COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST FOREIGN INTERFERENCE

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Executive Summary

This paper takes reference from and builds upon our prior report “Cases of Foreign Interference in Asia”. In that report, we had proposed a framework for understanding the relationship between foreign interference, foreign influence, and hostile information campaigns. We had also proposed a definition of foreign interference as occurring when a foreign entity (state or non-state actor described as the “Adversary”), with hostile intent, takes actions to deliberately, covertly and deceptively disrupt the politics and policies of the Defender state (the “Defender”). We then described the forms in which such foreign interference has been observed to take, and the respective tactics employed.

This paper continues this trajectory of analysis by proposing a framework of countermeasure responses to the identified tactics in the following order: understanding the Adversary’s objectives; assessing the Defender’s vulnerabilities; setting clear goals for the countermeasures; setting up a task force for strategic responses; and countering specific tactics where necessary.

We note that in the assessment phase, the Defender must be alert to multi-faceted attacks, but must also be careful not to confuse a foreign entity’s legitimate activity for foreign interference.

For each aspect of this framework response, we propose and discuss the relevant strategic factors that should be considered, and provide examples of countermeasures deployed by other states.

We conclude by observing that an effective response against the threat of foreign interference needs to take the form of an integrated and strategic approach of focusing on the strategic factors outlined, and the design and implementation of practical and active countermeasures.
1. Foreign Interference

In our prior report Cases of Foreign Interference in Asia, we proposed a framework (in Figure 1 below) for understanding the relationship between foreign interference, foreign influence, and hostile information campaigns below. This framework was proposed with the understanding that the definitions can be fluid, grey areas abound, and what is condemned as “foreign interference” by one nation may not be regarded as interference by another.

![Figure 1- A framework derived by the authors for understanding the relationship between foreign interference, foreign influence, and hostile information campaigns.](image)
We also defined foreign interference as occurring when a foreign entity (state or non-state actor, which we hereafter refer to as “the Adversary”), with hostile intent, takes actions to deliberately, covertly and deceptively disrupt the politics and policies of the Defender state (“the Defender”). This can be:

1. Covert funding or coercion, in order to negatively affect the Defender state, of
   1.1. Politicians and political parties, government officials
   1.2. Influential people and business groups
   1.3. NGOs and activists
   1.4. Academics and educational institutions
   1.5. Civil unrest

2. Cyberattacks (e.g., “hack and leak” campaigns)\(^1\)

3. Hostile Information Campaigns, including
   3.1. Spreading disinformation or biased information in the Defender state
   3.2. Spreading narratives by traditional media (such as newspapers), through proxies, or under covert identities
   3.3. Carrying out the above activities using automated social media accounts (bots) or inauthentic social media accounts (trolls) to create coordinated campaigns, often disguised as local opinions.

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\(^1\) For instance, during the French presidential election campaign, data was hacked from then presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron’s campaign and leaked online. See “Parliament: Foreign Countries Hit by Hostile Information Campaigns.” *The Straits Times*, 13 February 2019, https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/foreign-countries-hit-by-hostile-information-campaigns.
2. Framework for Countermeasures

Since the Adversary can engage in a coordinated campaign using any number of the tactics listed above, it would not be effective to deal with any of them piecemeal. We instead propose dealing with foreign interference campaigns strategically, using the following framework for countermeasures:

(1) Understand the Adversary’s objectives
(2) Assess the Defender’s vulnerabilities
(3) Set clear goals for the countermeasures
(4) Set up a task force for strategic response
(5) Counter specific tactics where needed

2.1. Understand the Adversary’s objectives

To determine why the Adversary might want to interfere in the Defender’s domestic affairs, it is necessary to appreciate how the Adversary perceives the world and wants to change it. External influences include shifts in the distribution of geopolitical power, and internal influences include domestic politics, public opinion, and agendas of interest groups (e.g., businesses). The Adversary’s worldview also determines how it uses its national power — diplomatic, informational, military and economic — and takes risks to grow its influence and interfere overseas. For example, experts believe that prolonged economic stagnation drives Russia to prioritise the use of its military power to gain control over foreign lands, such as Crimea, in restoring what it views as its former sphere of influence, whereas China views the economy as the foundation for its global rise and therefore, prioritises the use of its economic power first — in the shape of the Belt and Road Initiative — to influence access to markets and natural resources.²

