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Abstract

This paper, focusing on the 1968-1976 institutional changes of ASEAN, a Third World Security-Oriented Institution (SOI), attempts to develop a theoretical model of institutional transformation by utilizing a punctuated equilibrium model. This theoretical model illustrates interactions between structure and agent to explain both why and how institutional transformation occurs: first, changes in the external security environment foster or hinder SOI’s functions, and thus, they trigger internal political discussions among member states; and second, internal political discussions define the direction of SOI’s institutional transformation. Focusing on changes in the regional balance of power in Southeast Asia from 1968 to 1971 and from 1972-1976, this paper examines the process of ASEAN’s creation of the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and the Bali Concord in 1976.

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I. Introduction

Institutions change over time. This notion is scholarly well accepted, yet there is little scholarly consensus in the IR field over the questions why and how institutions transform. The rationalists emphasize the material benefits: while structural/neo-realists consider that common threats were the tie that binds member states and form institutions, institutionalists argue that reduction of transaction costs can make institutions durable. On the other hand, social constructivists emphasize the role of ideational factors and argue that institutions can become identities or constitutive norms for member states that attempt to sustain institutions. However, the focus of these arguments is mainly on the durability of institutions and does not explore the mechanism of changes of international institutions. Besides, these mainstream theories do not focus on regional organizations that are led by small and middle powers in the Third World.

This paper, focusing on the 1968-1976 institutional changes of ASEAN, a Third World Security-Oriented Institution (SOI), attempts to develop a theoretical

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2 I define “security-oriented institutions” as the multi-purposed state-based groups whose original purpose implicitly derives from political/military security interests of member states. Since security institutions are defined as institutions that have explicit security objectives, such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, this is different from security-oriented institutions. Additionally, there are two types of security institutions: great power-led security-oriented institutions, such as the EU, and small-power-led security-oriented institutions, such as ASEAN, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), MERCOSUR, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Therefore, criteria for the security-oriented institutions are four-fold: (i) they are multipurpose institutions, (ii) they are inter-governmental institutions, (iii) they are multilateral institutions (more than two states), and (iv) they have an implicit security purpose. Although there are IR concepts of institutions, including "collective defense", "collective security", "cooperative security", and "security community", these concepts cannot apply to “security-oriented institutions” as these concepts focus on institutional functions, not institution itself. In this paper, I focus on small-power-led security-oriented institutions.
model of institutional transformation by utilizing a punctuated equilibrium model. This theoretical model illustrates interactions between structure and agent to explain both why and how institutional transformation occurs: first, changes in the external security environment foster or hinder SOI’s functions, and thus, they trigger internal political discussions among member states; and second, internal political discussions define the direction of SOI’s institutional transformation. In order to clarify what types of environmental changes can trigger institutional transformation and how an institution determines the direction of such transformation, three hypotheses are constructed.

The first hypothesis is: *if members of a security-oriented institution expect the regional or intra-regional balance of power to be altered in the near future, then the institution is more likely to undertake institutional transformation in order to ensure member states’ security.* As realists implicitly suggest, changes in the security environment, which are based on changes of the political and military balance of power, becomes a trigger to transform institutions as it is likely to alter common threats/interests that bind member states together. At the same time, actors ultimately define these common threats/interests, and thus when they find that a change would increase their security in a new environment, they have more incentives for institutional transformation. In short, in the context of a changing security environment, member states are likely to seek ways for sustaining or increasing the utility of the institution.

The second hypothesis is: *the nature of the expected changes is likely to lead to the type of institutional transformation. Specifically, expectations of positive changes are likely to lead to institutional consolidation; of uncertain changes are...*
likely to lead to institutional layering; and of negative changes are likely to lead institutional displacement. While perceived changes in regional or intra-regional balance of power would likely cause the institutional transformation, types of member states’ aggregated expectations towards institutional utility vis-à-vis a new environment also affect the types of institutional transformation. The independent criterion to evaluate these expectations is an institution’s existing utility for member states’ security vis-à-vis changes in the regional or intra-regional balance of power. This can be assessed by discourses, such as speeches and interviews, of decision-makers.

The third hypothesis is: an SOI’s institutional security preference shapes its member states’ expectation. “Institutional security preferences” refer to the ranking-order of institutional security focus, which is determined by the basis of a common understanding of institutional capabilities to manage internal or external security. Formulation and reformulation of an institutional security preference is shaped by the decision-making process that member states undertake within the institution. This is triggered by an “institutional norm entrepreneur,” a member state that introduces a new institutional concept, norm, rules, and objective.

To test these hypotheses, this paper first analyzes the types of ASEAN’s transformation in 1968-1976; second, it discusses the process of formulating the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality in 1971 on the one hand, and of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord in 1976 on the other; and third, it will assess the outcome of the test and the validity and applicability of the hypotheses.

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6 There are basically three types of expectations: positive, uncertain, and negative. First, positive expectation for changes in the regional or intra-regional balance of power and its impact on SOIs promotes institutional consolidation, where institutions consolidate rules and norms through such means as joint declaration and treaties. This is because there are little needs to drastically alter institutional utilities when the environment was favorable for their security. Second, when expectations for changes are uncertain, SOIs are likely to undergo institutional layering, where institutions introduce new functions or objectives in addition to old ones. Since it is not clear that existing institution can produce positive feedback for member states’ security in an uncertain environment, it is likely to add new functions in order to hedge emerging a new environment without displacing old ones. Third, negative expectations for changes are likely to induce institutional displacement, where institutions introduce new norms and displace old ones. Since it was obvious for member states that the institution no longer provides positive feedbacks for their security, institutions would likely be renewed by introducing new functions and norms. These are first intervening variable for outcome of institutional transformation, and the variable to look for is institutional perception on a security environmental change.

7 Thus, institutional security preference is the second intervening variable to determine the direction of institutional transformation although it precedes the second hypothesis. In order to identify these institutional security preferences, the variable to be analyzed is decision-making process triggered by institutional norm entrepreneur.
II. ASEAN’s Institutional Consolidation: ZOPFAN, TAC, and Bali Concord

From 1968 to 1976, ASEAN undertook institutional transformation by producing three official documents. After August 8, 1967, when it was established and the ASEAN Declaration was adopted, ASEAN created the concept of the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in November 1971, and it concluded the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) as well as the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (the Bali Concord) in February 1976. The process of institutional transformation through these three documents reflects ASEAN’s functional evolution: its internal security management evolved from weak intra-member conflict containment to exclusive cooperative security, while its external security management function, political alignment, was more focused on the economic field.

First, the 1971 Declaration of ZOPFAN provided more specific institutional objectives on regional cooperation than the ASEAN Declaration. While “the neutralization of South East Asia” was only a “desirable objective,” the document focused more on the fundamental normative code of conduct for inside and outside Southeast Asia. It emphasized the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states,” “abstention from threat or use of force,” “peaceful settlement of international disputes,” and “equal rights and self-determination and non-interference in affairs of States.” In particular, its concept of non-interference was sharpened: ASEAN began to distinguish non-interference “within” the region from “outside” by emphasizing...
“external” interference. In this sense, ASEAN began to forge a collective action toward outside powers: to disseminate and secure “the recognition of, and respect for” ZOPFAN principles to outside powers, while broadening the realm of cooperation among member states.

Second, the 1976 TAC provided a code of conduct in Southeast Asia in a legally binding form. It stipulates six principles: 1) mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations, 2) the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion, 3) non-interference in the internal affairs of one another, 4) settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means, 5) renunciation of the threat or use of force, and 6) effective cooperation among themselves. According to Article 4, 9, and 11 of the TAC, the means to achieve peace and stability is not only regional cooperation in the economic, social, technical, scientific and administrative fields through regular contacts and consultations, but also every member’s national economic and social development. Moreover, as Article 7 stipulates, it becomes clearer that ASEAN began to focus on formulating regional strategies for economic development and mutual assistance.

Third, the 1976 Bali Concord stipulated its institutional form, objectives, and prioritization. The objectives are “the stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region,” and in order to achieve these objectives, ASEAN prioritized fostering national development and strengthening ASEAN, rather than regional solidarity through peaceful settlement of intra-regional differences and more specific institutional cooperation, including political, economic, social and cultural cooperation. In addition, although military cooperation would be undertaken on a non-ASEAN basis, ASEAN began to explicitly promote security cooperation in the so-called non-traditional security fields, such as natural disasters and human security, including the elimination of poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy. Through these principles and institutional settings, the Declaration points out that ASEAN needs to strengthen it member states’ “national and ASEAN resilience.”

11 The Declaration of ZOPFAN used the term, “external interference,” three times, while the ASEAN Declaration merely mentioned “interference.”
13 Article 7 of the TAC stipulates, “The High Contracting Parties, in order to achieve social justice and to raise the standards of living of the peoples of the region, shall intensify economic cooperation. For this purpose, they shall adopt appropriate regional strategies for economic development and mutual assistance.” [emphasis added].
In this sense, ASEAN’s transformation process from 1968 to 1976 was institutional consolidation. While the transformation did not add a new institutional function or completely displace its original objectives, ASEAN consolidated its ambiguous institutional objectives by providing a more specific conceptual framework and means to ensure its members’ security. For its internal and external security management, ASEAN’s external security management function changed only slightly during this period, but was expanded into economic fields. As ASEAN member states’ national and institutional capabilities were essentially limited, it was difficult to militarily constrain external powers’ behavior. Instead, ASEAN members attempted to politically align with each other in international economic negotiations, as the TAC indicated. On the other hand, the institutional transformation in internal security management occurred to a significant degree; ASEAN became an exclusive cooperative security institution besides intra-member conflict containment. Nevertheless, at ASEAN’s inception, the Bangkok Declaration envisioned ASEAN’s function to contain the intra-member conflict through institutional consolidation by adhering to the UN Charter and fostering economic, social and cultural cooperation among member states. Because it only reiterated the existing international legal terms, this was a weak form of intra-member conflict containment. However, the TAC and the Bali Concord provided features of exclusive cooperative security function—a code of conduct, consultation mechanisms, with a regional scope.

The TAC provided a legally binding form of a code of conduct in Southeast Asia. Though it still lacked military and economic “teeth” in times for dealing with treaty violation, the TAC created the behavioral guideline for member states. Also, further institutionalization of ASEAN by setting up such forums and mechanisms as the ASEAN Summit and ASEAN Secretariat provided ample opportunities for member states to further interact with each other, which helped them exchange information and coordinate their policies. In addition, its scope of regional cooperation became more evident in the Bali Concord. The Concord used the term “ASEAN resilience” instead of “regional resilience,” so that it could justify strengthening inter-member states’ cooperation. From its inception, ASEAN envisioned inclusion of all Southeast Asian states, and this institutional posture had not changed even in the ZOPFAN declaration. However, the Bali Concord was the first official document to distinguish between Southeast Asia and ASEAN, and it prioritized cooperation among ASEAN member states.
Admittedly, it did not mean that other Southeast Asian states could no longer assume membership, as Article 18 of the TAC stipulated that it would be “open for accession by other States in Southeast Asia.” Yet, ASEAN temporarily introduced soft-exclusivity and started to consolidate cooperation among its member states. In this sense, ASEAN undertook institutional transformation from inter-member conflict containment to exclusive cooperative security through institutional consolidation.

Why and how did ASEAN’s institutional transformation occur? In the next section, I will analyze the formation of ZOPFAN, TAC, and the Bali Concord. While the ZOPFAN was created in 1971 and the TAC and the Bali Concord were concluded in 1976, I will divide the period into two phases: 1968-1971 (Phase I) and 1972-1976 (Phase II) to trace the process of creating these documents.

### III. Phase I: ASEAN in 1968-1971—ZOPFAN

To explain ASEAN’s transformation from the 1967 Bangkok Declaration to the Declaration of ZOPFAN, this section analyzes three variables: changes in regional balance of power during the period of 1968-1971; ASEAN’s perceptions towards such changes; and ASEAN’s institutional discussions and procedures to establish the ZOPFAN concept.

#### i) Triggers: UK and US Military Retrenchment and Sino-US Rapprochement

Before ASEAN issued the Declaration of ZOPFAN in 1971, the regional strategic environment in Southeast Asia had begun to shift. There were three main significant events from 1968 to 1971 that influenced the regional balance of power in Southeast Asia: the UK decision to withdraw from Southeast Asia, US disengagement from Vietnam in line with the Nixon Doctrine of 1969, and the emergence of Sino-US rapprochement in the early 1970s.

First, the United Kingdom’s security role in Southeast Asia was gradually diminishing in the late 1960s. Its purpose was defence of its colonies or former colonies, especially Malaysia and Singapore, through the Anglo-Malayan/Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA) and countering communist threats in Southeast Asia. Although the AMDA itself was not specifically aimed at the containment of communism, it served as a security tool to prevent British colonies and former colonies from falling to the communists by providing military assistance to those
states to thwart communist insurgencies. Although it had long asserted its regional security role, well-illustrated by the 1957 White Paper that laid out the United Kingdom’s responsibility “to defend British colonies and protected territories against local attack, and undertake limited operations in overseas emergencies,” the United Kingdom increasingly faced economic difficulties in the post-war era, and it made UK presence in Southeast Asia unsustainable.

In fact, throughout the 1960s, there was a political tension within the United Kingdom regarding its military presence overseas, namely the “East of Suez” policy. While Prime Minister Harold Wilson continuously confirmed his intent to sustain the UK security commitment to Southeast Asia, especially Malaysia and Singapore, despite its prolonged domestic economic stagnation, there was an increasing prospect that the United Kingdom would reduce its military commitment to Southeast Asia, if not completely withdraw. However, when Sukarno’s political power was significantly traduced by the 1965 coup-d’état, the so-called 30 September Movement (G30S), and Indonesia’s Konfrontasi policy was formally terminated in August 1966 after Suharto came to power, the political and military tensions between Malaysia/Singapore and Indonesia were significantly reduced. With the existing questions about the UK’s global role in the context of economic setbacks, this allowed the British government to reconsider its “East of Suez” policy, and the government started to discuss defense reduction, which would be completed by around 1970.

