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Spoilers, Partners and Pawns: Military Organizational Behaviour and Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

This paper tries to explain the political behaviour of military organizations within the context of civil-military relations. The key purpose is to extract several key variables that could serve as a starting theoretical model for future research on Southeast Asian militaries and political armies in general. This would be done by analysing four distinct cases of political behaviours of the Indonesian military in its relations with the president. This paper aims to answer why these distinct behaviours occur, how they came about, and under what conditions would they be observed. This paper finds that the political behaviours of military organizations can be at least typologized into four distinct categories that depart from the traditional literature: regime spoiler, critical regime partner, uncritical regime partner, and regime pawn. This paper also finds that several variables could help explain such behaviours. First, internal military variables: the military’s self-conception and portrayal of the “national interests”; the degree of military unity and cohesion; and the institutional and individual interests of the key military leadership. Second, variables within the political leadership: the degree of civilian interference in internal military affairs, civilian strength vis-à-vis the military, and civilian handling of the domestic political condition. However, how all these variables interact, the degree of significance of each variable, and how they shape the military’s political behaviour would eventually have to depend on the national political, economic, security and social conditions of the specific time of the case at hand.

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Although military organizations in Asia still play a key role in state and nation-building, maintaining internal order, and ensuring international security (Alagappa 2001a: 9), the theoretical study of civil-military relations in this region has not commanded much attention. Instead, the focus thus far has been on individual empirical studies on the role of the military in domestic politics throughout the region as well as on establishing civilian supremacy over the military. As a result, the literature has tended to analyse and measure military political behaviour in terms of “subordination” or “insubordination” to the political leadership.

This is also the case with Southeast Asian militaries, especially Indonesia. There is little theoretical study on these militaries that could help us understand the nature of military political behaviour as well as to predict how and under what conditions the military would behave differently in the domestic political realm. This paper is a modest initial attempt to fill in this gap in the literature by utilizing the Indonesian case as a basic model. The key purpose here is to extract key variables that could serve as a starting theoretical model for future research on Southeast Asian militaries, or political armies in general. This would be done by analysing four distinct political behaviours of the Indonesian military as an organization that departs from the traditional focus of “subordination” or “insubordination”.

First, there are cases of where the military opposed the government’s policies, either through outright military insubordination (e.g. in 1948 General Sudirman, then Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, refused to follow the civilian leaders’ surrender to the Dutch and continued the guerrilla warfare) or through strong arm tactics short of insubordination (e.g. in the “17 October 1952” affair, the military pointed a cannon at the presidential palace to push President Soekarno to dissolve the parliament). Second, there are cases where the military, which is supposedly “controlled” by the political leadership, voiced their critical opposition to some of the regime’s practices (e.g. the Army’s Staff and Command School published a paper shortly before the 1977 general election contending, inter alia, that...
political life should be based on democratic principles). Third, there are cases where the military acted as an unequivocal regime partner (e.g. in 1998 the military under General Wiranto was given free rein over internal military policies while he provided unequivocal support to President Habibie’s policies). Finally, there are cases where the military acted as a “dead tool” used for the political interest of the regime (e.g. used to protect the business empires of President Soeharto’s family).

Therefore, this paper seeks to explain why, how, and under what conditions the Indonesian military would act: to reject the government’s policies (whether through insubordination or strong arm tactics), to accept the government’s policies while voicing their critical opposition, to accept and support the government’s policies unequivocally, and act as a “dead tool” of the regime. Thus, this paper would be structured as follows. First, we will review the literature on civil-military relations and military organizational behaviour, as well as some gaps in the debate. Second, we will explain each of the military’s distinct political behaviours using several empirical cases scattered throughout Indonesia’s history, rather than employing a time-series analysis that is beyond the scope of this paper. Finally, we will highlight some of the key variables that explained Indonesia’s military political behaviour and proposed them as possible variables in future theoretical constructs attempting to explain the organizational behaviour of Southeast Asian militaries.

**Literature on Civil-Military Relations and Military Organizational Behaviour**

Civil-military relations have always been complicated. Scholars have not been able to agree on how to define and measure them as a dependent variable, either because it is not always clear which issues belong to the relationship, or because the measurement to view whether the relationship is good or bad has been subjective or vague (Desch 1999: 3). Nevertheless, traditional studies of civil-military relations had two major foci: normal military participation in policy-making and military intervention in politics (Harries-Jenkins and Moskos 1981: 44). Huntington’s (1985) work is the benchmark of the former. He argued that: (i) there is a distinct civil and military group, and civilians are the political masters; (ii) the military’s main mission is to protect the society from external threats, and their involvement in politics would diminish their ability to do so; (iii) the solution is objective civilian control by
maximizing military professionalism. Subsequent civil-military relations literature takes its cue from these arguments (e.g. Sarkesian 1981; Feaver 1996, 2003).

