

No. 62

**GLOBALIZATION AND
NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY ISSUES:
A STUDY OF HUMAN AND DRUG
TRAFFICKING IN EAST ASIA**

Ralf Emmers

**Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
Singapore**

MARCH 2004

With Compliments

This Working Paper series presents papers in a preliminary form and serves to stimulate comment and discussion. The views expressed are entirely the author's own and not that of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies

The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) was established in July 1996 as an autonomous research institute within the Nanyang Technological University. Its objectives are to:

- Conduct research on security, strategic and international issues.
- Provide general and graduate education in strategic studies, international relations, defence management and defence technology.
- Promote joint and exchange programmes with similar regional and international institutions; organise seminars/conferences on topics salient to the strategic and policy communities of the Asia-Pacific.

Research

Through its Working Paper Series, *IDSS Commentaries* and other publications, the Institute seeks to share its research findings with the strategic studies and defence policy communities. The Institute's researchers are also encouraged to publish their writings in refereed journals. The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region. The Institute has also established the S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies (named after Singapore's first Foreign Minister), to bring distinguished scholars to participate in the work of the Institute. Previous holders of the Chair include Professors Stephen Walt (Harvard University), Jack Snyder (Columbia University), Wang Jisi (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) and Alastair Iain Johnston (Harvard University). A Visiting Research Fellow Programme also enables overseas scholars to carry out related research in the Institute.

Teaching

The Institute provides educational opportunities at an advanced level to professionals from both the private and public sectors in Singapore and overseas through the Master of Science in Strategic Studies and Master of Science in International Relations programmes. These programmes are conducted full-time and part-time by an international faculty from July each year. The Institute also has a Doctorate programme in Strategic Studies/International Relations. In 2004, it will introduce a new Master of Science in International Political Economy programme. In addition to these graduate programmes, the Institute also teaches various modules in courses conducted by the SAFTI Military Institute, SAF Warrant Officers' School, Civil Defence Academy, Singapore Technologies College and the Defence, Home Affairs and Foreign Ministries. The Institute also runs a one-semester course on '*The International Relations of the Asia Pacific*' for undergraduates in NTU.

Networking

The Institute convenes workshops, seminars and colloquia on aspects of international relations and security development, which are of contemporary and historical significance. Highlights of the Institute's activities include a regular Colloquium on Strategic Trends in the 21st Century, the annual Asia Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers and the biennial Asia Pacific Security Conference (held in conjunction with Asian Aerospace). Institute staff participates in Track II security dialogues and scholarly conferences in the Asia-Pacific. The Institute has contacts and collaborations with many think-tanks and research institutes in Asia, Europe and the United States. The Institute has also participated in research projects funded by the Ford Foundation and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. The Institute serves as the Secretariat for the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), Singapore. Through these activities, the Institute aims to develop and nurture a network of researchers whose collaborative efforts will yield new insights into security issues of interest to Singapore and the region.

ABSTRACT

East Asia faces a series of non-traditional security challenges that include environmental concerns, infectious diseases and transnational crime. Rather than creating such forms of insecurity, the process of globalization has significantly amplified their spread and impact and accelerated their significance. This paper focuses on illicit drug and human trafficking in China and the Southeast Asian countries and examines these categories of transnational crime in the context of a globalizing world. It argues that the protection of state and human security against drug and people trafficking will increasingly require effective transnational cooperation and some surrendering of state sovereignty. The paper reflects on the depth of such problems in East Asia by analyzing the production, distribution and consumption of narcotics as well as the trafficking of women in the region. It notes an increasing level of multilateral cooperation in East Asia to combat human and drug trafficking. Yet, in addition to the ongoing development of capacity-building and soft mechanisms of cooperation, deeper law enforcement and judiciary collaboration is required at a multilateral level to address these non-traditional security challenges.



Dr Ralf Emmers is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He completed his Masters of Science (MSc) and PhD in the International Relations Department of the London School of Economics (LSE). His research interests include security studies, the international relations of Southeast Asia and multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific. His book entitled *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF* was published in 2003 by Routledge as part of its Politics in Asia Series. Other publications include chapters in edited volumes and articles in *The Pacific Review*, *Contemporary Southeast Asia* and *Pointer*. Dr Emmers is also one of the authors of an IDSS monograph on *A New Agenda for the ASEAN Regional Forum*. He teaches a course on Multilateralism as part of the MSc in International Relations at IDSS and lectures at the SAFTI Military Institute.

GLOBALIZATION AND NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY ISSUES: A STUDY OF HUMAN AND DRUG TRAFFICKING IN EAST ASIA

Introduction

In the 21st century East Asia faces a series of security challenges that go beyond the traditional dimensions of security. This security agenda consists of terrorism, environmental concerns, conflicts between growth and development, migration pressures, health issues (HIV-AIDS and other epidemics), the spread of weapons of mass destruction, transnational crime and others. These problems, which are widespread in East Asia, are categorized in security studies literature as non-traditional security (NTS). Non-traditional security issues move beyond inter-state conflicts and geo-political concerns. They focus on non-military security concerns and incorporate both states and non-state actors. Beyond challenging state security, non-traditional security issues are particularly relevant to human security.¹ Indeed, these threats endanger both the stability of states and the security of other actors in international relations, including the individual. This paper studies non-traditional security issues in East Asia, with a particular focus on illicit drug and human trafficking in China and the Southeast Asian countries. It examines these forms of transnational crime in the context of a globalizing world.

The so-called new security agenda is often associated with the rapid pace of globalization. One may question the novelty of these threats to state and human security. For a long time, policy makers and practitioners have had to deal with matters such as human smuggling, cross-border crime and drug trafficking. These issues have now been included in a 'new security agenda'. Hence, rather than creating these new forms of

¹The term human security was introduced in the international security discipline following a 1994 *Human Development Report* published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The report outlines seven areas of human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. It also identifies six main threats to human security; namely, unchecked population growth, disparities in economic opportunities, migration pressures, environmental degradation, drug trafficking, and international terrorism. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report, 1994*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

insecurity, the forces of globalization have extended and accelerated their significance. In other words, their spread and impact have been significantly amplified by the effects of globalization. The conditions of globalization have increased international economic liberalization, trade and financial flows, but they have also magnified illicit cross-border flows of narcotics, smuggled migrants and even infectious diseases like the Sever Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS).

Globalization has therefore a clear security dimension, and a non-traditional one in particular. Beck writes that 'it is now transnational threats of substate perpetrators and networks that challenge the collective world of states'.² Non-state actors, such as criminal organizations and others can abuse the processes of globalization to operate at a truly transnational level. In this regard, they are more successful than states, which are 'restrained' by the founding principles of the traditional state system, namely the values of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of nation-states.

The paper asserts that in a context of globalization, state and human security will depend increasingly on deeper forms of transnational cooperation. In order to protect the state and its people against transnational crime, some surrendering of state sovereignty will be required in order to achieve more effective inter-state cooperation. The first section of the paper defines the notions of globalization and transnational crime and discusses how organized criminal groups extend their transnational activities aided by the forces of globalization. The following two sections apply this discussion to East Asia by studying in some detail the issues of drug and human trafficking in the region. Attention is given to describing and examining the kind of transnational cooperation that has emerged in East Asia to tackle them. It is noted that while an increasing level of multilateral cooperation has been achieved to combat drug and human trafficking, collaboration in the region has primarily been restricted to capacity building and soft mechanisms of cooperation. Deeper law enforcement and judiciary cooperation is required at a multilateral level to address some of the darker sides of globalization.

