Africa
Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Nigeria
Africa has taken centre stage in global discussions on terrorism, marked by increasingly complex patterns of violence and political instability. The continent’s prominence in the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) reflects this reality, as African countries dominate the rankings due to a surge in terrorist activities. The GTI, which assesses terrorism’s global impact based on incidents, fatalities, injuries and property damage, shows that nations such as Somalia, Nigeria and Burkina Faso rank among the most severely affected by violent extremism. This article examines current developments in the terrorism and counter terrorism landscape in Africa, looking at the threat and impact of terrorism, government responses and future trends.
Domestic Threat Landscape in Africa
Impact of Military Coups
In West Africa, the rise in terrorism has coincided with a troubling trend of military coups. This undermines political structures and democratic norms. Countries like Mali, Chad and Niger have experienced coups in recent years, which continue to shake confidence in the future of democracy. For instance, Mali faced two military coups in 2020 and 2021, which exacerbated its security and governance crises. Similarly, Chad’s military takeover in 2021 and Niger’s coup in 2023 indicate an ominous shift towards authoritarianism, casting doubt on the region’s democratic resilience. Other nations, such as Burkina Faso and Guinea, have also faced military upheavals which signify a broader regional challenge that intertwines political fragility and escalating terrorist threats.
Islamic State (IS) Affiliates and Activities
The Islamic State (IS) terrorist group’s expansion across Africa through various provinces highlights the group’s strategic adaptation and regional embedding via its ability to leverage local conflicts and weak governance to consolidate power. Each so-called province represents a unique facet of IS’ diverse approach to extending its ideological and operational influence across the continent.[1] This is predicated on three stages of interaction: terrorists’ coexistence, cooperation and convergence into a single group.
The estimated number of fighters within the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in north-eastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin region remains a subject of fluctuation. However, the group is believed to maintain a strength of an approximately[2] 3,500 to 5,000 fighters as of 2020.[3] Despite the uncertainty, this number represents a substantial segment of ISWAP’s operatives in north-eastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, where it remains the most potent insurgent force.[4] In June 2024, the north-eastern Nigerian region of Gwoza in Borno State witnessed a deadly resurgence of suicide bombings, attributed to Boko Haram. Coordinated attacks by female suicide bombers targeted high-profile civilian locations such as wedding ceremonies, a funeral and a hospital where victims from the earlier explosions were receiving treatment. These attacks killed at least 30 people and left many injured. This marks a return of female suicide bombing tactics after several years of relative quiet from such strategies in the region. Although the history of Boko Haram remains contested, the terror group became increasingly violent after the death of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, in 2009.[5] In 2016, it split due to ideological differences, which led to the creation of ISWAP.[6] While Boko Haram under Shekau continued to unleash indiscriminate violence, ISWAP led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi focused on targeting the military and the government.
Boko Haram and ISWAP have continued to pose threats by regrouping and launching sporadic attacks.[7] The latest attack in the country was reported in October 2024, where about 40 soldiers were killed in Barkaram. Though the location of the attack was near the Nigeria-Niger border, an area where jihadist militants are known to be active, the statement from the Chadian authority did not name any suspects in the attack.
As of 2024, the so-called Islamic State Sahel Province (IS-Sahel)[8] is reported to have increased efforts to gain support in building its fighting capacity, with its concentration in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.[9] Recent IS-Sahel attacks reflect a strategic modus operandi that includes ambushes on military convoys, assaults on outposts and kidnappings.[10] Notably, in 2023, IS-Sahel claimed responsibility for a series of high-profile attacks in the Liptako-Gourma region, including a deadly ambush on Nigerien forces that resulted in dozens of fatalities. The group has also exploited political upheaval in Niger following the 2023 coup, intensifying attacks near the Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger border. The expansion of violent extremism in the Sahel has been attributed to persistent weak governance, characterised by corruption, democratic backsliding, legitimacy deficits and human rights violations.[11]
The IS-Sinai Province (IS-SP), primarily based in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, has launched multiple attacks on Egyptian military and police forces, including an attack in January 2024 on a security checkpoint in Rafah that killed several officers.[12] IS-SP has also targeted critical infrastructure, such as pipelines supplying natural gas to Israel and Jordan, which emphasises its tactic of striking both military and economic targets.[13] IS-SP’s operations underscore its adaptability and the group’s strategic role within the broader IS network, using local insurgency tactics to promote IS’ regional ambitions.
