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**OUTLOOK ON THE INDONESIAN  
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ELECTION 2004**

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*With Compliments*

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## ABSTRACT

Indonesia will be holding a series of general elections this year. The closest of which is the parliamentary election. While much attention has been paid on the direct presidential election, the parliamentary election is at least equally important, since only major parties or coalition of parties would be able to nominate candidates for the presidential election. Historically, the Indonesian politics have been organized around political groupings known as the *aliran*, especially in conditions of unimpeded political competition. The last election in 1999 marked a return of *aliran* politics after a long hiatus. The election this year will not bring a major change to the structure of the *aliran* politics. The major parties will still be those that have strong *aliran* bases, either in the nationalist, modernist Muslim or traditionalist Muslim camps. Having said that, the election this year will see an interesting dynamism, particularly in the nationalist camp, where the Sukarnoist parties led by the PDI-P will face challenges from some Suhartoist parties. In the modernist and traditionalist *aliran*, the race will be more structured and simple. A heated struggle for the non-*aliran* votes will occur, especially within Golkar. In the near future, a struggle for power in Golkar likely will take place and will probably change the outlook of the election.

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# OUTLOOK ON THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION 2004

## **Introduction**

The year 2004 is a year of political change. Important countries in the world such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia will hold elections this year, and may result in change of governments. In Southeast Asia, elections will take place in Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. Malaysia has undergone a change of leadership last year, whilst there are speculations that a power transfer will also happen in Singapore this year.

In that context, elections in Indonesia this year become important. As the largest nation in Southeast Asia and the largest Muslim nation in the world, elections and a possible change of leadership in Indonesia will have external repercussions. This year's elections are also rather special. For the first time in the history of the republic, Indonesians will vote directly for their president and vice president.

Some observers have noted that the direct presidential election in June will take much of the attention away from the parliamentary election in April. But this could be misleading, since only parties or coalition of parties that receive 15 percent of the total seats in the DPR (parliament) or 20 percent of the popular votes in the parliamentary election can nominate candidates for president and vice president.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See Law No. 23/2003 on Elections of President and Vice President, Article 5(4).

Similar to the 1999 election, the competition in this year's parliamentary election will undoubtedly be intense with some possibilities of clashes among supporters of different parties. But the likelihood of parties receiving more votes and seats is greater, since there are now only 24 contestant parties, down from 48 in 1999. The parties are competing for 550 seats up from 462 in 1999.<sup>2</sup>

This paper discusses the outlook of this election. It first provides background information on the structure of Indonesian politics by focusing on the analysis of existing political groupings, known among Indonesianists as the political *aliran*. It then analyzes the electoral race among the contending parties within each of these respective *aliran*. It also assesses the significance of non-*aliran* parties in the race for the votes of the urban-educated middle classes. It then concludes with some early crude estimation of the election results.

### **The Structure of Indonesian Politics: The Primordial *Aliran* and the Rational Middle Class**

The groups that make up Indonesia's important political segments are known as the "*aliran*". The definitions of *aliran* are usually divided into two large clusters. Political scientists Herbert Feith and Lance Castles perceive the *aliran* as political parties encircled by a number of social organizations, which are linked through formal or informal networks.<sup>3</sup> A number of studies have been undertaken using the political *aliran*

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<sup>2</sup> See Law No. 12/2003 on Elections of National Parliament, Regional Representation, and Local Parliament, Article 47.

<sup>3</sup> Herbert Feith (1970) "Introduction," in Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, eds. (1970) Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-1965, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

perspective, especially in the 1960s and 1970s.<sup>4</sup> The other definition of *aliran* reflects its anthropological roots more closely. For example, Benedict Anderson refers to a unique, integral cultural outlook adhered to by a number of people with a similar world-view who are either organized or unorganized (but potentially organizable) in socio-political groupings.<sup>5</sup>

The *aliran* concept is naturally used more often in anthropological and cultural studies of Indonesia, since Clifford Geertz first coined the concept in an anthropological study in the 1950s. The focus of Geertz's study was on the divergent socio-religious practices in the Javanese community, between the syncretic *abangan*, the pious *santri* and the aristocratic *priyayi*.<sup>6</sup> In fact, the utilization of the *aliran* concept by political scientists can be perceived as an extension of the anthropological perspective, and as an attempt to gauge the saliency of the divergent socio-cultural groupings in the political arena. The political science use of the *aliran* could therefore be defined as structural, as it focuses more on the political *aliran* organizations and institutions, such as major political parties and associated major social organizations, whereas the anthropological use is more cultural, as it focuses on the ideational aspects and socio-cultural practices.