²Ulrich Beck, 'The Silence of Words: On Terror and War', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 34, no. 3, September 2003, p. 259.

A. The Forces of Globalization and Transnational Crime

The definition of the term ‘globalization’ is contested. The concept is both highly complex and debated in the field of social sciences. According to Giddens:

Globalisation is a complex range of processes, driven by a mixture of political and economic influences. It is changing everyday life, particularly in the developed countries, at the same time as it is creating new transnational systems and forces. It is more than just the backdrop to contemporary policies: taken as a whole, globalization is transforming the institutions of the societies in which we live.³

In this paper, we refer to ‘globalization’ as the processes of economic liberalization and transformation, the rapid scientific developments in communication, transport and information and the emergence of a global civil society.

The growing transnational reach of organized criminal activities is part of the darker side of globalization. Coker writes that ‘[o]ne security challenge which owes almost everything to globalisation is that of organized crime, which has moved away from the traditional clan-based and localized models (...) to transnational networks that are structured like international business’.⁴ This indicates that globalization has not created these security threats but rather accelerated their impact and significance. Indeed, progress in telecommunications and information technology, as well as the rapid increase in cross-border movements mean that criminal organizations can spread their operations and act at a transnational level. The activities of many criminal groups cross national boundaries and escape the control of governments and law enforcement agencies. Coker rightly argues that ‘organised crime is now transnational: all the main syndicates or

³Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998, p. 33.

⁴Christopher Coker, *Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risk*, Adelphi Paper no. 345, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002, p. 47.

cartels operate and are structured internationally'.⁵ In short, criminal groups tend to be network-orientated as well as transnational and entrepreneurial in their operations.

The links between globalization, global inequality and transnational crime should also be noted. The forces of globalization are uneven in their effects, creating winners and losers between and within states. Steinberg explains that the 'benefits of globalization are not fully shared, either within our own societies, or around the world – where the disparities are far more dramatic'.⁶ These disparities enhance the problem of transnational crime by facilitating the activities of criminal networks.

The United Nations (UN) defines transnational crime 'as offences whose inception, prevention and/or direct or indirect effects involved more than one country'.⁷ Transnational crimes must be differentiated from international crimes, which are recognized by and can therefore be prosecuted under international law, and domestic crimes that fall under one national jurisdiction. In order to be considered as transnational, a crime must involve the crossing of borders or jurisdictions. The problem of transnational crime in East Asia is severe and consists primarily of drug trafficking, human smuggling and trafficking, money laundering, transnational prostitution, sea piracy, and arms smuggling.

Some of the largest and most dangerous criminal organizations operating in East Asia are the Chinese triads, the Japanese yakuza and Vietnamese gangs.⁸ Smaller networks have also flourished in most regional states and set up transnational criminal activities. Most East Asian countries suffer from fragile domestic institutions and socio-economic problems and inequalities. Attempts to combat organized gangs are undermined by

⁵Coker, *Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century*, p. 19.

⁶James Steinberg, 'An Alternative Partnership: Salvaging Transnational Relations', *Survival*, vol. 45, no. 2, Summer 2003, p. 131.

⁷Definition reproduced in Gerhard O.W. Mueller, 'Transnational Crime: Definitions and Concepts', in Phil Williams and Dimitri Vlassis (eds) *Combating Transnational Crime*, a Special Issue of *Transnational Organized Crime*, Vol. 4, Nos 3&4, Autumn/Winter 1998, p. 18.

⁸See Alan Dupont, *East Asia Imperilled: Transnational Challenges to Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, chapter nine; and John McFarlane, 'Transnational Crime and Asia-Pacific Security', in Sheldon W. Simon (ed) *The Many Faces of Asian Security*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001, pp. 197-229.

corruption and poorly financed law enforcement agencies. Organized criminal groups take advantage of corrupt officials and politicians, as well as weak governmental institutions to broaden their actions and increase their profits. By doing so, they undermine new democracies and developing countries in East Asia.

In an era of globalization, the problem of transnational crime cannot be effectively addressed by individual governments and requires instead a transnational response. Steinberg asserts that ‘the consequences of globalisation make international cooperation imperative’.⁹ To combat organized crime, the UN has established different bodies, which include the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, and introduced conventions such as 2000 Convention Against Transnational Crime, which includes Protocols on Human Smuggling, Sex Trafficking, Illicit Trafficking in Arms, Corruption and others. Once the 2000 Convention gains international legal standing, the signatory nations will be forced to translate all its protocols into national law.

Despite numerous international efforts, inter-state cooperation against crime tends to be limited. Transnational cooperation is complicated by the fact that it touches on sensitive questions such as national sovereignty and jurisdiction, the sharing of information, extradition laws and problems of corruption.¹⁰ The issue of transnational crime is closely linked to the question of national sovereignty. On the one hand, transnational criminal activities represent a threat to the national sovereignty and integrity of independent states and endanger the survival of their governments. On the other, effective cooperation in combating transnational crime requires some surrendering of state sovereignty. As Beck argues:

The only path in the face of the threat posed to national security by global terror (as well as financial risks, climatic catastrophe, organized crime, etc.) is transnational cooperation. The

⁹James Steinberg, ‘An Alternative Partnership: Salvaging Transnational Relations’, *Survival*, vol. 45, no. 2, Summer 2003, p. 130.

¹⁰John McFarlane and Karen McLennan, *Transnational Crime: The New Security Paradigm*, Working Paper no. 294, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1996, p. 10.

following paradoxical axiom is thus valid: Out of national interest, states must be denationalized and transnationalized – that is, part of their autonomy must be given up in order to master *national* problems in the globalized world.¹¹

In short, a section of national sovereignty needs to be abandoned for it to be protected more effectively. The fight against organized crime and other transnational threats thus demands a rethinking of the principle of sovereignty that could lead to some form of shared sovereignty or international governance on specific issues. The paper has so far defined the notions of globalization and transnational crime and discussed how criminals benefit from a globalizing world to extend their transnational activities. The following two sections apply this discussion to two forms of transnational crime in East Asia; namely, the problems of illicit drug and human trafficking.

B. Drug Trafficking in East Asia

The Illicit Drug Trade in a Global Market

Drug trafficking is a transnational criminal activity and most likely the largest international crime problem in the world. The global trade of illicit drugs is believed to be worth as much as US\$ 400 billion a year; this figure is almost comparable to the tourism industry.¹² The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that 200 million people consume illegal drugs worldwide, mostly cannabis.¹³ The drug trade occurs in a global market where narcotics are transported from a producing country to transit states and then to their final destinations. Drug cartels operate across national boundaries and produce, process, transport and distribute illicit drugs.¹⁴ The drug trade is based on a complex transnational structure that includes farmers growing coca, opium poppies and cannabis, heroin and cocaine producers, manufacturers of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), smugglers, corrupt officials, distributors, wholesalers and small local

¹¹Beck, 'The Silence of Words: On Terror and War', p. 264.

¹²Philip Fiske, 'Drugs: A Global Business', *BBC News*, 9 June 2000.

¹³'Illegal Drugs', *The Economist*, 26 July 2003, p. 86.