The second factor that caused the regional strategic shift was the US intention to withdraw its forces from Vietnam. As the Vietnam conflict became prolonged, US public support for the war began to decline amid the increasing number of casualties and little prospects for the war, particularly after North Vietnam’s Tet Offensive on January 31, 1968. The Tet had a psychological impact on decision-makers in the United States, and promoted US consideration of a strategic exit from Indochina. After he assumed US Presidency in 1969, Richard Nixon announced the Guam

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17 According to Chin, the British Cabinet began to reassess the scale of its commitments to the East of Suez policy between the end of 1965 and early in 1966, and the Defence Committee seemed to favor its withdrawal from Singapore in 1970 while not considering an alternative to place its presence in Australia. In May 1966, because the end of Indonesian Confrontasi seemed more likely, the debates within the British Labor Party over East of Suez became intensified, and a private meeting of the Parliamentary Labor Party faced the demand of its withdrawal from Malaysia, Singapore, and the Persian Gulf. Ibid., p. 127, and pp. 130-131.
Doctrine, otherwise known as the “Nixon Doctrine,” in July 25, 1969, and reiterated in his “silent majority” speech on November 3, 1969. Nixon suggested three principles of US policy toward Asia: keeping all of its treaty commitments, providing a shield if there is a threat from a nuclear power, and providing economic and military assistance in the case of aggression other than a threat of nuclear weapons. This illustrates that while the United States would provide an extended nuclear deterrent to maintain security stability in Asia, it would not become involved in regional conflicts at the level of the Vietnam Conflict. Nixon argued that the United States should aim at multilateralizing political and military efforts should communist threats need to be countered, and regional security efforts, including a regional defense pact, should be considered.

The United States took a cautious approach, since it feared that immediate withdrawal might invite potential encroachment by North Vietnam and its communist allies, not only in Asia but throughout the world. As US withdrawal needed to be carefully calibrated, the United States adopted a two-pronged exit strategy by pursuing both negotiations with North Vietnam and US conditional withdrawal from South Vietnam. Yet, both strategies faced difficulties in implementation. The US proposals were flatly rejected by North Vietnam, and complete withdrawal depended on two factors: North Vietnam’s military and political reaction to the suggestion of a peaceful settlement of conflicts through the Paris talks; and the level of training of South Vietnamese forces. Consequently, such a conditional exit strategy was not smoothly implemented, and further, the United States faced deteriorating military and political situations in both Vietnam and on the US domestic front. Nevertheless, the US troop level began to decrease regardless of the level of implementation of the US two-pronged strategy.

Third, the United States began to seek rapprochement with China from the early 1970s. This policy was not motivated by a desire to exploit the Sino-Soviet split,

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20 More specifically, he raised three points: (a) a collective effort by the nations of the region to contain the threat by themselves; and, if that effort fails, (b) a collective request to the United States for assistance.
21 For the negotiations front, the United States offered three proposals for Vietnamization: the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year, a cease-fire under international supervision, and free elections under international supervision. For US withdrawal, the United States considered training South Vietnam forces and providing its military equipment while reducing its own troop size.
because such a diplomatic maneuver would increase political tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the Soviet Union and China, which would make regional conflicts more likely. Instead, following the open conflicts between China and the Soviet Union along their Siberian border in 1969, President Nixon sought rapprochement with both China and the Soviet Union to reduce its political and military tensions with them in the international arena. In Asia, China was an important actor due to its political influence and social connections to other Asian states, and it was not in US national interests to maintain hostile relations with China. To keep its options open, the United States increased its channels of communication, reduced its economic restrictions, and began to negotiate with China for conditions conducive to US-China diplomatic normalization. For its part, China also needed to align with the United States to deter the Soviet Union, as indicated by the deterioration of its relations with the Soviet Union caused by two border conflicts on Zhenbao island and in Xinjian in 1969, and the Soviet consideration of a military attack against China’s nuclear facilities in northwest China.

From 1970, the United States and China intensified their diplomatic efforts to improve the Sino-US relations through undertaking “ping-pong diplomacy” and landmark visit of President Nixon to China and the issuing of their Joint Communique in February 1972. The Shanghai Communiqué sought out common interests for both the United States and China, including the current international and regional strategic situation. In this communiqué, both states agreed that they would not seek “hegemony” in the “Asia-Pacific region” and would reject third-countries or groups to establish “hegemony,” and recognized the necessity of a balanced distribution of power in the region. Admittedly, “hegemony” and “Asia-Pacific region” were never defined in the statement, and it was not clear what criteria needed to be employed to assess the strategic situation in the region. Nevertheless, considering the military and economic capabilities at the time, the most likely candidate for “third party”

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25 Its four agreed assumptions were: 1) progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries; 2) both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict; 3) neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and 4) neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states. See Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, “Joint Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America (28 Feb, 1972),” at <http://us.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zywj/t36255.htm>.
involvement was the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent, Japan, and the statement sent a diplomatic signal to deter Soviet expansion of its influence in Asia.

With these changes in great power politics in Southeast Asia, ASEAN member states were concerned about regional strategic uncertainty. Despite each ASEAN member state having its own political position towards the development of the regional balance of power, they also perceived a need to have some political cooperation among ASEAN member states in changing the regional balance of power. This was well illustrated when, on October 2, 1971, ASEAN Foreign Ministers met for the first time. The ministers gathered for an informal meeting to discuss strategic changes in the region, including the end of the Vietnam War, although they did not create a cohesive political position in the world affairs. There were political concerns among member states that if the region continued to be divided, Southeast Asia would once again be dominated by the foreign powers. ASEAN member states considered the necessity of coordinating their political stance to counter both communist insurgencies against ASEAN member states and China’s potential political influence over Southeast Asia.

**ii) Positive Expectation: ASEAN’s Consolidation through ZOPFAN**

As described above, changes in the Southeast Asian strategic landscape affected security perceptions of each ASEAN member state, and they faced a certain political dilemma. On the one hand, from the perspective of ASEAN’s fundamental institutional raison d’être, it was a positive change since one of the ASEAN’s institutional objectives was to “ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples.” The US and UK withdrawal, thus, meant reduction of the Western influence in the region, which would contribute to regional autonomy in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, the Western military withdrawal would create a power vacuum in the region, so that other

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28 However, in October 25, 1971, when the United Nations General Assembly held voting for the membership entry of the People’s Republic of China, ASEAN member states’ stance was disarrayed: Malaysia and Singapore supported, the Philippines opposed, and Indonesia and Thailand abstained. *The New York Times*, October 27, 1971.

29 ASEAN Secretariat, *Bangkok Declaration*.
outside powers, especially the Soviet Union and China, might fill that vacuum. To overcome this dilemma, ASEAN attempted to place its institutional emphasis on ensuring non-interference from outside through the ZOPFAN declaration, which envisioned ASEAN member states free from external interference.\(^{30}\)

To be sure, there were gaps in ASEAN member states’ perspectives on the association’s utility in the context of the changing political and security situation in Southeast Asia, and thus, the creation of the ZOPFAN declaration was neither an automatic nor unanimous institutional product. In fact, the concept started to be gradually formed from 1968. In the 2\(^{nd}\) AMM in 1968, while all ASEAN foreign ministers emphasized further economic and social cooperation, it was Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore that noted the prolonged Southeast Asian in security. They argued that Southeast Asian states were divided and faced potential outside intervention.\(^{31}\) On the other hand, the Philippines and Thailand, the US regional allies, had reservations about explicitly advocating this perspective. The Philippines focused more on regional diversities and divides themselves rather than mentioning its attribution, whereas Thailand mentioned about regional division by western colonial domination, but it maintained vagueness where the current threats came from by using the word, “certain quarters” that made use of the divisiveness of the region. Thus, despite the fact that the fundamental principle set the common ground for all ASEAN member states, there was a perception gap on political and security situations in the region.

The member states’ expectations of ASEAN’s utility were also different notwithstanding the conclusion of the 1967 Bangkok Declaration. On the one hand, Indonesia and Malaysia viewed the situation more positively for ASEAN. Indonesia consistently advocated non-intervention by external actors. Since ASEAN’s inception, Suharto attributed historical Southeast Asian division to foreign domination,\(^{32}\) and Adam Malik predicted that with the great power disengagement from Southeast Asia, they would “jointly consider policies in [regional] effort to cope with the new emerging situation…it is our duty to direct [the centre of gravity] into that of a

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\(^{30}\) ASEAN Secretariat, **Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality**.


polarization of forces of the Southeast Asian Nations themselves” and recommended that to consolidate ASEAN should not invite another external power into the region. The Indonesian initiative to convene the Jakarta conference for peaceful resolution for the Cambodian crisis in 1970 showed its resolve to provide a regional solution for regional problem. In September 1971, Adam Malik also said, “ASEAN…as basically reflecting the determination of its member countries to take charge of their own future and to reject the assumption that the fate of their region is to continue to be determined by outside powers.” Therefore, Indonesia’s political stance towards Southeast Asia had been consistent, and it perceived that the shift in the regional strategic situation was beneficial to the region.

This position was also echoed by Malaysia. In 1968, recognizing the UK and US disengagement would pose security challenges to Southeast Asia, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra encouraged further bilateral and multilateral cooperation within the region by stating “a time of danger is also a time of opportunity.” Tun Abdul Razak, deputy prime minister of Malaysia, stated that bilateral and multilateral cooperation among Southeast Asian states could safeguard outside interference and intervention, and that to this end, ASEAN should take decisive steps to more responsibility to prevent regional conflicts. In 1971, Ismail Abdul Rahman attributed the prolonged Vietnam War to great power’s intervention and interference in the internal affairs. Considering the announcement of the UK withdrawal in 1967, Malaysia has shifted its foreign policy from alignment with the Western power to nonalignment, and thus, it sought for a regional autonomy in Southeast Asia, which resonated with Indonesian political stance. However, although the western withdrawal was being undertaken, the regional security situation was still unstable due to the ongoing Vietnam War and conflicts in Laos and Cambodia. It is in this context that Ismail Abdul Rahman in the 4th AMM of 1971 made a speech on a policy of neutralization for Southeast Asia, which aimed at neutralizing the region with

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guarantees of the United States, the Soviet Union and China, to ensure regional security despite the on-going conflicts.39

On the other hand, the perspectives on the regional environment of Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand were more ambivalent and uncertain. Singapore had a relatively positive view at the beginning. Although it feared a rapid change of the regional strategic landscape would negatively affect its national security, Singapore regarded ASEAN as an instrument to fill a power vacuum created by UK and US withdrawal from the region not by political or military means, but economic and social cooperation among member states. Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore, emphasized in 1968 that ASEAN should promote economic, social and cultural cooperation, not be a military organization, since these cooperation helped increase national strength of regional states.40 However, increasingly frustrated with its slow progress of institutional cooperation, in the 3rd AMM in 1969, he argued that ASEAN would need to “seek the assistance and participation from outside the region” while ASEAN member states should firstly consider about its internal stability through social and economic development.41 In 1971, he also asserted that ASEAN needed to implement its cooperative projects more effectively rather than just merely issuing declarations and setting up new projects.42

From Singaporean point of view, the utility of ASEAN in a new environment was economic and social development for member states, which indirectly ensure member states’ security. Since ASEAN had little military capabilities to counterbalance any regional powers, Singapore believed that rather than fostering political and military cooperation, ASEAN was and should persist in its original institutional objectives: economic, social, and cultural cooperation among Southeast Asian states. With this line of argument, similar to Indonesia’s concept of “national resilience,” Singapore believed that regional strength stemmed from each state’s national stability, which would be achieved by national development. In this sense, it regarded the changing regional balance of power as a relatively positive development for the region, yet because of ASEAN’s institutional deficiency, it considered that ASEAN by itself was not sufficient to promote national and regional development,

39 Ibid., pp. 156-160.
and thus, its expectations towards ASEAN’s utility were more uncertain even though it advocated firmer institutional consolidation of ASEAN.

The Philippines’ view was relatively uncertain from the beginning, because it did not expect that ASEAN would be the only institution to foster regional cooperation or play a security role. Rather, its view on ASEAN’s institutional utility was to manage the inter-mural conflicts. In 1968, Narciso Ramos, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, considered ASEAN as an institution of intra-member security management by emphasizing the necessity of its firm adherence to the UN Charter of peaceful settlement of the disputes.\(^4^3\) Considering that the territorial disputes over Sabah with Malaysia became intensified, ASEAN from the Philippines’ perspective needed to advocate the peaceful settlement of disputes among member states.

This view emerged, when US withdrawal from the region became more likely in 1969, but the Philippines did not consider relinquishing its dependence on external actors. Carlos Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, argued that self-reliance, mutual assistance within the region, and assistance from “other sources” were important for development as well as peace and stability in the region.\(^4^4\) His objectives towards ASEAN shifted from management of inter-member conflict to regional mutual assistance through enhancement of regional cooperation. He still regarded ASEAN as just one of several regional organizations that needed to play a role to maintain peace and stability, yet he was more inclined to utilize and strengthen the Asia Pacific Council (ASPAC) and other specialized organizations such as Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). Especially, since the membership of ASPAC included Japan, which was a rising economic power in Asia through its rapid economic development, the Filipino focus was more on ASPAC or other forums rather than ASEAN. This is well-illustrated by President Marcos’ 1969 State of Nations Address, which reiterated his proposal to establish an Asian political forum, including all Asian states, to defuse potential conflicts in East Asia.\(^4^5\)

However, in 1970, the Philippines’ expectations toward ASEAN began to tilt toward the line of Malaysia and Indonesia in terms of regional political or security

\(^4^3\) Narciso Ramos, “ASEAN a Living Reality,” at the 1968 AMM in Siagian, p. 80.
\(^4^5\) Marcos stated that conflicts should be solved peacefully, and “for this reason, we have proposed, more than once, the creation of an Asian political forum, to help solve intra-regional conflicts or, at least, defuse potentially explosive situations.” See Ferdinand E. Marcos, Fourth State of the Nation Address, January 27, 1969, at <http://www.gov.ph/1969/01/27/ferdinand-e-marcos-fourth-state-of-the-nation-address-january-27-1969/>. 
cooperation. Although Marcos argued that it was unrealistic for ASEAN to play a military security role in the region, he would be “receptive…to the merits of a regional security system committed to the defense of the region” albeit not military role.\textsuperscript{46} In 1971, he also pointed out that Southeast Asia was torn by foreign intrusions and that the region needed to foster strong cooperation.\textsuperscript{47} Nevertheless, the Philippines still regarded ASEAN more as an economic and social development institution. Indicating that the Philippines needed to restructure its foreign policy, Marcos in 1971 asserted that ASEAN should foster the establishment of common market and free trade area and development of member states by proposing an “ASEAN Development Decade” by focusing on implementation of ASEAN projects, such as food production and technological cooperation.\textsuperscript{48} Thus, the Philippines’ expectation for ASEAN’s political and security roles in the region were relatively low.

