This resurgence has raised alarms among law enforcement, who are concerned about the group’s objective to establish a so-called caliphate governed by shariah law, as it perceives democracy as “un-Islamic”. The recent arrest of Imtiaz Selim, the group’s media chief, reflects intensified legal action against HT. Selim had publicly called for the lifting of the group’s ban, echoing previous government actions towards other organisations.[31] HT’s activities have notably expanded to include younger demographics, prompting worries about the group’s influence on youth.[32]
HT’s recent public demonstrations, including vandalism of memorials commemorating victims of past terrorist attacks, have further provoked tensions in a politically charged environment.[33] Analysts caution that allowing such extremist groups to operate openly poses a significant risk of escalating violent extremism in Bangladesh. The group’s connections to international funding and networks, alongside its calls for government overthrow, highlight a complex security landscape that challenges the balance between civil liberties and national safety.
Ethnic Conflict and Refugee Crisis
Bangladesh experienced a rise in ethnic conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in the south-eastern region in 2024. Separately, in Cox’s Bazar, violence erupted among Rohingya armed groups vying for control, exacerbated by worsening conditions across the border in Myanmar.
Amid the lax law and order situation, violence has surged in the hill districts of Rangamati and Khagrachhari. In September, the murder of a Bengali Muslim over an alleged motorcycle theft in Khagrachhari sparked clashes between the Bengalis and ethnic minorities, leading to four deaths and many injuries.[34] In response, government officials issued a temporary travel restriction in the affected areas, urged calm and announced a high-level investigation. The public relations division of the Bangladesh Armed Forces has warned of potential riots amid rising tensions. In Khagrachhari, the unrest led to a deadly shootout during an army patrol on September 19, causing multiple casualties.
Meanwhile, in Bandarban, security forces have ramped up operations against the Kuki-Chin National Front (KCNF), seizing significant arms caches and arresting numerous militants linked to recent criminal activities, including bank robberies.[35] These developments highlight the broader instability affecting the hill districts, as armed groups continue to challenge state authority, prompting a strong military response to maintain peace and security.
The situation in the Rohingya refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar has also deteriorated, with escalating violence primarily between militant groups such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO). This violence has resulted in at least 22 deaths and numerous injuries.[36] Compounding the unrest, criminal activities have surged, with law enforcement making at least 32 arrests and recovering weapons, revealing the camps’ complex security challenges. Additionally, a significant influx of approximately 15,000 new arrivals in September – driven by intensified conflict in Myanmar – has further strained resources and complicated humanitarian efforts, with smuggling rings facilitating the influx.[37] Despite concerns from the government and international officials about the camps potentially becoming hotspots for terrorism, responses have frequently fallen short of addressing the underlying causes of violence and instability.
State Response
In 2024, Bangladesh’s response to terrorism and extremism faced significant setbacks, particularly during the third quarter, marked by massive protests and a breakdown of law and order. This shift in focus diverted law enforcement efforts towards restoring stability.
The interim government’s release of high-profile militants has also raised concerns. On September 10, the Inspector General of Police Md Mainul Islam called for tougher actions against terrorism, emphasising the zero-tolerance policy and the commitment of specialised police units to maintain communal harmony. He highlighted the need to remain vigilant, especially regarding recently released individuals.[38] As the interim government implements drastic changes in the security sector, there are fears that critical counter terrorism capabilities, developed with international support, could be lost, creating gaps in monitoring terrorist activities.
Additionally, ongoing instability in the CHT and the multi-faceted Rohingya crisis further complicate the security landscape, underscoring the need for comprehensive solutions which address immediate security challenges while also providing humanitarian assistance and long-term strategies for repatriation and integration.
Outlook
Developments in 2024 reveal an intensified threat landscape in Bangladesh, posing major challenges for the interim government. Weaknesses within law enforcement are severely hindering counter terrorism efforts, allowing terrorist groups to exploit the situation for recruitment and funding, and providing them with more opportunities to operate and scale up their activities. This vulnerability raises doubts about the effectiveness of the government’s zero-tolerance policy. AQ-affiliated groups may also seek to gain popular support and infiltrate politics.
