CONTESTING VISIONS OF REGIONAL ORDER IN EAST ASIA

Event Report
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CONTESTING VISIONS OF REGIONAL ORDER IN EAST ASIA
Editors:
Bhubhindar Singh, Sarah Teo

Rapporteurs:
Alexandra Burton, Shawn Ho, Sarah Teo, Henrick Z. Tsjeng

This is a report of a roundtable organised by the Regional Security Architecture Programme, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

It summarises the proceedings of the roundtable as interpreted by the assigned rapporteurs. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this report.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The East Asian order is in a period of transition. The current key strands of the regional order include: (i) the US-led hub-and-spoke system of bilateral alliances; (ii) the rise of a Chinese-led order comprising the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative; (iii) the multilateral architecture centred on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); and (iv) emerging minilateral mechanisms to address specific regional challenges. Points of both divergence and convergence exist across these elements.

Regional stakeholders have a common interest in maintaining peace and stability in East Asia, but differ on the extent to which the current order needs to be changed to achieve that goal. Much about the approaches of the US and China towards the East Asian regional order, as well as their attitudes towards the other’s role in the region, remains uncertain. While there are clear differences between the American and Chinese visions of the regional order, it is uncertain if these differences will lead to an actual conflict.

The US remains the preponderant power in the region by far, and has a vested interest in the continuation of a strong hub-and-spoke system. The Trump administration’s perceived turn away from multilateralism, however, has raised concerns about their country’s commitment to existing regional institutions. Meanwhile, China appears to be aiming for a bigger voice in the region with the establishment of its own institutions and strategic partnerships. Nevertheless, the extent to which China wants a complete overhaul of the existing regional order and its institutions is debatable.

To manage the effects of major power competition in the East Asian order, regional and middle powers have adopted a flexible approach in their regional strategies and enhanced interstate relations among themselves. These efforts include strengthening cooperation through ASEAN-led platforms and initiating minilateral mechanisms with like-minded states. Nevertheless, for traditional US allies such as Japan and Australia, their respective bilateral alliances remain a priority and they are likely to work towards ensuring the US stays committed and present in East Asia.

ASEAN is facing challenges to its centrality and unity, and the 10-member association risks having to choose between the US and China. Given the Sino-US competition for regional influence and leadership, it is critical for ASEAN and its member states to think of alternative ways to deal with the changing strategic landscape. These could include the “ASEAN minus X”
model, or diversifying the economies of ASEAN countries to decrease their reliance on a single major power. Such strategies might help to maintain ASEAN’s centrality in the multilateral architecture, and allow it to preserve its own norms and mechanisms in the region vis-à-vis the major powers.

WELCOME REMARKS

Professor Joseph Liow, Dean and Professor of Comparative and International Politics at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, welcomed participants to the roundtable, and highlighted three crucial issues surrounding the regional order. First, there is a need for more analytical precision in the notion of order. While the maintenance of order is often viewed as important, it is less clear what comprises such an order. Elements that shape an order could include institutions, ideas, and power. Second, threats and disruptions to the existing order are emerging. While the US has assumed the leadership role in East Asia over the last few decades, China has increasingly expressed interest in sharing some of that leadership. To cope with the evolving realities, other regional powers are adjusting their own postures. This includes efforts by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to maintain its centrality amid the new dynamics. Third, the rise of anti-globalisation movements and non-state actors that challenge the status quo suggest that the current order might not be as widely accepted as presumed. Thus, there is a need to take into account the domestic forces at play within East Asian countries. The regional order shapes and reshapes itself against the backdrop of changing geopolitical forces. Given the scale and frequency of changes occurring today, the need for a conversation on the evolution of the regional order is more urgent than ever.
SESSION 1:
US AND CHINESE VISIONS OF EAST ASIAN POLITICAL-SECURITY ORDER