The Islamic State Algeria Province (IS-Algeria), originally formed as Jund al-Khilafah fi Ard al-Jazair, a breakaway faction from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), pledged allegiance to IS in 2014. While its operations have been less significant compared to other so-called provinces, the existence of IS in Algeria highlights how the terror group has sought to penetrate North African jihadist movements by integrating splinter groups with shared ideological commitments.[14]
In Congo, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which rebranded under IS, was responsible for over 1,000 civilian deaths in 2023 in the eastern region of the country, marking it as a severe threat to local populations. Employing brutal tactics such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), kidnappings and mass killings, the ADF continues to destabilise both Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).[15] Notably, the group was implicated in the June 2023 Lhubirira Secondary School massacre in Uganda, where 42 people, mostly students, were killed. Additionally, in January 2024, an ADF bomb attack during a church service in eastern DRC killed 12 and injured around 50.[16] Despite sustained military operations against the ADF, including joint Ugandan and Congolese efforts, the group has been resilient in adapting its tactics and maintaining its operational capacity.
Overall, the formation of these IS provinces demonstrates a strategic shift from centralised operations in the Middle East to more decentralised, localised insurgencies across Africa. IS has managed to embed itself in this region by integrating with or absorbing pre-existing groups and exploiting regional instabilities. This makes it a persistent and adaptive threat. Consequently, this evolution requires nuanced, context-specific responses that address both security and the underlying socio-economic drivers of extremism in Africa.
Al-Qaeda (AQ) Affiliates
Recent estimates of Al-Shabaab’s fighting capacity in Somalia range between 7,000 and 12,000 fighters.[17] Al-Shabaab reportedly draws new fighters from recruitment campaigns, often fuelled by political grievances and leveraging local clan dynamics. For instance, in early 2024, Al-Shabaab called for opposition to Ethiopia’s influence in the region, which attracted recruits motivated by nationalistic sentiments. Despite ongoing counter terrorism efforts by Somali forces and international allies, including the United States (US) and the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), Al-Shabaab continues to exert control over parts of south and central Somalia, where it enforces its taxation and governance. Notably, in June 2024, the group launched a large-scale assault on El Dher in Galgadud, killing dozens of Somali soldiers and briefly seizing control of the area, before being repelled by Somali forces with the assistance of US airstrikes.[18] In addition to this major offensive, Al-Shabaab has targeted public spaces in urban areas, as seen with the August 17 bombing at a tea shop in Mogadishu, which injured and killed several civilians.[19]
Furthermore, there have been clashes between Al-Shabaab and IS operatives in Somalia’s Puntland region. Casualties were significant in 2023.[20] Sources indicate that in March 2023 alone, at least 40 militants from both sides were killed. These confrontations intensified as IS claimed further attacks, especially in the Balidhidin district, with ongoing skirmishes and ambushes throughout the year. IS’ statements suggest that the campaign left over 200 Al-Shabaab members dead or wounded by the end of 2023.
Apart from Al-Shabaab, another AQ affiliate, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM), a prominent jihadist group based in Mali, remains active. It also operates in Burkina Faso and Niger.[21] In Burkina Faso, on September 4, 2023, JNIM conducted an attack on a military unit in the Koumbri area, killing 17 soldiers and wounding 36 members of the Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie (VDP), a local volunteer defence group. The attack also left at least 30 others injured.[22] Three days later, the group struck again in the Tombouctou Region of Mali, carrying out an attack on a riverboat near Abakoira causing the deaths of at least 49 civilians.