Meanwhile, during the 1960s, scholars began to notice the military intervention in domestic politics across Third World countries, and theories of civil-military relations were subsequently proposed to explain this. Some focused on societal decay (Huntington 1968), modernization and development (Bienen 1968), sociological aspects of the military (Janowitz 1964), principle of civil supremacy and level of political culture as it relates to the military’s disposition, motive, and opportunity to intervene (Finer 2002), and other alternative factors, like shifts in foreign relations, or changes in military doctrine (Albright 1980: 564–572). In the end, since the military’s political behaviour remained crucial in explaining civil-military relations (Perlmutter 1977), scholars began to question Huntington’s framework, including whether a polarization of “civil” and “military” remains a useful tool (Welch 1976a; Harries-Jenkins and Moskos 1981). Thus, subsequent research has tended to examine how military regimes integrate with civilian structures, which often results in a fused civil-military regime (Stepan 1971; Moskos 1976).

Two relevant issues stand out: military politics and civilian supremacy. In addition to the abovementioned literature on military politics and intervention (or praetorianism4), by the late 1980s, the focus shifted to military disengagement from politics (Danopoulos 1988). However, considering that in these countries the military is a permanent political force and disengagement is never final, what we can rationally hope to achieve then is to “manage” the military in the political realm. This brings us to the next issue, civilian supremacy. First of all, the concept of civilian supremacy itself is contested as scholars have preferred four different terms: “participation”, “control”, “direction”, “supremacy” (Alagappa 2002: 5; Bland 1999: 18–19; Aguero 1995), while others argue that it is matter of degree (Welch 1976a: 2).

Thus, theoretically, the term “civilian control” needs to be reformulated and adjusted based on the specific context of the case. Practically however, the literature has focused on strategies and indicators of civilian control, whether short or long term (Welch 1976a: 5–6; Alagappa 2001b: 39–40). Subsequent research has focused on the level of civilian control and its causal factors, and how to measure it: individual military and civilian leaders (Betts 1977;

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4 Initially, it refers to soldiers hired by a government to police an unruly population (Rapoport 1962: 72), but recently, it is defined as a situation where military officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force (Nordlinger 1977: 2).
Cohen 2002); integration of the military and society (Janowitz 1960); level of military professionalism (Huntington 1985); civilian institutional factors (Avant 1994); congruency of values among civilians and the military (Danopoulos 1992); level of threats (Desch 1999); policy outcomes (Bland 1999); and governmental ability to alter the military’s responsibilities, missions, organization, and employment of force free from military interference (Welch 1976b; Trinkunas 1998; Abrahamsson 1972).

These varieties of causal factors and measurement in the literature are an indication of the variety of specific historical, political, and cultural factors across regions and states. Therefore, recently, scholars have tried to propose an all-encompassing theory that could address this. Bland’s (1999) theory of shared responsibility argued that civil control of the military is managed and maintained through the sharing of responsibility between civilians leaders and military officers conditioned by a nationally evolved regime of principles. Meanwhile, Schiff’s (1995) theory of concordance claimed that civilian control will be achieved when the military, political elites, and the citizenry have a cooperative relationship and agree on four indicators: social composition of the officer corps, the political-decision-making process, recruitment method and military style.

Meanwhile, within civil-military relations studies, many of the literature on military organizations takes its cue from the sociological work pioneered by Janowitz (1960), which focused on the relation of the military with the society. Meanwhile, from the discipline of strategic studies, the literature on military organization has centred on aspects of military combat effectiveness and military adaptation to face external threats. Initially, however, scholars have tried to define the military in terms of its organizational traits. First, military organizations have a political character, since they are a complex political community (Rosen 1988: 140–141). Second, compared to civilian institutions, the military has several potentially advantageous traits that are structurally adapted for combat and the application of force to achieve defined goals (Callaghan and Kernic 2003: 27; Lang 1972: 11; Harries-Jenkins and Moskos 1981: 56). Third, they are an important political pressure group due to the resources invested in them, aside from their coercive power (Abrahamsson 1972: 12). Finally, although
historically, state control over the military is an exception rather than the rule (Black 2002: 22), the central concern of military organization theory is about internal and external control.\(^5\)

Other scholars focused on the military’s purposes, which is about both the mission and the character of the organization. Historically, the military’s purpose may not be to achieve a specific military outcome, but rather, the prime objective may be to produce a system that fulfills and represents certain domestic socio-political goals (Black 2002: 23). Today however, the role of modern military organization can be seen as the *ultima ratio* of state power in an anarchic international system where states need to fend for themselves to survive (Morgenthau 1973). This leads to the central argument in civil-military relations literature that the military exists to defend the state against real or potential external threats and as a coercive tool to promote and protect national interests abroad (Huntington 1985; Edmunds 2006: 1059; Edmonds 1988: 29).

Subsequently, as studies on the military’s wide-ranging role in nation-building and internal security in the Third World emerge, scholars began to recognize that a purely externally orientated definition is too narrow (Cawthra & Luckham 2003). Thus, a means-based rather than an ends-based definition of the military was preferable. Lasswell (1941: 457) looked at the military as “specialists on violence”; while Huntington (1985: 12) saw them as specialist in the “management of violence”, and Janowitz (1960: 15) claimed that they are experts in “war-making and the organized use of violence”. These definitions remained centred on the use of force and violence. Therefore, it is not surprising that scholarship from strategic studies on military organizations has followed this lead.