Professor Khong Yuen Foong, Li Ka Shing Professor of Political Science, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, posited that the US still views itself as the hegemon of East Asia (despite any contrary signals from the Trump administration), and is focused on preventing China from achieving dominance in the region. China, on the other hand, believes that it deserves a role in shaping the regional order and would like to be treated as an equal. There are four reasons why the US is unwilling to accept this Chinese vision. First, despite huge growth, China’s military and economic power still lags far behind that of the US. Second, US hegemony in East Asia is undergirded by several formal alliances and partnerships with smaller states, many of whom fear the consequences of US abandonment and wish to avoid this. Third, China’s activities in the South and East China Seas suggest that it would not necessarily be a responsible regional hegemon. Fourth, China’s non-democratic domestic politics continue to discourage the US from accepting it as an equal power. Nonetheless, even as the US continues to deny China the equality it seeks, the latter has already set in motion several processes which could eventually lead to an alternative China-led order in East Asia. These include the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It remains to be seen if the geopolitical tensions between the US and China will result in a militarised hegemonic transition conflict.

Dr Feng Zhang, Fellow (Senior Lecturer), Department of International Relations, Australian National University, commented that the US global vision is often characterised as a “liberal international order,” while China’s vision has been described by President Xi Jinping as a “community
of a shared future.” There are two components of the US vision which China has difficulty with. First, the former’s attempt to install liberal values, such as democracy and human rights, around the world is viewed by China as an attempt to encircle it with liberal democracies and therefore constrain it. Second, China does not welcome the US system of bilateral security alliances. Nevertheless, while Beijing would like to see this system weakened, it has not been so bold as to call for this openly. Instead, China has been engaged in promoting its own system of strategic partnerships in East Asia and sees this as part of a long-term strategy of alleviating strategic pressure from the US. Over time, the Chinese network of strategic partnerships could possibly present a viable alternative to the current security approach in the region. China’s goal is not to create a complementary order to the US-led extant order, but to create an alternative one for the region. Nonetheless, while their visions of the regional political-security order do clash conceptually, it remains unclear if the two states will in reality clash on the ground.

Discussion

Participants expressed interest in the US and Chinese views of the global order, highlighting the possibility of differing opinions on the issue within the respective governments. It was suggested that policymakers in the US might no longer hold a unified long-term vision of a “liberal international order.” Regarding China, participants questioned if there was any reasonable way to distinguish President Xi’s personal view from that of wider perceptions within the Chinese government, and consequently if the current Chinese vision will outlast President Xi’s tenure. Participants further observed that beyond the issue of China’s rise, the US faces other domestic constraints in sustaining its leadership role in the current international order — such as its declining willingness to act as the global peacekeeper — and therefore reducing its credibility around the world.

Participants also looked at the roles of other regional powers such as Japan, India, and Russia, and suggested that they will continue to pose a challenge to China’s rise given their differing perceptions of regional order and strategic approaches. Given that Southeast Asia will likely be the political battleground on which the US and China fight for dominance, regional multilateralism remains integral in preventing a potential hegemonic transition conflict between the two major powers. In this regard, developments in the South China Sea disputes as well as the BRI might determine how both countries react to one another in the short term. Some participants pointed out that China has been extremely careful not to alarm Southeast Asian countries by explicitly excluding the US from the region, and so thus far has been broadly
Professor Takashi Terada, Department of Political Science, Doshisha University, said that China and the US engage in power struggles primarily to build institutions through which they can create their preferred version of the regional order. The key recent examples of these institutions are the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), as well as the AIIB and BRI. The TPP reflects more palpably on liberal interests and values that serve to draw attention to the problems related to China’s state capitalism. However, since President Donald Trump took office, his policies have resulted in an “economic power vacuum” given his lack of interest in multilateralism. The US also does not participate in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) because it suffers from a “lowest common denominator problem” — its speed and level of liberalisation is not that high since it is based on the standard that China, India, and ASEAN’s developing countries generally prefer. Regarding China and its efforts to build its own institutions, the strategic intent of some of these efforts is to link development to defence and security. As for the AIIB, China promotes it as a “clean, lean, and green” multilateral bank with the highest international lending standards — the AIIB was given a “+AAA” rating in July 2017. However, one problem with the AIIB is that it has a relatively small workforce of about 150 officers. This limits the range of issues it can handle due to lack of certain expertise.