¹⁴Michael J. Dziedzic, 'The Transnational Drug Trade and Regional Security', *Survival*, November-December 1989, p. 533.

traders. The laundering of drug money depends on accountants, lawyers, bankers and other actors.¹⁵ Drug trafficking is also connected to other categories of transnational crime that include money laundering, arms smuggling, corruption, illegal migration and in some cases terrorism.

The Chinese triads trade most of Asia's narcotics.¹⁶ They collaborate with other transnational criminal organizations, such as the Japanese yakuza and Vietnamese gangs, to distribute illicit drugs. The drug trade, but also to an increasing extent human smuggling and trafficking, has provided these mafias with exceptional financial resources. These funds enable the criminal syndicates to purchase modern military equipment and to pay off corrupt politicians, judges and police authorities. Consequently, the reference to these mafias as mere criminal groups, especially in the case of the Chinese triads, tends to minimise the threat that they pose to the political, economic and societal stability of East Asian states. Instead, it may be more appropriate to deem them as transnational criminal powers.

Drug trafficking is perhaps the most serious transnational criminal problem faced by East Asian states. The social ills caused by the trafficking and consumption of narcotics are well known and documented. The drug trade increases drug consumption and addiction, raises the level of violent crime, affects the health of the consumers, spreads HIV/AIDS through intravenous drug use,¹⁷ wastes human potential and undermines family structures.¹⁸ These social effects are felt in the countries of production, transit and destination. In addition to its social consequences, drug trafficking has significant economic and political effects. It creates shadow economies that evade taxation authorities, distort financial institutions and undermine national economies. Moreover,

¹⁵Allan Castle, *Transnational Organized Crime and International Security*, Working Paper no. 19, Vancouver: Institute of International Relations, The University of British Columbia, November 1997, p. 15-16.

¹⁶See Ko-Lin Chin, Sheldon Zhang and Robert J. Kelly, 'Transnational Chinese Organized Crime Activities: Patterns and Emerging Trends', *Transnational Organized Crime*, vol. 4, no. 3&4, Autumn/Winter 1998, pp. 127-154.

¹⁷Mangai Balasegaram, 'Aids explodes on Trafficking Routes', *BBC News*, 15 June 2000; Mangai Balasegaram, 'Vietnam's Drugs and Aids Epidemic', *BBC News*, 9 June 2000.

¹⁸'Economic and Social Consequences of Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking', United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Regional Centre for East Asia and the Pacific.

the drug trade is the prime contributor to the worldwide problem of money laundering. Finally, drug traffickers violate national borders, compromise political and administrative systems and erode the rule of law. They manipulate state authority by corrupting politicians, judges as well as police and military authorities.

Narcotics Production in East Asia

The production of narcotics in East Asia is an historic phenomenon that has clearly predated the emergence of a so-called process of globalization. Regional production has been increased, however, as a result of an ever-growing demand for illicit drugs at a global level. The Golden Triangle, which incorporates Northern Thailand, Eastern Myanmar and Western Laos, has traditionally been one of the leading producing regions of narcotics in the world.¹⁹ Thailand has succeeded in significantly reducing opium cultivation in its Northern provinces primarily through economic development that has offered these regions with an alternative to drug trafficking.²⁰ In contrast, Myanmar and Laos are still among the largest cultivators of opium poppies worldwide. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated that the cultivated areas in these two countries were respectively 80,000 and 15,000 hectares in 2002.²¹ In the case of Myanmar, however, this figure had been reduced from 105,000 hectares the previous year. The recent efforts made by the military leadership to reduce opium production in the country have led the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNDCP) to describe Myanmar as one of the countries most committed to combating illicit drugs.

Rather than a derivative of the forces of globalization, the production of narcotics is still very much dependent on the domestic conditions prevailing in a specific producing country. The central importance of Myanmar in the Golden Triangle heroin trade partly results from the activities of the former Burmese Communist Party (BCP) and its

¹⁹See Ronald D. Renard, *The Burmese Connection: Illegal Drugs and the Making of the Golden Triangle*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996.

²⁰See *Opium Reduction in Thailand 1970-2000: A Thirty-Year Journey*, Prepared by Ronald D. Renard for the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), Regional Centre for East Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok: UNDCP, 2001.

²¹'Illegal Drugs', *The Economist*, 26 July 2003, p. 86.

breaking-up into separate factions in 1989.²² The BCP started to traffic drugs in the 1970s to fund its fight against the military regime of General Ne Win who had seized power in 1962. The BCP gradually became a central player in the production and distribution of heroin. In September 1988, the military government in Yangon transformed itself into the State and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) after having violently suppressed a popular rebellion. This was followed a year later by the splitting up of the BCP into numerous groups including the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Shan State Army, the National Democratic Alliance Army, and the New Democratic Army. Between 1989 and 1995, SLORC reached ceasefire agreements with 14 rebel ethnic groups, permitting them to trade heroin in exchange for not attacking government troops or entering areas under its control. Due to the growing evidence of complicity between the military government and the drug traffickers, Dupont writes that Myanmar is ‘the most egregious example of a drug-tainted regime in East Asia’.²³

The production of narcotics in the Golden Triangle rapidly increased in the 1990s because of the drug trafficking activities of rebel groups and the rampant level of corruption among Myanmar’s government officials.²⁴ Olson explains that it is not clear whether the ethnic rebel armies are ‘drug trafficking organizations that use a cover of nationalism to give their activities a patina of legitimacy or whether they are national liberation movements that turned to drug trafficking as a means to raise money’.²⁵ The UWSA is one of the largest armed drug trafficking militia in the world, disposing over 10,000 soldiers and exercising almost full control over the Shan State in Northeast Myanmar. It is untroubled by Yangon with which a ceasefire agreement has been signed. The agreement allows the UWSA to retain its weapons, to administer the Shan State area and it provides a ‘*de facto* licence to traffic in drugs’.²⁶ The military junta in Yangon is still in conflict, however, with the Shan State Army and the Karen National Union that

²²Alan Dupont, ‘Transnational Crime, Drugs, and Security in East Asia’, *Asian Survey*, vol. 34, no. 3, May/June 1999, pp. 433-455.

²³Dupont, ‘Transnational Crime, Drugs, and Security in East Asia’, p. 445.

²⁴Dupont, *East Asia Imperilled*, pp. 198-199.

²⁵William J. Olson, ‘Illegal Narcotics in Southeast Asia’, in William M. Carpenter and David G. Wienczek (eds) *Asian Security Outlook 2000*, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000, p. 102.

²⁶Richard M. Gibson and John B. Haseman, ‘Prospects for Controlling Narcotics Production and Trafficking in Myanmar’, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, vol. 25, no. 1, April 2003, p. 8.

often clash militarily with the *tatmadaw* (Myanmar's armed forces) and the pro-Yangon UWSA.