The Lukurawa – A New Terrorist Group
A new terrorist group in Nigeria, the Lukurawa (or “Lakurawas”) emerged in the north-western part of the country, with active operations in several areas, including Sokoto and Kebbi States.[23] Declared a terrorist organisation by the Nigerian Defence Headquarters on November 7, 2024, the Lukurawa is believed to have been formed from factions of herding communities along the Nigeria-Niger border.[24] Initially identified around 2018 as a group of about 200 nomadic herders from Niger Republic, they were considered non-violent by local authorities despite suspicions of heavy armament.[25] However, recent developments, including violent confrontations and ideological shifts, have led the Nigerian Defence Headquarters to declare the Lukurawa a terrorist organisation with connections to Sahel-based jihadist networks, particularly in Mali and Niger.[26]
The group has been involved in deadly attacks on rural communities, including a recent violent incident in Mera village, Kebbi State, which left 15 people dead. The Lukurawa aligns with extremist Salafi-jihadist ideologies, aiming to establish shariah law in areas under its control. It operates with a combination of local grievances and religious ideological motives. The group has deployed sophisticated weaponry in target areas in north-western Nigeria, which is already struggling with banditry.[27] According to reports, the group uses financial inducement as part of its recruitment strategy, offering as high as NGN one million (SGD 799) to youth willing to join.[28] The group’s current targets include government security forces, other armed vigilante groups and rival terrorist factions, while civilians are largely spared and encouraged to adopt radical Islamist practices that the group claims align with divine law. Lukurawa fighters often preach about payment of alms (zakat) and obedience to their ideological principles.
Increase in Terrorism-Related Deaths
Sub-Saharan Africa now has the highest number of terrorism-related deaths compared to any other region. For the past seven years, the region has consistently reported the most fatalities.[29] For instance, on August 24, 2024, jihadists linked to AQ killed hundreds in a single day near Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso.[30] The country now tops the Global Terrorism Index, with 1,907 terrorism-related deaths in 2024, accounting for a quarter of all such fatalities worldwide. These fatalities and incidents are a result of the continuous expansion of terrorist groups in the region, which poses profound implications for stability and peace in Africa, making it crucial to understand these emerging trends and address their root causes. Meanwhile, Niger recorded 676 deaths from 153 attacks in 2024.
Overall, the principal perpetrators behind these alarming figures are a mix of well-known and splinter extremist factions. Boko Haram and ISWAP remain dominant in Nigeria and parts of Niger, while JNIM, an AQ-affiliated coalition, operates extensively in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.
Responses
Operation Hadin Kai (OPHK), launched in April 2021, is an ongoing Nigerian military campaign targeting ISWAP and Boko Haram insurgencies across north-eastern Nigeria. As part of a strategic shift from earlier operations, OPHK combines air and ground forces to weaken insurgent strongholds, improve territorial security and restore civilian authority in affected regions, particularly Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States. With support from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), OPHK seeks to protect vulnerable communities, reclaim territories and curb cross-border terrorist activities across the Lake Chad Basin.
On May 9, 2024, OPHK handed over Lydia Simon, a rescued Chibok schoolgirl, along with her three children, to the Borno State government in Maiduguri. Lydia’s release marked a continuation of successful rescue efforts under OPHK aimed at reuniting former Boko Haram captives with their families – this comes 10 years after Boko Haram abducted 276 female students at Government Girls Secondary School in Borno State, north-eastern Nigeria.[31]
In September 2024, OPHK forces killed eight Boko Haram and ISWAP fighters in a focused assault within Borno State. The mission also led to the release of 16 hostages and the recovery of significant arms and ammunition from the insurgents. Through sustained operations like these, OPHK has not only inflicted casualties on insurgent ranks, but has also worked to dismantle logistics hubs, recover territories and rescue hostages.
Operation Safe Corridor is a Nigerian government initiative focused on the rehabilitation and reintegration of former Boko Haram fighters who voluntarily surrender. The programme began in 2016 and is carried out primarily in north-eastern Nigeria, particularly in Borno State, where Boko Haram and ISWAP have historically been active. The initiative is overseen by the Nigerian Defence Headquarters in collaboration with state governments and local authorities.