By appreciating the Adversary’s worldview, the Defender can better determine what the foreign state regards as significant risks to be avoided and significant gains to be made. The Defender can use this to develop denial countermeasures to disrupt the foreign interference.³

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The Defender will need to use its intelligence gathering apparatus internally, such as cultivating human intelligence assets (HUMINT) in critical public and private institutions, and social and business organisations where foreign involvement or interests are high. This will also help gather evidence if legal countermeasures are needed. The Defender may also need to invest resources externally in growing its influence in and collecting more intelligence on other states for forward defence.\textsuperscript{4}

The Defender should then fuse internal and external intelligence for comprehensive threat assessment, including five important elements:\textsuperscript{5}

(a) the interests and perceptions of the foreign state actor;
(b) the interests and vulnerabilities of the Defender;
(c) the interests and vulnerabilities of the intermediaries;
(d) how the domestic context of the Defender state features in the broader geopolitical environment; and
(e) the possible desired outcomes of the foreign state actor.\textsuperscript{6}

During this phase, the framework that we propose in Figure 1 is particularly important: The Defender should be alert to the multi-faceted nature of the threat, but should also not mistake a foreign entity’s legitimate activity for foreign interference. The risk of witch-hunting, or seeing foreign agents around every corner, is in creating a self-destructive national paranoia that can damage international relations and trade, to the detriment of the Defender’s own economy and development.\textsuperscript{7}

2.2. Assess the Defender’s vulnerabilities and strengths

The Defender should also map the relationships between parties that have stakes or influence in its 4Is: Infrastructure and Information that constitute the foundations of national sovereignty, and Ideas and Individuals that define national identity and policies.\textsuperscript{8} For example, one central idea for Singapore is multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-religious harmony.

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\textsuperscript{4} Forward defence policy encompasses pre-empting external threats before they reach the borders of the state and building trust and friendships with foreign states. This policy requires the state having the capability to project its influence overseas.


\textsuperscript{8} Rahman, “Strategizing Countermeasures Against Foreign Interference in Singapore – Analysis.”
One example of such mapping is the Vulnerability Index of Central European countries. On the one hand, these parties — such as key personnel, suppliers, political and community figures — are in the right position to detect and defend the Defender state’s 4Is from foreign interference. On the other hand, these parties are also in a position to act as agents of influence for a foreign state. These maps are therefore useful for (i) investigating the scope, scale, and sophistication of foreign interference when it happens, (ii) developing programmes to raise awareness in these parties of the potential risks of foreign interference, and (iii) cultivating partners, such as from community organisations and private sector, to counter foreign interference.

2.3. Set clear goals for the countermeasures

At the strategic level, the Defender should set clear goals for foreign interference countermeasures, which can include broad categories such as (i) deterrence by punishment, and/or (ii) deterrence by denial of goals.

Smaller states (like Singapore) have limited ability to deter larger / more powerful states by punishment through hard power — military, economic or cyber. The global interdependence of people, economies, and technologies, makes retaliation complicated and risky for smaller states. Smaller states can leverage their unique strengths instead, such as using strong laws to expel an agent of foreign influence, Singapore did to Professor Huang Jing in 2017. His actions were classified by the Ministry of Home Affairs of Singapore as “subversion and foreign interference”. Such expulsions would disrupt the relationships that the Adversary has invested time and resources to build, reduce the effectiveness of foreign interference, and hopefully send a deterrent message to the Adversary.

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10 Huang Jing leveraged his former position at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy to advance the agenda of a foreign country. He engaged with foreign intelligence operatives and recruited others as he sought to influence the Singapore government’s foreign policy and public opinion in Singapore. See Leslie Schaffer, “Pro-Beijing professor expelled from Singapore for being ‘agent’ of foreign power”, 7 August 2017, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/07/pro-beijing-professor-expelled-from-singapore-for-being-agent-of-foreign-power.html.