Today, the focus of such literature has been on military organizational change or innovation\(^6\) (in mission, doctrine, technology, posture, etc.) in a militarily threatening environment (Farrell & Terriff 2002). Some has looked at how the external environment changes a military’s doctrine (Posen 1984; Snyder 1984; Van Evera 1984)\(^7\), while others focused on internal factors within the military organization that prompted military change (Rosen 1991). Subsequently, other scholars tried to offer an integrative approach combining

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\(^{5}\) In the former, there is a colleague group which oversees internal cohesion of the officer corps as professionals and as social group, while in the latter; the source of control and of discipline is the hierarchy of authority (Perlmutter and Bennett 1980: 27).

\(^{6}\) For an excellent overview of military innovation studies, see Grissom (2006).

\(^{7}\) Farrel and Terriff (2002: 4–5) argues that focusing on doctrine is problematic because: (1) not all militaries have a doctrinal tradition; (2) in different national contexts, doctrine has a different meaning, function and importance; (3) changes in military doctrine may leave other organizational workings unaltered; (4) doctrine may be developed as much for political as for strategic or operational reasons.
internal and external factors, albeit with different emphasis (Avant 1994; Zisk 1993; Murray and Millet 1996). Other scholars, however, drew on organizational theory to explain innovation in military organizations (Nagl 2002). Recently, a cultural explanation developed, especially the idea of strategic culture, to explain differing responses of different militaries to similar threatening situations (Iain Johnston 1995; Kier 1999).

**Current Trends and Gaps in the Theoretical Literature**

Thus far, we have seen the literature on civil-military relations and military organizational behaviour. In the former, Alagappa (2001b: 41–42) noted three trends: (i) the explanations advanced has been focused on “single factor explanations”, (ii) explanations have been development specific, (iii) with a few exceptions, explanations have not been connected to the broader political processes. In addition, many of these theories have been: (i) generalized from the American or Western experience, (ii) locked in the notion of a distinct “civil” and “military” sectors, (iii) adopting an a priori approach about the value preferences of the military and civilians without adequate attention to empirical evidence (Lovell and Albright 1997: 7).

Meanwhile, from the literature on military organizations, we have seen that the focus has been on how military organizations behave and adapt in a military threatening environment, especially modelled from the Western experience. However, there has not been a theoretical and conceptual explanation offered to explain how armies in the Third World, who are mostly “political armies”, behave in its political environment, in the absence of an external military threat.

Therefore, we can identify several gaps here that should be filled. First, civil-military relations studies, although increasingly broadened, remain preoccupied with explaining military politics and establishing civilian control in terms of “subordination” or “insubordination” while neglecting the possibility of the military acting as an independent force. Second, little, if any, research has been conducted to explain military organizational behaviour as an institution led by a specific leadership that can adapt to the changing domestic political environment. Third, organizational theory should have been particularly relevant in complementing the sociological school of civil-military relations, but it has been
underutilized thus far. Finally, Southeast Asian militaries, even Indonesia, has suffered from too little theorizing as the focus thus far has been based on area studies scholarship of military politics.

Military Organizational Political Behaviour: The Case of Indonesia

Before we begin, some caveats and assumptions are in order. First, in this paper, “civil-military relations” is defined as the relationship between the political leadership and the military leadership, where the central question deals with civilian supremacy over the military (Rukavishnikov and Pugh 2003: 131; Feaver 1999: 211; Burk 2002: 7). Second, the Indonesian Military (TNI) here is defined as a political army—“military institutions that consider involvement—or control over—domestic politics and the business of government to be a central part of their legitimate function” (Koonings and Kruijt 2002a: 1)—who originated from guerrilla warfare. The implication would be to assume that the TNI is a permanent political force in Indonesia, and that, as a political army, the TNI have strong identification with the fate of the nation, emphasize order, and incorporate these issues into an overarching military doctrine (Koonings and Kruijt 2002b: 10).

Third, this paper defines military organizational political behaviour as the action of the military as an organization driven by a small group of people (its leadership) within the context of civil-military relations. More specifically, this paper would focus on the military’s behaviour in terms of subordination (or not) to the political leadership. This paper, adapting from Lee (2006: 5), sees insubordination when there are deliberate non-compliant actions of key individuals, a group, or groups within the military after an order has been issued by the political leadership. Meanwhile, adapting from Feaver (2003: 61), subordination occurs when: the military is doing what the government asked it to do without asking further questions, when political leadership makes the decision, and when the military is avoiding behaviour that could undermine the political leadership.

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8 For example, we could do well to have insights on how the principles of organizations as a learning institution (target-oriented, driven by routines, and history-dependent) (Levitt and March 1988: 320; Reiter 1994: 493) could help explain how the military constructed and sustained historical interpretations, and how it shapes their behaviour in civil-military relations.