Professor Tu Xinquan, Dean of the China Institute for WTO Studies, University of International Business and Economics, said that China has benefitted greatly from the current economic order (especially from its World Trade Organization accession) and has always chosen to support accepting of the current institutional architecture. However, President Xi’s speech in 2014, in which he called for a new Asian-centric security concept, indicates that China intends to establish a regional security architecture that diverges from the norms of the US-led order.
Asian community that excludes it. Therefore, the best way to conceptualise the regional order is to use the term “Asia Pacific” to include the US. In recent years, China has been rethinking its East Asian regional integration strategy to make it more pragmatic. Seeing itself not only as a regional power but also as a global actor, China will try to provide more global public goods which will create more options for other countries to choose from. The BRI and AIIB are not replacements for US institutions. They are not in opposition to the existing US-led regional economic architecture; rather, they reflect a global partnership which offers an alternative to the present system. In fact, even though its details have not been fully disclosed or understood, the BRI has been envisaged to enhance multilateral mechanisms.

Discussion

The discussion revolved mainly around China-led institutions and whether they should operate more in accordance with the norms of other rules-based institutions. Some countries in the region hope that China can be more transparent with its intentions for the BRI. One participant, however, suggested that China’s attempt to shape the regional order is perhaps not meant to check the US, but to drive domestic development growth in the region by creating a more stable external environment. There was also a comment that China had never intended for the AIIB to grow as big as it currently is. In addition, many of the staff currently working at the AIIB have worked previously for the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. From China’s perspective, other countries must seek to understand that Beijing works on a different set of traditions and customs, and it is not so keen to establish a rules-based order or a binding set of rules. For instance, the BRI has no legal documents. Rather, it is based on the mutual willingness of countries to participate in it. It is therefore uncertain if China is willing to adopt a systematic and legally binding approach to its institutions.
Aside from a discussion about rules-based institutions, another major topic that arose was whether the US will remain engaged in Southeast Asia and what impact this will have on the regional economic order. One successful aspect of the US pivot under former President Barack Obama was the work done in the Lower Mekong and its engagement in Myanmar. Given that the US approach to the region is different from China’s — the former focuses more on soft infrastructure like health and education, which is different from the AIIB — coupled with the fact that President Trump has not talked about ASEAN, Southeast Asia, or the Mekong region thus far, it will be interesting to see what he says about Southeast Asia when he visits in November 2017.

SESSION 3:
REGIONAL/MIDDLE POWER VISIONS OF AND ROLES IN REGIONAL ORDER

Mr Hideshi Tokuchi, Senior Fellow, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), highlighted that traditional security challenges are intertwined intricately with non-traditional security issues in East Asia, meaning that the complex dynamics of the Sino-US relationship is more than just geopolitics. The post-World War II order has been underpinned by the hub-and-spoke system of US bilateral alliances. This system serves as an instrument for maintaining the balance of power. It has also been weaved into a web of security networks connecting the respective spokes, and provides the necessary infrastructure for multilateral cooperation. The US-Japan alliance remains at the core of the hub-and-spoke system for three reasons. First, both countries share common interests in key security issues surrounding the region, such as China’s rise and the threat posed by North Korea. Second, Japan is among the few regional countries with the ability to provide a stable base for US troops. Third, both Japan and the US are maritime democracies, indicating a convergence of objectives in the regional maritime domain. Japan remains extremely committed to its alliance with the US, and aims to strengthen the bilateral relationship by enhancing communication and cultivating mutual understanding. Tokyo should also assume greater roles for regional and
global security, not only through the alliance, but also through practical cooperation with other regional countries and ASEAN.