Meanwhile, stalled community engagement initiatives aimed at preventing violent extremism underscore the urgent need for revitalisation. The presence of escaped militants also heightens the risk of violent attacks, and without rebuilding counter terrorism infrastructure, the police force remains exposed. Continued cyber surveillance is essential, especially in remote areas like the CHT, to prevent the establishment of terrorist hideouts.
Following the government’s fall in Bangladesh on August 5, protesters looted around 5,818 weapons and 300,000 rounds of ammunition from police stations nationwide.[39] While some weapons have been recovered, about 2,000 firearms remain missing, fuelling the rise of armed gangs.[40] The looted arms pose a risk of being diverted to extremist groups, potentially escalating violence. Police efforts to recover the looted weapons have been slow, raising concerns about growing instability, organised crime and militant threats.
Moreover, overcrowded jails, security lapses and the absence of rehabilitation programmes create an environment conducive to radicalisation, highlighting the urgent need for reforms alongside security measures. To counter these threats effectively, the interim government must enforce its zero-tolerance policy with credible measures, while also addressing pressing issues such as the situation in the CHT and the ongoing impact of the Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh.
About the Author
Iftekharul Bashar is a Research Fellow with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].
Citations
[1] Julhas Alam and Krutika Pathi, “Bangladeshi PM Sheikh Hasina Resigns as Widening Unrest Sees Protesters Storm Her Official Residence,” Associated Press, August 6, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/bangladesh-hasina-student-protest-quota-violence-fdc7f2632c3d8fcbd913e6c0a1903fd4.
[2] Saif Hasnat and Andrés R. Martínez, “What We Know About the Ouster of Bangladesh’s Leader,” The New York Times, August 5, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/article/bangladesh-student-protests.html.
[3] “Police Say 44 Personnel, Mostly Constables, Killed in Movement,” bdnews24.com, August 19, 2024, https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/8fe1a2063786. See also “List of Policemen Killed in July-August Published,” Prothom Alo, October 25, 2024, https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/zqhqbxhiij.
[4] “Over 150 Rajshahi JMB Militants Involved in Dhaka Violence,” Somoy News, July 26, 2024, https://en.somoynews.tv/news/2024-07-26/TtP9CRy6.
[5] “98 Militants Escaped From Prisons, 15,000 Granted Bail Amid Unrest,” bdnews24.com, September 17, 2024, https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/b1d13ca57c3c.
[6] Partha Pratim Bhattacharjee and Mohammad Jamil Khan, “Cops Working, Not Effectively,” The Daily Star, September 6, 2024, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/cops-working-not-effectively-3695511.
[7] “Ahmadiyya Muslims Denounce Attacks on Community,” Dhaka Tribune, September 1, 2024, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/356884/ahmadiyya-muslims-denounce-attacks-on-community.
[8] “205 Incidents of Persecution of Minorities Since Aug 5: Oikya Parishad,” The Daily Star, August 9, 2024, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/205-incidents-persecution-minorities-aug-5-oikya-parishad-3673106.
[9] “Bangladesh and Shari’ah Rule,”al-Naba, No. 461 (2024).
[10] Mahmudul Hasan, “8 Years of Holey Artisan Attack: Ansar Al Islam Still Active,” The Daily Star, July 1, 2024, https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/pi4wsmcc72.
[11] “Abu Bakar’s Attempt to Revive New JMB From the Middle East: 8 Years Since the Holey Artisan Attack,” Kalbela, July 1, 2024, https://www.kalbela.com/ajkerpatrika/firstpage/100285.
[12] Based on author’s compilation of Bangladeshi media reports.
[13] Nuruzzaman Labu, “Eight Years Since the Attack on Holy Artisan Cornered Militant Organizations Are Still Active Online,” Bangla Tribune, July 1, 2024, https://tinyurl.com/ms972nd3.
[14] Mahabub Alam, “Ansar Al Islam Regrouping With Foreign Funding, Military-Style Training,” Daily Sun, July 11, 2024, https://www.daily-sun.com/post/757242.
[15] Mohammad Jamil Khan and Emrul Hasan Bappi, “Ansar Al Islam Raised Tk 18 Lakh Through Crowdfunding,” The Daily Star, June 6, 2024, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/ansar-al-islam-raised-tk-18-lakh-through-crowdfunding-3627741.