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<sup>4</sup> See for example, the analysis of *aliran*'s influence on the elite bureaucracy in Donald K. Emmerson (1976) Indonesia's Elite: Political Culture and Cultural Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. On the operation of *aliran* politics in the local level, see R. William Liddle (1970) Ethnicity, Party, and National Integration: An Indonesian Case Study, New Haven: Yale University Press.

<sup>5</sup> Benedict R. O'G. Anderson (1972) "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," reprinted in Benedict R. O'G. Anderson (1990) Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, fn. 85.

<sup>6</sup> Clifford Geertz (1960) The Religion of Java, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

However, it should be noted here that this division is not, by any measure, neat or clear-cut. Analyses of political issues such as the relations between religion and state were given considerable attention in Geertz's, The Religion of Java.<sup>7</sup> Feith's "streams of political thinking" also dealt with some ideational analysis, albeit not to a great extent. And then of course, Anderson's Language and Power was perhaps the best work linking both the political and the cultural in the Indonesian analytical setting. Nevertheless, there is yet to be a systematic effort at mapping out the relationship between the structural, embodied in political *aliran* groupings, and the cultural, in terms of general group perceptions on statehood matters.

Anderson's work could actually be perceived as a beginning in this direction. However, it covered only one facet of the segmented society, albeit of the majority and dominant group, the Javanese political culture and its manifestation in Indonesian politics. While significant and important, Javanese political culture is but one subset of Indonesian society. It shares the same political space with other groups. These other groups who, for lack of a better term are known collectively as the *seberang* peoples. They are spread throughout the archipelago (including the non-heartland of Java), which partly explains the difficulties in mapping out their political culture. However, they do share some common traits that eventually give rise to a discernible pattern of politico-cultural perceptions. It is important to note here that the role of Islam and its different modes of reception by different peoples of the archipelago, as well as its interaction with local tradition, also significantly influenced the politico-cultural traits of the *aliran* groups.

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<sup>7</sup> See *ibid.*, especially Chapters 13 and 15.

There are three major *aliran* groups.<sup>8</sup> The nationalists draw support from the *abangan* heartland of Java (occupying the fertile land in south-central parts of the island). Javanese society is agrarian, with a long history of encounters with foreign influence. Unity and harmony are among the most cherished values. One of the hallmarks of Javanese culture is syncreticism. The Javanese have adapted a succession of foreign influences into their own indigenous cultural traits. The arrival of Islam, therefore, did not wipe out the previous Hindu-Buddhist civilizations. They tended to be complementary, so as to create a socio-religious practice that was quite different from any of the religious beliefs practiced elsewhere. The term “*abangan*” reflects the relaxed, syncretic outlook of the Javanese.<sup>9</sup>

The modernist Muslims have roots in the *seberang* culture. Many of the *seberang* societies, especially the more assertive ones such as the peoples of Sumatra and Sulawesi are maritime-based. These societies tend to be more competitive and less obsessed with ideas of unity and harmony. The Hindu-Buddhist influence in these societies is also relatively less than in Java, except in the notable case of the Sriwijaya Empire. Islamic influence is thus more significant in these societies. The *seberang* generally practice Islam in a more pure and orthodox way than their Javanese brethren. In Indonesian political lexicon, they are known as the *santri* (pious Muslims).

