JOKOWI’S LEGACIES AND THE INCOMING PRABOWO ADMINISTRATION
CHANGE OR CONTINUITY?

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Executive Summary

Prabowo Subianto has won the 2024 Indonesian presidential election and will be sworn in as Indonesia’s eighth president on 20 October 2024. This paper aims to outline key legacies of his predecessor Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”) and develop several scenarios on how the Prabowo–Jokowi relationship could evolve and how it might help shape Prabowo’s policies during his upcoming five-year term (2024–2029). We argue that in addition to his accomplishments in bringing about economic and infrastructure development as well as political stability, Jokowi is leaving behind two significant legacies in the twilight of his presidency: (1) unprecedented use of state power to favour his preferred presidential candidate, and (2) further recentralisation of state power through two newly enacted omnibus laws. Through Jokowi’s recalibration of presidential power, Prabowo will be inheriting a more powerful Indonesian presidency.
Introduction

After 10 years of stable presidential rule under incumbent president Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”) – a period characterised by both significant economic prosperity and the COVID-19 pandemic – Indonesia stands at the cusp of a new era. Jokowi is slated to step down on 20 October, and Prabowo Subianto will take over the reins of power, having won the presidential election by a large margin. Clearly, 2024 will be an important transition period for Indonesia. While Prabowo won this year’s presidential race by promising that he would continue Jokowi policies if elected, he is known to have his own vision and ambition to turn Indonesia into a great economic and global powerhouse.2

This policy report aims to do two things: (1) make sense of Jokowi’s 10 years in office and its possible legacies for Indonesia, and (2) develop several scenarios for how the Prabowo–Jokowi relationship is likely to evolve once Prabowo assumes office in October 2024 and how Indonesia will move forward under his administration.

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The Jokowi Administration and its Legacies

In August 2023, a staff member of the RSIS Indonesia Programme wrote that Jokowi had made three contributions to Indonesia during his term of office. First, Jokowi reinvigorated a state-led economic development strategy to speed up the development of physical infrastructure, reduce investment red tape and attract foreign direct investments into sectors deemed to be economically strategic. Second, Jokowi developed a style of leadership based on moderate populism that is down-to-earth in reaching out to ordinary Indonesians and successfully reduced elite infighting and discord. Finally, through a successful G20 presidency in 2022, Jokowi demonstrated Indonesia’s growing economic and geopolitical heft to the world, which will pay dividends down the road as major powers around the world seek to broaden and deepen economic cooperation with Indonesia.

However, considering recent developments in the lead-up to the elections, as well as reflecting on the substantive political changes that have occurred over Jokowi’s last decade in power, we believe that two other key aspects of Jokowi’s legacy need to be highlighted. First, in the last few months leading up to the 14 February voting day, it was clear that Jokowi utilised state power in new and unprecedented ways to back his preferred presidential candidate, Prabowo. Second, accelerating a trend first begun under the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono government, Jokowi further recentralised power, raising questions about what a more powerful central government will mean for Indonesia in future.

(1) Unprecedented use of state power to favour a presidential candidate

In the lead-up to the 2024 election, it became increasingly clear that Jokowi had begun to utilise state power in novel and unprecedented ways to try to increase the general public’s level of support for his preferred presidential candidate, Prabowo. Jokowi’s intervention in the presidential election started as early as April 2023, when he sought to broker a “national unity” coalition composed of the five parties in the government coalition (which excludes the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, PDI-P) to jointly back a presidential ticket.

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The first step in Jokowi’s electoral intervention was to signal to the public that he supported Prabowo, without directly endorsing him. Jokowi calculated that supporting Prabowo’s candidacy would be the best way of ensuring the continuity of his administration’s policies. His decision seems to have been influenced by the timing of PDI-P’s announcement that Ganjar Pranowo was its presidential nominee – at a time when the president was on an overseas trip.\(^5\)

To signal indirectly his support for Prabowo, Jokowi allowed his son Gibran Rakabuming to stand for election as Prabowo’s running mate. But Jokowi had to first facilitate Gibran’s eligibility to join Prabowo’s ticket. As his son was 36 years old – below the minimum age requirement of 40 to run in the presidential election – a Constitutional Court ruling was needed to overcome the age barrier. A favourable ruling was obtained on 16 October 2023, when the Constitutional Court ruled that potential presidential or vice-presidential candidates needed to be either at least 40 years old or have current or previous experience of serving in an elected position, including that of a regional executive (mayor, regent or governor). As a result, Gibran, who was then the mayor of Solo, became eligible to run in the presidential election. Jokowi also intervened in the political process by campaigning indirectly for Prabowo and Gibran. In January 2024, he spent several days in Central Java and Jogjakarta to distribute social assistance to the needy and travelled to PDI-P strongholds, such as Bali and East Nusa Tenggara.\(^6\) Although Jokowi did not campaign directly for Prabowo, the social assistance boosted his approval ratings, leading many voters who approved of Jokowi to support a ticket that included his son.