Thailand was ambivalent regarding changes of the balance of power in the region. While Thailand faced decreasing US commitment to Thai security, Thailand regarded ASEAN as a tool for future regional integration. Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, stated in 1968 that ASEAN’s ultimate goal was “regional integration.” In 1969, he elaborated on this by stating that it was to create a “Southeast Asian Community,” which was to maintain “peace, freedom, happiness and balanced prosperity,” and was only achievable by ensuring regional security and stability.\textsuperscript{49} To this end, Thailand considered the possibility of regional security arrangements, if not through ASEAN, thus through bilateral and multilateral military cooperation, such as border security cooperation between Thailand and Malaysia and between Indonesia and Malaysia. Yet, he admitted that ASEAN would not be a military institution because military power was not enough to secure stability. Accordingly, Thailand recognized that economic, social, and political developments were imperative for national stability, which could be achieved only when ASEAN maintained the “unifying force of solidarity.”\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{47} “Opening Statement by H.E. Mr. Ferdinand E. Marcos, President of the Republic of The Philippines, at the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, 12 March 1971,” in ASEAN Secretariat, \textit{Statements by the ASEAN Heads of Government}, pp. 17-18.  
\textsuperscript{50} Khoman, “ASEAN—A Productive and Effective Organization,” in Siagian, p. 117.
At the same time, Thailand recognized ASEAN’s institutional limitations. It faced security threats from communist insurgencies in Northern parts of Thailand and the 1970 Cambodian crisis due to its geographical proximity, yet ASEAN did not have enough capabilities and political consensus to resolve the issue. Also, it recognized that ASEAN was viewed by some Southeast Asian states, especially North Vietnam, as security threats. Facing these realities, Thailand did not expect that ASEAN could resolve regional issues in a short time although several regional efforts had been already made. Accordingly, instead of pursuing a functional utility, Thailand saw ASEAN as gaining recognition from the international community by holding its solidarity. Khoman argued that it was only through ASEAN that member states could gain increasing economic assistance from other international organizations, such as the United Nations. Thus, Thailand was ambivalent on whether ASEAN could appropriately deal with the changing security environment though it did not deny ASEAN’s political and security utility in the long-term and the necessity of institutional consolidation.

Thus, ASEAN member states had divergent perspectives on ASEAN’s utility for member states’ security in the context of changes in the regional balance of power. Although each perceived some security concerns regarding the Western military withdrawal, Indonesia and Malaysia strongly supported these security developments in the region; Singapore and Thailand inevitably accepted the evolving situations, but did not expect ASEAN to immediately manage them; and the Philippines attempted to open its security option by considering possibilities to develop other regional organizations. Nevertheless, despite the fact that their means and emphases were different, all ASEAN member states attempted to consolidate the association as one of their means to prevent further foreign powers and actors, such as China, the Soviet Union, and North Vietnam, from expanding their sphere of influence into Southeast Asia given the opportunity of the Western withdrawal. In spite of their diverging perceptions, the implicit consensus was that they considered the change in the regional balance of power positively for ASEAN, but all perceived that the ASEAN institutional capability was not enough to meet the new security environment. They were compelled to ensure that such geostrategic changes would not be utilized by external powers, resulting in the declaration of ZOPFAN, which emphasized the

principle of non-interference in any form from outside power. Although it did not have any military functional meanings, it had a potential to function as a political shield for member states. Facing an opportunity to realize ASEAN’s institutional objectives as well as difficulties in immediately increasing functional capabilities of ASEAN, member states achieved a common political stance to maintain institutional solidarity for their security through the ZOPFAN declaration.

This implicit consensus was well-illustrated by ASEAN’s incremental institutional consolidation process. It was gradually consolidated from 1969 to 1971 without clear political intensions. According to AMM joint communiqués from 1967 to 1968, there was not any description regarding ASEAN’s political cooperation. They mainly stipulated functional cooperation within ASEAN, such as tourism, food production and supply including fisheries, civil air transportation, shipping, and means of expanding intraregional trade. However, this trend changed from the early 1970s, when the UK withdrawal became evident and United States demonstrated its future policy direction of its military withdrawal from Vietnam. Informally, political and security discussion among ASEAN member states were institutionalized. In 1971, the ASEAN foreign ministers emphasized the importance of “close consultation and cooperation” at regional and international forums to show its united stance for their common interests.52 The endorsement of ASEAN foreign ministers for Adam Malik’s candidacy for the UN Secretary General in 1971 illustrates this point. Moreover, an informal meeting for consultation was regarded as a useful diplomatic tool for ASEAN member states to discuss about international and regional political security issues. Because of its informality, it did not provide the image of security institution to the international community, which might otherwise provoke other regional powers. This system was institutionalized in October 2, 1971, when ASEAN foreign ministers agreed to “meet periodically to discuss international developments affecting the region” in New York.53 As a result, ASEAN foreign ministers met in Kuala Lumpur on November 26-27, 1971 outside ASEAN institutional framework and issued the ZOPFAN declaration, and they decided to convene a Summit Meeting, aiming at maintaining peace and stability in the region.54

52 “Joint Communique of the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.”
53 Siagian, p. 385.
Despite these differences, all the ASEAN member states attempted to manage a new regional security environment, possibly preventing further foreign powers from expanding their spheres of influence into Southeast Asia. To this end, they attempted to find some, ASEAN institutional utility for regional security. The implicit consensus was that while they considered the change in the regional balance of power positively, viewed from ASEAN’s institutional perspective, all perceived that the existing ASEAN institutional capability would not be enough to meet the new security environment to ensure one of ASEAN’s fundamental objectives—the principle of non-interference. In this sense, the divergence among ASEAN member states emerged because of institutional prioritization and methods of implementation, not its raison d’être. The declaration of ZOPFAN was made not to develop military capabilities or military pacts among member states to counter potential external intervention, but to ensure the unification of their political stance vis-à-vis outside powers.

**iii) Forging Institutional Security Preference**

The shift in the regional balance of power encouraged ASEAN’s transformation, and ASEAN’s original institutional raison d’être provided positive perspectives of such strategic changes and moved toward institutional consolidation. And yet, ASEAN did not have an institutional consensus on its prioritization or on methods to implement its objectives, and thus the direction of institutional consolidation was undecided. In this context, the member states attempted to forge ASEAN’s utility for their own security, for which two main institutional norm

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55 This implicit consensus was formed by ASEAN’s incremental institutional consolidation process from 1969 to 1971. Even though ASEAN did not have clear institutional intentions to form a unifying political stance at its inception, the gradual development by providing joint communiqué fostered such institutional development. According to AMM joint communiqués from 1967 to 1968, there was not any description regarding ASEAN’s political cooperation. They specifically focused on ASEAN’s functional cooperation, such as tourism, food production and supply including fisheries, civil air transportation, shipping, and means of expanding intraregional trade. However, facing the UK and US withdrawal in early 1970s, Informal political and security discussion among ASEAN member states took place. In March 1971, the ASEAN foreign ministers emphasized the importance of “close consultation and cooperation” at regional and international forums to show its united stance for their common interests. Moreover, an informal meeting for consultation was regarded as a useful diplomatic tool for ASEAN member states to discuss about international and regional political security issues. Because of its informality, it did not have to provide the image of security institution to the international community, which might otherwise provoke other regional powers in Asia. This system was institutionalized in October 2, 1971, when ASEAN foreign ministers agreed to “meet periodically to discuss international developments affecting the region” in New York. As a result, ASEAN foreign ministers met in Kuala Lumpur on November 26-27, 1971 outside ASEAN institutional framework and issued the ZOPFAN declaration, and they decided to establish a Summit Meeting for peace and stability in the region. For ASEAN’s statement, see “Joint Communique of the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”; ASEAN Secretariat, “Joint Press Statement Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting To Issue The Declaration Of Zone Of Peace, Freedom And Neutrality, Kuala Lumpur 25-26 November 1971,” at <http://www.aseansec.org/3712.htm>. For ASEAN’s chronology, see Siagian, p. 385.
entrepreneurs, Indonesia and Malaysia, emerged. Indonesia offered potential security cooperation within the framework of ASEAN and implicitly proposed functional expansion of ASEAN into the security field, and Malaysia proposed the idea of regional neutralization. After internal discussions, Indonesia’s proposal was
flatly rejected, and Malaysia’s neutrality proposal was ultimately incorporated as ASEAN’s institutional objective after undergoing significant modification.

However, both Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s proposals contributed to forging an institutional security preference of ASEAN by setting institutional limitations on security cooperation, and fostered the creation of an institutional approach to pursue security. For security cooperation, the Indonesian proposal challenged institutional ambiguity regarding security cooperation since security cooperation was not explicitly prohibited in its formative years; neither the 1967 Bangkok Declaration nor other ASEAN official documents contained any statement regarding security cooperation, and yet they did not explicitly deny its potentiality. As bilateral military networks already existed among some ASEAN member states, such as Malaysia and Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, and Indonesia and Malaysia, the proposal was to further push security cooperation on the multilateral basis. Yet, due to multilateral security cooperation being considered impractical among ASEAN member states, it was ultimately rejected.

In ASEAN’s approach to ensure security, the Malaysian proposal of neutrality fostered ASEAN’s discussion to clarify the concept of “security” and provided a means to meet security threats to the member states. In fact, ASEAN’s security

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59 It is, however, noted that Indonesian definition of “security cooperation” was not clear at the time. In the context of the middle of the Cold War, “security” in the international arena had a strong connotation of military on the inter-state basis while Southeast Asian states regarded that their security was linked with not only inter-state military conflicts, but also transnational and domestic insurgencies. In fact, most of bilateral defense cooperation among ASEAN member states aimed at thwarting domestic insurgencies, not directed at external relations. This potential definition of regional security notwithstanding, it was until the post-Cold War era when ASEAN could redefine the meaning of “security” even though such institutional cooperation took place during the Cold War.


61 The proposal was rejected by most of ASEAN member states for three main reasons. First, the multilateral defense cooperation would send a wrong signal to major powers. It would likely be seen as another regional security bloc, which also provoked external powers, especially the Communist bloc, and lead to Southeast Asian states’ involvement of the great power politics, since most of ASEAN member states had security linkage with the Western states despite their decreasing presence. Second, it had little defense practicality to prevent external interference due to member states’ limited military capabilities. Additionally, most of Southeast Asian states struggled for stabilizing domestic politics and fostering economic development and did not have capacity to drastically increase its military budget. Third, it would become more difficult to integrate all Southeast Asian states into ASEAN, and at worst, further divide Southeast Asia, considering on-going political and military conflicts in Indo-China states. Particularly, North Vietnam was likely to regard ASEAN as another anti-communist bloc in the region. Thus, multilateral security cooperation under ASEAN was explicitly rejected by member states, and the Indonesian proposal put it in a low priority in ASEAN’s institutional security preference.
contained not only inter-state security, but also intra-state security, which consisted of three levels: external intervention from regional powers, intra-regional conflicts over such issues as disputed islands, and internal threats from secessionist and communist insurgencies. The 1967 Bangkok Declaration addressed these threats in a loose manner and provided vague institutional responses to these three threats: collective determination to prevent interference and intervention from outside with adherence to the UN Charter; economic, social, and cultural cooperation to contain or diffuse regional conflicts in addition to adherence to the UN Charter; and national development to thwart internal insurgencies. However, with the exception of actual economic, social, and cultural cooperation among the member states, these responses remained purely declaratory policies, and the institutions did not have any action plans to achieve such objectives, even in the diplomatic arena.

Under such circumstances, Malaysia’s neutralization proposal provided a conceptual framework for ASEAN to weave the three levels of threats together and produce the conceptual linkage between regional and internal threats. The original proposal set out three major requirements for ASEAN member states to achieve regional neutralization. First, it was necessary for Southeast Asian states to promote regional cooperation, strictly follow the principle of non-interference, respect other states’ sovereignty, and “not participate in activities likely to directly or indirectly threaten the security of another.” Second, the major powers in Southeast Asia, namely the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, needed to provide security guarantees by accepting Southeast Asia as a zone of neutrality. In other words, they are responsible for maintaining regional stability, preventing regional conflicts that are caused by external actors, and intervening voluntarily when such conflicts would likely occur. Third, ASEAN member states were responsible for their internal stability. In other words, aiming at regional neutralization, the proposal provided more concrete action plans: first, pursuing domestic stability individually; second, fostering bilateral and multilateral contacts and consultation in the region; and third, assuring great powers that these actions do not impede their interests.

63 Ibid.
64 Malaysian officials repeatedly proposed this neutralization concept and its requirements to international fora. In 1971, Ismail stated this concept by making a speech of a policy of regional neutralization at the Third AMM. He argued:
It is with Vietnam in mind together with the withdrawal of the American and British from Southeast Asia that my government is advocating a policy of neutralization for Southeast Asia to
If this neutralization policy were achieved, it would contain external intervention as well as regional conflicts, which would benefit security for not only ASEAN member states but also other non-member Southeast Asian states. Admittedly, its feasibility was highly in doubt due to three difficult political realities: the past regional experience of failure of Laos’ neutrality, difficulty in attaining US, Soviet, and Chinese guarantees, and skepticism within several ASEAN member states.\(^65\)

However, the significant outcome of this proposal was that all ASEAN member states did not deny, if not agree to, Malaysia’s proposal as a long-term

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be guaranteed by the big powers viz. the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and People’s Republic of China. The policy is meant to be a proclamation that this region of ours is no longer to be regarded as an area to be divided into spheres of influence of the big powers. It may be regarded as a project to end or prevent small countries in this region from being used as pawns in the conflict between the big powers. The policy of neutralization represents a programme to ensure stability and preserve peace in this area so that we may get on with the urgent task of developing our countries and improving the wealth and welfare of our people.

Mr. Chairman, before we are in a position to seek an undertaking from the three big powers to guarantee our independence, integrity and neutrality, it is imperative amongst other things that we develop a strong sense of regional consciousness and solidarity. In this respect I am happy to note that we have now in Southeast Asia a number of regional organizations for a variety of purposes. The decade of the 70s is not the time nor is an ASEAN Meeting the place to state reasons why we should cooperate together and reiterate our firm belief in the concept of regional cooperation.