9 It should be noted that in the broadest sense, the field of civil-military relations covers a wider range of questions about the relationship between the armed forces, the polity, and the populace (Krebs 2004: 123)—which is certainly the next research cluster on Southeast Asian militaries, including Indonesia.
Indonesian Military Political Behaviour: A Typological Proposal

It has been noted that problems of military subordination are greatest when the military have traditionally exercised wide-ranging political responsibilities and where changes in military doctrine and equipment have abetted role-expansion (Welch 1976a: 34). This is certainly the case with the Indonesian military, where the situation surrounding their birth—their self-created existence before the creation of state, the leadership of General Sudirman (their first Commander-in-Chief), the experience of conducting a military government during the guerrilla war—shaped their subsequent political behaviour (Said 1991: 3). However, such typical argument indicates that military behaviour in the face of civilian supremacy should be either “subordinate” or “insubordinate”, and nothing in between and that their relationship is a static one.

However, as Sebastian (2006: 324) noted, the relationship is dynamic since much of TNI’s behaviour vis-à-vis the President depended on the calculation of the TNI leadership, leading to a variety of military behaviour: as a tool of the regime, as supporters of the regime, and as an independent political force. More specifically, Rinakit (2005: 39–54) argued that there are three different roles that the military assumed: (i) as a spoiler—when the military oppose the president’s policy, (ii) critical supporter—when they accept the policy but provide input and propose alternative policies and criticism, and (iii) political instrument of the regime—where the military had no bargaining power and produced no policy independent of the president.

However, to take these typologies further, we could actually discern four distinct behaviour of the Indonesian military vis-à-vis the political leadership across a spectrum line: insubordination, critical supporter, uncritical supporter, and subordination. This is a departure from the traditional “subordinate” or “insubordinate” tradition in civil-military relations studies. In addition, the gradation across the spectrum of political behaviour from insubordination to subordination can also be seen as gradation spectrum of the military’s political force, from “independent” to “dependent”. We shall explore each of these behaviours using case samples found throughout Indonesia’s history and explain what factors account for such behaviour.

10 For studies on the historical evolution of the Indonesian military, see Crouch (1985), Said (2006b).
Insubordination: The Indonesian Military as Spoilers

It has been argued in cases where the military acts as spoilers, the control over force is employed to the profit—political, social, and financial—of their members, especially the leaders (Black 2002: 35). More specifically, Rinakit (2005: 39) argued that as a spoiler, the military would oppose the president’s policies if they judge it to be unfavourable to their interests, and in this capacity, they use rejection and strong arm tactics. In other words, the military’s organizational political behaviour would then be either, blatant insubordination (i.e. refusing a direct order), or strong-arm tactics short of refusing orders (e.g. aiming canons at the presidential palace). This second characteristic, I would argue, actually lies somewhere between critical supporter and insubordination.

The first case of explicit refusal to carry out orders, or to create an independent policy reserved for the political leaders, actually took place during the birth of the Republic (1945–1949). On 18 December 1948, a surprise Dutch attack was launched on Yogyakarta—then Indonesia’s capital, and most civilian leaders headed by President Soekarno hesitated over what to do, and in the event, allowed themselves to be captured by Dutch troops (Kristiadi 1999: 100). Previously, General Sudirman, who had the military squarely behind him and was voted by the officers to be Commander-in-Chief in 1945, had pleaded with President Soekarno and Vice-President Hatta to leave the city and lead the guerrilla war. However, both refused, and Sudirman decided to leave. Before leaving, he managed to issue an urgent order to the entire Republican forces to fight a guerrilla war, although the cabinet had not reached a decision (Said 1991: 98). In addition, a few days later, the army, through Colonel A. H. Nasution, then commander of the Java Territorial Army, established a military

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11 Something that supposedly has been promised by both leaders (Said 1991: 99).
government for all of Java and ran the guerrilla war without civilian leadership (Tjokropranolo 1995: 95–151).

Once the political leadership was released six months later, another disagreement between the military (Sudirman) and civilians (Soekarno) occurred over the timing of the ceasefire and negotiations—which the military saw as a sign of surrender. Subsequently, on August 1949, General Sudirman decided to tender his resignation but would continue to lead the guerrilla war even though the civilian leaders were surrendering (Rinakit 2005: 40). Sudirman eventually withdrew his resignation because of Soekarno’s plea but insisted that his troops continued the guerrilla warfare. Thus, Sudirman could only pose such challenge vis-à-vis the political leadership because he had the military unified behind him and the fact that Soekarno and the rest of the leadership were indecisive and weak.

Meanwhile, we can see strong arm tactics short of insubordination in the so-called “17 October 1952 affair”, when Nasution and such protégés as Colonel Kawilarang aimed cannons at the presidential palace while organizing a large civilian demonstration in front of the palace demanding the dissolution of parliament. In an attempt to stop the political opposition in parliament from discussing a topic regarded by the military as its internal problem—namely, its plan to modernize the army—the military asked the president to assume executive power and dissolve the parliament (Sundhaussen 1986: 124–125). However, President Soekarno faced the protesters and talked them down while refusing to succumb to military pressure—resulting in Nasution being forced to resign.