Another example of Jokowi’s intervention was the politicisation of the state apparatus down to the village level to shift support away from Ganjar and his running mate, Mahfud MD, towards the candidacy of Prabowo–Gibran in the provinces where they were expected to perform best. Many village heads, including those in Karanganyar regency, Ganjar’s hometown, were pressured by their superiors to make campaign videos endorsing the


Prabowo–Gibran pair in their localities or face prosecution for corruption. Seeing where the wind was blowing, village heads unsurprisingly starting campaigning for Prabowo–Gibran, even in areas where Ganjar was expected to win.

One common charge by the Ganjar–Mahfud camp and the other presidential ticket of Anies Baswedan and Muhaimin Iskandar was that the 2024 elections were marred by “electoral fraud” (kecurangan). However, what would be more accurate is that the incumbent president used various means of coercing national, provincial and local officials into mobilising voters to support his preferred successor prior to the election, rather than tampering with the voting process per se.

(2) Recentralisation

A second and longer-term effect of Jokowi’s 10 years in power is the gradual reversal of the decentralisation reforms that were first introduced in 1999. The regional autonomy policy, which devolved state power to hundreds of local governments, sought to enhance service delivery and improve accountability by making directly elected regional leaders responsible for public services in their respective regions. However, it soon became apparent that decentralisation had failed to live up to its promise.

Many local governments lacked the capacity to deliver an adequate quality of public services, and many become mired in corruption. Furthermore, decentralisation created a complicated political and bureaucratic structure that impeded the central government’s development goals. President Jokowi’s focus on economic development and ambitious infrastructure projects meant the president had to enact policies to welcome foreign direct investment. But the complex bureaucratic red tape that discouraged foreign investors thwarted his goals.

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7 kumparanNews, “Pengakuan kades di Ngawi diancam dan terpaksa bikin video ‘dukung 02 satu putaran’” [Several Ngawi village heads confessed they were threatened and forced to make campaign video to ‘support Prabowo-Gibran in one round’], kumparanNews, 13 February 2024, https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/229vrfrPZ3b/3?utm_source=App&shareID=PHLRaNYRA0zq&utm_medium=copy-to-clipboard
Jokowi thus sought to amend existing regional autonomy laws and introduce laws that strengthen the central government’s control over the bureaucracy at the subnational level. In October 2020, amid the COVID-19 outbreak, the Indonesian parliament (DPR) ratified the Jokowi government’s Omnibus Law on Job Creation. The ratification of the law stripped local governments of their authority to issue business permits in their regions and centralised all permit issuance under the Ministry of Investment.\(^\text{10}\) The law also revoked several existing manpower and environmental laws in order to minimise the regulatory burden on businesses and encourage new investment.\(^\text{11}\) Besides the Omnibus Law on Job Creation, the president also promulgated the Omnibus Law on Health in July 2023, which not only strengthened the government’s position in regulating the health sector, but also opened up the possibility of liberalisation and widened the commercialisation of health services.\(^\text{12}\) Based on these new laws, we can see that Jokowi’s recentralisation efforts were focused on legislative initiatives that facilitated his economic agenda.


\(^{11}\) UNCTAD, “Omnibus Law on Job Creation Has been Enacted”, Investment Policy Monitor, 2 November 2020, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-monitor/measures/3567/indonesia-omnibus-law-on-job-creation-has-been-enacted#:~:text=The%20key%20points%20include%20among,a%20land%20bank%20supervisory%20authority

The Prabowo Administration: Looking Forward

(1) The Jokowi–Prabowo relationship

The personal relationship between outgoing president Jokowi and president-elect Prabowo is likely to be the single largest determinant of whether the latter will continue programmes and policies enacted by his predecessor.

Much of the political manoeuvring we have seen in recent months has been part of a last-ditch effort by Jokowi to preserve his political influence after he steps down from office in October 2024. There were allegations earlier that he was seeking to either extend his second term or secure a third five-year term of office through a constitutional amendment and that this effort was opposed by the political elites. The nomination of Jokowi’s son, Gibran, as Prabowo’s vice-president indicated the president’s attempt to retain his influence beyond October 2024.

After Prabowo’s landslide election victory, political discussion in Jakarta has quickly shifted to how Jokowi intends to retain his influence over state policy once he hands over the presidency to Prabowo. Jokowi is said to be currently mulling over the option of gaining control of the Golkar Party’s leadership. This means that he will effectively control the second largest party in the DPR (and the largest party in Prabowo’s coalition) when the new parliamentary term begins on 1 October 2024.