\(^{65}\) In detail, first, the neutrality might not enable Southeast Asia to prevent external interference as indicated in the case of Laos. The 1962 Geneva Agreement, which made Lao a neutral state, could not prevent itself from being involved in conflicts with Indochina. Second, the requirement of great power guarantee was practically infeasible. In theory, it imposes great powers to refrain from any internal interference unless neutralized states ask for assistance. Also, in the case of conflicts within the zone caused by external factors or violations by other powers, they have obligations to quell these conflicts. The reaction from China and the Soviet Union were sympathetic for the proposal, but reserved. While the Soviet Union was eager to establish second front on Southeast Asia to counterbalance China’s political influence in the region, China was also wary about the regional development of the balance of power. The United States, which began to militarily disengage from the region, also was concerned about the development of the regional balance of power once accepted. Such political commitment was likely to constrain their freedom of action to pursue their respective national interests. Consequently, great powers could neither agree nor disagree with the concept. Third, ASEAN member states were also skeptical about this proposal. Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore worried that the neutralization would accelerate US disengagement from the region. Indonesia also questioned its practicality. Adam Malik, Indonesian Foreign Minister, argued in September 1971 that neutralization was more attractive option for the region than alignment with major powers, but it required major powers’ guarantee, which would easily invite major powers’ intervention, considering political conditions of early 1970s. He pointed out that neutralization was more a long-term objective, and that what regional states needed to pursue was domestic stability through socio-political and economic development by bringing Indonesia’s own concept of “national resilience.” With these setbacks, even Malaysia recognized that its feasibility was considerably low in the short-term as Ismail and Razak admitted in 1970 and 1971 respectively.

objective for the region, and it became an informal focal agenda for ASEAN. To push this idea forward, Malaysia was also ready to compromise on its own proposal. This is because, in addition to its recognition of the difficulty of achieving neutralization in the short-term under the on-going regional conflicts in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, Malaysia had also difficulty in attaining international supports for its own proposals. Moreover, even though in numerous international conferences, including UN General Assembly, Non-Aligned Conferences, and the Conference on Economic Development of Southeast Asia, Malaysia explained its rationale and objectives of regional neutralization, these efforts did not produce fruitful outcomes, and Malaysia began to regard ASEAN as a crucial constituency for its proposal.66

The outcome of its compromises was the declaration of ZOPFAN. After ASEAN member states held a special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting at Kuala Lumpur on November 25-26, 1971,67 the neutralization proposal was modified in six ways. First, ASEAN explicitly stated that regional neutralization was the long-term goal, not a short-term effort. Second, great power guarantees were not mentioned. Instead, ASEAN would make necessary efforts to “secure the recognition of, and respect for,” Southeast Asia as a ZOPFAN. Third, non-involvement in the region of external powers was deleted. Instead, non-interference of external powers was reiterated by exerting the sentence from the 1967 Bangkok Declaration. Fourth, the principle of non-aggression among Southeast Asian states was mentioned. Fifth, a nuclear-free zone was mentioned. Sixth, the legal terms of neutralization were entirely deleted, and it became a political document rather than a legal one. Because of these significant modifications, the original concept of neutralization was diluted.

These substantial compromises notwithstanding, the declaration of ZOPFAN synthesized the neutralization concept into non-interference principles inside and outside Southeast Asia as well as national development as stipulated in the Bangkok Declaration. ZOPFAN requires not only great power non-interference, but also containment of intra-regional and intra-member conflicts through such means as non-interference or non-aggression and national development. Thus, providing the conceptual framework to pursue security, all three levels of institutional cooperation

66 Wilson, pp. 22-24.
67 The meeting was held outside the ASEAN framework, and thus it could be seen as a genesis of informal ASEAN meeting. In this meeting, according to Hanggi, three agenda items were discussed in the meeting: 1) Southeast Asia as a zone of peace, 2) the attitude of the ASEAN member countries towards the PRC, and 3) the desirability of having an Asian Summit as envisaged by the President of the Philippines. Hanggi, p. 16.
and individual efforts existing separately became an integral part of ZOPFAN realization.

This conceptualization also fostered the institutionalization of political consultations among ASEAN member states. As the ZOPFAN declaration stipulated, ASEAN member states would “explore ways and means of bringing about its realization” and collectively and individually secure the recognition and respect from outside states. ASEAN member states produced initial procedural steps for realization of ZOPFAN: continuation of consultation for an integrated approach on “all matters and developments which affect the Southeast Asian region”; holding a summit meeting among leaders of ASEAN member states; creating a Committee of Senior Officials to study the necessary steps toward ZOPFAN; and reaching out to non-member Southeast Asian states to inform them of ZOPFAN. At this point, detailed political procedures and the ZOPFAN concept had yet to be materialized; however, this declaration became a reference point for ASEAN to evaluate the regional strategic landscape, and it enabled ASEAN to take one step further to clarify and prioritize its future institutional actions.

In sum, the years between 1968 and 1971 was a period of policy fumbling for ASEAN to effectively manage the changing regional strategic landscape and ensure member states’ security. Debates over the proposals for security and political cooperation under the ASEAN framework clarified ASEAN’s raison d’être and helped to shape its institutional security preference: avoidance of the ASEAN military pact and creation of the conceptual framework of an institutional approach to ensure security—promotion of diplomatic and political cooperation among ASEAN member states, continuation of economic, social, and cultural cooperation among ASEAN and other Southeast Asian states, and the promotion of national development.

IV. Phase II: ASEAN in 1972-1976—TAC and Bali Concord

ASEAN’s institutional transformation began with the declaration of the ZOPFAN concept in 1971. The ZOPFAN concept was still being developed as shown by the establishment of a Committee of Senior Officials to study necessary steps toward ZOPFAN. The period 1972-1976 saw the further institutional consolidation of

68 ASEAN Secretariat, “Joint Press Statement Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting To Issue The Declaration Of Zone Of Peace, Freedom And Neutrality.”
ASEAN through the creation of TAC and the Bali Concord in 1976. As in the previous section, this section analyzes changes in the strategic environment, the regional and intra-regional balance of power, ASEAN’s perceptions, and internal discussion that led to the establishment of TAC and the Bali Concord.

i) Triggers: US Disengagement and the Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Southeast Asia

During the period of 1972-1976, the regional strategic balance in Southeast Asia underwent readjustment. The US global strategy for rapprochement with China and the Soviet Union and the US decision on military disengagement from mainland Southeast Asia had a major impact on the regional strategic balance. However, this improvement did not translate into immediate stability in the intra-regional balance of power in Southeast Asia. Instead, the intra-regional balance of power remained fluid because of the concurrent evolution of the Sino-Soviet rivalry over the regional power vacuum created by the Western disengagement. With civil wars in Indochinese states, namely Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, reconfiguration of a new regional strategic balance was underway. Admittedly, even under these circumstances, a slight positive strategic trend in Indochina was seen in 1973. After the 1972 Easter Offensive and Christmas bombings, both the United States and North Vietnam began to commit themselves to the Paris peace talks, and on January 17, 1973 the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, the so-called 1973 Paris Accord, was reached. However, even this seemingly positive trend created more uncertainty for some ASEAN member states.

With the US disengagement from Vietnam, several ASEAN member states faced the loss of US military presence in Southeast Asia as well as its military and economic aid to them, which was essential for their national development. To be sure, before 1973, despite the fact that the general direction of US foreign policy had already been set by the “Nixon Doctrine” and that the US was reducing the number of troops in Southeast Asia, the United States recognized the importance of maintaining its political and military commitments to Southeast Asia, as regional security was still unstable and other regional security frameworks were ineffective. In February 1972, Nixon, mentioning ASEAN’s concept of ZOPFAN, pointed out the validity of ASEAN’s own understanding that to achieve ZOPFAN, “much remains to be done
before such an objective can be realized,”" and subsequently, he confirmed that US treaty commitments, nuclear deterrence, and military and economic assistance would continue in Southeast Asia. As a result, the United States maintained its material commitment of Southeast Asia, and instead of increasing its military presence, from 1971 to 1973 it increased both economic and military assistance to ASEAN member states from US$402.1 million to US$551.6 million. 71

However, the United States substantially decreased economic and military assistance to ASEAN member states from 1973 to 1974 following the conclusion of the Paris Peace Accords. The amount of US economic assistances to Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand as well as its military assistance to the Philippines and Thailand—US military allies in Southeast Asia—was reduced to less than half the previous amount; total US assistance to ASEAN member states dropped to US$275 million. 72 The United States argued that this assistance was aimed more at strengthening the internal security management of each Southeast Asian state,73 and that reducing political commitment to ASEAN was aimed at reducing suspicions that the United States would create a puppet organization. The United States sought to encourage the Asian states to take the initiative to resolve their regional issues on their own, in the long run.74 In this sense, while reducing hostility with the Soviet Union and China, the United States had aimed at not only “Vietnamization,” but also “Southeast Asianization” since 1973.75

However, the political vacuum created by the US disengagement also began to increase the tension between China and the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia. While the Sino-Soviet rivalry consolidated the political division in Indochina, China and the Soviet Union attempted to influence the ASEAN member states as both began to prevent each other from taking advantage of this strategic opportunity to increase their political and military influence in Southeast Asia. On the one hand, already undertaking rapprochement with the United States and producing the Shanghai

71 See “Appendix II. US Aids to ASEAN Member States (1967-1976).”
72 Ibid.
75 Although the United States provided more foreign assistance to ASEAN members in 1975 and 1976, its increase did not reach to the same level of 1971-1973.
Communiqué in 1972, China became more explicit in its attempt to counterbalance the Soviet influence in the international arena and North Vietnam’s ambitions in Indochina. Although it competed with the Soviet Union over strengthening ties with North Vietnam during the 1960s by providing economic and military aid to North Vietnam, the early 1970s witnessed China’s disengagement from North Vietnam because it could no longer compete with the Soviet Union in terms of economic and military technological aid provided to North Vietnam. By 1973, China had substantially reduced its aid and completely withdrawn its troops from North Vietnam, and it became more assertive in its territorial claims regarding both land borders and the South China Sea, especially the Paracel and Spratly Islands. This is illustrated by the series of Sino-Vietnamese armed border skirmishes, more than one

76 The strategic competition between the Soviet Union and China over North Vietnam set in forth from the mid-1960s, when the United States decided to intensify the Vietnam War by sending its troops in Vietnam. Both the Soviet Union and China increased its military and economic assistance to North Vietnam in order to counterbalance the US military involvement. While China contributed to its engineering troops for the construction and maintenance of defense works, airfields, roads, and railways in North Vietnam as well as anti-aircraft artillery troops, the Soviet Union substantially increased its economic and military aids from approximately US$ 150 million to US$500 million. However, it was four main events in 1968 that the foundation of major strategic changes in the relations among the Soviet Union, China, and North Vietnam shifted toward the Sino-North Vietnam split and intensification of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. First, the Tet Offensive was undertaken, and this offensive strategy constituted a contradiction with China’s strategy of “people’s war.” According to Mao Zedong’s theory of protracted people’s war, the revolutionary force would use guerrilla tactics, gradually move from rural areas to city areas, and eventually commit positional warfare. However, the offensive did not take a necessary step and quickly moved into positional warfare, and China began to directly contact with the NLF, bypassing North Vietnam. Second, although China had been opposing the peace talks with the United States in order to pursue a negotiated settlement was more preferred by the Soviet Union in the context of the US-Soviet détente, and partly because it would likely marginalize China’s international and regional political influence as it would illustrate US and the Soviet Union bypassing China. Third, the Soviet Union announced the doctrine of “limited sovereignty,” by which it would intervene other socialist states under the name of the Warsaw Pact. This is well-illustrated when the Soviet crushed the “Prague Spring” in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. As this political doctrine would justify Soviet intervention in other region, including Southeast Asia, it became possible that the Soviet Union would attempt to increase its political and military influence in Southeast Asian socialist states by intervention. Fourth, Richard Nixon became the US president-elect in November 1968, and it became more likely that the United States would undertake its military withdrawal from Vietnam. This was expected to create the regional political and military vacuum in Indochina, and the expectation that such windows of opportunity for the Soviet Union would increase its political and military influence in the region in the near future heightened. In this setting, from China’s perspective, it became more challenging to win over North Vietnam and thwart the Soviet influence, and pursuing its status-quo strategy would no longer serve its national interests. In order to overcome these setbacks, China began to gradually shift its strategy by starting to reduce its military and economic supports for North Vietnam, approaching to other Southeast Asian states, including Laos and Cambodia, and considering potential rapprochement with the United States to capitalize on the US-Soviet contention. Admittedly, it did not induce an immediate, complete strategic shift from both China and North Vietnam. For example, North Vietnam still attempted to maintain a strategic tie with China in 1971 by refusing the Soviet proposal to conclude a “Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” to counter China’s influence. Also, even though China became more reluctant to provide economic and military aid to North Vietnam, it kept providing them, especially during and after the 1972 Easter Offensive. In short, Vietnam still hedged not to be strategically dominated by either the Soviet Union or China, while China hedged by pursuing a two-pronged policy: maintaining its influence over North Vietnam and approaching to the United States and Southeast Asia. However, their strategic inclination became more evident, and the broader strategic shift was under way. It was after the 1973 Paris Peace Accord that Hanoi and China stopped pursuing these hedging policies. See Douglas Pike, *Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance*, (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987), p. 91, p. 139; Chen Jian, *Mao’s China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 221-229, p. 231; Zhai, pp. 174-177, p. 179, and p. 182; Chen, p. 235.