In supplement to the heroin trade, drug manufacturers in the region have diversified into the manufacturing of ATS, which include amphetamines, methamphetamines and substances with hallucinogenic properties such as Ecstasy. ATS can be produced in small and portable laboratories and can easily be smuggled in large quantities to other countries. Its illicit production has dramatically increased in the Golden Triangle since the early 1990s, specifically in Myanmar where relatively inexpensive forms of the drug are being produced in massive quantities. Over the last few years, the UWSA is believed to have become the largest producer and supplier of synthetic drugs in Southeast Asia. Gibson and Haseman point out that drug traffickers in Myanmar have 'supplemented their heroin product with methamphetamine to meet the new demand from overseas as well as from neighbouring countries for new "cocktail drugs" that are widely distributed in Southeast Asia and transited to Western markets'.²⁷

Distribution and Consumption of Narcotics in East Asia

Some Southeast Asian countries have traditionally served as transit for illicit drugs exported to different parts of the world including North America, Europe and Northeast Asia. An effective distribution network enables the drug traffickers to transport the refined heroin and amphetamines from the Golden Triangle into Thailand but also into China's Yunnan Province and then overland to Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao. Moreover, Ho Chi Minh City, Manila and Phnom Penh have become important hubs in the global drug distribution network. All these destinations are used as transit points to supply domestic and international markets and clearly illuminate the transnational nature of the drug trade.

Thailand has remained an important route of the illicit drug trade. It has a rugged land border of 2400km with Myanmar, most of which is un-demarcated. These geographical factors make the reduction of the inflow of drugs from Myanmar a difficult task. The

²⁷Gibson and Haseman, 'Prospects for Controlling Narcotics Production and Trafficking in Myanmar', p. 7.

Phra Nuang Task Force is a special unit of the Thai army that guards the mountainous border and has received over the last few years training and support from the US army. In addition to the geographical impediments, the Thai authorities are poorly equipped to deal with the drug trafficking problem coming from Myanmar. Moreover, some corrupt Thai officials are believed to be involved in the illicit drug trade. Finally, the activities of the Thai authorities are restrained by the fact that they have no influence on the production of ATS in the Shan State of Myanmar. Unless the military junta in Yangon forcefully combats the production of narcotics within its frontiers and puts strong pressure on the UWSA to stop its illicit activities, millions of ATS tablets will continue to be smuggled into Thailand each year. Thai army officials expected a billion ATS bills to pour into the country in 2003.²⁸

Narcotics produced in the Golden Triangle used to be primarily exported to non-Asian countries. This has changed since the late 1980s due to a dramatic increase in drugs consumption in East Asia.²⁹ Though relatively new, the problem of ATS is growing rapidly. Its consumption has already become the prime drug problem in Asia, larger than opium or heroin addiction.³⁰ Young people prefer to consume synthetic drugs that come in the form of easy to swallow pills over heroin, increasingly perceived as an 'old man's drug'.³¹ This paper will use Thailand as an illustration to highlight the consequences of drug consumption.

Thailand's office of Narcotics Control Board estimates that the country has at least 1.2 million consumers of amphetamines and heroin, the most abused drugs in the nation.³² Heroin abuse takes a large proportion of the available drug treatment resources and has contributed to the spread of HIV/AIDS in Thailand, which has one of the highest infection rates in Asia. Yet, the most serious recent trend in the country has been the

²⁸Andrew Marshall and Anthony Davis, 'Soldiers of Fortune', *Time*, 16 December 2002, p. 18.

²⁹Dupont, *East Asia Imperilled*, p. 205.

³⁰Jayandra Menon, 'Scourge of Asia: Not Heroin but Synthetic Drugs', *The Straits Times Interactive*, 28 February 2002; Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, 'Asia faces New Drug Scourge', *BBC News*, 20 May 2002; 'Methamphetamine Scourge', *BBC News*, 25 June 2002; 'Ice ousts Ecstasy as Drug of Choice among the Youth', *The Straits Times Interactive*, 13 September 2002.

³¹K.C. Vijayan, "'Status Drugs' New Enemy No. 1', *The Straits Times Interactive*, 5 August 2003.

³²Simon Ingram, 'Thailand's War on Burmese Drugs', *BBC News*, 25 June 2002.

rapid increase in the use of synthetic drugs, especially a form of methamphetamine cheap to produce and easy to consume known in Thai as *ya ba* – ‘crazy medicine’. The consumption of ATS in Thailand has been a growing source of concern since 1998 and has over the last few years reached epidemic proportions.

The International Narcotics Control Board estimates that 5 per cent (3 million) of the Thai population (63 million) are consumers of methamphetamines. According to official figures, 700 million pills are sold domestically every year. The consumption of ATS has become popular among university students but also increasingly among school children. The average age of drug initiation continues therefore to decline. ATS consumption has had a negative impact on crime rates and the justice system, with more than sixty per cent of court cases in Thailand somehow related to narcotics.³³

Since becoming Thai Prime Minister in 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra has portrayed drug trafficking as a threat to the Thai national security and has promised to rid the country of the illicit drugs problem. He repeated his declaration of war on drugs on 1 February 2003 vowing to the Thai population to eliminate the narcotics problem within three months. Besides the seizure of more than 40 million ATS pills and the arrest of thousands of suspected drug producers and dealers, it was later reported that more than 2,500 people had been killed as part of the anti-drugs campaign between 1 February and 30 April 2003.³⁴ The Thai government blamed inter-gang warfare for most of the killings. In contrast, human rights groups suspected the police of having executed alleged traffickers and condemned the war on drugs as targeting minority groups in Thailand.

Thaksin announced in December 2003 that the illicit drug problem had been eradicated up to the point where it no longer had a major impact on the Thai population but added that the fight would go on until the country was entirely drug-free.³⁵ Beyond the human costs and effects on the Thai justice system, it is questionable whether any crackdown on

³³‘Nasty Business’, In A Survey of Thailand, *The Economist*, 2 March 2002, p. 14.

³⁴‘Drugs Victory Price “too High”’, *Bangkok Post*, 3 December 2003.

³⁵Yuwadee Tunyasiri Supoj Wacharoen, ‘PM declares Nation now out of Danger’, *Bangkok Post*, 2 December 2003.

narcotics could ever transform Thailand into a drug-free country. Drug abuse and trafficking is a phenomenon that will most likely never disappear completely. The prime target of any anti-drugs policy should therefore be to reduce and manage the problem rather than try to eradicate it through short-term and radical measures.

Multilateral Response to Drug Trafficking in East Asia

It was previously argued that in a context of globalization state and human security against drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime will increasingly depend on deeper forms of transnational cooperation. It is therefore important to examine the kind of transnational cooperation that has emerged in East Asia to tackle the illicit drug trade. The East Asian countries have formulated a plan to combat the narcotics problem at a multilateral level. In October 2000, Thailand hosted the International Congress in Pursuit of a Drug Free ASEAN 2015 with the UNDCP. The congress was attended by the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the United States, Canada, Japan, Korea, China, India, New Zealand, Australia and the European Union. It led to the formulation of the Bangkok Political Declaration in Pursuit of a Drug-Free ASEAN 2015 and to the adoption of a plan of action, the ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD).

The ACCORD seeks to eradicate, or at least drastically reduce, the production, trafficking and consumption of narcotics in Southeast Asia by 2015. It created a Plan of Action that relies on four central pillars:

1. Proactively advocating civic awareness on dangers of drugs and social response
2. Building consensus and sharing best practices on demand reduction
3. Strengthening the rule of law by an enhanced network of control measures and improved law enforcement co-operation and legislative review
4. Eliminating the supply of illicit drugs by boosting alternative development programmes and community participation in the eradication of illicit crops³⁶

³⁶ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD), Bangkok, Thailand, 13 October 2000.