It was rumoured initially that Jokowi wanted to take over the Golkar party chairmanship or put one of his trusted aides – the current minister of investment, Bahlil Lahadalia – as the party’s leader. But indications now are that Airlangga Hartato’s chances of re-election as Golkar chairman are getting stronger. Airlangga’s efforts to placate his party’s senior figures, such as Akbar Tandjung, Aburizal Bakrie and Agung Laksono, as well as appease Jokowi and Prabowo seem to have helped the Golkar chief strengthen his chances of retaining his position.

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In general, we envision two scenarios regarding the future of the relationship between Jokowi and Prabowo relationship after the latter assumes the presidency in October 2024:

The most likely scenario is that Jokowi and Prabowo will maintain good relations, and Jokowi accepts being relegated to a respectable but also a marginal advisory position in the Prabowo administration. Here, Jokowi and his son Gibran will hold nominal official positions, and Prabowo will seek Jokowi’s advice on political and policy matters, but Jokowi will hold little real influence in policy matters.

Our second scenario holds that Jokowi attempts to mobilise his loyalists and residual networks to reach an accommodation with Prabowo. To stabilise his administration, Prabowo appoints candidates aligned with Jokowi’s interests as ministers holding key economic portfolios and delegates to Gibran some economic matters to manage. In this scenario, Prabowo will be resigned to accepting that Jokowi will have some influence in his cabinet; alternatively, a falling out between the two men will ensue as Prabowo tries to consolidate power and appoint his own loyalists.

(2) Domestic legitimacy

In late February 2024, presidential candidate Ganjar proposed that the parties in parliament file a parliamentary censure motion (hak angket) to investigate allegations of electoral fraud in the run-up to the election.\(^\text{16}\) Back in November 2023, Masinton Pasaribu, a member of parliament from PDI-P, had first floated this proposal. He wanted to utilise the power of parliamentary censure to investigate the Constitutional Court’s decision to amend the age threshold for presidential candidates, which paved the way for the nomination of Gibran as Prabowo’s vice-presidential candidate.\(^\text{17}\)

PDI-P’s efforts to question the legitimacy of the elections, such as the parliamentary censure idea, would be an issue for Prabowo’s presidency. The parliamentary censure idea failed to gain traction among the other political parties.


The Prabowo camp quickly initiated multiple meetings with the leaderships of the Nasdem party and PDI-P to defuse the parliamentary censure issue. In the aftermath of the Constitutional Court’s rejection of the charges by the Anies and Ganjar teams that the presidential election was fraudulent, Nasdem’s chair, Surya Paloh, declared that the option of a parliamentary censure was “no longer up to date” and that his party would no longer support it. Hence the proposal for a parliamentary censure now seems to be at a dead end. This leads us to the next question: how is Prabowo likely to build his coalition?

(3) Potential Scenarios: How Prabowo is likely to build his coalition

Prabowo is widely expected to follow the playbook used by Yudhoyono and Jokowi and form a large “rainbow coalition” consisting of the bulk of the political parties represented in the national parliament.

In general, Prabowo should be able to put together a legislative majority. As political parties in Indonesia are not self-financing, they are dependent on the diversion of state funds allocated to the ministries controlled by these parties. This reality creates incentives for political parties to join the government of the winning presidential candidate, which would further enlarge the size of Prabowo’s coalition in parliament.

In addition to including in his future government coalition the parties that backed his election campaign, Prabowo is keen to also enlist the parties that supported Anies and Ganjar’s presidential bids. Analysts are predicting that most of the remaining political parties represented in parliament would eventually join the Prabowo government. Both Nasdem’s Surya Paloh and National Awakening Party (PKB) chair Muhaimin Iskandar have recently

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21 Slater (2018), op cit.
confirmed that they will instruct their respective parties to join the Prabowo coalition. Only the nationalist PDI-P and/or the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) are expected to remain in opposition during Prabowo’s first term.

There are two possible scenarios regarding the composition of Prabowo’s coalition. Who is in the coalition will depend on how durable Prabowo’s alliance with Jokowi is going to be. Under the first scenario, the alliance between the two will hold strong until the next presidential election in 2029. If so, we can expect Prabowo to have a large legislative coalition.

Under the second scenario, the Prabowo–Jokowi alliance breaks down within a year or two of Prabowo’s assumption of office. Under such a scenario, while Gibran is likely to remain vice-president, ministers who are closely associated with Jokowi may resign from the cabinet or be reshuffled. Meanwhile, PDI-P could be invited to join the coalition to balance out remaining Jokowi supporters.