The traditionalists are the hybrid *aliran*. Most of the traditionalists hail from the eastern part of Java, out of the direct influence of the courts of the Javanese heartland, but

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<sup>8</sup> Also known as “*aliran politik*” (streams of political thinking). Clifford Geertz introduced this concept to academic circles in The Religion of Java. Subsequent efforts to map out and analyze the *aliran* were carried out by several Indonesianists. The most prominent of these were included in the Herbert Feith and Lance Castles edited book, *op.cit.*

<sup>9</sup> For *abangan* religious practices, consult Geertz, *op.cit.*, part 1.

still significantly influenced by the Javanese outlook. They are also *santri* in terms of Islamic practice, while at the same time are also syncretic. The traditionalist socio-educational institutions are known as the *pesantren*, whose history predates the arrival of Islam. With the arrival of Islam, Islamic teaching merely took over the theological content of these educational institutions, while keeping most of the rituals and societal structure of the past civilization.

The power of the *aliran* has been proven in the two past elections that were considered as being conducted in a free and fair manner, *i.e.*, the elections of 1955 and 1999. The *aliran* parties dominated both elections, which resulted in the control of most of the parliamentary seats in the hands of the *aliran* parties. The results of these two elections also demonstrated the consistency of the regional based of the *aliran*'s constituents.<sup>10</sup> The graphs in the appendix show the similarity of the distribution of seats according to region between the PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia* – Indonesian Nationalist Party) and the PDI-P (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan* – Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle) in the nationalist camp, between the modernist Masyumi and the parties of the *Poros Tengah* (Middle Axis), and between the NU and the PKB (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* – National Awakening Party) in the traditionalist side.

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<sup>10</sup> The data for 1955 election have been taken from Alfian (1971) *Hasil Pemilihan Umum 1955 untuk Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (D.P.R.)* (1955 Parliamentary General Election Result), Jakarta: Lembaga Ekonomi dan Kemasjarkatan Nasional, p. 16, while the 1999 data were acquired from *The Jakarta Post*, July 17, 1999, p. 2. The Javanese provinces in these graphs include Central and East Java as well as Bali. However, Bali was not included in the 1955 data because during that time it was still part of West Nusa Tenggara. The outer islands comprised provinces in Sumatra, Sulawesi, and the rest of eastern Indonesia, except for Irian Jaya in 1955, which was then still under Dutch rule. See also Dwight Y. King (2003) *Half-Hearted Reform: Electoral Institutions and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia*, Westport, Conn.: Praeger.

While the *aliran* are important, they are not the only players in the Indonesian political landscape. Many Indonesians feel that the *aliran*'s cultural and primordial attachments with their respective electorates are considered as antithetical to the very idea of the modern Indonesian nation. This is especially the perception of the urban intellectual middle class. The members of this class are more influenced by western ideas than by any ethnic, cultural or religious traits. They are, therefore, more prone towards the idea of modernity. They do not possess the primordial attachment towards any of the *aliran* parties, and their political behavior is based on rationality. This does not mean, however, that the middle class would not vote for the *aliran* parties. They have apparently done so from time to time. But it does mean that their political choice is based less on any preconceived cultural attachment to the *aliran* than on a conscious rational calculation. Therefore they are more likely to sway their votes whenever they perceive that other parties may better represent or cater to their aspirations.

Since independence, members of the urban intellectual middle class have occupied important positions in the government, academia and businesses. Many of them belonged to the urban-based social democratic party of PSI (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia* – Indonesian Socialist Party). But their influence had been reduced since their poor showing in the election of 1955. It was further diminished after the PSI's involvement in the regional rebellion of PRRI/Permesta in the late 1950s, which resulted in the party being banned by Sukarno and their leaders being either jailed or exiled. The urban intellectuals made a comeback during Suharto's New Order. Many of them became the

intellectual force behind the capitalist developmentalism that was the hallmark of the New Order.<sup>11</sup>

The following sections discuss the electoral race in the respective *aliran* as well as among the non-*aliran* parties. They also gauge the approximate constituent size of the *aliran* based on the results of the previous two elections that were conducted in free and fair manner, *i.e.*, the 1955 and 1999 elections.

### **The Crowded Nationalist Race**

The nationalists are the largest *aliran* in Indonesia. In the 1955 election, the PNI came out with the largest votes of 22 percent. In the 1999 election, the PDI-P received even larger votes of 31 percent. However, some notes should be attached to these figures. In the 1955 election, the votes of the *abangan*, the traditional constituent of the nationalists, were split between the PNI and the PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia* – Indonesian Communist Party). The latter received 16 percent of the total votes. But the figure of the 1999 election might be too large. It was widely considered that the PDI-P became so powerful due to the influx of votes from the non-*aliran* middle class, who tended to view Megawati Sukarnoputri as a martyr in the fight against the New Order. Therefore, the size of the nationalist constituent is more likely to range between 25 to 30 percent.