The plan links each of the four pillars to a set of challenges as well as actions that ought to be undertaken by China and the ASEAN states. In the case of the third pillar, for instance, the challenges are said to be the large production of opium in Southeast Asia, the rapid increase in ATS trafficking and consumption, the urgent need for legal cooperation and the strengthening of the rule of law. In response to these problems, several actions are recommended that include the training of law enforcement agencies, the introduction of national legislation to combat money laundering, and better judicial drug control.

With regards to the final pillar, i.e. the elimination of the supply of illicit drugs, the two interrelated challenges faced by the regional states are to reduce the cultivation of opium poppies and to integrate poor rural areas into their national economies. The actions suggested by the ACCORD involve a better measurement of the quantities of opium cultivated in the region and a decline in production through crop substitution. Furthermore, the ASEAN states and China agreed in October 2000 on target dates and the creation of a monitoring mechanism to follow the progress of the drug control activities. The ACCORD declares: ‘All participating countries and international organizations will share the responsibility of data collection as well as the monitoring of the process. The resulting information will be available to all participating bodies’.³⁷

The first operational meeting of the ACCORD Plan of Action was organised in Bali in November 2001 and attended by 17 states as well as some governmental and non-governmental organisations.³⁸ Thailand and Myanmar agreed to contribute financially to the action plan while Japan, the United States, the UN and the Asian Development Bank reiterated their support. It was decided to enhance cooperation between ASEAN and China on law enforcement, alternative development and other measures. Finally, the participants agreed that the different task force meetings would gather once a year.

³⁷ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD).

³⁸First Meeting of the Accord Plan of Action Task Forces, Bali, Indonesia, 12-14 November 2001.

The ACCORD is a comprehensive plan put forward by China and the Southeast Asian countries in their fight against drug trafficking and abuse. If properly implemented, its four pillars could provide an initial response to the narcotics problem. While the ACCORD is primarily a declaration of intent, it still seeks to address some key issues. First, it regionalises and internationalises cooperation against narcotics by including China. The regional production, trafficking and consumption of narcotics should be viewed as an East Asian problem with global ramifications and it needs therefore to be tackled increasingly through broader cooperative structures. Second, the ACCORD addresses the question of supervision by establishing a monitoring mechanism and introducing some target dates. Finally, the need for financial resources is discussed in the ACCORD.

Nonetheless, it is still to be seen whether the ACCORD will succeed in contributing to a reduction and a better management of the narcotics problem in East Asia. The multilateral agreement offers an institutional structure to enhance inter-state cooperation and focuses on action plans to reduce narcotics demand and supply. Yet, its success will depend on the actual implementation of its central pillars and actions lines rather than on their endorsement at a diplomatic level. However, most attention has so far been directed towards declaratory cooperative efforts rather than on actual collaboration in illicit drugs interdiction.

ASEAN has also sought to address the problem of drug trafficking in its Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime adopted in May 2002.³⁹ To enhance the exchange of information, the programme asks member states to disseminate relevant laws, regulations and bilateral agreements, as well as to the international treaties they have acceded to. It also seeks to improve law enforcement and training by recommending the appointment of drug liaison officers, the organization of conferences and training programmes. In short, the ASEAN and broader regional reaction to drug trafficking has primarily focused on soft mechanisms of cooperation. Areas of concentration include the sharing of

³⁹Work Programme on Terrorism to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 17 May 2002.

intelligence and expertise and to the development of capacity building programmes. While this increased level of multilateral collaboration should be welcomed, more needs to be done in terms of strengthening law enforcement and judiciary cooperation.

C. Human Smuggling and Trafficking in East Asia

Migration and Organized Crime in a Globalizing World

Human smuggling and trafficking further complicates and adds a criminal dimension to the issue of cross-border migration. The latter is a complex social phenomenon that is influenced by economic, political, socio-cultural, historical and geographical factors and accelerated by the rapid pace of globalization. Economic determinants, especially poverty and economic disparities are the prime motivation for migrants to leave their countries of origin. Over the last ten years, the issue of illegal migration has been increasingly linked to organised criminal groups that now largely control the smuggling and trafficking of people. Although we live in a globalizing world, migrants increasingly face restrictive immigration policies and reduced legal immigration opportunities. This leads to a growing reliance on illegal methods to either enter or remain in a specific country.

Skeldon points out that as 'long as countries in the region maintain their policies of restrictive immigration, trafficking can be expected to continue and almost certainly increase'.⁴⁰ The US government estimates that approximately 800,000 to 900,000 people are trafficked annually across international borders.⁴¹ Human smuggling and trafficking is a thriving activity for organized criminal groups, and it is gradually replacing the illicit drug trade as the largest illegal business in the world.⁴² It is already the most lucrative illicit business after the smuggling of narcotics and arms. Human smugglers and

⁴⁰Ronald Skeldon, 'Trafficking: A Perspective from Asia', in Reginald Appleyard (ed.) *Perspectives on Trafficking of Migrants*, New York: International Organization for Migration, United Nations, 2000, p. 22.

⁴¹'State Department says Human Trafficking on Rise', *cnn.com*, 11 June 2003.

⁴²'Human Smuggling eclipses Drugs Trade', *BBC News*, 20 June 2002.

traffickers make high profits while facing a low risk of detection and, if caught and tried, encounter relatively short prison sentences in comparison with drug traffickers.

People-smugglers demand large sums of money to individuals in exchange for their illegal entry into a new country.⁴³ They normally provide transport, fake passports, transit accommodation and the crossing of borders. Those who wish to escape domestic poverty or conflict increasingly rely on these dangerous and expensive services. For example, 353 illegal migrants en route to be smuggled into Australia were killed in 2001 when their ship sank in Indonesian waters. The smuggled immigrants usually reimburse the price of the passage after their arrival. Due to their illegal status, they cannot enter the open labour market and end up in the underground economy in low skilled jobs or get involved in the sex industry and crime.

Human smuggling ends once the illegal migrants reach their destination and reimburses their debt. This is the point, however, where the exploitation of the trafficked people starts.⁴⁴ People traffickers trap mostly young women and children into work or prostitution through the use of force or deceit. They end up after having been promised good jobs as sex slaves, domestic labourers and cheap labour. The illegal trade in women is difficult to apprehend as it is predominantly hidden within the broader phenomenon of undocumented migration.

Victims of traffickers are betrayed, exploited and have their human rights violated. Their passports are generally confiscated and their illegal status makes it much harder for them

⁴³The UN defines people smuggling as ‘the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or permanent resident’. *Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*, New York: United Nations, December 2000.

⁴⁴The UN defines people trafficking as ‘the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation’. *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*, New York: United Nations, December 2000.

to approach local police authorities.⁴⁵ When they do, they risk fines, prison terms and deportation. Organized criminal groups can be involved in the smuggling and in the exploitation of illegal labourers. Moreover, these gangs traffic smuggled people who are unable to pay back their debt after reaching their destination. The distinction between trafficking and smuggling can therefore be blurred.⁴⁶ While human smuggling is by definition a transnational activity, the trafficking of people occurs between as well as within states.

Human Smuggling and Trafficking in East Asia

Many undocumented workers in East Asia have relied on people-smugglers to illegally enter foreign countries. Smugglers use Cambodia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Indonesia and others as transit points before transporting the illegal migrants to third countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, the United States, Australia, Canada and Japan.⁴⁷ A majority of these illegal immigrants are women who often end up in the sex industry and fall into the hands of people traffickers. For example, 150,000 foreign women are estimated to work in the sex industry in Japan.⁴⁸ The criminal syndicates employ middle people, generally female, to trap women.