“Small, frontline states do not, however, lack options in the face of coercion. To the contrary, they could pursue a number of competitive strategies in an effort to make coercion less attractive. These include strategies of denial, which seek to harden a state against coercion; cost-imposing strategies, which seek to force an adversary to bear burdens sufficient to cause a reconsideration of coercion; efforts to attack and render ineffective the adversary’s coercive strategy; and strategies that seek to exploit divisions within the enemy’s political leadership to end the coercive campaign.”

2.4. Set up a task force to respond strategically

Since this work crosses different sectors – intelligence, foreign affairs, home affairs, communications – several countries have established cross-cutting task forces or government divisions tasked with responding to different aspects of the problem. They have different focuses in different countries, including media monitoring, election safeguarding, and exploration of the broader threat framework.

- Australia founded the Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce to safeguard elections from cyberattacks and interference.14

- Denmark’s intergovernmental task force attends to election integrity as part of the broader framework of influence campaigns. The intergovernmental taskforce seeks to bolster the coordination and power of concerned authorities in fighting influence operations, including election interference.15

- Sweden’s efforts are coordinated by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), which is regarded as one of the world’s most effective organisations in building public awareness about influence operations and responding to them. Sweden is also establishing a psychological defence unit to counter disinformation and maintain public morale in crisis periods.16

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Such task forces or agencies are needed to coordinate a whole-of-government approach and comprehensive countermeasures across different government agencies. We have identified three good practices:

Firstly, the agency should embark on broad research to examine all government agencies for functional areas and issues that may be potential vulnerabilities that hostile foreign states can exploit, especially those that oversee critical national infrastructure as well as critical industries. Additionally, the coordination agency should also assess whether the various agencies have roles and capabilities that can contribute to the overall endeavour of countering foreign interference. The coordination body should have the capability to respond to ongoing potential threats and vulnerabilities, not just during election periods. This capability would include an integrated function of facilitating intelligence sharing and analysis. For example, the Czech Republic established the Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats in 2017 and “house[ed]” it under the Ministry of Interior. The organisation is concerned with a wide range of security threats, including terrorism, extremism, and foreign disinformation campaigns. Since its inauguration, the organisation has attracted criticism for allegedly “duplicat[ing] [the] work [of] the Ministry of Interior and others,” and insufficiency of its output.

Secondly, the agency should identify and monitor foreign states and actors that may be involved in foreign influence and interference operation. This requires a fusion of analysis in international relations, geostrategic ambitions, strategic coercion and internal security. The agency should then (i) identify its intelligence collection and analysis requirements, (ii) establish well-defined procedures for various agencies to report suspected attempts of foreign interference, (iii) and collaborate with local and international security research institutes. Countries who have enacted legislation to support this are the US’ Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), and the Australian Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme (FITS) under the Foreign Influence Transparency Act 2018 (FITA).

Thirdly, the agency should embark on broad research to identify entities both in the private and non-governmental sectors that may become targets of foreign influence and foreign interference operations. The agency should then establish partnerships, information sharing and liaison channels with these entities, and enlist their support.

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2.5. Counter specific tactics where needed

With all of the above in place, the Defender should be able to counter specific tactics where needed, in a strategic and holistic way.

2.5.1. Countering covert funding / coercion of politicians, political parties, government officials, influential people, business groups, academics

Public coverage: Attempts to penetrate foreign influence through covert funding of politicians, political parties, government officials, influential people, businesspeople, and academics have received attention in the media in recent years. The coverage of such incidents by mainstream outlets is essential not only for raising public awareness on the issue but also to publicly condemn such acts.

Legislation: Some states follow up by introducing legislation. For instance, amidst growing concerns about potential foreign interference and plans to hold elections late 2020, New Zealand announced its plan to ban “foreign donations to politicians and tighten disclosure rules for political advertising.”19 Australia, on the other hand, passed a bill on “electoral funding and disclosure” to prevent foreign donations and revise the threshold for disclosing political donations,20 after Senator Sam Dastyari stepped down because of financial engagements that raised concerns about Chinese influence.21 The espionage and foreign interference bill introduces new offences for spying, sabotage, and theft of trade secrets on behalf of a foreign government, while the foreign influence transparency scheme bill will create a register for individuals or entities undertaking activities on behalf of “foreign principals”.22 Including communications activities.

Both laws are useful though they have their limitations. Larissa Waters from the Australian Greens’ party argued that the Australian bill does not stop foreign companies from channelling donations through “Australian subsidiaries” and criticised the “exception allowing foreign residents of Australia to donate.”