[16] Md Raihanul Islam Akand, “Ansarullah Bangla Team Chief Released on Bail From Kashimur Jail,” Dhaka Tribune, August 26, 2024, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/nation/356166/ansarullah-bangla-team-chief-freed-from-kashimur.
[17] Keshav Padmanabhan, “Released by Yunus, Pro-Al-Qaeda Islamist Rahmani Seeks Support From Pakistan for Kashmir & Khalistan,” ThePrint, September 7, 2024, https://theprint.in/world/released-by-yunus-pro-al-qaeda-islamist-rahmani-seeks-support-from-pakistan-for-kashmir-khalistan/2257285/.
[18] “New Militant Group ‘Shahadat’ Emerges Out of ‘Dormant’ Ansar al-Islam: RAB,” bdnews24.com, May 25, 2024, https://tinyurl.com/yehfmuss.
[19] “3 Members of New Extremist Group ‘Shahadat’ Arrested,” New Age, May 25, 2024, https://tinyurl.com/5ajmj7ha.
[20] “New Group of Ansar al-Islam Members, 3 Arrested,” Bangla Tribune, May 25, 2024, https://tinyurl.com/u6h5htr2.
[21] Sweety Kumari, “West Bengal Police Arrest College Student for Alleged Links With Bangladesh Terror Outfit,” The Indian Express, June 24, 2024, https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/kolkata/suspected-terrorist-bangladesh-arrest-west-bengal-police-9409693/.
[22] “Three Islamists of ‘As-Shahadat’ Arrested in Cox’s Bazar,” bdnews24.com, June 29, 2024, https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/bf1fe4a485dd.
[23] Kalbela, “Abu Bakar’s Attempt to Revive New JMB from the Middle East.”
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Mohammad Jamil Khan, “Militants Using Prisons to Run Operations,” The Daily Star, July 4, 2024, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/militants-using-prisons-run-operations-3648421.
[27] “8 Years of Holy Artisan Attack: Prisoners in Sensational Case Invite Militants,” Samakal, July 1, 2024, https://tinyurl.com/jhsy3apv.
[28] “Neo JMB trying to reorganise,” The Daily Star, January 1, 2024, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/neo-jmb-trying-reorganise-3507916.
[29] Interview with a Bangladeshi counter terrorism expert, July 2024.
[30] “Hizb ut-Tahrir Posters Emerge Amid Ruins of Holey Artisan’s Deepto Shopoth Sculpture,” Dhaka Tribune, August 29, 2024, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/dhaka/356512/hizb-ut-tahrir-posters-emerge-amid-ruins-of-holey.
[31] “Hizb ut-Tahrir Media Coordinator Imtiaz Remanded,” Dhaka Tribune, October 4, 2024, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/court/360770/hizb-ut-tahrir-media-coordinator-imtiaz-remanded.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Dhaka Tribune, “Hizb ut-Tahrir Posters Emerge Amid Ruins of Holey Artisan’s Deepto Shopoth Sculpture.”
[34] Ruma Paul, “Fears Grip Ethnic Minorities After Deadly Violence in Bangladesh,” Reuters, September 21, 2024, https://tinyurl.com/29hkp637.
[35] “How Kuki-Chin Commits Bank Robbery,” Somoy News, April 3, 2024, https://www.somoynews.tv/news/2024-04-03/CM6KNV1B.
[36] Based on author’s compilation of Bangladeshi media reports.
[37] Jobaer Chowdhury, “Over 15,000 More Rohingyas Enter Bangladesh Amid Attacks in Rakhine,” The Business Standard, September 11, 2024, https://www.tbsnews.net/rohingya-crisis/over-15000-more-rohingyas-enter-bangladesh-amid-attacks-rakhine-938426.
[38] “IGP Asks for Taking Prompt Action Against Terrorism, Communalism,” BSS News, September 10, 2024, https://www.bssnews.net/news-flash/208831.
[39] “Report: 5,818 Weapons Looted Nationwide, 3,933 Recovered,” Dhaka Tribune, September 7, 2024, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/357584/police-report-5-818-weapons-looted-nationwide.
[40] Mohammad Jamil Khan, “Drive Recovers 318 Weapons in One and Half Months,” The Daily Star, October 19, 2024, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/drive-recovers-318-weapons-one-and-half-months-3730791.