Dr Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Senior Fellow and Head, Nuclear & Space Policy Initiative, Observer Research Foundation, underscored that India’s preferred version of the regional order is one that is rules-based and not dominated by any single Asian power. In the current context, New Delhi is concerned about the increasing likelihood that US inattentiveness and China’s rising power would necessitate some kind of regional balancing effort against Beijing. This would mean enhancing cooperation with like-minded states through minilateral mechanisms, although it is unclear if such efforts will be effective in balancing China. India remains committed to maintaining US presence in the region, including bearing a greater share of the military burden. Nevertheless, India itself faces several challenges in its attempt to take on more responsibilities in regional security, especially vis-à-vis China. First, India’s economic growth remains far too low for it to catch up with China. The foreseeable lack of economic capacity suggests that India’s ability to balance China is limited. Second, while India currently does not possess missiles with sufficient range to target all of China, it is in the midst of developing longer-range missiles. The fact that these new capabilities are going to be perceived as directed at China is likely to further complicate bilateral ties. Third, India’s conventional military capabilities face serious deficiencies in terms of capacity gaps and modernisation, constraining its power relative to China.

Dr Andrew Carr, Senior Lecturer, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, suggested that Australia is moving towards a reactive role in the regional order, and added that the country is best seen as a stability-oriented power. This means that Canberra has consistently welcomed the rise of Asia and China — even though this could change the regional order.
and undermine US primacy in the region. The key question for Australia is what types of change in the regional order it should support, within the context of an emerging bipolarity in East Asia. Australia currently employs a two-track foreign policy approach. The first track involves continual efforts to strengthen and expand the US-Australia alliance. This is not merely a response towards recent strategic uncertainty, but more accurately reflects a long-time trend of deep institutionalisation and interoperability between both states. The second track involves Australia joining undirected and loosely coordinated groupings with other middle and smaller powers, to mitigate the risks and capitalise on the opportunities of a changing strategic order. This has primarily led to strengthened ties with Japan, as well as with ASEAN. On many issues, the two tracks are expected to converge. However, should these tracks start to conflict, Australia would likely prioritise its alliance with the US over the emerging cooperation with other middle and smaller powers in the region.

Discussion

The topic of Japan’s role in the region was raised by many participants. Generally, Japan is seen as an alternative regional leader that should step up in place of a distracted US. In this regard, it was questioned if Japan’s emphasis and firm reliance on its US alliance was too static given the new dynamics in the region arising from the Trump administration and China’s rise. However, Japan’s regional policy faces challenges, particularly in the form of domestic and economic constraints. Some participants also noted that because of the power differential between the US and regional countries, there is little option other than to ensure that the former remains committed to the peace and stability of East Asia. For example, US deterrence appears to be the only viable way to address the security threat posed by North Korea. Multilateral and bilateral cooperation involving the US also contribute towards regional efforts in, for instance, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Nevertheless, it is important for the regional order to be inclusive and open, bringing in as many countries and actors as possible. Some participants highlighted that regional countries should be prudent in their bilateral ties and multilateral cooperation, and be careful not to promote one set of relations at the expense of antagonising another. Assurance is crucial. In the spirit of openness, ASEAN is also hoping for China, Japan, and South Korea to develop a Northeast Asian sub-regional architecture to manage their challenges. While there was a general sense of pessimism about the abilities of middle and smaller powers to shape the regional order, it was also noted that many past regional initiatives and ideas — including trade liberalisation
and democracy — have been led by these states. In this regard, non-major powers still have roles to play in the East Asian order. To fulfil those roles, it would be important for regional countries to consolidate, first within their respective domestic spheres, their approaches and strategies towards the changing regional dynamics.