Similarly, critics of the New Zealand law said that it might fail to respond to more roundabout means of pumping foreign money into New Zealand politics.

The Australian legislation has also been criticized for potentially covering political expression without presenting any proof of harm or illegitimate foreign interests.

Taiwan has been trying to tackle the problem of Chinese funding and coercion of politicians, parties, businesspeople, and other influential people, for a long time. For instance, Taiwan has the Classified National Security Information Protection Act in place to safeguard classified information and among others, penalise the sharing of such information with a “foreign hostile power.” Taiwan also passed an anti-infiltration law before its 2020 presidential elections. The law – among others - seek to prevent the injection of foreign funding into lobbying endeavours and election campaigns.

The means of funding and coercion, especially when they are covert, may be hard to pinpoint and trace. Hence, it is vital to study publicly available cases with particular attention to the vulnerabilities the foreign actors leverage and channels they use. The like-minded countries can learn from one another’s experiences by exchanging information and intelligence and with that have a better view of the tactics hostile actors may employ.

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2.5.2. Countering covert funding of NGOs

Some states implement legislation to govern both foreign and domestic NGOs operating within the country. China, for example, has introduced two laws to administer domestic social organisations and overseas NGOs, to regulate interactions between foreign NGOs and local organisations. The Charity Law introduced in September 2016 prevented improperly registered NGOs from engaging in fundraising from Chinese donors. The Foreign NGO Law which came into effect on 1 January 2017 compels foreign NGOs to register with the Ministry of Public Security or equivalent agencies on the provincial level prior to establishment of office in China. It also works to limit funding sources available for Chinese NGOs by preventing unregistered Chinese NGOs from seeking funding and collaboration from foreign NGOs.

2.5.3. Countering covert funding of educational institutions

Some states issue guidelines to identify possible cases of foreign interference or funding of educational institutions. For example, Australia’s University Foreign Interference Taskforce provides guidelines that help relevant departments and programmes to identify possible cases of interference including funding. Australian universities are encouraged to consider: (i) the minimum level of due diligence is applied to foreign investments and partnerships at all levels; (ii) providing appropriate internal reporting for funding sources; (iii) Ensuring that donations from international or domestic companies with strong foreign links place no undue influence on academic program and are appropriately disclosed including through the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme if required; and (iv) policies on international travel, staff appointments and engagements, bribery, foreign donations and gifts.

2.5.4. Countering covert funding of media

Covert funding of media efforts (as shown in the examples raised in the previous paper) has historically utilised mediums such as radio or print. However, the prevalent form of media consumption has shifted online towards social media and the internet. The popularity of websites, microblogs and social media platforms (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) creates potential for more covert funding opportunities.

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While many states have existing regulatory restrictions for foreign ownership of media entities, Defenders can tighten regulatory tools to limit potential covert funding, and media ownership restrictions for new forms of internet content providers. For example, the Broadcasting (Class Licence) Notification of Singapore requires internet content which propagate, promote or discuss political issues relating to Singapore to submit annual statutory declarations, including funding. Statutory declarations prevent against covert funding of media and mitigates foreign influence.

Defenders may want to create a public-access repository of media ownership, which would enable the public, journalists, and academics, to hold media entities or internet content providers to account. Increased public scrutiny can be beneficial to expose linkages between covertly funded entities or individuals. This can also strengthen media literacy of citizens, who can become more aware of where their media is coming from.

2.5.5. Building Resilience to Cyberattacks

The fundamental means of cyber deterrence are (i) deterrence through hardening-- making the cyberattack too difficult to execute, (ii) deterrence through punishment – imposing a cost on the attacker, and (iii) deterrence by resilience – mitigating or reducing the impact of the cyberattack. Deterrence by hardening has its limits, as few organisations can withstand a sustained assault by hackers who are state sponsored and well resourced. Deterrence by punishment also has limits, inter alia because of the difficulty of accurate attribution. Taking into account that eventually some cyberattacks will be successful in breaching defences, states are advised to build resilience, i.e., what should be done upon detection of a breach. This resilience is built through creating greater awareness before incidents occur, and developing comprehensive backup and response plans.