The UN estimates that 200,000 women are trafficked annually in Southeast Asia.⁴⁹ Sixty per cent of the regional trafficking in women and children is believed to occur between major cities in Southeast Asia and the remaining 40 per cent to the rest of the world, particularly the United States.⁵⁰ The trafficking of people by criminal groups in East Asia therefore occurs both at a regional and global level. Again, while the process of

⁴⁵Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 'Trafficking in People: The Human Rights Dimension', in Phil Williams and Dimitri Vlassis (eds) *Combating Transnational Crime*, a Special Issue of *Transnational Organized Crime*, vol. 4, nos 3&4, Autumn/Winter 1998, p. 245.

⁴⁶Skeldon, 'Trafficking: A Perspective from Asia', p. 11.

⁴⁷Dupont, *Asia Imperilled*, pp. 156-158. See also Jeremy Hillman, 'Hong Kong: Gateway to the West', *BBC News*, 5 July 2000; 'Illegals Sneaking in via Bintan on Fridays', *The Straits Times Interactive*, 20 March 2002; 'KL Airport used as Transit Point to Smuggle Illegals', *The Straits Times Interactive*, 1 April 2002.

⁴⁸'Japan's Sex Industry thriving on Visa Abuse', *The Straits Times Interactive*, 17 November 2003.

⁴⁹'200,000 Women enslaved by Traffickers in S-E Asia, says UN', *The Straits Times Interactive*, 22 August 2002.

⁵⁰Panitan Wattanayagorn, 'Transnational Crime and Threats to Regional Stability: Trafficking in Persons, Narcotics, Small Arms, and Sea Piracy', Conference Paper presented at *Dialogue on US-Vietnam Relations: Global and Regional Influences*, Dalat, Vietnam, 23-25 October 2003, p. 4.

globalization has not created this criminal problem, globalization has extended its transnational scope and amplified its effects.

In terms of women trafficking, the Southeast Asian nations can be divided into source, transit and receiving states.⁵¹ The Philippines and Indonesia are mainly source countries. In particular, the Philippines has been actively encouraging its citizens, above all women, to migrate and has become with about six million workers abroad the largest migrant country in the world. Almost two-thirds of the Indonesian and Filipino labourers working abroad are female.⁵² The illegal trafficking of many of these women is organized and developed by criminal networks, which force them to work in sweatshops and the sex industry.

Cambodia is mostly a source country but has also become in recent years a key transit and receiving nation. Vietnamese girls are trafficked to Cambodia to supply the sex trade. Thailand is a source, transit and receiving country. Thousands of women from China, Laos, and Myanmar work as prostitutes in Thailand.⁵³ Some women are first trafficked to Thailand before being moved to other regional states or other parts of the world like Japan, Taiwan, Australia, Europe and North America.⁵⁴ Finally, Singapore and Malaysia are receiving countries.

People trafficking are essentially a human security issue. It is crucial to focus on the security of the women and children who are abused and victimized by people traffickers. Kristof writes that at its worst human trafficking ‘takes innocent village girls, often sold by relatives or kidnapped by neighbours, imprisons them in brothels to be raped repeatedly and leaves them dead of AIDS by their early 20’s’.⁵⁵ Still, too often, states in East Asia treat trafficked people as criminals who undermine their border security and territorial integrity. In contrast, many governmental and non-governmental

⁵¹Wattanayagorn, ‘Transnational Crime and Threats to Regional Stability’, p. 5.

⁵²Dupont, *Asia Imperilled*, p. 158.

⁵³See Pasuk Phongpaichit, Sungsidh Piriyarangsarn and Nualnoi Treerat, *Guns, Girls, Gambling, Ganja: Thailand’s Illegal Economy and Public Policy*, Bangkok: Silkworm Books, 1998, chapter eight.

⁵⁴Wattanayagorn, ‘Transnational Crime and Threats to Regional Stability’, p. 5.

⁵⁵Nicholas D. Kristof, ‘Back from the Brothel, and full of Hope’, *International Herald Tribune*, 26 January 2004.

organizations, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) focus on the security and welfare of the smuggled and trafficked migrants. They approach these persons as victims of people traffickers rather than perpetrators of a crime and demand that the war against people smuggling and trafficking does not damage their individual human rights.

The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 and the ongoing socio-economic difficulties faced by Indonesia and other regional nations have increased the trafficking of women in East Asia. The root causes of this problem are poverty, insufficient knowledge and information about the risks of trafficking, as well as a lack of education and job opportunities for women. In discussions about people trafficking, Skeldon asserts that 'the improvement in the socio-economic status of the population, particularly through the education of girls, is likely to lead to reductions in its worst forms'.⁵⁶ Literacy and job programmes are key factors to consider when addressing the low status of girls in poor rural societies.⁵⁷

The support of governmental and non-governmental actors is crucial for financing and implementing concrete projects in different East Asian countries. Initiatives are also needed to enhance public awareness on the dangers of human trafficking and to assist women and children who have been victimized by traffickers. Finally, it is essential that all East Asian countries develop the necessary legislation against people trafficking and vigorously enforce the laws against this horrendous crime.

Multilateral Response to People Trafficking

Many governments in East Asia have so far lacked the political will, institutional capabilities and laws to respond effectively to well-organized criminal groups involved in human trafficking. Their operations are network-orientated, underground and take place at a transnational level. Such criminal activities rely on complex infrastructures and are connected to other transnational networks involved in narcotics, arms trafficking, money

⁵⁶Skeldon, 'Trafficking: A Perspective from Asia', p. 22.

⁵⁷Kristof, 'Back from the Brothel, and full of Hope', 26 January 2004.

laundering and counterfeit documentation. They also possess the necessary funds to purchase modern equipment and pay off corrupt police and government officials.

Moreover, some East Asian countries have been slow at criminalizing human trafficking. Indonesia, for example, does not have legislation against human smuggling and trafficking. Its judiciary system often prosecutes these crimes merely for visa offences. Other countries only prosecute this despicable form of crime with short prison sentences. In contrast, Thailand has adopted tougher and effective laws over the last few years, including the 1997 Trafficking in Women and Children Act.

As we are dealing with transnational challenges to state and human security, it is important to discuss the kind of multilateral cooperation that has emerged in East Asia to tackle human smuggling and trafficking. In response to the scale of the problem, Hassan Wirayuda and Alexander Downer, the foreign ministers of Indonesia and Australia respectively, co-chaired the Regional Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime in February 2002. The event was held in Bali and gathered ministers from thirty-four countries, including Iran and Afghanistan from where a substantial number of illegal migrants depart, as well as representatives from the International Organization for Migration, the UNHCR and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).