In the upcoming election, the race for the nationalist votes is going to be rather crowded. The nationalist parties can be divided into two types. First, the Sukarnoist

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<sup>11</sup> Many of these experts were economists trained in the West, especially in the United States. They were the *protégés* of Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, former PSI leader, of the Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia.

type. These are parties that base their ideologies on Marhaenism, an indigenous socialist ideology invented by former President Sukarno. The other type is the Suhartoist type. These are parties set up by former officials during the Suharto era, which base their ideologies on the combined security and development approaches of the New Order.

Five parties clearly belong to the Sukarnoist type. Three of them are led by Sukarno's feuding daughters: Megawati leads the PDI-P; Sukmawati the *Partai Nasional Indonesia – Marhaenisme* (Indonesian National Party – Marhaenism); and Rahmawati the *Partai Pelopor* (Pioneer Party). Another Sukarnoist party is the *Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan* (PNBK – Freedom Bull National Party), a party set up by splinter figures from the PDI-P led by Eros Djarot. The other party is the *Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia* (Indonesian Democracy Builders Party), set up by figures from the rival faction of Megawati in the original, now defunct, *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (PDI – Indonesian Democratic Party).

Among the Sukarnoist parties, the PDI-P is clearly in a superior position. While claiming to be Sukarno's "ideological daughters," both Rahmawati and Sukmawati are not as popular as their sister, Megawati. Potential challenge could come from the PNBK. Eros Djarot is quite popular among the nationalist constituent. He could attract a quite substantial number of followers when he left the PDI-P and set up the PNBK. A number of nationalist figures were dismayed by Megawati's policies and saw that the PDI-P has betrayed the Marhaenist ideology by favoring figures from the New Order establishment over their own in the elections of regional heads in the past two years. They have left the PDI-P and joined the PNBK. However, after three years in power, the PDI-P has more than sufficient resources in carrying out an effective campaign. Additionally, many in

the traditional nationalist constituent, especially among the peasantry in Java still perceive Megawati as the rightful heir to her father's power. Therefore, the threat for the PDI-P from the other Sukarnoist parties should not be too significant. Perhaps only the PNBK would be able to pass or approach the electoral threshold of three percent in the upcoming election.

But a real threat for the PDI-P's supremacy in the nationalist camp could come from another source. The Suhartoist nationalist parties seem ready to compete in the next election. An old party, the *Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia* (PKPI – Indonesian Justice and Unity Party) is a revised form of the *Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan* (PKP). This party almost made the electoral threshold in the last election. It is led by Edi Sudradjat, former chief of the ABRI (armed forces) and relies on the network of armed forces extended family, known as FKPPI. This party was originally formed to cater to the aspirations of Golkar members who were dissatisfied with the influx of modernists into the party following the election of Akbar Tanjung, the former chief of the *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (HMI – Islamic Students Association).

Two other Suhartoist parties were set up for the upcoming election. One is another Golkar's splinter. The *Partai Patriot Pancasila* (Pancasila Patriot Party), was established by members of the *Pemuda Pancasila* organization, originally Golkar's paramilitary organization. The other party, the *Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa* (PKPB – Compassion for the Nation Functional Party), was set up by R. Hartono, former Army chief and former Minister of Home Affairs in the last Suharto cabinet. From early on, it has shown its resolve to carry the banner of Suhartoism by claiming that it is the only party to have received the blessing from the former president, and by nominating Siti

Hardiyanti Rukmana (popularly known as Mbak Tutut, Suharto's eldest daughter and a former minister in the last Suharto cabinet) as the party's candidate for the presidential election.