The programme has recorded relative success, with some former insurgents contributing valuable intelligence and fostering local peace-building. The main rehabilitation camp for Operation Safe Corridor is in Gombe State, where former insurgents undergo vocational training, psychological counselling and religious reorientation.[32] In 2023, around 600 former fighters completed the rehabilitation process at the Gombe camp and were reintegrated into their communities. This reintegration process includes handing over rehabilitated individuals to local authorities and community leaders, who play a role in monitoring their progress and ensuring a smooth transition into society. However, significant challenges persist, particularly scepticism and resistance from affected communities.
Niger’s Operation Almahaou was launched in 2020 as a response to increasing attacks by Islamic State in the Sahel (also referred to as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, or ISGS), particularly in the Tillabéri and Tahoua regions near the borders with Mali and Burkina Faso. However, insurgent groups adapted to the offensive by moving across borders and employing mobile and decentralised tactics. Niger also partnered with France’s counter terrorism initiative, Operation Barkhane, which spans the Sahel region, including Mali and Burkina Faso. As of 2024, Niger’s partnership with France, particularly in terms of military collaboration, significantly changed due to political upheaval and shifting alliances.[33] French troops, particularly under Operation Barkhane, had provided substantial support to Sahelian countries through anti-terror efforts, including surveillance, intelligence and combat training.[34]
With French troops now absent from Niger, local forces face a heavier security burden, potentially weakening Niger’s ability to contain extremist violence and cross-border insurgencies. The withdrawal leaves a vacuum that international players, such as Russia, are likely to exploit. The Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organisation, has already established a presence in Mali and the Central African Republic, and there are indications that some Sahelian nations are considering or have already accepted Wagner support to bolster their militaries. However, the effectiveness of the Wagner Group in counter terrorism remains uncertain, as their approach differs from French and Western methods, focusing instead on direct financial gains from local resources (e.g., mining).
Challenges in Counter Terrorism
Political instability remains one of the most significant obstacles to effective counter terrorism in the Sahel. This is marked by a series of coups and changes in leadership. For instance, Mali experienced coups in August 2020 and May 2021, which resulted in the removal of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta and subsequent leadership changes. In a similar pattern, Niger faced a coup in July 2023, which deposed President Mohamed Bazoum and led to the suspension of military partnerships with Western allies. These disruptions prevent long-term policy implementation and hamper the consistent execution of counter terrorism strategies.
Additionally, while regional bodies such as the G5 Sahel and the MNJTF have been crucial frameworks for joint military actions, their efficacy has been limited by coordination issues and a lack of resources. The G5 Sahel (which includes Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad) has struggled with unified leadership and financial constraints. This lack of cohesive action became more pronounced after Mali’s withdrawal from the G5 Sahel in 2022, which weakened the coalition’s ability to launch coordinated operations.
Finally, while the US government says it has provided more than US$1.9 billion since the start of 2024 to support counter terrorism measures, the ability of Sahelian nations to conduct sustained counter terrorism operations is severely hindered by insufficient military resources and logistical support.[35] For instance, the withdrawal of the US military base in Niger following the cancellation of a security agreement with the military government in 2023 has significant implications for Niger’s internal security, particularly its counter terrorism strategies.[36] Furthermore, with the end of this agreement, the US has lost a key intelligence-gathering hub and a direct operational presence in West Africa. Similarly, without such an agreement, Sub-Saharan Africa will continue to face limitations in training and resources, which will hinder the effectiveness of their security forces.
Outlook
Africa is increasingly recognised as a continent severely affected by terrorism, with a significant proportion of the world’s deadliest attacks occurring within its borders. This reflects a grim reality where extremist violence has become a central challenge to security and stability in the region. The proliferation of terrorist groups, coupled with political instability characterised by military coups and weakened governance structures, exacerbate the situation. This trend indicates that without a comprehensive approach addressing both immediate security concerns and the underlying socio-economic grievances, the threat of terrorism in Africa is likely to persist and even escalate, posing profound implications for regional and global security.