The Co-Chairs' Statement emphasized the rapid increase in illegal migration in the Asia-Pacific and acknowledged the human rights issues associated with people smuggling and trafficking.⁵⁸ The ministers indicated that the criminal networks that control human smuggling and trafficking are connected to other forms of transnational crime, such as the drug trade, money laundering and arms trafficking. They agreed to cooperate on five non-binding measures; namely, to increase the exchange of information and establish intelligence sharing arrangements; to strengthen collaboration among law-enforcement agencies; to improve cooperation on visa services; to enhance public awareness on the dangers of people smuggling and trafficking; and to collaborate on determining the

⁵⁸Co-Chairs' Statement, Regional Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime, Bali, Indonesia, 28 February 2002.

identity and nationality of illegal migrants. Finally, the statement announced the holding of ad hoc experts' meetings to help implement these recommendations. The conference was an initial success as a regional attempt to formulate a reaction to human smuggling and trafficking. As Wirayuda stated at the end of the event, '[t]he most important achievement is that countries in the Asia-Pacific region agreed that people smuggling and related transnational crimes are international issues that require a collective response'.⁵⁹

The two foreign ministers co-chaired a second conference on the issue in Bali in April 2003. This second conference gathered delegates from more than 30 Asian and Pacific countries.⁶⁰ Wirayuda told the delegates that Indonesia would fulfil its promise to outlaw human smuggling and trafficking. The co-chairs' statement reviewed the progress made since the last conference and made a series of recommendations on the measures that needed to be adopted and implemented. These consisted of promoting regional cooperation, developing more intelligence sharing arrangements and of the enactment of national legislation to criminalize human smuggling and trafficking.

The ministers involved agreed to continue the Bali Process under the coordination of Indonesia and Australia and to convene a third conference in the following two to three years. In the meantime, ad hoc experts' groups would continue to meet. Although such inter-state conferences are necessary to highlight the seriousness of the problem, it is uncertain whether multilateral gatherings that only make broad recommendations can lead to a better regional response to human smuggling and trafficking. Moreover, in comparison to the first conference, this second conference appeared to have only a limited impact.

Similar to the response to drug trafficking, the East Asian reaction to human smuggling and trafficking has focused on establishing soft mechanisms of cooperation that include the sharing of intelligence and expertise and the development of capacity building programmes. It should be noted for instance that the ASEAN work programme to

⁵⁹Quoted in 'Ministers Agree Action on Smugglers', *BBC News*, 28 February 2002.

⁶⁰Co-Chairs' Statement, Second Regional Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime, Bali, Indonesia, 29-30 April 2003.

combat transnational crime also seeks to fight human trafficking by focusing on the exchange of information, training, institutional capacity-building and extra-regional cooperation. While this increased level of multilateral collaboration is beneficial, more needs to be done in terms of strengthening law enforcement and judiciary cooperation.

The absence of deeper collaboration on human smuggling and trafficking has also contributed to a political environment of general mistrust where states blame each other. The lack of political unity on these urgent problems results from the sensitivity of the migration question and the ensuing bilateral pressures. The situation is made worse by the fact that human smuggling and trafficking have caused tensions among regional states, especially since the financial crisis of 1997. For instance, the issue of human smuggling has complicated bilateral relations between Indonesia and Australia. Most of the asylum-seekers who travel illegally to Australia are smuggled by criminal syndicates via Indonesia. In this respect, the co-chairmanship of the international conferences has been especially relevant, as it indicates the willingness of the two countries to cooperate on this issue.

Conclusion

This paper has focused on illicit drug and human trafficking in East Asia. The issues and questions raised seek to highlight examples of transnational crime in the context of a globalizing world. Drug trafficking is an ancient domestic and transnational problem that will most likely never disappear completely. Yet, drug cartels have taken advantage of the forces of globalization to extend their operations and establish transnational networks that transcend national borders and regions. In addition to developing effective interstate cooperation against criminal syndicates, the prime target of any anti-drugs policy at both national and regional level should be to reduce and manage the problem rather than try to eradicate it through short-term measures. Moreover, policy responses to drug trafficking tend to focus on the supply-side, and pay insufficient attention to the demand for illicit drugs. Yet, combating the supply side alone cannot reduce drug abuse and

trafficking, as demonstrated for example by the failure of the US war on drugs over the last 20 years. Besides strong law enforcement, a reduction in demand is the key to effectively managing the problem. Such a reduction hinges on education and preventive programmes, treatment, rehabilitation and other measures that can themselves only develop from an overall domestic policy against illicit drugs.

Economic inequalities and disparities, which are exacerbated by the processes of globalization, increase the criminal problems of human smuggling and trafficking. Illegal migratory movements will continue to rise as long as rich nations with low fertility rates and states with problems of overpopulation, economic difficulties, political instability, and in some cases civil wars co-exist side by side in a globalizing world. As these wide disparities are unlikely to disappear, the crucial question becomes how to regulate and manage these undocumented movements and prevent them from being increasingly controlled by criminal organizations. Unfortunately, multilateral cooperation on human smuggling and trafficking has so far been limited because the necessary collaboration touches on delicate issues like national jurisdiction, information sharing and problems of corruption.

The paper has argued that the protection of the state and its people against drug and human trafficking will increasingly require effective transnational cooperation. The discussion has indicated the depth of these problems in East Asia and has noted an increasing willingness towards multilateral cooperation in efforts to combat them. The regional response to drug and human trafficking has primarily consisted of sharing intelligence and expertise and on developing capacity building programmes. Yet, collaboration has also been restricted by questions of national jurisdiction and other matters. This suggests that a paradigm shift vis-à-vis the question of national sovereignty has not yet occurred in the region.

The East Asian countries have continued to adopt an understanding of the principle of national sovereignty associated with borders and national independence. This has led to a clash between the necessity to achieve deeper transnational cooperation against crime and

an opposition to measures that might undermine the territorial integrity of states. In addition to soft mechanisms of cooperation, deeper law enforcement and judiciary collaborations are required to address one of the darker sides of globalization. This could be initiated in East Asia with the signing of more bilateral and multilateral extradition treaties and mutual legal assistance treaties. Deeper forms of judiciary cooperation have already occurred at a bilateral level to combat terrorism, as demonstrated for example by the excellent collaboration between the Indonesian and Australian police forces during the investigation into the Bali bombings of 12 October 2002.

The growth of transnational cooperation against crime has been undermined by criminal groups and corrupt government officials. Yet, the development of effective cooperation has also been affected by the involvement of some state and non-state actors with political agendas in transnational crime networks. The role played by non-state political actors in criminal activities has been noted in the paper. Rebel groups in Myanmar have been involved in the production of narcotics in the Golden Triangle, while the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) is believed to finance some of its operations through sea piracy in the Straits of Malacca. State complicity is also a barrier to transnational cooperation in East Asia. In addition to exercising a *laissez-faire* policy with regards to law enforcement, some government officials in some East Asian countries play a direct and active role in transnational crime.⁶¹ These actors contribute to and benefit from a weak implementation of law and order in their own countries and may seek to prevent the emergence of transnational cooperation against crime at the regional level.

Finally, governments in East Asia have tended to treat non-traditional security issues as traditional ones, i.e. viewing these issues as tantamount to the security of the state. Human smuggling and trafficking are often described for example as threats to border security. Non-traditional security questions have therefore been absorbed into an understanding of security that focuses on the stability of the state. Too little attention is paid to the security of other actors in international relations, including that of the

⁶¹John McFarlane, 'Cooperation on Countering Transnational Criminal Networks in the Asia-Pacific: Cautious Optimism for the Future?', Paper presented at a Conference organized by IDSS on 'Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region, Washington DC, USA, 20-21 November 2003, p. 4.

individual. Security has continued to be generally equated with the state despite the fact that matters such as drug and human trafficking primarily endanger human security.