77 Zhai, pp. 135.
hundred since 1973, and the 1974 naval clash over the Paracel Islands with South Vietnam. North Vietnam remained silent at the time even though it had proposed resolving the territorial disputes in December 1973. Further, China began to take a more accommodative approach towards ASEAN. For example, when Chen Ji-Shen, China’s Director of Southeast Asian Affairs, officially visited Malaysia in July 1974, China officially mentioned for the first time that the ZOPFAN concept was compatible with principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of the region and freedom from external intervention, and China’s Premier Zhou Enlai also reconfirmed this stance later. Since China intended to hold off the Soviet influence over Southeast Asia, it endorsed the concept of neutrality, if not fully approved, even though China’s guaranteeing of neutrality was still limited in terms of its military capability vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union strengthened its political, economic and military ties with North Vietnam, and it attempted to expand its political and military influence in Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union, maintaining détente with the United States, sought to thwart China’s influence in Southeast Asia by a “divide-and-rule” strategy. First, it further strengthened its ties with North Vietnam by providing more aid. At this time, the Soviet Union had already shifted its policy towards global communist movements, and instead of indiscriminately providing assistance to all socialist states, it concentrated on providing its resources to states that were likely to be successful in their communist movement. Accordingly, the Soviet Union concentrated on its assistance to North Vietnam, and by 1975, its economic aid accounted for approximately 80 percent of North Vietnam’s state budget. Also, North Vietnam increasingly relied on the Soviet heavy weapon systems, including its SAMs, arsenals, tanks and rocketry, in its war-fighting strategy, and their economic and military ties became stronger than ever. Second, the Soviet Union also approached Southeast Asian states. It first approached Indonesia, which had been suspicious of China’s ambitions in Southeast Asia, and announced agreement with Jakarta to resume Soviet development aid, including power projects of the 500 and

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81 Pike, p. 77 and p. 106.
180 megawatt range.\textsuperscript{82} Also, while sympathizing with the ZOPFAN concept, the Soviet Union attempted to strengthen its influence over the ASEAN states by revitalizing Brezhnev’s “Asian collective security” proposal, which aimed at excluding the United States and China,\textsuperscript{83} although this proposal again failed.\textsuperscript{84}

By 1975, when North Vietnam captured Saigon, the Sino-Soviet strategic rivalry over Indochina became more evident. After the war, China suggested to North Vietnam that it keep its distance from the Soviet Union, as the Soviet Union had the political intention of becoming a regional hegemon, but North Vietnam did not take this anti-hegemony stance.\textsuperscript{85} After this, China dropped the political intention of winning over North Vietnam. When North Vietnamese delegations visited China, China clearly showed its reluctance to provide aid to Vietnam, resulting in no joint communiqué or statement after the meeting. Chairman Mao Zedong implicitly told Vietnamese Party Secretary General Le Duan that Vietnam should not look for aid from China any more.\textsuperscript{86} On the contrary, the Soviet-Vietnamese relations were further strengthened. When a bilateral meeting was held in Moscow in October, the Soviet Union agreed to provide more economic and military aid over the next five years to purchase Soviet equipment and technical assistance and to strengthen economic ties, while showing their congruence of political views on “many issues,” including the Soviet détente with the United States, and discussing the creation of a bilateral formal alliance. In December, the Soviets promised to reconstruct more than 160 heavy and light industrial enterprises and to provide 40 capital projects that amounted to a total aid package of approximately $500 million.\textsuperscript{87} In addition, by strengthening strategic ties with Vietnam and utilizing its strategic location, including the Cam Ranh Bay, the Soviet Union began strategic military containment of China in Indochina. Therefore,

\textsuperscript{84} Since North Vietnam maintained its hostile posture toward ASEAN as a result of Thai and Filipino participation in the Vietnam War on the side of the United States, and since the Soviet Union did not spell out the full detail of the proposal nor ask for endorsement, the idea again dissipated. See “Parliamentary Questions and Answers,” \textit{Foreign Affairs Malaysia}, Vol. 6, No. 2, (June 1973), p. 90. Moreover, Tun Abdul Razak argued in July 1973 that “we should concentrate our efforts on ensuring the security for our region of Southeast Asia through our neutralization proposal first.” See “Parliamentary Questions and Answers,” \textit{Foreign Affairs Malaysia}, Vol. 6, No. 3, (September 1973), p. 38.
\textsuperscript{86} Mao said on September 24 that “today, [Vietnam is] not the poorest under the heaven. [China is] the poorest. We have a population of 800 million.” See Zhai, p. 213.
in late 1975, with the increasingly diminishing US presence, Southeast Asia faced a different strategic power balance that was shaped by the Sino-Soviet rivalry.

ASEAN member states, having already anticipated that the United States would not maintain the same level of military presence in the region in the early 1970s, were acutely aware of the changing regional balance of power, resulting in formulation of the 1971 ZOPFAN concept. However, as changes in the Southeast Asian balance of power were still underway in early 1970s, each ASEAN member state also expected further changes from 1971; however, they had difficulty in assessing how the future strategic balance in the region would be reconfigured. In the meantime, from 1972 to 1976, both the Soviet Union and China approached ASEAN member states, and consequently, despite the informal consultations among ASEAN member states, their views and diplomatic maneuvers were not congruent in terms of their relations with regional powers. Indeed, while Indonesia and Singapore were unwilling to have formal ties with China, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand normalized their relations with it. Also, as the Sino-Soviet rivalry intensified in Indochina, the ZOPFAN concept could not prevent major power intervention, and it became more difficult for ASEAN to realize ZOPFAN. It is in this strategic context that ASEAN needed to reconsider its institutional methods to realize ZOPFAN.

**ii) Two Expectations: Positive Inside, Uncertain Outside**

The period from 1972 to 1976 saw the process of ASEAN’s institutional consolidation, yet its process was not straightforward. Since the ZOPFAN concept required inclusion of all Southeast Asian states and great power guarantees, engagement toward all Southeast Asian states and great powers was the policy option that ASEAN needed to pursue. However, while US disengagement opened windows of opportunity, the instability in Indochina, namely Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, which was caused by domestic political instability and entanglement of the Sino-Soviet rivalry, remained, and it became the greatest concern in ASEAN, as it might spill over to all of Southeast Asia. Thus, ASEAN member states’ expectations of the future regional balance of power during this period oscillated between “positive” and “uncertain,” struggling for institutional consolidation: positive consensus in 1972;

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88 In fact, there were several exchanges of views among ASEAN member states, regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations with China, through such an informal dialogue as the Razak-Suharto and the Razalk-Kittakachorn meetings. See “Parliamentary Questions and Answers,” *Foreign Affairs Malaysia*, Vol. 6, No. 3, (September, 1973), pp. 41-42.
mixed positive and uncertain views in 1973; consensus on uncertainty in 1974; and diverging positive and uncertain views in 1975.89

In April 1972, the ASEAN’s overall evaluation of the regional security situation was cautiously positive. Singapore argued that despite major powers’ involvement in the region, there was a game change in the great power politics. Rajaratnam pointed out that while there were conflicts in the past “on the basis of a life-and-death struggle between the free world and socialist camps…when necessary, with direct military intervention by the big powers to ensure victory,” great powers no longer considered the third world as the stage of great power conflicts.90 Thailand also generally saw a positive change in the regional balance of power on the basis of the Sino-US rapprochement. Khoman touched on the Shanghai Communiqué and argued that both the United States and China agreed “not to seek hegemony in the Asia Pacific region and to oppose efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony” in addition to the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, which was an “encouraging sign” for the regional stability.91 Khoman advocated that regional states needed to take more responsibilities for peace and security in the region, and he no longer attributed regional conflicts to great powers. Indonesia saw the rapid change in the political relations among the major powers rather favorable. While it maintained cautious attitude towards the shift by arguing that the shifts in the regional balance of power “may have adverse effects for [Southeast Asia]” due to the Indochinese conflicts, Indonesia asserted that it was ASEAN’s responsibility to take adequate measures for its institutional principles, such as the Jakarta Conference for Cambodian settlement.92 Malaysia considered that the development of the security situation was slowly moving toward “peace and tranquility,” and the Sino-US rapprochement was the evidence of the potential to realize the ZOPFAN because “states with different political systems can co-exist peacefully on the basis of mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and integrity.”93 The Philippines, pointing out the Shanghai Communiqué produced by the

89 For details, see “Appendix VI. ASEAN’s Perceptions: 1972-1976.”
Sino-US rapprochement and the US-Soviet détente, saw them as positive development for the ZOPFAN declaration.\(^94\)

Seeing the regional security environment was moving favorably to the association, ASEAN at this period attempted to cautiously consolidate its political-security function by holding informal AMMs, followed by the November 1971 Kuala Lumpur meeting, which made ASEAN work as a cooperative security mechanism. In July 1972 and February 1973, ASEAN held two informal meetings to assess the development of security situation in Southeast Asia. The two meetings basically reconfirmed that Southeast Asian states were primarily responsible for the regional stability, including Indochina, in the context of changes in the balance of power, and they endorsed periodic informal consultations among ASEAN countries.\(^95\) While the 1972 meeting was to reaffirm the basic principle of ASEAN, the 1973 meeting, which was held immediately after the Paris Peace Accords, went further to express their satisfaction with the Accords regarding Vietnam’s cease-fire and respect for non-intervention of Laos and Cambodia. To further consolidate the institution, ASEAN proposed creation of an “Asian forum” of all the Southeast Asian states and expansion of the membership.\(^96\) Each member had a positive view of the evolving regional security situation and suggested that ASEAN need to become more effective by institutional consolidation.\(^97\) Although ASEAN’s security function was essentially limited to political discussions about the development of the regional security situations, it became clear that ASEAN attempted to develop itself into an inclusive cooperative security mechanism in Southeast Asia.

In April 1973, however, ASEAN faced security challenges despite the Paris Peace Accords. Since the balance of power in Indochina was still unstable and the US aids to Southeast Asia was expected to reduce, ASEAN member states could not maintain the same positive expectations as they did in 1972. Accordingly, differing perspectives of the intra-regional balance of power and expectations for ASEAN

\(^{94}\) Jose D. Ingles, “ASEAN Should Have Two Levels of Priorities,” at the 1972 AMM, in Siagian, pp. 198-199.  
\(^{95}\) “The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting to Discuss International Developments Affecting the Region, Manila, 13-14 July 1972,” in ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Documents Series, p. 151; “The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting to Assess the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and to Consider its Implications for Southeast Asia, Kuala Lumpur, 15 February 1973,” in ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Documents Series, p. 152.  
\(^{97}\) “Joint Communique of the Fifth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 13-14 April 1972,” in ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Documents Series, pp. 72-73.
emerged: Thailand held a more negative view of the change; Singapore and the Philippines was more uncertain; and Indonesia and Malaysia maintained a positive view. Thailand, having a more serious concern about Indochinese conflicts, especially its neighbor, Cambodia, showed a negative view on the intra-regional balance of power. This was shown when Thailand’s Prime Minister Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn despite ASEAN’s preference that it would not institutionally form any military coalition, advocated that ASEAN should collectively tackle the problems of security and initiated the Southeast Asian forum where all the states in Southeast Asia would gather to discuss security issues.98 Brigadier-General Chatichai Choonhavan, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, also argued that ASEAN needed to assume its responsibilities for the security issues, and opposing to the expansion of the membership, suggesting detachment of ASEAN member states from other Southeast Asian states to consolidate the institution, including the establishment of the ASEAN central secretariat.99 Although these ideas were not further discussed within ASEAN, Thailand attempted to add a military-security function for its security.

Singapore, which emphasized ASEAN as an “economic organization,” leaned towards a more an uncertain view due to two major concerns: ASEAN’s economic growth and intra-regional conflicts. First, it was concerned about the reduction of aid coming from the United States because great powers shifted their strategies to settle differences “not buying allies but through direct negotiation among themselves.”100 Rajaratnam saw this trend as a negative economic situation for the ASEAN member states. He feared that it would slow economic growth because ASEAN’s growth was dependent on not intra-ASEAN cooperation but extra regional trade and investment. Second, the Singapore considered the possibility of further instability in the intra-regional balance of power in Southeast Asia. Rajaratnam argued that while it considered that wars from external actors were less likely, the probability of conflicts and rivalry within Indochina, namely Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, increased. The Philippines were also uncertain about the future prospect of the regional balance of power by asserting that the current regional situation faced “unpredictable change.”101

100 S. Rajaratnam, “We Formed ASEAN Without War,” at the 1973 AMM, in Siagian, p. 213.
On the other hand, Indonesia took a cautious optimistic view. Acknowledging that rapprochements among major powers were still positive trend, it continued that the “shifts in the power equilibrium may have adverse effects on Southeast Asia,” ASEAN needed to undertake actions through institutional consolidation, including strengthening national and regional development program, creation of the ASEAN central secretariat, and coordinating unified political stances in economic negotiations with major powers towards the establishment of ZOPFAN. 102 Malaysia still maintained its view of a positive shift in the regional balance of power and regarded this shift as an opportunity for ASEAN to bring peace in Indochina through the ASEAN Coordination Committee in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Indochina and to “consolidate [ASEAN’s] foundations.”103 Therefore, at this point, ASEAN member states’ views were not monolith, while all of them attempted to seek its institutional utility for their security.

In May 1974, despite these dissonances, ASEAN’s expectations towards the changes again began to converge and to have a consensual view of “uncertainty” as the member states were increasingly aware that the major power rapprochement had not positively affected the regional balance of power while the high probability of Indochina conflicts still existed. Indonesia was convinced that uncertainty in Indochina was heightened because of external intervention into Southeast Asia. Suharto argued that “the present détente still refers to the behavior of superpowers…[and] détente still prevails in certain regions of the world only while war and conflicts continue to be the disturbing reality in [Southeast Asia],” and thus, the détente “[does] not automatically provide [Southeast Asians] with the assurance that outside powers will cease interfering in the internal affairs of our region.”104 Malik added to this assessment that Southeast Asia was “being confronted with an alarming chain-reaction of new crises enveloping the world…[and] real peace has still not returned to the people of Indochina.”105

Other ASEAN member states also had similar assessments. Malaysia maintained its positive perspective of great powers’ rapprochement, yet it leaned to a

negative view of the development in terms of conflicts in Indochina and economic uncertainties evolved from the world inflation and the monetary instability. This was also echoed by Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen, Malaysian Minister of Information and Special Functions for Foreign Affairs, who explained that détente among super powers was not a “panacea” for world major political, economic and social problems. The Philippines held the similar perspective to Malaysia’s by mentioning that the ceasefire agreement in Indochina gave the “sense of optimism” but did not bring peace in Cambodia and Vietnam. Singapore argued that the Paris Peace Treaty and détente between the great powers had “little substance” in 1974. Thailand followed suit by saying “[Indochina’s] developments since [the Paris Peace Accords] have given us little reason to rejoice” and was concerned about the high possibility of North Vietnam’s new offensive and the political situation in Cambodia.

In May 1975, soon after the fall of Saigon and Cambodia, the regional security assessment among the ASEAN member states again differentiated from each other. Some states, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, attempted to see the security situation in Southeast Asia as relatively positive, albeit with a cautious assessment. While Razak asserted that Southeast Asia became “a different place from what it was only a few short weeks ago…Peace, for the most part, has come to this Region,” Malik said “peace has come to Indo-China, suddenly and dramatically.” Others, such as Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand were more cautious about the development. Singapore’s Rajaratnam warned that despite the shift of regional balance of power, ASEAN member states should not forget that the United States would remain

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106 Since Tun Dr. Ismail, Deputy Prime Minister, died in August 1973, his successor, Datuk Hussein Onn, attended the 1974 AMM meeting. Since this was the first time for him to attend the AMM, his speech was relatively short and See Datuk Hussein Onn, “Good Would Come out of ASEAN Spirit—Vision—Faith in it,” at the 1974 AMM, in Siagian, p. 248-249.
engaged in Asia, and that ASEAN should not take a side with one major power.\textsuperscript{113} The Philippines was concerned that the shift in the balance of forces in Indochina would still have the potential for Chinese and the Soviet intervention, which would destabilize the region, and thus, Romulo pointed out that “no matter how we view the situation, the Asian future is decidedly uncertain.”\textsuperscript{114} Thailand, while it said that ASEAN welcomed the restoration of peace in Cambodia and Vietnam, still saw the possibility of conflicts among Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand on the basis of historical patterns shown in the past 100 years in the Indochinese Peninsula.\textsuperscript{115} In this sense, the oscillation of security perspective among ASEAN member states from 1973 to 1975 illustrates that there was a little institutional consensus on security outlooks in Southeast Asia.