SESSION 4:
ASEAN’S VISIONS OF AND ROLES IN REGIONAL ORDER

Dr Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Associate Professor, Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University, noted that China has caused divisions in ASEAN, and has generated a lot of momentum in Southeast Asia to its own advantage. In addition to building and weaponising islands in the South China Sea, China’s veto power over ASEAN has also been reflected in its strong ties with Cambodia. These divisions are geographical rather than ideological, and may eventually erode ASEAN centrality and unity. China has established its own institutions, including the AIIB and BRI, which has gained the favour of many ASEAN countries. For example, China is Thailand’s number one source of tourism, trade, and investment. Dr Pongsudhirak underscored that the US pivot has been a disappointment despite starting off well. While President Trump has neither a strategy nor vision for the region, he has actually been more effective than former President Obama since many leaders of ASEAN countries are now keen to engage the US. There are three modalities for middle powers in this situation. The first is China-led. The second is a G2 arrangement with the US and China sharing power, but the former’s security establishment is unlikely to support such an arrangement. The third is a US-led system with the hub-and-spoke alliances reinforced by strategic partnerships. An optimal order, however, would be led by middle powers. The way forward is for ASEAN to balance the major powers and keep them at bay.

Professor Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Distinguished Visiting Professor, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, highlighted that history and internal dynamics, rather than external
structures, affect Indonesia’s foreign policy discourse. Indonesia has from the beginning declared a free and active foreign policy to prevent being subsumed by the bipolar structure of the Cold War, and prefers not to choose sides. Indonesia holds ambiguous attitudes towards China and the US, with no strong reactions towards either when internal power struggles within Indonesia play out. The main characteristics of Indonesia’s vision for the Southeast Asian regional order are, first, its opposition to the presence of foreign military bases and direct roles for external military forces in Southeast Asia. Second, Indonesia emphasises strategic autonomy for regional states based on national and regional resilience. Third, Indonesia stresses norm building rather than relying on external security guarantees. Prof Anwar emphasised that, unlike during the Cold War, Indonesia no longer has to choose sides. Indonesia also regards the Sino-US rivalry as positive because China exports money and technology to the region rather than ideology, and Indonesia can engage both China and the US without ideological conflict. Moving forward, increased regionalism is likely, and the region would prefer to see a multi-layered and functional regional order with ASEAN as the hub. This vision is not one of balance, but a “dynamic equilibrium” that is much more cooperative. Unity will continue to be crucial for ASEAN centrality, which involves strengthening the ASEAN community so that it can continue to engage the major powers.

Dr Tran Viet Thai, Deputy Director-General, Institute for Strategic Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, explained that the transformation of the strategic landscape — from Vietnam’s point of view — would involve a number of things. First, there must be changes in the balance of power due to the rapid and unevenly changing levels of national power in the region. Second, there is competition for influence and leadership among the major powers. China and the US are not only competing in traditional domains, but also in areas like maritime and cyberspace. There is room for middle powers to
help ASEAN countries build capacity in these areas so that they can fit in this new context. Third, regional mechanisms are being challenged, with new rules being added and current ones being rewritten by China. In this context, ASEAN has to uphold its own rules and mechanisms and maintain an ASEAN-centric architecture in the region. Fourth, ASEAN needs bolder reforms on issues such as the consensus principle to maintain its centrality and collective bargaining power. Vietnam’s role would include a larger regional presence, its promotion of rule of law and inclusive regionalism, capacity building, as well as engagement with different actors to conduct dialogue and build trust. Vietnam would also be a responsible member of ASEAN and support its mechanisms. Vietnam shares with other ASEAN countries common interests in peace and stability, and the maintenance of the ASEAN-centric architecture, but lacks the capacities to match its aspirations. Vietnam remains willing to cooperate with external and internal actors and maintain dynamic balancing among the major powers.