This affair actually reflected an internal conflict within the military. Nasution’s idea of military modernization was feared by another faction within the military surrounding Bambang Supeno, who suspected that Nasution’s idea was to promote Dutch-educated officers while blocking the less educated ex-Peta and/or ex-Laskar officers (Rinakit 2005: 41). These officers were close to Soekarno and since many Laskar groups were actually paramilitary wings of political parties sitting in Parliament, they also had access to parliamentarians (Said 2006: 10). Thus, although many within the officer corps under Nasution had a solid front vis-à-vis the president, the fact that there other officers who sided with Soekarno had constrained Nasution from taking a more direct challenge without risking a “civil war”.

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12 PETA (Defenders of the Fatherland) was a Japanese-made youth paramilitary group created during their occupation. Laskar were indigenous paramilitary youth groups formed prior to Independence.
As a continuation of this affair, three years later, another affair took place as senior military officers boycotted the government’s decision to appoint Colonel Bambang Utoyo, a fairly junior officer, as Army Chief of Staff on 27 June 1955 (Crouch 1978: 31). After Nasution resigned, internal military conflict intensified. As a result, the officer corps decided to hold a meeting in Yogyakarta on February 1955 that produced the so-called Yogyakarta Charter, officially dubbed “Army Unity Charter”. This signalled the resolve and cohesion of the officer corps. This partly explains why the army could pose a more serious challenge vis-à-vis the civilian leadership by refusing to attend the inauguration ceremony and denying the appointment of Bambang Utoyo.

We can conclude several points here. First, the military’s insubordination and strong arm tactics was triggered by their “nationalistic commitment” (Sudirman case) as well as by their disappointment in civilian weakness, while interfering in internal military affairs (October 1952 and June 1995 affairs). Second, the method employed by the military depends on the internal unity of the military. In the October 1952 affair, where military factionalism was high and the officer corps could not present a unified front, the military could not play a stronger spoiler role. In the June 1955 affair, once the military could minimize factionalism, they were willing to blatantly display insubordination.

Critical Supporter: The Indonesian Military as Partners (1)
As a critical supporter, the behaviour of the military was to provide input and propose policies to the president, as well as to offer criticism, albeit in a polite way—which was evident during the first two decades of President Soeharto’s New Order (Rinakit 2005: 43). In the first component of the “partnership” (i.e. supporting Suharto), the military helped control society in the political field and in the economic field by “safeguarding” the economic programmes outlined by Soeharto’s technocrats. The military also began to dominate the bureaucracy with the support of Soeharto.14

In the political field, the military’s support can be seen in the following. First, the military helped restructure Sekber Golkar (Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups) in 1967, in order to prepare Golkar to become Soehartos’s all-powerful electoral machine while

13 It also outlined that officer promotion should be based on seniority (Notoeusanto 1991: 27–28).
14 By 1973, the military made up 34 per cent of cabinet ministers, 70 per cent of the governors, and 44.4 per cent of ambassadors (Rinakit 2005: 45).
guaranteeing military domination in politics (Suryadinata 1992: 8–18). Second, related to the abovementioned political machine, the military initiated a law to merge the political parties in 1973 (Suryadinata 1992: 79–83). Third, the military initiated and supported several policies on political parties, mass organization, and election laws to strengthen Soeharto’s grip—one of which made it mandatory to adopt the national ideology of Pancasila as the sole official foundation for all political parties and mass organizations (Ramage 1995: 3). This was done through their claim as the dynamizer and stabilizer of development based on Law No. 20/1982 on Security and Defence.

Meanwhile, the critical aspect of the partnership can be seen from several instances. First, when General Soemitro, Head of Operational Command for the Restoration of Order and Security (Kopkamtib), disagreed with Soeharto about Ali Moertopo being appointed as Chief of the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (Bakin) (Jenkins 1984: 13). Granted that Moertopo and Soemitro were rivals at that time, but the fact that Soemitro had the leverage to suggest a critical policy decision indicated the military’s critical partner behaviour. Second, when Ali Moertopo reminded Soeharto about the technocrat-controlled economic policies under Widjojo Nitisastro that he thought was too focused on monetary issues (Rinakit 2005: 48).

Third, when the Army’s Staff and Command School (SESKOAD) published a paper shortly before the 1977 general election, arguing that although the military “supported” Soeharto’s policies in terms of elections, they contended that the military should refrain from publicly taking sides or aligning themselves with any political groups, and that political life should be based on democratic principles (Said 1998: 538). This was supported by a group of retired Army generals, the so-called Forum for Study and Communication (FOSKO) (Jenkins 1981: 90–112). Finally, when General Benny Moerdani, then Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief, appealed to Soeharto about the involvement of Soeharto’s children in mega-business projects across the country (Schwarz 1994: 146).

Why did the military support Soeharto and criticize him at the same time? One main reason behind this was the generation of military leadership at that time who felt that they were on par with Soeharto and helped found the New Order. This feeling stemmed from the fact that many of the Indonesian military elite at that time were Soeharto’s peers or former staff. In addition, Soeharto, being a relatively new President, was more willing to listen to his inner (Ali Murtopo, Soedjono Hoemardani, Sudomo, Yoga Sugama) and outer circle
(Soemitro and Sutopo Yuwono) group of advisers (Jenkins 1981: 20–32). Of course, the fact that the military also benefited politically and economically added an additional impetus on the partnership.