However, the significance of these periods for ASEAN was that ASEAN member states began to geographically detaching from Indochina states that were entangled by the great power politics. Indeed, unlike the period between 1968 and 1971, ASEAN’s security discussions from 1972 to 1976 focused exclusively on Indochina and the major powers’ maneuver in it, not intra-member conflicts within ASEAN. There was no speech indicating the intra-member rivalry in this period, and the ASEAN member states no longer debated in its meetings over the intra-member rivalry on the basis of territorial disputes or potential major powers’ military and political encroachment into the ASEAN member states. Their security concerns were more about each member states’ internal subversion and the spill-over effects of the potential intensification of the conflicts in Indochina, not of that in ASEAN region, although they disagreed over the implication of the potential effects of the future intra-regional balance of power. In other words, they perceived the intra-member security situations more positively than Indochina’s, and ASEAN decided to first consolidate itself rather than including unstable Indochinese states.

Admittedly, this does not necessarily mean that ASEAN abandoned the Indochina states as potential members of the association. The ZOPFAN concept, which encompassed all the Southeast Asian region, was still institutionally valid, and one of the ASEAN’s ultimate objectives was to include all the Southeast Asian states as members. For example, the joint communiqué of the 1972 informal AMM meeting

\textsuperscript{113} He said, “Worse [still] if we have no choice but to come to terms with one power, then that is disaster.” S. Rajaratnam, “ASEAN Today is our Shield,” at the 1975 AMM, in Siagian, p. 300.
\textsuperscript{114} Carlos P. Romulo, “A Period of Sober Reassessment,” at the 1975 AMM, in Siagian, p. 293.
\textsuperscript{115} Chatichai Choonhavan, “A Sad Chapter of History has ended,” at the 1975 AMM, in Siagian, pp. 305-306.
stipulated ASEAN’s desire to expand its membership to Indochinese states, and in the 1973 AMM soon after the Paris Peace Accords, Indonesia and Singapore argued for ASEAN’s membership expansion. Also, in 1973, Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister Ismail A. Rahman rejected an ASEAN institutional option to build defenses against potential emergence of an Indochinese communist bloc and pursue a policy of containment, as it would only exacerbate conflicts in Southeast Asia. Yet, an institutional momentum to include non-member states in Indochina diminished as uncertainty in the Indochinese security situation increased, and while it remained as an institutional objective, ASEAN did not and could not expand its membership in the 1970s. By 1975, several ASEAN states were more explicit in emphasizing differences between ASEAN and Indochina. For example, Singapore argued that Southeast Asia had two systems of government, non-communist governments on the one hand, and communist or communist influenced governments on the other, and it emphasized that ASEAN member states had more population, more dynamic economic growth, and more integrated than those in Indochina. Consequently, when the first ASEAN summit was held in 1976, it was only Malaysia that still advocated the expansion of membership. Indeed, according to Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, Malaysian Foreign Minister, ASEAN decided to postpone taking a collective stance about its membership expansion by then.

Instead, ASEAN began to pursue two phased institutional consolidations. First, ASEAN in a relatively positive security environment would proceed to consolidate itself, and second, whenever the security situation became favorable in Indochina, non-member Southeast Asian states would join ASEAN. This is well illustrated by the 1976 TAC and Bali Concord. On the one hand, the TAC aimed at applying its principles to all the Southeast Asian states. As indicated in the “Treaty of Amity and

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116 “The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting to Assess the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and to Consider its Implications for Southeast Asia, Kuala Lumpur, 15 February 1973,” in ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Documents Series, p. 152.
117 Tun Dr. Ismail bin Dato Haji Abdul Rahman, “Current Scene in Southeast Asia and Malaysia’s Perspective, at the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs at Wellington on March 22,” Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 6, No 1, (March 1973), p. 22.
118 Rajaratnam, “ASEAN Today is our Shield,” pp. 301.
119 At the 1976 Summit Meeting, Onn said, “At the last Ministerial Meeting held in Kuala Lumpur almost a year ago, ASEAN has shown its readiness to extend its hand of friendship, goodwill and cooperation to the Government of the Indo-China states.” However, there was no statement regarding the membership expansion in the 1975 AMM joint communiqué. “Statement by the Prime Minister of Malaysia His Excellency Datuk Hussein Onn at the Opening of the Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government on February 23, 11976 at Denpasar, Bali,” in ASEAN Summit Meeting, Bali, 23-25 Feb. 1976, (Jakarta: State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia, 1976), p. 16.
Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” Article 18 stipulated that the treaty “shall be open for accession by other States in Southeast Asia” to maintain possibility to include Indochinese states as members.\(^{121}\) On the other hand, it also stipulated in Article 19 that the treaty “shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification with the Governments of the signatory States,” while leaving the Indochinese states aside for the time being. The Bali Concord explicitly aimed at consolidating ASEAN by increasing national and “ASEAN” resilience instead of using the term “regional resilience,”\(^{122}\) thus narrowing the scope of ASEAN’s objective in the short-term. In short, ASEAN created a tentative geographical space, and ASEAN member states attempted to ensure their own security through the consolidation of the institution.

### iii) Further Shaping Institutional Security Preference: From Concept to Action

In 1971, the ZOPFAN created a broad conceptual framework for ASEAN’s activities and forged its institutional security preference by integrating regional, intra-regional, and internal security concepts. Also, as ASEAN’s long-term objective, ZOPFAN became the member states’ guideline for their action in the international arena. Nevertheless, since details of the concept were still under consideration by a Committee of Senior Officials, and since institutional priorities had yet to be decided, ASEAN did not include any official reference to ZOPFAN in its AMM joint communiqués from 1972 to 1975.\(^{123}\) Instead, representatives of the ASEAN member states informally discussed about the concept and provided their assessments of the progress of the ZOPFAN in their speeches and press statements at AMMs.\(^{124}\) Thus, during the period from 1972 to 1976, two levels of institutional processes were concurrently undertaken to set priorities for the realization of ZOPFAN: one at the foreign ministers’ level and the other at a senior official level.

\(^{121}\) ASEAN Secretariat, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.
\(^{122}\) ASEAN Secretariat, Declaration of ASEAN Concord.
\(^{123}\) The 9\(^{th}\) AMM in June 1976 mentioned about the ZOPFAN not because of outcomes of ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ discussions, but because of outcomes of the first ASEAN Summit, which was held in February 1976 and officially mentioned about ZOPFAN for the first time.
At the Foreign Ministers’ level, the 1973 Paris Peace Treaty triggered ASEAN’s discussion on ZOPFAN. Although the prospect of regional stability was still in question, it at least created a window of opportunity to pursue the realization of ZOPFAN. Malaysia, the original proposer of the neutralization idea, attempted to gain political and security guarantees for neutrality from the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. It began to make continuous diplomatic efforts to approach all the major powers that have current and potential influence in Southeast Asia and to spread the idea of neutralization through several international forums.125

In this setting, four institutional norm entrepreneurs emerged: Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines. First, Indonesia introduced the concept of “regional resilience” on the basis of its own concept of “national resilience.”126 This concept introduced not only national development but also coordination efforts among Southeast Asian states as an alternative policy to neutralization though they were not mutually exclusive.127 Second, Singapore emphasized more on strengthening

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125 In 1973, Rahman in New Zealand endorsed to “establish contacts with all Southeast Asian countries and all the major powers…[for] the development of a strong neutral Southeast Asian region…” Shaife argued in Zurich that in order to realize ZOPFAN, “[i]t must and can be founded and forged on the basis of a relationship between all the major powers.” Moreover, on March 12, 1973, Malaysia decided to withdraw its participation in the ASPAC, which was seen as an anti-communist institution, and began to seek the establishment of diplomatic ties with not only Southeast Asian states, but also China. In early 1974, Razak said, “There is a legitimate role for all to play in Southeast Asia and Japan in particular has an important and a neutral role…It is in the interest of [Japan] and the major countries of the world which have a stake in Southeast Asia, to work with ASEAN, to strive for peace, stability and prosperity in the region.” In fact, Razak considered that the major powers’ guarantee was the “very heart of the Neutralization proposal.” See Tun Dr. Ismail Al-Haj bin Dato Haji Abdul Rahman, “Current Scene in Southeast Asia and Malaysia’s Perspective,” at the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs at Wellington on March 22,” Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 6, No 1, (March 1973), p. 23; Tan Sri M. Ghazali bin Shafie, “The Search for Stability,” at the Malaysian Investment conference in Zurich, Switzerland on March 5, 1973, Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 6, No. 1, (March, 1973), p. 56; “Visit of Prime Minister of Japan to Malaysia January 12-14: Speech by Tun Haji Abdul Razak bin Hussein, Prime Minister of Malaysia at the dinner given in honour of the visiting Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Kakuei Tanaka, in Kuala Lumpur, January 12,” Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 7, No. 1, (March 1974), p.31.

126 In 1972, defining national resilience as “to enhance the capabilities and abilities of each member country and its people in all fields of national endeavor, in order to withstand and to overcome all kinds of external interference and adverse influences, harmful to its sound and harmonious development,” Malik connected the concept to the regional context by stating that national resilience would be applied “within the regional context and its special bearing on ASEAN.” He further argued that it should be “the guiding principle” for ASEAN toward regional peace and stability. The corollary of this is that achievement of national development and regional cooperation would create regional strength in Southeast Asia to prevent external powers from intervening into the region in any form. Adam Malik, “ASEAN Strategy,” in Siagian, p. 181.

127 The 1973 joint press statement of the ASEAN Ministers’ informal meeting used this term for the first time in the ASEAN meeting and expressed “the developing national and regional resilience could be the foundation on which Southeast Asian countries could assume [the] responsibility [to achieve the peace and stability of the region and their own well-being].” Malik also expressed national and regional resilience as “vital for the eventual creation of a cohesive, strong, stable, prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian Nations” at the 1973 AMM. It was echoed by other ASEAN member states, such as Malaysia and Thailand. For example, Malaysia asserted that national and regional resilience was “the promise of the neutralization proposal.” See “The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting to Assess the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam,” in ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Document Series, p. 152; Adam Malik, “ASEAN—Cristalized into a Dynamic Reality,” in Siagian, p. 223. Ayuthaya, “The Spirit of Compromise of Mutual Accommodation,” in Siagian, p. 266; Ismail Bin Datuk Abdul Rahman, “The New Challenges in ASEAN Cooperation,” in Siagian, p. 228; Ayuthaya, “The Spirit of Compromise of Mutual Accommodation,” in Siagian, p. 266; Rahman, “The New Challenges in ASEAN
the economic function of ASEAN, resulting in ASEAN’s political alignment in international economic negotiations. Third, Thailand induced a two-step approach for ASEAN’s institutional consolidation: including non-ASEAN member states in Southeast Asia after the establishment of an Asian Forum. Fourth, the Philippines, touching on its proposal for the adoption of an ASEAN charter in 1973, advocated in 1974 that the principle of the ASEAN Declaration in 1967 should be legally binding in order for the member states to strictly adhere and fully commit to the principles through the creation of such Charter.

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128 Given the fact that ASEAN member states’ economies were competing with each other as most of member states were primary producers, Singapore dismissed the idea to strengthen intra-regional economic cooperation through such a means as establishment of a regional free-trade area as a short-term objective, and instead, it advocated that ASEAN need to foster trade with and attract investment from outside the region. Consequently, this concept began to form more coordinated political alignment in international economic negotiations. Singapore’s economic emphasis was well-supported by member states since ASEAN member states considered economic development was a vital factor for their national development as well as their internal security. In fact, ASEAN created the Special Coordinating Committee of ASEAN (SCCAN) to negotiate with the European Economic Community (EEC) for better trading terms in 1972. Perceiving a “serious threat” economically from “indiscriminate expansion of the synthetic rubber industry by Japan,” ASEAN decided to work out appropriate measures, which eventually induced an agreement that Japan exercises self-restrain. By 1973, these economic policy coordination among the ASEAN member states became an institutionalized practice, as in shown in the 1973 joint communiqué stated that the ASEAN Geneva Committee was established in order to “make necessary preparations for, and a collective approach to, the [Tokyo] multilateral trade negotiation.” Moreover, this economic collaborative efforts evolved into the ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meeting, whose first meeting was held in 1975. Thus, ASEAN began to politically cooperate and coordinate their economic policies in multilateral trade negotiations with the world. See Lee Kuan Yew, “ASEAN Must Achieve Institutional Strength to Survive,” at the 1972 AMM, in Siagian, p. 171; “Joint Communiqué of the Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Pattaya, 16-18 April 1973,” in ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Documents Series, pp. 73-74. “Joint Communique of the Seventh ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta, Indonesia, 7-9 May 1974,” in ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Documents Series, pp. 75-76; “Joint Communique of the Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Pattaya, Thailand, 16-18 April 1973,” in ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Document Series, pp. 73-74.

129 This is illustrated by its proposal of an Asian Forum in 1973 after the Paris Peace Agreement. This forum was a modified version of the 1960s Filipino proposal of an Asian political forum. Instead of inviting all Asian states, which included such major powers as the United States and the Soviet Union, it would invite only Southeast Asian states, and this proposal was well considered within ASEAN. In April 1973, ASEAN confirmed its desirability of convening an Asian forum to “discuss problems of vital interest in the region,” “remove misunderstanding and dispel suspicion,” and “lead to productive and peaceful co-operation among the Southeast Asian nations,” in order to “safeguard the interests of the region as a whole.” This idea was based on a cautious step to realize ZOPFAN. Before including all Southeast Asian states into ASEAN, it attempted to hold dialogues to build confidences between ASEAN member states and non-member states in Southeast Asia, and thus, it emphasized more on intra-regional security. Na Ayuthaya, a leader of the Thai delegation of the seventh AMM in 1974, stated that while aiming at inviting all Southeast Asian states to subscribe to the objectives and principles of ASEAN, the current ASEAN member states should promote consultation among themselves for the regional stability. When the Sino-Soviet rivalry intensified and the prospect of Indochinese conflicts became more uncertain, this idea was dissipated; yet the two-step approach was taken in creation of TAC and the Bali Concord. “Press Statement issued at the end of the Conference of Foreign Ministers from ASEAN countries, in Pattaya, Thailand, April 17,” Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 1973), p. 30; Chrunphan Isarangkun Ayuthaya, “The Spirit of Compromise of Mutual Accommodation,” in Siagian, p. 266.