About the Author
Fr Atta Barkindo is a Security & Terrorism Expert on Africa with a specialty in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions. He has consulted for and held several research positions at various institutions across the world. He sits on the board of the Africa Research Institute, London. He can be reached at [email protected].
Citations
[1] Erik Alda and Joseph L. Sala, “Links Between Terrorism, Organized Crime and Crime: The Case of the Sahel Region,” Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2014), pp. 1-9, https://stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.ea.
[2] Tomás F. Husted, “Boko Haram and the Islamic State’s West Africa Province,” Congressional Research Service, March 26, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10173/8.
[3] “Analyst: ISWAP’s Momentum Unlikely to Be Stalled by Recent Loss of Members,” Africa Defence Forum, May 28, 2024, https://adf-magazine.com/2024/05/analyst-iswaps-momentum-unlikely-to-be-stalled-by-recent-loss-of-members/.
[4] Luminous Jannamike, “Nigeria’s Recurring Nightmare: The Return of Suicide Bombings,” Vanguard, July 13, 2024, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2024/07/nigerias-recurring-nightmare-the-return-of-suicide-bombings/.
[5] Anwar Auwalu, “From Maitatsine to Boko Haram: Examining the Socio-Economic Circumstances of Religious Crisis in Northern Nigeria” (unpublished paper, March 2013), p. 40.
[6] See Dabiq (2015), pp. 14-16.
[7] Natasha Booty, “Attack on Chad Military Base Kills at Least 40 Soldiers,” BBC News, October 28, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz7wqqqvq2vo.
[8] Reports have shown that ISGS is an affiliate of this group and attacks by the group are often attributed to IS-Sahel.
[9] Clayton Thomas and Abigail G. Martin, “The Islamic State: Background, Current Status, and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, May 6, 2024, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/terror/IF10328.pdf.
[10] Liam Karr, “Africa File, August 29, 2024: North African Competition in the Sahel; Libya on the Edge; Burkina Faso is Spiralling,” Institute for the Study of War, August 29, 2024, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-august-29-2024-north-african-competition-sahel-libya-edge-burkina-faso.
[11] The Center for Preventive Action, “Violent Extremism in the Sahel,” The Global Conflict Tracker, October 23, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel; Aidan Lewis, “Egyptian Guard Killed in Shooting on Rafah Border, Israel and Egypt Investigating,” Reuters, May 8, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/egyptian-guard-killed-shooting-rafah-border-israel-egypt-investigating-2024-05-27/.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Lukáš Tichý, “The Islamic State Oil and Gas Strategy in North Africa,” Energy Strategy Reviews, Vol. 24, (2019), pp. 254-260, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2019.04.001.
[14] Ladd Serwat, “Democratic Republic of Congo: Re-Elected President Tshisekedi Faces Regional Crisis in the East,” Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, January 17, 2024, https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2024/drc/.
[15] “Extremist Group Increases Attacks in Western Uganda,” Africa Defence Forum, January 3, 2024,
https://adf-magazine.com/2024/01/extremist-group-increases-attacks-in-western-uganda/.
[16] David McKenzie and Radina Gigova, “Worshipers Killed as Bomb Detonates During DRC Church Service,” CNN, January 16, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/01/16/africa/drc-church-attack-deaths-intl/index.html.
[17] “Al-Shabab: Are Militant Attacks on the Rise in Somalia?” BBC News, November 2, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49908716.
[18] “US Conducts Precision Airstrike Against Al Shabaab Movement in Somalia,” Global Defense News, August 30, 2024, https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2024/us-conducts-precision-airstrike-against-al-shabaab-movement-in-somalia.
[19] “Seven Killed in Suicide Bombing at Cafe in Somalia’s Mogadishu,” Al Jazeera, October 18, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/18/seven-killed-in-suicide-bombing-at-cafe-in-somalias-mogadishu.