Uncritical Supporter: The Indonesian Military as Partners (2)

Meanwhile, the military’s behaviour as an uncritical regime partner means that the military acts as a partner with the president to sustain the regime with a specific set of agreements where the president could outline any other national policies, except dealing with the military’s internal affairs, and the military would support the regime unequivocally. This behaviour was clearly manifested during the tenure of President B. J. Habibie, Soeharto’s vice-president and successor. Under President Habibie, General Wiranto, then Commander-in-Chief/Minister of Defence and Security, was given a free hand to plan and execute all internal military policies, including military reforms, rotations, demotions, and promotions (Chrisnandi 2005: 97; Singh 2001: 107). Some have even suggested that military had a relatively large influence in policy-making. Therefore, as Chrisnandi (2005: 98) noted, the military was positioned as the “President’s partner” whose input into policymaking was significant, and not just a policy executor. Thus, during President Habibie’s tenure (May 1998-October 1999), there was no serious crisis between the military and political leadership.

This, however, does not mean that Habibie established civilian supremacy over the military, because in reality, the civil-military relations were more of a “marriage of convenience”, or what Hafidz (2006: 121) calls a “Siamese-Twin power sharing”. Habibie, being a Soeharto protégé and having no strong political base of his own (Rabasa and Haseman 2002: 38), needed the military’s support to stabilize his rule, fend off political challenges and prevent individual officers from undermining his populist policies, while the military needed the goodwill of President Habibie, given his constitutional powers over the military, to distribute resources and set the political agenda (Mietzner 2006: 10).

Habibie gave many concessions to the military, and even expressed his interest to appoint General Wiranto as his Vice-President if he was to be re-elected in the upcoming elections in 1999. It has been argued that Habibie, due to his involvement in the policy-

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15 This includes the establishment of a new Regional Military Command in Aceh (1999), the separation of the police from the military (1999), the support for the Special Session of the People’s Consultative Assembly (November 1998), and the new political laws lifting the ban on political parties (1999).
making process under Soeharto, understood the basic nature of the military and knew its strength and weaknesses (Singh 2001: 107). This was believed to be the reason why he had managed to develop an amicable working relationship with Wiranto. That being said, the new government introduced radical changes to the political system, including fresh general elections with multiparty participation, press freedom, and vastly expanded civil liberties, which some of them affected the military, challenging deeply entrenched military paradigms of political corporatism and social control (Mietzner 2006: 10). The fact that the military did not pose any serious challenge even with the introduction of these policies underlines the uncritical nature of the military behaviour.

Moreover, the support given by the military under General Wiranto in the following cases reiterate this point. First, in July 1998, Habibie wanted Wiranto to help secure the election of Akbar Tanjung, his preferred candidate for the chairmanship of Golkar during the party’s Extraordinary National Session (Munaslub), who was up against former Army Chief Edy Sudrajat and his followers (Hafidz 2006: 121). Initially hesitant, Wiranto finally agreed to intervene and secure the victory when he ordered Mardiyanto, the Socio-Political Assistant to the Chief of Socio-Political Affairs to call all regional military commanders to support Akbar (Crouch 1999: 132; Hafidz 2006: 121). Second, in November 1998, the military was asked to mobilize thousands of civilian demonstrators to back Habibie’s plan to legalize his leadership in a special session of the People’s Consultative Assembly. Wiranto then ordered former Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) Chief of Staff, Major General Kivlan Zen, to accomplish the task (Zen 2004: 95).

Another factor should be mentioned to help explain the “equilibrium” in the partnership between President Habibie and General Wiranto, which is military factionalism. First, the friction between General Wiranto and Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto, Soeharto’s son in law and Kostrad Commander that began during the Soeharto period. Lee (2006) argued that this intra-military conflict is the major reason that prompted the military’s “failure” to intervene and save Soeharto during his last days. Although following Habibie’s support for the Officer Honorary Council, where Prabowo would later be discharged for his involvement in the kidnapping, torture, and murder of regime protestors in 1998, some of
Prabowo’s loyalists were still in service\textsuperscript{16}, which constrained Wiranto’s room to manoeuvre. Second, Habibie had his own stock of generals who kept Wiranto in check. They were remnants of the “green” faction\textsuperscript{17} within the military (Honna 2005: 47; Chrisnandi 2007: 7–8) and had tried to influence Habibie to sack Wiranto (Hafidz 2006: 122). This helped explain Wiranto’s reluctant adherence to Habibie’s requests.

From this case, we could conclude several points. First, the military will be an uncritical partner when they are internally factionalized and weakened; especially when a faction of the top leadership (e.g. Wiranto) feels that they need the support of the political leadership to consolidate their power base. Externally, the military will also be constrained in terms of options to intervene when their standing and image in front of the public at large is severely damaged. Second, the military’s behaviour as an uncritical partner will also be determined by the strength of the top political leadership, and whether the then political leadership is in need of the military’s support to survive. Finally, the military will become an uncritical partner when both the military and civilian leadership are severely weakened but their interests are highly at stake and in conjunction at that particular time.