It is not easy to estimate which of the Suhartoist parties would come out as the strongest. Each has a strong organizational background, even though their appeals may be limited to the organizations' adherents. But it is not too difficult to see what sort of appeal the figure of Mbak Tutut might exert on the general public. Six years after the economic crisis that brought about *Reformasi*, the public saw things have not improved. The economy remains in a precarious condition with high unemployment rate. KKN (corruption, collusion, and nepotism) is even worse than before. Bickering among politicians seems to be the order of the day. In such a situation, some members of the public naturally feel some nostalgic inclination towards the "good old days" of the Suharto regime. They hope that figures such as Mbak Tutut, despite her notorious reputation in the past, might be able to restore the prosperity and stability provided by the New Order.

Thus, Mbak Tutut and her PKPB might provide a credible threat to Megawati in the race for the nationalist votes. Even though it is quite difficult for a new party such as the PKPB to make a significant gain in the elections, it will almost certainly take away some votes that will otherwise have gone to Megawati and the PDI-P, albeit not in great numbers. A figure of 3-4 percent would be realistic.

Despite these challenges, the PDI-P will remain the vanguard party of the nationalist *aliran*. Its power lies in the still powerful association between the images of Megawati and Sukarno and the power of network of supporters built during the last three

years. While it is likely that the PDI-P will still emerge as the single largest party in parliament, the party's votes will most probably be eroded. Instead of achieving more than 30 percent of the votes as in the last election, the party would be considered as doing well with around 25 percent.

### **The More Structured Modernist Race**

The modernist *aliran* is the second largest *aliran*. In the 1955 election, Masyumi and other smaller modernist parties received around 25 percent of the votes. In the 1999 election, the modernist parties of the *Poros Tengah* - consisting of the *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP – United Development Party), the *Partai Amanat Nasional* (PAN – National Mandate Party), the *Partai Bulan Bintang* (PBB – Crescent and Stars Party) and the *Partai Keadilan* (Justice Party) received fewer votes with 22 percent. This slight electoral downturn and the fact that PAN was nominally a secular party made some analysts view the last election as one marked by the defeat of political Islam.<sup>12</sup>

But the poor showing of the modernist parties might be partly due to the ambivalent outlook of PAN. On one hand, PAN was perceived as the party of the Muhammadiyah, the largest modernist organization and the second largest Islamic organization in the country. But on the other hand, Amien Rais as the leader of PAN was inspired to create a “rainbow coalition” party encompassing all political actors, including the non-*aliran* urban intellectuals. But as a result, rather than winning the best of both worlds, the modernist electorate moved away from PAN and voted for either PPP (which

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<sup>12</sup> See for instance, Saiful Mujani, “*Kekalahan Partai Islam*” (The Defeat of Islamic Parties), in *Gamma*, Vol. 1, No. 18, June 27, 1999; R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, “Indonesia: Militant Islam is Losing Ground,” in *The New York Times*, October 13, 2003.

they have traditionally voted for during the New Order) or even Golkar with Akbar Tanjung and his HMI link. PAN and the figure of Amien Rais also could not compete for the votes of the non-*aliran* middle class electorate who overwhelmingly voted for the PDI-P. But since the last election, PAN has apparently learnt from its mistakes. It has reestablished its modernist stature and rekindled its ties to the modernist constituent, to the expense of almost totally discarding the plural image it has initially attempted to portray.

As opposed to the very crowded race in the modernist landscape during the 1999 election, this time it will be much more structured. In 1999, 15-16 parties carried the banner of Islamic modernism and now it is only five. Other than the four *Poros Tengah* parties, only one additional party was set up, the *Partai Bintang Reformasi* (PBR - Reform Star Party). The PBR was established by some splintered elements from the PPP and was led by a popular cleric Zainuddin MZ.

The *primus inter pares* among the modernist parties is the PPP. In the 1999 election, it received the highest votes among these parties with 12.5 percent. The election of Hamzah Haz to vice-presidency clearly gave the PPP an advantage in mustering support for campaign. But being part of the Megawati's administration, Hamzah and the PPP also carried the brunt of its unpopularity. The desertion of some party members to establish the PBR also hurt the party, even though the impact could be just minimal. As a new party competing on the same ground with the PPP's established campaign machine, the PBR would do very well to get a single seat or two in the parliament.