[20] Caleb Weiss, “Islamic State Describes Intense Campaign Against Shabaab in Northern Somalia,” FDD’s Long War Journal, February 2, 2024, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/02/islamic-state-describes-intense-campaign-against-shabaab-in-northern-somalia.php.
[21] “At Least 53 Burkina Faso Soldiers, Volunteers Killed in Clashes with Rebels,” Al Jazeera, September 5, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/5/over-50-burkina-faso-soldiers-volunteers-killed-in-clashes-with-rebels.
[22] George Wright, “At Least 49 Civilians Reported Dead in Attack on River Boat,” BBC News, September 8, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66747884.
[23] Olugbenga Ige, “DHQ Confirms Emergence of New Terrorist Group in Sokoto, Others,” Punch, November 7, 2024, https://punchng.com/dhq-confirms-emergence-of-new-terrorist-group-in-sokoto-others/.
[24] Abiodun Jamiu, “Lakurawa: Once Called Harmless Herders, Now a Deadly Terror Group in North West Nigeria,” HumAngle, November 9, 2024, https://humanglemedia.com/lakurawa-once-called-harmless-herders-now-a-deadly-terror-group-in-north-west-nigeria/.
[25] “Terrorism in Nigeria: Emergence of New Group Lakarawas Alarms Security Experts,” News Central TV, YouTube video, November 11, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v2yAvPa02VQ.
[26] Jamiu, “Lakurawa: Once Called Harmless Herders.”
[27] Odita Sunday, “Sokoto LG Chair Alleges N1m Youth Inducement from New Terrorist Group,” The Guardian, November 6, 2024, https://guardian.ng/news/sokoto-lg-chair-alleges-n1m-youth-inducement-from-new-terrorist-group/.
[28] Jamiu, “Lakurawa: Once Called Harmless Herders.”
[29] David Lewis, Jessica Donati and Kaylee Kang, “Why West Africa Is Now the World’s Terrorism Hotspot,” Reuters, September 24, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/west-africa-becomes-global-terrorism-hotspot-western-forces-leave-2024-09-24/.
[30] Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2024: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism (Sydney: Institute for Economics & Peace, 2024), https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GTI-2024-web-290224.pdf.
[31] Shola Lawal and Sani Adamu, “Nigeria’s Chibok Girls Kidnapping: 10 Years Later, a Struggle to Move on,” Al Jazeera, April 14, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/4/14/nigerias-chibok-girls-kidnapping-10-years-later-a-struggle-to-move-on; John Shiklam and Linus Aleke, “Nigerian Troops Kill 8 Terrorists, Rescue 16 Hostages Amid Ongoing Operations,” Arise News, September 24, 2024, https://www.arise.tv/nigerian-troops-kill-8-terrorists-rescue-16-hostages-amid-ongoing-operations/.
[32] Timothy Obiezu, “Nearly 600 Former Boko Haram Militants Graduate from Nigeria Rehab,” VoA, March 27, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/nearly-600-former-boko-haram-militants-graduate-from-nigeria-rehab/7024167.html.
[33] “France Outside Niger: The End of Western Counterterrorism in the Sahel,” Africa News, August 13, 2024, https://www.africanews.com/2023/12/22/france-outside-niger-the-end-of-western-counterterrorism-in-the-sahel/.
[34] Tyler Alexander, “The French War on Terror in Africa,” Onero Institute, February 26, 2024, https://www.oneroinstitute.org/content/french-war-on-terror-africa.
[35] United Nations Security Council, Lack of Coordinated Regional Responses in West Africa Increases Risk of Further Terrorist Expansion in Central Sahel Region, Delegate Tells Security Council, SC/15764, July 12, 2024, https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15764.doc.htm.
[36] Shola Lawal, “Can the US Find New Partners in West Africa After Niger Exit?” Al Jazeera, September 15, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/15/can-the-us-find-new-partners-in-west-africa-after-niger-exit.