It is conceivable that Prabowo and PDI-P chair Megawati Sukarnoputri could come to an accommodation at some point. Prabowo was Megawati’s running mate in the 2009 presidential election. To protect PDI-P’s standing as the largest party in parliament and use it as leverage in the party’s dealings with the new administration, Megawati could conceivably move PDI-P closer to Prabowo, who always had cordial relations with her. With several leading PDI-P politicians – including Ganjar himself – having indicated their preference that the party remain in opposition under Prabowo’s presidency.

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Conclusion

We argued in this report that Jokowi’s most important political legacies as Indonesian president are (1) his unprecedented use of state power to favour the presidential candidacy of his chosen successor, Prabowo Subianto, and (2) the recentralisation of state power, seen in the two omnibus laws – on job creation, which affected business licensing, manpower and environmental rules (enacted in 2020), and on health provision (enacted in 2023).

These two laws signify that Jokowi wants the Indonesian presidency to be a strong and autonomous institution that is empowered to enact and implement state policy, particularly policies related to economic development and investment in infrastructure, critical minerals and other sectors classified as strategic. He has strengthened the presidency by leveraging the existing authority of the Indonesian president to issue a wide range of decrees and state regulations and by coercing rival political parties to join his rainbow coalition to ensure that his legislative initiatives would not encounter meaningful opposition in the DPR. Pending amendments to two laws could, if passed, further strengthen the president’s authority on the eve of the transition from Jokowi to Prabowo. These are the State Ministry Law, which would give the president the authority to add more ministerial posts, and the Constitutional Court Law, which would allow the president to remove a Constitutional Court justice before his/her term expires.

Through this recalibration of presidential power, Prabowo will be inheriting a more secure and stable presidency compared to previous administrations. The question now is how Prabowo will utilise such powers to push his policy agenda and whether his presidency will be characterised by a continuation of Jokowi’s agenda in large part or a significant departure from it.

The following points should also be considered when assessing Prabowo’s future policymaking:

- As Prabowo is likely to seek a second five-year term in 2029, he will enact policies that will ensure his popularity among prospective voters. It is likely that he will endeavour to implement many of the programmes he had proposed during the 2024 presidential campaign trail. For instance, Prabowo championed his free lunch programme for Indonesian schoolchildren and urged Jokowi and the current cabinet to formally incorporate it as a state policy. If it is implemented, the programme would take a lion’s share of
state budget and would in turn put into question the continuation of other projects – for instance, the new capital project – as Indonesia’s state budget will not be able to support multiple large-scale projects at the same time. Nonetheless, Prabowo’s political outlook would most likely influence him into prioritising his free lunch programme.24

- To be able to introduce and implement successful policies, Prabowo needs the full support of the national parliament. Having only a slim majority in parliamentary support sometimes led to delicate political situations as the defection of one major party could result in the loss of parliamentary control. To prevent such a risk, Prabowo needs to ensure that he has majority support in parliament by forming a large coalition. His recent alignments with parties that were not members of the coalition that supported his presidential bid – like Nasdem, PKB and the United Development Party (PPP) – are part of his ongoing efforts to increase the size of his rainbow coalition to ensure that he will not face any parliamentary obstruction that could derail or postpone his policy agenda. These efforts will ensure that only a few parties – most likely PDI-P and PKS – will be formally in opposition when he finally assumes office in October.

To conclude, Jokowi’s expansion of presidential power and authority during his tenure is a major asset that would greatly benefit his successor once the handover of power is completed. As someone who has long harboured a desire to serve as Indonesia’s president and has ambitions of making Indonesia a major nation in the economic, political and security realms, Prabowo would certainly utilise these expanded powers once he assumes the presidency. To what degree he manages to implement his policy agenda will be determined by the nature of his relationship with Jokowi. How Prabowo manages his relationship with his coalition partners – and potential opposition, most likely from PDI-P – will also help to determine whether his policy agenda can be enacted and implemented once he assumes office in October.

24 Providing an indication of Prabowo’s inclinations recently was Soedradjad Djiwandono, senior economic adviser to the Prabowo campaign and also Prabowo’s brother-in-law, who stated in an interview on national television that the incoming president would prioritise the free school lunch programme over the development of the new capital since the former would be more beneficial for Indonesia’s future generations. See Kompas TV, “Mantan gubernur BI: Makan siang gratis lebih penting dari bangun IKN” [Former Indonesian Central Bank governor: Free school lunch scheme is more urgent than IKN development], 28 March 2024, https://www.kompas.tv/ekonomi/496514/mantan-gubernur-bi-makan-siang-gratis-lebih-penting-daripada-bangun-ikn.
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