IDSS Working Paper Series

1. Vietnam-China Relations Since The End of The Cold War (1998)
Ang Cheng Guan
2. Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Prospects and Possibilities (1999)
Desmond Ball
3. Reordering Asia: “Cooperative Security” or Concert of Powers? (1999)
Amitav Acharya
4. The South China Sea Dispute re-visited (1999)
Ang Cheng Guan
5. Continuity and Change In Malaysian Politics: Assessing the Buildup to the 1999-2000 General Elections (1999)
Joseph Liow Chin Yong
6. ‘Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo’ as Justified, Executed and Mediated by NATO: Strategic Lessons for Singapore (2000)
Kumar Ramakrishna
7. Taiwan’s Future: Mongolia or Tibet? (2001)
Chien-peng (C.P.) Chung
8. Asia-Pacific Diplomacies: Reading Discontinuity in Late-Modern Diplomatic Practice (2001)
Tan See Seng
9. Framing “South Asia”: Whose Imagined Region? (2001)
Sinderpal Singh
10. Explaining Indonesia's Relations with Singapore During the New Order Period: The Case of Regime Maintenance and Foreign Policy (2001)
Terence Lee Chek Liang
11. Human Security: Discourse, Statecraft, Emancipation (2001)
Tan See Seng
12. Globalization and its Implications for Southeast Asian Security: A Vietnamese Perspective (2001)
Nguyen Phuong Binh
13. Framework for Autonomy in Southeast Asia’s Plural Societies (2001)
Miriam Coronel Ferrer
14. Burma: Protracted Conflict, Governance and Non-Traditional Security Issues (2001)
Ananda Rajah

15. Natural Resources Management and Environmental Security in Southeast Asia: Case Study of Clean Water Supplies in Singapore (2001)
Kog Yue Choong
16. Crisis and Transformation: ASEAN in the New Era (2001)
Etel Solingen
17. Human Security: East Versus West? (2001)
Amitav Acharya
18. Asian Developing Countries and the Next Round of WTO Negotiations (2001)
Barry Desker
19. Multilateralism, Neo-liberalism and Security in Asia: The Role of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum (2001)
Ian Taylor
20. Humanitarian Intervention and Peacekeeping as Issues for Asia-Pacific Security (2001)
Derek McDougall
21. Comprehensive Security: The South Asian Case (2002)
S.D. Muni
22. The Evolution of China's Maritime Combat Doctrines and Models: 1949-2001 (2002)
You Ji
23. The Concept of Security Before and After September 11 (2002)
 - a. The Contested Concept of Security
Steve Smith
 - b. Security and Security Studies After September 11: Some Preliminary Reflections
Amitav Acharya
24. Democratisation In South Korea And Taiwan: The Effect Of Social Division On Inter-Korean and Cross-Strait Relations (2002)
Chien-peng (C.P.) Chung
25. Understanding Financial Globalisation (2002)
Andrew Walter
26. 911, American Praetorian Unilateralism and the Impact on State-Society Relations in Southeast Asia (2002)
Kumar Ramakrishna
27. Great Power Politics in Contemporary East Asia: Negotiating Multipolarity or Hegemony? (2002)
Tan See Seng
28. What Fear Hath Wrought: Missile Hysteria and The Writing of "America" (2002)
Tan See Seng

29. International Responses to Terrorism: The Limits and Possibilities of Legal Control of Terrorism by Regional Arrangement with Particular Reference to Asean (2002)
Ong Yen Nee
30. Reconceptualizing the PLA Navy in Post – Mao China: Functions, Warfare, Arms, and Organization (2002)
Nan Li
31. Attempting Developmental Regionalism Through AFTA: The Domestic Politics – Domestic Capital Nexus (2002)
Helen E S Nesadurai
32. 11 September and China: Opportunities, Challenges, and Warfighting (2002)
Nan Li
33. Islam and Society in Southeast Asia after September 11 (2002)
Barry Desker
34. Hegemonic Constraints: The Implications of September 11 For American Power (2002)
Evelyn Goh
35. Not Yet All Aboard...But Already All At Sea Over Container Security Initiative (2002)
Irvin Lim
36. Financial Liberalization and Prudential Regulation in East Asia: Still Perverse? (2002)
Andrew Walter
37. Indonesia and The Washington Consensus (2002)
Premjith Sadasivan
38. The Political Economy of FDI Location: Why Don't Political Checks and Balances and Treaty Constraints Matter? (2002)
Andrew Walter
39. The Securitization of Transnational Crime in ASEAN (2002)
Ralf Emmers
40. Liquidity Support and The Financial Crisis: The Indonesian Experience (2002)
J Soedradjad Djiwandono
41. A UK Perspective on Defence Equipment Acquisition (2003)
David Kirkpatrick
42. Regionalisation of Peace in Asia: Experiences and Prospects of ASEAN, ARF and UN Partnership (2003)
Mely C. Anthony
43. The WTO In 2003: Structural Shifts, State-Of-Play And Prospects For The Doha Round (2003)
Razeen Sally

44. Seeking Security In The Dragon's Shadow : China and Southeast Asia In The Emerging Asian Order (2003)
Amitav Acharya
45. Deconstructing Political Islam In Malaysia: UMNO'S Response To PAS' Religio-Political Dialectic (2003)
Joseph Liow
46. The War On Terror And The Future of Indonesian Democracy (2003)
Tatik S. Hafidz
47. Examining The Role of Foreign Assistance in Security Sector Reforms: The Indonesian Case (2003)
Eduardo Lachica
48. Sovereignty and The Politics of Identity in International Relations (2003)
Adrian Kuah
49. Deconstructing *Jihad*; Southeast Asian Contexts (2003)
Patricia Martinez
50. The Correlates of Nationalism in Beijing Public Opinion (2003)
Alastair Iain Johnston
51. In Search of Suitable Positions' in the Asia Pacific: Negotiating the US-China Relationship and Regional Security (2003)
Evelyn Goh
52. American Unilateralism, Foreign Economic Policy and the 'Securitisation' of Globalisation (2003)
Richard Higgott
53. Fireball on the Water: Naval Force Protection-Projection, Coast Guarding, Customs Border Security & Multilateral Cooperation in Rolling Back the Global Waves of Terror from the Sea (2003)
Irvin Lim
54. Revisiting Responses To Power Preponderance: Going Beyond The Balancing-Bandwagoning Dichotomy (2003)
Chong Ja Ian
55. Pre-emption and Prevention: An Ethical and Legal Critique of the Bush Doctrine and Anticipatory Use of Force In Defence of the State (2003)
Malcolm Brailey
56. The Indo-Chinese Enlargement of ASEAN: Implications for Regional Economic Integration (2003)
Helen E S Nesadurai

57. The Advent of a New Way of War: Theory and Practice of Effects Based Operation (2003)
Joshua Ho
58. Critical Mass: Weighing in on *Force Transformation & Speed Kills* Post-Operation (2004)
Iraqi Freedom
Irvin Lim
59. Force Modernisation Trends in Southeast Asia (2004)
Andrew Tan
60. Testing Alternative Responses to Power Preponderance: Buffering, Binding, Bonding and Beleaguering in the Real World (2004)
Chong Ja Ian
61. Outlook on the Indonesian Parliamentary Election 2004 (2004)
Irman G. Lanti
62. Globalization and Non-Traditional Security Issues: A Study of Human and Drug Trafficking in East Asia (2004)
Ralf Emmers