But the challenge for the PPP's primacy could well come from PAN. During the last election, PAN was considered as a frontrunner, but ended up getting only 7.5 percent,

for reasons of am bivalency cited above. PAN's resolve to reshape its image as a real modernist party would win over voters that had voted for either the PPP or Golkar in the last election. On the other hand, by shedding its pluralist image, PAN might lose its appeal to the non-*aliran* voters. So in a way, PAN's elite is gambling on the premise that the influx of votes from the modernist constituent might offset or even exceed the loss of its non-*aliran* middle class votes. If PAN is successful in this effort, then we might expect an erosion of votes for the PPP in the range of around 2-3 percent. But PAN's major increase of votes is doubtful. It would do well if an additional 1-2 percent can be garnered. As a result, we might expect to see that the powers of the two primary modernist parties will be pretty much level as a result of the next election. It will also provide an interesting landscape in the modernist politics with the PPP representing the more conservative faction, while PAN the more liberal one.

Not much change can be expected from the PBB's attainment. The party barely passed the electoral threshold. And despite the presence of the party's president Yusril Ihza Mahendra in Megawati's cabinet, not much either improvement or deterioration in the party's stature can be foreseen. But the party's network is quite strong, so it might expect to pass the threshold again this year. Even if it does not, probably due to the threshold bar being elevated from 10 to 17 seats, it will not be relegated to a minor party status. It can probably retain around 10 seats.

The *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS – Justice and Prosperity Party), formerly the PK, is perhaps going to be the single most interesting phenomenon in the next election. It was three seats away from making the threshold previously. And many observers expect that they would surpass it this year. Some more ambitious calculations even predict that

it could become one of the major players after the next election. During the last election, the party relied on the network of Islamic study groups (*usrah*) that started out in campus mosques in major cities. Its seeds were sown since the days of the New Order, especially in the late 1980s to 1990s. So, from the beginning it has had an appeal towards some of the non-*aliran* urban intellectuals. But the appeal was only limited to the mosque activists whose numbers were not so great. But the PKS is also synonymous with *santrinisasi* (the phenomenon of greater piety among Indonesian Muslims). It has been able to capitalize on the desire of younger generation to be spiritually more devout amidst the crisis of modernity that sometimes brought the adverse effects of moral hazards. Additionally, the PKS has also been very successful in portraying itself as a “clean” party in the midst of increasing corruption in the society. So if the PKS can maintain these images, it can attract more votes from the non-*aliran* middle class, especially from young voters. It then will be able to increase its votes quite dramatically. It would be unsurprising if it can surpass the threshold. This means that its representation in the parliament will be more than doubled from the results of the last election, in which it has seven seats.

### **The Simple Traditionalist Race**

The traditionalists are the smallest among the *aliran*. In the 1955 election, NU, the primary traditionalist party received 18 percent of the votes. But in the 1999 election, the PKB and other smaller traditionalist parties were able to garner only about 13 percent. It should be noted that not all of the traditionalist voters actually voted for the PKB, which is considered as the legitimate political representation of NU. Many, especially

the more conservative traditionalists have opted to remain in the PPP, their home throughout the New Order. The estimated figure of the size of the traditionalist constituent, then, is about 15 percent.

During the 1999 election, it was clear that the PKB was the legitimate political channel of the majority of NU members and sympathizers. But there were a number of other parties led by some prominent traditionalists, the largest of which was the PNU (*Partai Nahdlatul Ummah – Ummah Awakening Party*) led by K.H. Syukron Ma'mun. The PNU garnered five seats in the 1999 election, but did not make the threshold. For the upcoming election, the PNU changed its name to the PPNU (*Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia – United Ummah Awakening Party*), and has become the only other traditionalist party beside the PKB. With only two parties in the *aliran*, and a possible retention of some traditionalist votes by the PPP, the traditionalist race will become much simpler.

No major change should be expected in the traditionalist landscape from the last election. As was the case with its predecessor in the last election, the PPNU will probably not make the higher threshold this year. The traditionalist votes that go to the PPP can be expected to be around the same figure of 2-3 percent. With the support of the majority of NU's network, the PKB is expected to grab the majority of the traditionalist votes. But a question mark remains on how much appeal the PKB will have on the non-*aliran* voters. During the 1999 election, perhaps around 1-2 percent of votes for this party came from these voters. But the erratic Gus Dur's short presidency probably has dismayed them. Nevertheless, the PKB remains popular among the NGO activists and perhaps some in the general public, for its unwavering stance on secularism and pluralism

in Indonesia. Hence, the PKB is likely to keep its 11 percent votes this year, with possible margin of plus minus of 1-2 percent.