Estonia has a well-documented case of Russian political interference by major cyberattack, which aimed to disrupt Estonian society by focusing on media websites, online bank accounts, and email systems, followed by disinformation campaigns. From this experience, Estonian officials learned that resilience to cyberattacks require not only technical responses, but also political responses.

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France also showed resilience to disinformation campaigns and “hack and leak” operations conducted by hackers linked to Russian military intelligence during their 2017 presidential campaign. These were unsuccessful in swaying the French public, due in large part to French efforts to build awareness about information manipulation in both the government and among the public, strong central organisations put in place to counter disinformation, and a strategy to push counter-narratives to blunt the effects of disinformation, such as focusing public attention on the leakers rather than the leaks.33

2.5.6. Countering Hostile Information Campaigns

National institutions should enhance their capability to detect and disrupt information campaigns that target them. This could involve publicly exposing disinformation, designing relevant counter-messages for stakeholders, and planning strategies for delivering the counter-messages. National campaigns can educate the public be wary of messages that encourage social division or discord. Governments within the Asia Pacific region have increased media and digital literacy efforts to assist in countering foreign influence campaigns.34 Australia’s News and Media Research Centre (NMRC) has proposed that media literacy be the first line of defence against disinformation. Research from NMRC demonstrated that 76 per cent of social media news consumers recorded low/very low levels of literacy.35 To combat this, all school and university students will be instructed in information literacy, including providing them an understanding of algorithms and artificial intelligence.36 This initiative

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34 Singapore has placed high emphasis on media and digital literacy initiatives. These are seen as important anchors in the country’s strategies against deliberate online falsehoods and influence efforts. These initiatives target a variety of population segments, including students, young adults and senior citizens. The “Better Internet Campaign”, for instance, seeks to nurture students to become responsible and ethical users of the Internet. The National Library Board (NLB) of Singapore has a nationwide campaign which seeks to raise awareness of the dangers of fake news. The “Source. Understand. Research. Evaluate. (SURE)” programme attempts to train individuals to identify fake news. The programme was recently upgraded to comprise three main thrusts: “SURE for Life”, “SURE for Work” and “SURE for School” – ensuring a comprehensive messaging to reach out to Singaporeans from different walks of life.


36 An idea was proposed to fold in media and digital literacy efforts into civic education studies for Australian students, as students were more active online in activities such as political advocacy. This enables initiatives relevant for students, as current issues resonating with students are given a platform to be raised. Both political advocacy efforts and digital literacy initiatives can complement and reinforce the other.
is being conducted alongside Twitter.37 Ahead of the Australian Federal elections, “Stop and Consider”, a nationwide digital literacy campaign, was rolled out on April 2019, to increase awareness of the potential risks hostile information campaigns and disinformation pose to electoral integrity.38

Legislators in some countries have implemented legislative measures to tackle disinformation. Germany’s Network Enforcement Act (Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz or NetzDG) came into effect at the beginning of 2018, and is aimed primarily at online forms of hate speech inciting breaches of the public peace and public discourse, which might in some cases involve false information. It applies to social media network companies with more than two million registered users in the country. NetzDG requires these companies to implement procedures to review complaints regarding content about hosted hosting and remove anything that is illegal within 24 hours. Individuals may be fined up to €5m ($5.6m; £4.4m) and companies up to €50m for failing to comply with these requirements.39 Since its implementation, criticism of the law has largely rounded on its chilling effect on freedom of speech, and an observation was made that most of the takedowns in the period after the law coming into force mostly took place as a result of enforcement of the key online platforms’ community guidelines, and not so much as a result of NetzDG.40 There is no substantial evidence as yet to demonstrate the law’s effectiveness on online disinformation. In October 2018, France passed two anti-fake news laws to counter the spread of false information during election campaigns, in the wake of allegations of Russian meddling in the 2017 presidential elections. These laws enable a candidate or political party to obtain a court injunction preventing the dissemination of “false information” in the three months prior to a national election. They empower France’s broadcast authority to take any network that is “controlled by, or under the influence of a foreign power” off the air if it intentionally disseminates false information.41 The next presidential elections are in 2022, and these laws have yet to be tested. In December 2018, Taiwanese legislators proposed amendments to their Social Order Maintenance Act, to criminalise the publication of misinformation.