\textit{Subordination: The Indonesian Military as Pawns}

The military’s behaviour as pawns of the political leadership can be seen when the military has no bargaining power; produces no policy independent of the president; does what the government asks it to do without questioning; when the political leadership makes the decision; and when the military avoids behaviour that could undermine the political leadership. This behaviour was more clearly seen during the last decade of Soeharto’s New Order, which was marked with the appointment of General Try Sutrisno in February 1988 to replace the General Benny Moerdani as Commander-in-Chief. As noted earlier, General Moerdani was one of the critical military leaders that had a strong power base within the military—which explained why he was “critical” in the first place.

\textsuperscript{16} This includes Lieutenant General Soebagio H. S. (Army Chief of Staff), Lieutenant General Fachrul Rozi (Chief of General Staff), Lieutenant General Z. A. Maulani (Chief of National Intelligence), and Major General Zaky Anwar Makarim (Chief of Army Intelligence) (Rinakit 2005: 100).

\textsuperscript{17} The “red-and-white” faction refers to the colour of Indonesia’s flag, signalling the officer’s more nationalistic inclinations, while “green” symbolizes the colour of Islam, which signalled the officer’s Islamic leanings. For more details, see Hafidz (2006: 4–5). Rinakit (2005: 4–5) calls it the “taliban” versus “Pancasila” factions. These splits were of course denied by the military (confidential conversation with a military officer at Military General Information Bureau, September 2007).
With military factionalism largely instilled within the military leadership throughout the New Order\textsuperscript{18}, and with Benny Moerdani officially sidelined, Soeharto was at the top of the political pinnacle in the 1980s with the military losing its independent political role and it became synonymous with the regime (Virgoe 2008: 97). In this sense, the military could easily be used by Soeharto as a regime pawn to protect the interests of Soeharto and the First Family, even at the consequences of human rights abuses and violence. This partly explains the military behaviour of establishing military operational areas in Aceh, East Timor and Irian Jaya as well as kidnapping, torturing, and imprisoning democratic activists and whoever criticized Soeharto and his family (Rinakit 2005: 52). Another instance would be the military involvement with the First Family’s Chinese business connection whereby the military had been called to provide “protection” to ensure that those businesses went undisturbed (Rieffel and Pramodhawardani 2007: 32).

However, the military’s violent behaviour had also created a backlash for Soeharto himself—proving the point that the military was like a pawn ready to be moved at Soeharto’s wish. The case of the Santa Cruz incident in 1991 showed this military behaviour as a helpless dependent force. The Santa Cruz incident took place when soldiers fired at unarmed demonstrators in the East Timor capital of Dili on 12 November 1991.\textsuperscript{19} This bloody event took place just when President Soeharto was on an international tour to lobby for his chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement in a bid to build his international standing. The incident certainly embarrassed the President, prompting him to make an unprecedented move to order an independent investigation and the establishment of the Military Honorary Board led by Major General Faisal Tanjung (Hafidz 2006: 9). The board later dismissed Major General Sintong Panjaitan and Brigadier General Rudolf S. Warouw, two highest ranking officers ever publicly discharged—without the military making any kind of movement to resist this.

The military’s behaviour in this regard must be seen within several contexts. First, although General Sutrisno was considered close to Moerdani and was disenchanted with Soeharto’s policies of sidelining the military (Kingsbury 2003: 154), he was a former personal adjutant of Soeharto. This means that he had no strong and solid power base of his

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\textsuperscript{18} Rinakit (2005: 52) notes that the conflicts among the military leadership—between Ali Moertopo and Soemitro (1974), Soedarmaono and Benny Moerdani (1984), Faisal Tanjung and Hendroprijono (1996) and Wiranto and Prabowo Subianto (1998)—were all engineered by Soeharto.

\textsuperscript{19} For an account of the Santa Cruz incident, or the “Dili Massacre”, see Schwarz (1994: 211–216).
own. Second, during the critical partner phase, many in the military were Soeharto’s peers and former staff while Sutrisno and the subsequent military leadership came from a different generation and career track. Many of the military leadership of that generation rose through the ranks due to their closeness to either Soeharto or the First Family. This made them “blind loyalists” due to the fact that their political and military careers depended on Soeharto’s personal blessings (Rinakit 2005: 50). Therefore, it is not surprising that, as pawns of the regime, the loyalty and ties of the officer corps is to the president, which were key factors in promotions and assignments (Rabasa and Haseman 2002: 38).

Third, at that time, Soeharto was relying on the military to control the society and look after his and his family’s personal interests. This reflected both Soeharto’s comfortable power grip on the military and his concern that as the military became more consolidated; they will become more of an independent force. This partly explains why Soeharto used a “divide and rule” strategy to create a sort of “bipolar factionalism” within the military leadership to control them and eventually used them as pawns to sustain the regime. This weakening of the top military leadership will naturally spill into the officer corps. Shiraishi (1999: 76–77) noted how the idea is to prevent the leaders in the eleven positions within the military leadership from forming a unified front.