### **The Race for the Non-*Aliran* Swaying Voters**

The rest of the Indonesian electorate can be classified as non-*aliran*. The non-*aliran* electorate can be divided into two categories. The first category consists of the minority groups, namely the Christian (Protestants and Catholic) groups and the ethnic Chinese.<sup>13</sup> The other category encompasses the urban intellectual middle class, as well as the urban poor. The size of the former group is around 10 percent, while the latter probably numbers to about 20 percent.

An interesting development regarding the Christian voters has occurred in the run-up to this year's election. Traditionally, Indonesian Christians voted for the parties of their own. In the 1955 election, the larger group, the Protestants voted for the Parkindo (*Partai Kristen Indonesia* – Indonesian Christian Party), while the Catholics for the *Partai Katolik* (Catholic Party). The Parkindo got eight seats from that election, while the *Partai Katolik* six. During the New Order, these two parties merged with the nationalists to form the PDI. In the 1999 election, various Christian parties emerged. The strongest of them, the PDKB (*Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa* – Love for the Nation Democratic Party) received five parliamentary seats. This year was marked by quite a major surprise, that is the eligibility of only one Christian party, the PDS (*Partai Damai Sejahtera* – Peace and Prosperity Party), to contest the election. Even the split variants of

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<sup>13</sup> Note that most of Indonesian Buddhists are of Chinese descent, and the Hindu people of Bali have traditionally voted for the nationalist parties. So separate categories for these two religious groups are unnecessary.

the PDKB did not pass the verification by the KPU (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum* – General Elections Commission). But this might prove as a blessing in disguise for this minority group. The Christians found the results of 1999 election to be disappointing, aside of the PDKB, the other four Christian parties made a poor showing. They were further dismayed by the split in the PDKB. But some analysts predict that there could be a concerted effort to mobilize the Christian votes into the PDS. If this is true, then the PDS could make a strong showing in the upcoming election. It could easily pass the threshold and with around 5-7 percent votes, it would be the strongest single minority bloc in the parliament.

The Indonesian Chinese never had a separate party of their own. In the 1955 election, many of them voted for the PKI. During the New Order, they voted for Golkar. In the 1999 election, a predominantly Chinese party was set up. The PBI (*Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* – Unity in Diversity Party) was able to get one parliamentary seat. But most of the Chinese votes actually went to the PDI-P. For this year's election, the PBI did not pass the KPU verification and the Chinese votes would probably be diffused to other parties as a result. Since the Chinese have traditionally voted for secular nationalist parties, it is possible that this year their votes could go to the PDI-P or Golkar.

The intellectual urban middle-class and the urban poor have long been considered the “floating mass”. They vote based on issues and party platform. The rest of the parties, i.e., the PBSO (*Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat* - Social Democratic Labor Party), the *Partai Merdeka* (Freedom Party); the PPDK (*Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan* - United Democratic National Party); the PPIB (*Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru* - New Indonesia Association Party); the PD (*Partai Demokrat* -

Democratic Party); the PSI (*Partai Sarikat Indonesia* - United Indonesia Party); the PPD (*Partai Persatuan Daerah* - United Regional Party); and Golkar can be expected to compete for the votes of this floating mass. It will then be a very crowded race for a relatively small proportion of voters.

Among these non-*aliran* parties, however, few could make a strong showing in the election. The PD is widely regarded as the party of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the present Coordinating Minister for Security. Bambang is currently among the top leaders in some of the popularity polls in the country. Despite the lack of established political machinery, the party will be able to ride on Bambang's popularity and attract many non-*aliran* votes. It will probably make the threshold in this year's election.

The PPDK may also do well. The party is lead by Ryaas Rasyid, a prominent figure of regional autonomy, and is backed up by a number of intellectuals, such as Andy Mallarangeng. While not as popular as Bambang Yudhoyono, Ryaas is recognized as a credible figure with reformist ideas. But the party has an appeal limited to the urban middle class. Hence, while it may approach the threshold, it may not surpass it.