37 Ibid.
These chiefly involve increased fines for disseminating disinformation, and it is left to government agencies and the courts to decide if published information is false. In the case of Singapore, the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act, which came into effect in early October 2019, is discussed below.

**Citizens** can be educated to resist hostile information campaign efforts. Improving the psychological resilience in the citizens (and non-citizens) in a country is one of the strategies in the toolkit of policymakers to combat foreign interference. Risks posed by foreign influence and interference campaigns are not restricted to a single demographic. Ultimately, research must go into determining and understanding the behavioural characteristics and demographics of population segments. Tailored messaging and communication strategies for various demographics is crucial in crafting media and digital literacy. Short, informational videos on the importance of resilience against hostile information campaigns online can provide brief explainers on foreign influence and interference. **Social media users** can flag malicious accounts and content to social media companies. A state-supported Netizens-On-Watch (NOW) scheme that is similar to Singapore’s Riders-On-Watch (ROW) scheme could help. Positive online influencers who can amplify positive messages – relating to national cohesion and public peace – can help to neutralise negative messages. They can focus on (i) preventing disinformation from pulling in more people, (ii) pulling back people who were influenced by negative messages but can be persuaded, and (iii) encouraging healthier debates on social and political issues.

**Social media companies** should be encouraged or required by law to detect and remove postings and accounts containing harmful content promoting sedition, hate and public disorder. So far, the self-regulatory measures that social media companies have undertaken have been found to be inadequate. They are reluctant to remove malicious accounts or content do not violate their “community standards”, even if potentially threatening to national security. Several countries have passed legislation to enforce compliance, which

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43 For instance, Instagram has a high concentric usage amongst teenagers and young adults in Singapore, while youth usage of Facebook has declined and tapered over the years. Understanding and analysing context is also important as social media platforms usage differs across Asia Pacific countries.

we have noted above. Currently, the companies have their own guidelines to assess the content circulated on their platforms. For instance, Facebook takes an action against “coordinated inauthentic behaviour” on their platform. The term “coordinated inauthentic behaviour” is often used by Facebook and it is defined as “groups of pages or people work[ing] together to mislead others about what they are or what they are doing.” Accordingly, Facebook takedowns are not guided by the content of a post; they are practiced based on the identification of a “deceptive” behaviour in the platform. The company leverages people and technological solutions in tackling coordinated inauthentic behaviour. While experts “manually” search for and “take down the most sophisticated networks,” technological solutions help “automatically detect and remove the most common threats” such as “fake accounts.”

Facebook recently started “We Think Digital”, an Asia Pacific digital literacy initiative, with the aim of developing the skills individuals need to enjoy digital technology safely, skills such as critical thinking and empathy. Announced in March 2019, this initiative has Facebook collaborating with various local partners in countries from Singapore, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia and the Asia Pacific region. Resources are made available for local partner agencies to educate on critical thinking and digital literacy skills when using Facebook (e.g. educating teenagers and young adults in navigating Facebook safely and securely). Technical solutions are being developed to uncover and monitor the usage of bots (coordinated and inauthentic automated accounts) for coordinated disinformation online campaigns (called “astroturfing”). Such tactics could reduce the bots’ ability to exploit and manipulate public opinion. Technical platforms such as BotSlayer can be used during elections to identify, monitor and remove malicious accounts.

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46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
49 Facebook plans to extend this initiative globally, including countries such as Argentina.
50 “Facebook Youth Portal”, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/safety/youth
Observations in respect of tackling coordinated inauthentic behaviour: Having outlined various countermeasures in respect of the online front, it must be emphasised that identification of the perpetrators of deceptive behaviour in online spaces is a difficult task. Strategising coordinated inauthentic behaviour may involve the mobilisation of intermediaries, including cyber troops. Cyber troops are “government or political party actors tasked with manipulating public opinion online.” Cyber troops are hard to locate in an online environment where ideologically driven groups, “fringe movements,” “hacker collectives,” social media influencers and other such groups co-exist, and sometimes work concurrently towards a mutual cause. Domestic as well as external actors may leverage cyber troops in their online mission, and cyber troops may carry out various tactics including “micro-targeting,” “trolling,” managing “political bots,” and others. Here it should be noted that not all these tactics are unlawful. However, the tactic becomes questionable when it is deliberately, covertly and/or deceptively used to disrupt or sway politics, policies, and opinions.