130 Ingles, “ASEAN Should Have Two Levels of Priorities,” in Siagian, p. 196.

131 Although there was no consensus, the 1974 joint communiqué stated that the proposal would be under consideration of the Standing committee and member governments. Considering its strong endorsement of Thai’s proposal of the Asian forum, the Philippines at this time aimed at strengthening political commitments to the Bangkok Declaration from all Southeast Asian states. However, although this proposal gave ASEAN member states an opportunity to consider an institutional option to conclude a binding treaty for ASEAN’s objectives, it was not materialized given the fact that ASEAN had yet to include all Southeast Asian states as its members and
Although they emphasized different aspects, unlike the 1968-1971 debates, all ASEAN’s ideas pointed toward the same direction to contribute to realizing the ZOPFAN: Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand concentrated on internal and intra-regional security; Singapore focused more on internal and intra-ASEAN security; and Malaysia attempted to secure major powers’ guarantees for regional security. Because the ZOPFAN concept weaved regional, intra-regional, and internal security together, despite their different emphases, it became less difficult for ASEAN member states to come to agreements with regard to ASEAN cooperation. For the institutional priority, ASEAN leaned towards intra-regional and internal security, yet they did not dismiss Malaysian attempts to secure major powers’ guarantees, either, since these ideas were not mutually exclusive. In this sense, the 1973 Paris Peace Accords was an important factor to foster these ideas. With the US disengagement and the settlement of conflicts in Indochina, the 1973 informal AMM press statement described this security situation as “a favourable climate” for the realization of ZOPFAN, albeit temporarily. Indeed, there was little disagreement among ASEAN member states on the direction of institutional consolidation, especially on the issue of expansion of its membership, although they had different opinions on the timing of implementation. In other words, the Accords created the institutional momentum to include all Southeast Asian states into ASEAN and to consolidate the association. Yet, by 1975, when there was little improvement in Indochina despite the Paris Accords, ASEAN member states began to consider the exclusion of the Indochina states from its initial roadmap of ASEAN’s consolidation along with Thailand’s tentative idea of a two-step approach.

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133 Even Malaysia, a proponent of a neutralization policy, redirected its efforts to focus on ASEAN’s cooperation. Instead of seeking major powers’ guarantee, Tan Sri Haji Sardon bin Haji Jubir, Malaysia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, argued in September 1974 that ZOPFAN proposals should “first have the support of countries in the proposed zone.” In 1975, Shafie put more emphasis on cooperation among ASEAN member states on the basis of national and regional resilience by throwing the term, “Pax-ASEANA.” In other words, by 1975, there was an intended modification of an original idea of pursuing the ZOPFAN: instead of focusing on the membership expansion as well as major powers’ guarantees, ASEAN aimed at undertaking a two-step approach by pursuing its institutional consolidation among the existing ASEAN member states. “29th Session U.N. General Assembly: Speech by Tan Sri Haji Sardon bin Haji Jubir, Malaysia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at the 29th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, in New York, September 30,” Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 1974), p. 51; Tan Sri M. Ghazali Shafie, “On the Domino Theory,” Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 8, No. 2, (June 1975), p. 11.
On the other hand, at the Senior Official level, the ZOPFAN committee helped shape the specific direction of ASEAN’s institutional consolidation. This Committee of Senior Officials was established by the 1971 ZOPFAN Declaration, and its objective was “to study and consider what further necessary steps should be taken to bring about the realization of their objectives.” This created two general directions for ASEAN’s consolidation process. First, the committee marginalized a “neutralization” process from the institutional objective to one of means to realize ZOPFAN by defining the concept of “neutrality.” Its definition of neutrality was broadened from the traditional meaning, and while traditional neutrality is generally applied to a state during the wartime, ASEAN’s definition is applied to both peacetime and wartime in any form of conflict from outside the zonal states. As ASEAN’s definition of neutrality was broadened, “neutralization” was not the only objective sought to realize ZOPFAN. This was followed through by the 1972 AMM press statement, which asked the Committee to consider “other means” to achieve it. Accordingly, the subsequent meetings of the Committee of Senior Officials in 1973 and 1974 did not stipulate any statement regarding major power guarantees to prevent or intervene into the region in the case of war or for maintaining regional neutrality. Instead, it produced “Manifestation of recognition and respect of the zone” as a means to secure recognitions from major powers. Although ASEAN stated the regional neutralization was a “desirable objective” in the 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration, it became one means, and these definitions left ASEAN’s options open to pursue ZOPFAN in ways other than neutralization. Second, the committee constituted the expected behavior of Southeast Asian states in terms of intra-regional

134 ASEAN Secretariat, “Joint Press Statement Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting To Issue The Declaration Of Zone Of Peace, Freedom And Neutrality.”

135 In 1972, the Committee reached a “common understanding of the interpretation” of ZOPFAN, and defined three terms, “Peace,” “Freedom,” and “Neutrality.” It defined “Neutrality” as “zonal states shall undertake to maintain their impartiality and shall refrain from involvement directly or indirectly in ideological, political, economic, armed or other forms of conflict, particularly between powers outside the zone, and that outside powers shall not interfere in the domestic or regional affairs of the zonal states.” On the other hand, the traditional definition of neutrality is “the maintenance of a state of impartiality in any war between other states as understood in international law and in the light of the United Nations Charter.” See ASEAN Secretariat, “Joint Press Statement The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting To Discuss International Developments Affecting The Region;” For definitions, see “Southeast Asia: The Neutralization Proposals,” in Current Notes on International Affairs, no. 43 (October 1972), pp. 501-502; Roeslan Abdulgani, Nationalism, Regionalism and Security: Problems in South-East Asia (New Delhi: Banyan Publications, 1986), pp. 47-48; Hasjim Djalal, “‘Gagasan ZOPFAN-KBSN-AT dalam Upaya Peningkatan Stabilitas Kawasan Asia tenggara,’” (The ZOPFAN-SEANWFZ Concept as a Means to Enhance the Stability of the Southeast Asian Region) in Jurnal Luar Negeri, no. 12 (April 1989), p. 131. All cited in Hanggi, p. 22; Hanggi, pp. 23-24.

136 ASEAN Secretariat, “Joint Press Statement The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting To Discuss International Developments Affecting The Region.”

137 See “Appendix V. Manifestation.”

138 ASEAN Secretariat, Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration.
relations in Southeast Asia by setting the regional code of conduct by producing the documents.\textsuperscript{139} The 14-point “Guidelines that would constitute a code of conduct covering relations among states within the zone and with states outside the zone” set specific principles and rules; “Manifestation of recognition and respect of the zone” provided an action plan for Southeast Asian states; and “Measures to be taken in the event of violation of the zone” provided the procedures that Southeast Asian states would take in times of violations of those principles and rules. For example, “peaceful settlement of differences or disputes” and “restriction from the use of armed forces for any purpose in the conduct of international relations except for self-defense” became a more specific regional code of conduct than the 1967 ASEAN Declaration and the 1971 ZOPFAN Declaration.

These two processes at the Foreign Minister and Senior Official levels produced the ideas for an institutional consolidation process, its geographical scope, and a concept of security, and contributed to further shaping the direction of ASEAN’s consolidation. These internal discussions culminated in the TAC and the Bali Concord in February 1976, whereby ASEAN’s institutional consolidation was officially materialized. ASEAN leaders came to a consensus on its institutional security preference: setting intra-regional and internal security as their priorities. Concluding TAC and the Bali concord, ASEAN aimed at further promoting ASEAN cooperation and consolidation, while postponing the inclusion of all Southeast Asian states in the near-term. Also, already recognized by several ASEAN states,\textsuperscript{140} the concept of security for ASEAN expanded beyond the political-military realm. While Malaysian Prime Minister Hussein Onn said that economic development would serve national and regional security,\textsuperscript{141} Marcos argued that economic development was the

\textsuperscript{139} See “Appendix III. A Set of Fourteen Guidelines,” and “Appendix IV. Measures in the Event of Violation.”

\textsuperscript{140} For example, in 1974, Marcos said that security “doesn’t merely mean military security. Today military security is interchangeable with economic stability.” In 1975, Lee argued that if there is any adverse consequence [to ASEAN member states], it will not be external aggression by Hanoi or Khmer Rouge or the Pathet Lao but by our inability to contain our domestic communists. So the communist threat is not external but internal...[and ASEAN] can successfully fight if we realize that the way to fight indigenous communists is through appropriate economic, political and social policies within our own countries...[Thus] [m]ore than ever before ASEAN is today our shield.” See Ferdinand Marcos, “Ninth State of the Nation Address, September 21, 1974,” at <http://www.gov.ph/1974/09/21/ferdinand-e-marcos-ninth-state-of-the-nation-address-september-21-1974>;

most effective means to counter subversion and insurgencies.\textsuperscript{142} Singaporean Prime Minister Lee, Indonesian President Suharto, and Thai Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj all valued ASEAN’s cohesive economic diplomacy to counter economic pressures from the world economic powers and groupings for their national security and stability.\textsuperscript{143} Since ASEAN member states’ security depended on national resilience, which required the economic development of each state, ASEAN’s concept of security had extended mostly into the economic field.\textsuperscript{144}

In sum, most of the ideas of institutional norm entrepreneurs were modified but taken into account as a means to achieve ZOPFAN. This became possible because the Committee of Senior Officials changed “neutralization” from ASEAN’s objective to a means by defining “neutrality” in ASEAN’s term. As an alternative means, Indonesia’s “national and regional resilience” became the key conceptual framework to place an institutional priority on dealing with intra-regional and internal security. While Thailand’s and the Philippines’ proposals provided ideas for the process of its institutional consolidation, the Singaporean proposal for diplomatic cooperation on international economic negotiation provided more a visible outcome for ASEAN’s economic benefits. Malaysia continued to pursue a “neutralization” path, yet it realized the difficulty in attaining major powers’ guarantees and redirected its efforts to first focus on regional resilience. These internal processes and outcomes were embodied by the Bali Concord, a political document that described “ASEAN resilience” for the first time in any official documents. On the other hand, ASEAN’s ultimate objectives remained in the TAC. The TAC remained aimed at ultimate

\textsuperscript{142} “Statement by the President of the Republic of the Philippines His Excellency Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Opening of the Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government on February 23, 1976 at Denpasar, Bali,” in \textit{ASEAN Summit Meeting}, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{143} “Statement by The Prime Minister of Singapore His Excellency Lee Kuan Yew at the Opening of the Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government on February 23, 1976 at Denpasar, Bali,” in \textit{ASEAN Summit Meeting}, p. 24; “Statement by the President of the Republic of Indonesia His Excellency General Soeharto at the Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government on February 23, 1976, At Denpasar, Bali,” in \textit{ASEAN Summit Meeting}, p. 32; “Statement by The Prime Minister of Thailand His Excellency Kukrit Pramoj at the Opening of the Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government on February 23, 1976 at Denpasar, Bali,” in \textit{ASEAN Summit Meeting}, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{144} This is well-illustrated by Suharto’s speech at the summit, which said:

Our concept of security is inward-looking, namely to establish an orderly, peaceful and stable condition within each individual territory, free from any subversive elements and infiltration, wherever from their origins might be. This problem becomes even more important because our success in this endeavor will be the key to the growing regional stability and to the increasing pace of development efforts of each of our nation...It is mainly for this purpose that we ought to promote constantly our respective national resilience which in turn will be conducive to the creation of a regional resilience.”

\textit{See} “Statement by the President of the Republic of Indonesia His Excellency General Soeharto at the Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government on February 23, 1976, At Denpasar, Bali,” in \textit{ASEAN Summit Meeting}, p. 31.
inclusion of all Southeast Asian states as in its formal name, the “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” and the legally-binding treaty materialized for the first time in its institutional history.


The analysis above illustrated three variables, external shocks, member states’ perceptions, and institutional security preferences, are important in explaining why and how ASEAN transformed its security functions from intra-member conflict management to exclusive cooperative security as well as from one form of political alignment to another from 1968 to 1976. The external shock, and subsequent changes in the regional and intra-regional balance of power, propelled ASEAN to transform. With the US and UK withdrawal from Southeast Asia, the intensification of Sino-Soviet rivalry, and the 1975 fall of Saigon and Cambodia, the ASEAN member states perceived changes in the regional strategic landscape, and attempted to utilize ASEAN for their security. The expected changes in the regional balance of power became a trigger for institutional changes of ASEAN.

As a regional institution, ASEAN perceived the political and military withdrawal of the United Kingdom and the United States as an encouraging sign for regional autonomy and attempted to utilize this window of opportunity to achieve this objective. In order to sustain this positive political trend of the balance of power for the association, ASEAN created the concept of ZOPFAN. After 1971, while recognizing that the degree of uncertainty in the intra-regional balance of power still existed, ASEAN accelerated the institutional consolidation process by approaching Indochinese states, while they cautiously established channels of communication with both China and the Soviet Union to avoid politically antagonizing them. Yet, after the stability of Indochina became uncertain in 1975, ASEAN took a two-step approach and decided to first pursue intra-ASEAN consolidation, since member states perceived intra-ASEAN stability more positively.

ASEAN’s expectations were shaped by formulation and reformulation of its institutional security preference. In Phase I, ASEAN focused on its institutional

145 In 1987, ASEAN amended the TAC. ASEAN member states agreed that its geographical scope applied not only to Southeast Asia, but also outside the region, and they decided that states outside the region could accede to the treaty. See “Protocol Amending The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Manila, 15 December 1987,” in ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Documents Series, pp. 43-44.
principle, “non-interference from external power” in Southeast Asia. With the changing regional balance of power, the principle became an important institutional reference point to assess the regional balance of power. Although the Bangkok Declaration itself was a vague political document, the ZOPFAN conceptually developed an institutional objective by emphasizing non-interference from external actors. After internal discussions, neutralization became one means to achieve ZOPFAN, and with the introduction of the concept of “national and regional resilience,” ASEAN focused on intra-ASEAN cooperation, resulting in the creation of the Bali Concord and the TAC.