From the discussion, we could conclude that the military will become an uncritical partner where several conditions are present. First, when the military leadership is factionalized and without an independent power hold within the organization as a whole. Second, when the military leadership is personally dependent (for assignments and promotions) on the personal preference of the president. Third, when the military as an organization receives high political and economic benefits.

**Military Organizational Behaviour of Political Armies: Key Variables**

This section will attempt to extract several variables from the previous sections and suggest further research and theoretical constructs to understand the political behaviour of military organizations within the context of civil-military relations. First, the dependent variable

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20 The Commander-in-Chief, the Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Chief of the Social and Political Staff (abolished in 2000), Chief of Military Intelligence, Army Chief of Staff, Commander of Army Strategic Reserve Command, Commander of Army Special Forces, Commander of Jakarta Regional Military Command, Navy Chief of Staff, Air Force Chief of Staff, and the Chief of National Police.
which is the phenomenon that we wish to explain: the political organizational behaviour of
the military within the context of civil-military relations. Theoretically, based on the
Indonesian case as a political army, there are at least four basic typologies of organizational
behaviour within the context of civil-military relations that depart from the traditional
literature on civilian supremacy: regime spoiler, critical regime partner, uncritical regime
partner, and regime pawn. Further comparative research could be done on other political
armies to explain if there are further variations of these typologies. However, such research
could begin with these typologies.

Second, the independent variables which are the underlying variables that could help
explain the four basic typologies mentioned before. These variables could serve as starting
points if one wishes to seek underlying factors to explain a variety of political organizational
behaviour of the military. First, internal variables within the military which would include the
following.

(1) The military’s self-conception and portrayal of the level of “national interests” at
stake—which is very much related to the military's corporate interests (Bienen 1981: 368).
This variable, of course, cannot be fully explained without understanding the history of the
military’s birth, because “a remembered past has always more or less constricted both action
in the present and thinking about the future” (Shy 1971: 210). How the military construct,
internalize, and sustain such a past as an organization is crucial to explain the degree of
significance of the rest of the internal variables. It should also be remembered that a
heritage of military intervention or extensive involvement in politics cannot be undone
(Welch 1976b: 315).

(2) The degree of military factionalism or unity and cohesion, as well as the power
and position of key leadership posts within the broader conflict in the military. This is related
to the organization’s integrity, which is the degree to which the organization presents a
unified front, where the higher the degree of organizational integrity, the greater the ability of
the organization to articulate preferences and pursue them as an actor in the political arena
(Avant 1994: 12). Armies that are organizationally divided, physically separated, and led by
multiple, and often competitive, command structures, are not in the best position to intervene
(Danopoulos 1992: 17). Additionally, the generational characteristics, power base, and patron

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21 A recent research on the history of the Indonesian military’s Information Centre and the role it played in
regime maintenance through historical narratives is a step in this direction. See McGregor (2007).
of the military leadership at a given time will determine the extent of the influence of such factionalism upon the military’s preferred method in dealing with the political leadership. This could be significant in determining the “critical” or “uncritical” partnership behaviour.

(3) The institutional and individual interests of the key military leadership, of which control over the military’s organization and management as an institution is paramount. Due to its history, roles and mission, the military often seeks internal autonomy, and as a corporate body, it strives for such internal control and autonomy by arguing that it is competent in judging such affairs like promotion, organization and size. (Alagappa 2001b: 35). In fact, the more professional a military organization is, the more it will collectively feel that only fellow professionals are competent to select officers for promotion (Rosen 1988: 142). Thus, the desire to maintain internal autonomy might push the military to limit civilian intrusion in this matter, or at the very least, might create resentment within the rank-and-file and officer corps if the civilians tried to interfere in such internal affairs. In addition, other institutional and individual interests of the military leadership being “bartered” in the civil-military partnership would also be a significant variable in explaining military behaviour.

Second, variables within the political leadership, of which the degree of civilian interference in internal military affairs, civilian strength vis-à-vis the military, and civilian handling of the economy and political condition, are three key factors. In the first, a political leader who attempts to bypass the chain of command will breach the nature of military organization (Bland 1999: 15). Additionally, civilian choices on how to organize the civil-military system will affect the integrity and institutional bias of the military organization (Avant 1994: 12). Meanwhile, the structure and political strength of civilian institutions will determine their leverage vis-à-vis the military. For example, Avant (1994: 1) noted that civilian leaders will have more difficulty agreeing about how to design and monitor military institutions if a division of powers exists. Finally, the way the civilian leadership behaves in the national political and economic scene will also determine whether the military will find the civilians’ behaviour acceptable or not.

Finally, how all the above-mentioned variables within the civilian and military spheres interact, the degree of significance of each variable, and how they shape the military’s organizational and political behaviour would eventually have to depend on the national political, economic, security and social condition of the specific time of the case at hand.
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