53 Ibid, 9.
54 Ibid, 1.
55 For instance, a marketing company may use micro targeting when advertising a product to a defined audience group, or companies may use bots to provide rapid response to basic customer enquiries.
3. The role of legislation in countering foreign interference

Legislation is one of the important parts of countering foreign interference, and has to be integrated into a comprehensive approach which includes establishing a strategic task force, intelligence gathering, technology development (for prevention and detection), skills development for practitioners, identifying and cultivating key stakeholders and partners, building information sharing channels, public announcements, strategic use of communications and media, public education, building media literacy and critical thinking, supporting citizens, and building public resilience.

Some of the key areas that legislation can cover are

- Regulating foreign funding of politicians, political parties, NGOs, business groups, educational institutions, media, etc. – learning from the experiences of Australia and New Zealand above
- Regulating new media / social media platforms for content which would amount to foreign interference – learning from the experiences of Germany and France above
- Prohibiting the use of inauthentic online accounts (trolls) or automated online accounts (bots) for foreign interference
- Updating procedures for investigation into foreign interference activities

Any foreign interference legislation must be used carefully and strategically. Political parties all over the world have been accused of alleging foreign interference as an excuse to target their opponents; one example is the US Republican party's hostile response to investigations into Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential Elections. Allegations of foreign interference can also damage international relations and trade. Foreign interference laws should be used in cases which are clear and undeniable, and even then, they should be used in coordination with strategic communications to ensure that they do not cause the very division that they are aiming to prevent.

3.1 POFMA

Singapore passed the Protection From Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019 (hereafter “POFMA”) to “prevent the electronic communication in Singapore of false statements of fact, to suppress support for and counteract the effects of such communication, to safeguard against the use of online accounts for such
communication and for information manipulation, to enable measures to be taken to enhance transparency of online political advertisements, and for related matters."\(^{56}\)

Although POFMA is not a legal tool that was enacted to counter foreign interference, it can complement national efforts to address the threat when it comes through the online information space. At the second reading of the POFMA Bill in May 2019, it was cited that sources of online falsehoods include “foreign countries using information warfare.”\(^{57}\) A noteworthy example is how Russia had interfered in the US 2016 Presidential Election through online political advertisements and social media. Investigations by the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence uncovered that the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA) had reportedly spent “$100,000 over two years on advertisements” in addition to the “61,500 Facebook posts, 116,000 Instagram posts, and 10.4 million tweets” that were created for influence operations.\(^{58}\)

In January 2020, the Singapore government had invoked POFMA against the Malaysian NGO Lawyers for Liberty (LFL) after it made allegations about the capital punishment for drug trafficking in Singapore.\(^{59}\) This episode follows earlier attempts by Malaysia to persuade Singapore not to send convicted Malaysian drug traffickers to the gallows.\(^{60}\) Of note, LFL reportedly has links with Malaysian politicians and the People’s Justice Party (PKR).\(^{61}\) Although there is no information to suggest a foreign state’s campaign against Singapore’s use of capital punishment, these episodes do highlight attempts by ideologically dissimilar foreign elements to influence Singapore’s crime-fighting and legal policies.


4. Conclusion

In sum, mounting a response against the threat of foreign interference should be a combination of focusing on the strategic factors outlined above, and the design and implementation of practical and active countermeasures. The focus is necessary as the threat will persist as long as divergent foreign policies exist and as long as the domestic policies of one state have external effects on the interests of another state.

Singapore must play a long game against foreign states that rely on foreign interference as an instrument of political warfare. The manner of application of these countermeasures must be fair and necessary both in terms of process and perception, without perpetuating the image of an Orwellian state. Singapore must not appear to be taking sides in geopolitical rivalries or using foreign interference as a pretext to clamp down on local political discourse and responsible activism. Ultimately, Singapore’s survival depends on both its foreign policy’s principle of neutrality and reputation of openness to global trade, talent, investments and ideas.
About the Authors

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About the Centre of Excellence for National Security

The Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) is a research unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

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