ASEAN’s institutional consolidation from 1968 to 1976 was never straightforward. Changes in the regional and intra-regional balance of power triggered ASEAN member states’ incentives to transform the association; the *raison d’être* of ASEAN affected member states’ expectations of ASEAN’s role in the changing security environment; and internal debates formulated and reformulated its institutional security preference. The debates produced explicit institutional norms, such as the concept of ZOPFAN, national and regional resilience, and diplomatic cooperation in international economic negotiations. Others became prohibitive norms, such as the creation of a multilateral military pact. Both of these determined ASEAN’s institutional preference. These became reference points to evaluate institutional actions and regional security environment.

**VI. Conclusion: Implications for Institutional Changes**

This study attempted to explain how ASEAN transformed its institution from 1968 to 1976, and the implications for both ASEAN’s institutional change and the study of international institutional change.

First, this study sheds light on the importance of institutional concepts in explaining ASEAN’s change. By assessing ASEAN’s developments, such institutional concepts as ZOPFAN and “national and regional resilience,” which were often dismissed as an irrelevant factor for institutional transformation, played significant role in determining the direction of institutional transformation. Especially, the concept of ZOPFAN has been scholarly debated for a long time. However, the

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146 As some scholars argue, ZOPFAN was merely a declaratory policy, which did not have a short-term security impact by itself. For example, Leifer asserts that the Kuala Lumpur Declaration hardly ensured Southeast Asia free
significant achievement was not only the effectiveness of ZOPFAN or the meaning of the ZOPFAN concept *per se*, but political and diplomatic processes and a conceptual frame which ZOPFAN created internally. ASEAN member states built on this concept to define institutional utility for their security. TAC and the Bali Concord are an extension of the ZOPFAN concept. Without the concept, it would be difficult for ASEAN to improvise such a treaty and declaration, and thus it had the significant implication for ASEAN’s institutional transformation.

Second, the study shows that the mainstream IR theories are insufficient to fully capture ASEAN’s institutional change during the period of 1968-1976. Realist would argue that change in the regional balance of power created common threat perception among member states, and thus, they strengthen institutional consolidation. However, the member states’ threat perception of changing regional and intra-regional balance of power often differed, and they are sometimes even conflictual. Moreover, it does not explain why some member states did not defect and bandwagon with either China or the Soviet Union. Liberal institutionalist may argue that ASEAN fostered cooperation among member states due to reduction of transaction cost. Yet, as many ASEAN member states argued, cooperation among them was very slow and limited. Social constructivist argues that “regionalism” creates an incentive for ASEAN member to form the Southeast Asian institution, resulting in consolidation. Nevertheless, it does not explain why ASEAN created the Bali Concord and decided to first consolidate itself without including others.

Third, the study demonstrates that the change in regional and intra-regional balance of power would provide an opportunity for states to transform a security-oriented institution. For ASEAN, these changes opened up the window of opportunity to subsume new institutional norms and rules, resulting in ZOPFAN, TAC, and the

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from external intervention and that it was it represented “an intra-mural accommodation of views rather than any assertion of corporate will.” On the contrary, constructivist scholars, such as Ba, argue that reaffirmation of ASEAN member states’ commitment under unstable security circumstance itself had significant political meaning. Acharya also argues that the ZOPFAN ideas “contained within it all the principal security considerations and objectives which underpinned the origin and evolution of ASEAN, including the norms of non-interference, non-use of force and regional autonomy,” although these principles were also implicitly included in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration. See Muthiah Alagappa, “Regional Arrangements and International Security in Southeast Asia: Going beyond ZOPFAN,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 12, No. 4,* (March 1991), p. 276; Emmers, p. 276; Leifer, *ASEAN and Security of South-East Asia,* p. 57; Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, 2nd Edition,* (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 68-69; Alice Ba, *[Re]Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,* (California: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 76.

147 Admittedly, the theory would apply to ASEAN’s diplomatic cooperation in economic negotiations as it would serve each member states’ national security interest. But then, it cannot explain why and how ASEAN could maintain itself before it realized such cooperation in 1973.
Bali Concord. At the same time, it is imperative to consider how a new norm can reformulate institutional security preference. For example, while ASEAN avoided formal institutional security and political cooperation among member states at its inception, the idea of “national and regional resilience” redirected the concept of security within ASEAN, and it made room for ASEAN to pursue political cooperation in economic fields, albeit not military fields.

To be sure, this study has a clear limitation in constructing a theory since the single case study cannot produce a rigorous generalization of transformation of security-oriented institutions. Much further case studies need to be done in order to test its theoretical validity. However, it sought to turn the light on why and how institutional transformation occurs and provided a general sense of institutional transformation.

**Appendix I. Definition and Types of Institutional Transformation**

Institutional transformation of SOIs can be distinguished by changes in institutional functions of either internal security management or external security management.

Internal security management refers to security management among member states. Despite the fact that SOIs do not possess a military means to ensure security of member states, it attempts to manage security among member states by setting institutional principles, which become the basis of internal security arrangement of the SOIs. Table 1 shows the degree of security management among member states from “non-intervention” to “coordinated security policy.” These are characterized from “intra-conflict containment” to “exclusive cooperative security,” “collective security (non-traditional),” “collective security (traditional)” and “security community.” The degree of political commitment of member states needs to increase from a less restrictive security arrangements (the top) to more restrictive security arrangements (the bottom). Thus, the more restrictive rules and norms on states’ behavior SOIs adapt, the more coordination among the member states will be required. This means that if SOIs successfully adapt such rules and norms, they can consolidate the institutions. For example, although intra-member conflict containment merely prevents conflicts among member states, non-traditional and traditional collective security allows the institution to have an authority to undertake intervention under certain conditions.
### Table 1: Internal Security Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Commitment</th>
<th>Principles</th>
<th>Arrangements</th>
<th>Functions and Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>- Non-Intervention</td>
<td>Intra-Member Conflict Containment</td>
<td>Prevent conflicts among member states non-militarily even without interaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Non-Aggression</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arms Race might occur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Peaceful Settlement of Disputes</td>
<td>Exclusive Cooperative Security</td>
<td>Prevent conflicts among member states non-militarily through interactions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Arms Race might occur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Diplomatic Intervention</td>
<td>Political Collective Security</td>
<td>Resolve intra-state conflicts through such non-military means, including diplomatic efforts and political condemnation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Arms Race might occur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Intervention (Domestic)</td>
<td>Collective Security (Non-Traditional)</td>
<td>Resolve military/intra-state conflicts through such means as diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions, and peace operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Institutions might not have an ability to intervene.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Intervention (Inter-State)</td>
<td>Collective Security (Traditional)</td>
<td>Resolve military/intra-state conflicts through such means as diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions, and military intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Institutions might not have an ability to intervene.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, external security management refers to security management outside the institution. As Table 2 illustrates, the SOI can utilize its institutional framework in order to prevent, deter, or respond to external threats, although it is not necessarily military means. The degree of such functions ranges from “political alignment” to “inclusive cooperative security,” “collective security management” and “collective self-defense.” The degree of the political commitment of member states also increases from “political alignment” (on the top) to “collective self-defense” (on the bottom).

### Table 2: External Security Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Commitment</th>
<th>Principles</th>
<th>Arrangements</th>
<th>Functions and Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>- Non-External Interference (or Independence)</td>
<td>Political Alignment</td>
<td>Prevent intervention from outside the institution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>When facing potential interventions, the institution would employ political and diplomatic means to counter the intervention.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Military means is not an option.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Peaceful Settlement of Disputes</td>
<td>Inclusive Cooperative Security</td>
<td>Prevent conflicts among member states non-militarily through interactions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Arms Race might occur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Memberships is inclusive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Non-state-based security (e.g. disaster-management)</td>
<td>Collective Security Management</td>
<td>Responding to non-traditional security threats, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, through such means as military means.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Institutions might not have an ability to respond.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Counter-External Military Threats</td>
<td>Collective Self-Defense</td>
<td>Militarily counter state-based security threats from other states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>When aggression occurs, respond militarily.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Institutions might not have an ability to respond.</td>
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SOIs’ original security objectives and functions evolve over time, and their principles and security arrangements shift from one to another or strengthen the
characteristics of existing security arrangement. Therefore, I define “institutional transformation” as consolidating through a change in security arrangements from one phase to another or a solidification of its security arrangement in each category, or shifting its institutional emphasis from one category to another.

In this context, there are mainly three types of institutional transformation: institutional consolidation, institutional displacement, and institutional layering. Each type has its distinct characteristic of institutional transformation, and some types are characterized by more explicit and fundamental changes than others (Table 3).

**Table 3: Types of Institutional Transformation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Institutional Transformation</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Consequence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Consolidation</td>
<td>Consolidate institutional rules and norms through such means as joint declarations and treaties. This action is primarily internal-driven and focuses on internal security management.</td>
<td>Solidifying or Advancing the Types of Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Layering</td>
<td>Introduce new functions or objectives in addition to old ones. This can be on either internal security management or external security management.</td>
<td>Adding Institutional Functions and Objectives and &quot;Differential Growth&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Displacement</td>
<td>Introduce new institutional norms and displace old ones. This can be on either internal security management or external security management.</td>
<td>Changes in Institutional Objectives</td>
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</table>

**Institutional consolidation** refers to such formalization of previously implicit institutional norms as joint declarations and treaties. This type of institutional transformation either moves from one phase to another in the category of internal security management or consolidates through more explicit rules and norms to shape behavior of member states within the security arrangement that SOIs have already held. For example, within the category of “exclusive cooperative security,” if such SOIs set up a conflict resolution mechanism within them, it means that the institutions have undergone security consolidation.

**Institutional layering** occurs when the SOI introduces new functions or objectives in addition to its original institutional ones. Although this type of transformation is similar to security displacement, it would not rapidly shift its institutional rules and norms and leave institutional options open for future decision. There are two consequences of this transformation. First, over time, new functions or objectives encroach on traditional ones, and ultimately they take over, which is called
“differential growth.” Second, new elements coexist with traditional ones. The process of layering is due to the stickiness of the original institutional design; as it becomes more costly politically and financially to dismantle it, an SOI adds a new function or objectives to secure its institutional raison d’être.

Institutional displacement occurs when “new models emerge and diffuse which call into question existing, previously taken-for-granted organizational forms and practices.” In the case of an SOI, the dominant institutional norm is replaced by a new norm. Since the logic of action based on the traditional norm is no longer accepted within the institution, a new norm that was either a less important norm within the institution or introduced from the outside takes over the traditional norm. This type of transformation occurs through two ways: shifting from one phase to another in either internal or external security management or emphasizing more on internal or external security management.

Although the reality would fall in between these three categories, these are three main categories to distinguish the type of institutional transformation SOIs could undertake.

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148 Streeck and Thelen, p. 23.
Appendix II. US Aid to ASEAN Member States (1967-1976)

### US Economic Aid to ASEAN Member States (1967-1976)

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</table>
Appendix III. A Set of Fourteen Guidelines

A set of fourteen Guidelines:
Constituting a code of conduct governing relations among states within and outside the Zone.


2. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations within and without the Zone.

3. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion.

4. Non-interference in the internal affairs of Zone states.

5. Refraining from inviting or giving consent to intervention by external powers in the domestic or regional affairs of the Zone states.

6. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

7. Renunciation of the threat or use of force in the conduct of internal relations.

8. Refraining from the use of armed forces for any purpose in the conduct of international relations except for individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Charter of the United Nations.

9. Abstention from involvement in any conflicts of powers outside the Zone or from entering into any agreements which would be inconsistent with the objective of the Zone.

10. The absence of foreign military bases on the territories of Zone States.

11. Prohibition of the use, storage, passage, or testing of nuclear weapons and their components within the Zone.

12. The right to trade freely with any country or international agency irrespective of difference in socio-political system.
13. The right to receive aid freely for the purpose of strengthening national resilience except when the aid is subject to conditions inconsistent with the objectives of the Zone.


(Cited at "Appendix A. Guidelines that would constitute a Code of Conduct Covering Relations Among States within the Zone and with States Outside the Zone," in Phan Wannamethee, "Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality: A Reappraisal," Paper presented ASEAN Experts Group Meeting on Zone of Peace, Freedom, & Neutrality (ZOPFAN), organized by Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia, at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 5-6 January 1991.)

**Appendix IV. Measures in the Event of Violation**

In case of violation from within the Zone
(a) Immediate consultation among the Zone States.
(b) Negotiations, bilaterally or collectively.
(c) Pacific settlement of disputes in accordance with effective procedures to be drawn up by the Zone states.
(d) Any other measures consistent with the UN Charter.

In case of violation from without the Zone
(a) Immediate consultation among the Zone States.
(b) Negotiations, bilaterally or collectively.
(c) Pacific settlement of disputes in accordance with existing and other procedures as may be drawn up between Zone States and outside powers.
(d) Appeal by Zone States to the United Nations with a view to securing a restraint on a country or countries committing a violation.
(e) Any other measures consistent with the UN Charter including collective measures as may be agreed upon by the Zone States.

(Cited from “Appendix C. Measures to be taken in the event of violation of the Zone,” in Phan Wannamethee, “Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality: A Reappraisal,” Paper presented ASEAN Experts Group Meeting on Zone of Peace, Freedom, & Neutrality (ZOPFAN), organized by Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia, at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 5-6 January 1991.)
Appendix V. Manifestation

The recognition of any respect for the Zone may be mentioned in any number of ways, both explicitly and implicitly.

Explicitly, it may be manifested in the form of:

i. a treaty or arrangement between the recognizing states and one or all of the Zone states, extending recognition to the area as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and neutrality;

ii. a unilateral declaration of the recognizing State of its recognition of and respect for the independence territorial integrity and neutrality of the Zone states;

iii. declaration of support for the Zone in the United Nations or any other international fora;

iv. an affirmative reply to a written request by the Zone states for recognition of and respect for the Zone.

Implicit recognition and respect for the area as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality will be manifested through continuing conduct by states outside the Zone along the following guidelines;

a. Respect the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and neutrality of the Zone states:

b. Respect the right of Zone states to load their national existence free from external interference, subversion, or coercion;

c. Abstain from intervention in the domestic or regional affairs of the Zone states;

d. Settle their differences or disputes with Zone states by peaceful means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

e. Abstain from seeking any agreement with Zone states which would be inconsistent with the objectives of the Zone;

f. Refrain from enabling any new military pacts or bases in the Zone and to gradually remove those that are in existence;

g. Refrain from the use, storage, passage or testing of nuclear weapons and their components within the Zone;

h. Respect the right of Zone states to trade freely with any country or international agency;
i. Respect the right of Zone states to receive aid freely for the purpose of strengthening national resilience;

j. Refrain from attaching conditions inconsistent with the objectives of the Zone to any assistance, which may extend to the Zone states.

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