The strongest of the non-*aliran* players by far is Golkar. Putting Golkar in the non-*aliran* camp may be perceived as contentious. Many regard this party as a secular-nationalist party. But the fact is that Golkar was set up as an alternative to the *aliran*-based parties. All throughout its history, it has attempted to co-opt the nationalists, modernists and traditionalists to join its rank and file. As a result, Golkar was susceptible to the power struggle among its members with different political leanings. As mentioned above, in the *Reformasi* era, the modernists took control of Golkar through the election of Akbar Tanjung and the influx of figures with HMI background. But in the lead-up to the

election, Akbar has been in trouble with the law for a corruption case. Another power struggle is currently taking place within the party, through the process of presidential convention. The nationalist wing within Golkar is attempting to rid the party of Akbar and his HMI friends. If this is successful, then Golkar will have a more nationalist face in the next election.


In addition to the already established political machinery that has become its foremost strength during the 1999 election, Golkar benefited from two factors. First of all is the Habibie factor. The nomination of Habibie as the presidential candidate in the last election proved quite effective in winning votes from the eastern Indonesia regions. Golkar and Habibie played this regional card smartly, pointing to the fact that Habibie was the first Indonesian president to hail from the outer islands. The second factor was the retention of the modernist votes. Golkar was able to portray a modernist image with Habibie's nomination and HMI outlook. This was further bolstered by the failure of PAN, which had been considered as a party with the most legitimate claim to the modernist constituent in its projection of a coherent modernist image

These two factors have now largely gone. PAN has been attempting to rekindle its link to its *aliran* constituent, and Habibie is of course no longer a significant player in the national scene. Golkar is at risk of losing a significant portion of its seats in the parliament. However, Golkar could benefit from the public's nostalgia for the prosperity and stability of the New Order era. If they campaign on such a platform, they might be able to attract votes not only from the middle class and urban poor, but also from the rural population in Java who voted overwhelmingly for the PDI-P in the last election, but who are rather dismayed by the deteriorating economic condition. But even here, Golkar will

face a serious challenge from Suhartoist parties, especially the PKPB. With the presence of Mbak Tutut in the race, the PKPB will be to lay a stronger claim to Suhartoism than Golkar. If Golkar could handle this challenge well, it would be able to retain its 24 percent votes, probably with a minor fluctuation. But if it fails to do so, then a loss of 5-7 percent can be expected, as many modernists will return to their *aliran* homes.

### **Conclusion**

The political competition through the election in Indonesia will still be organized along the *aliran* line. But the size of the “floating mass” urban middle class and urban poor are increasing. So, the *aliran* will not be able to rely solely on the primordial ties with their respective constituents. They will also have to be able to cope with the social, political and economic issues facing the Indonesian nation. Nevertheless, this upcoming election will still reflect the power of the *aliran* parties, while the non-*aliran* parties, although likely to gain some significance, will remain largely as marginal players. Finally, a diagram illustrating my observations on the *aliran* and non-*aliran* allegiances can be found below:



From the description above, an estimation below can thus be inferred:

Major Parties:

No.	Parties	Estimated Range	Estimated Parliamentary Seats
1.	PDI-P	27 – 28 percent	148 – 154
2.	Golkar	17 – 24 percent	93 – 132
3.	PKB	10 – 12 percent	55 – 66
4.	PPP	10 – 12 percent	55 – 66
5.	PAN	8 – 10 percent	44 – 55

Medium-Sized Parties:

No.	Parties	Estimated Range	Estimated Parliamentary Seats
1.	PDS	4 – 7 percent	22 – 39
2.	PKS	4 – 7 percent	22 – 39
3.	PKPB	3 – 5 percent	17 – 28







Smaller Parties Expected to Make the Threshold:

1. PNBK
2. PBB
3. PD

Smaller Parties Expected to Win Below-Threshold Seats:

1. Partai Pelopor
2. Partai Patriot Pancasila
3. PBR
4. PPNU
5. PPDK

Appendix:



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