Discussion

The discussion focused on what ASEAN can do to deal with the changing strategic landscape. There were disagreements over the feasibility of alternative arrangements, such as “ASEAN minus X,” or majority voting in place of consensus. These are considered antithetical to the ASEAN way, and may divide ASEAN and cause some countries to become disengaged from the organisation. ASEAN also needs to maintain the rules of the game for external countries to respect the association as the region’s host. It was highlighted that ASEAN states have diversified their economies by relying less on China, including promoting intra-ASEAN investment and seeking investment from other countries. At the same time, there is a need to further promote the importance of ASEAN to people in Southeast Asia.

There was debate as to whether China now has the upper hand in the region. One participant agreed, saying that China has already inserted its own narrative in Southeast Asia. Others said that China has the upper hand only on certain fronts, even if its influence has been increasing. For example, in the Philippines, the perception that President Rodrigo Duterte is leaning towards China is putting his domestic position at risk. At the same time, China’s initiatives do not have buy-in from all ASEAN countries yet, such as Vietnam. China was also seen to have acquired limited advantage when it attempted to silence other countries over the arbitral tribunal ruling, and is only suppressing the force of the ruling for the moment. China is also unable to behave in too assertive a manner or exert excessive influence over ASEAN states as it would result in blowback in the domestic politics of these countries and push them away from Beijing. That said, ASEAN states would
not want to distance themselves too much from China as they will miss opportunities that China has to offer. In fact, ASEAN countries would prefer to live harmoniously with a successful China that shoulders its great power obligations responsibly.
Roundtable Programme

Tuesday, 10 October 2017

1900 – 2100 hrs Welcome Dinner
(By invite only)

Wednesday, 11 October 2017

0815 – 0850 hrs Registration

0850 – 0900 hrs Welcome Remarks
Professor Joseph Liow
Professor of Comparative and International Politics; and
Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)


(i) How do the US and China envision the East Asian political-security order?
(ii) What are the points of convergence and divergence in their respective visions?

Moderator/Discussant

Dr Bhubhindar Singh
Associate Professor and Coordinator of the Regional Security Architecture Programme, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), RSIS

Speakers

Professor Khong Yuen Foong
Li Ka Shing Professor of Political Science, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore
Dr Feng Zhang  
Fellow (Senior Lecturer), Department of International Relations, Australian National University

1030 – 1045 hrs  Coffee Break

1045 – 1215 hrs  Session 2: US and Chinese Visions of East Asian Economic Order

(i) How do the US and China envision the East Asian economic order?
(ii) What are the points of convergence and divergence in their respective visions?
(iii) Are the initiatives proposed by China (AIIB, BRI) a “disruption” to the extant US-led regional economic architecture?

Moderator/Discussant

Dr Kaewkamol (Karen) Pitakdumrongkit  
Assistant Professor and Deputy Head, Centre for Multilateralism Studies, RSIS

Speakers

Professor Takashi Terada  
Professor, Department of Political Science, Doshisha University

Professor Tu Xinquan  
Dean and Professor, China Institute for WTO Studies, University of International Business and Economics

1215 – 1345 hrs  Lunch

1345 – 1515 hrs  Session 3: Regional/Middle Power Visions of and Roles in Regional Order

(i) What are regional/middle powers’ visions of the East Asian order in light of the Sino-US competition for influence and leadership in the region?
(ii) What roles do and could regional/middle powers play in the evolving regional order?
(iii) What are the prospects of issue-based minilaterals that are led by middle powers, emerging and becoming more permanent features of the East Asian regional landscape?

Moderator/Discussant

Professor Tan See Seng
Professor of International Relations, Deputy Director and Head of Research, IDSS, RSIS

Speakers

Mr Hideshi Tokuchi
Senior Fellow, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Japan

Dr Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
Senior Fellow and Head, Nuclear & Space Policy Initiative, Observer Research Foundation

Dr Andrew Carr
Senior Lecturer, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University

1515 – 1530 hrs Coffee Break

1530 – 1700 hrs Session 4: ASEAN’s Visions of and Roles in Regional Order

(i) What are ASEAN’s visions of the East Asian order in light of the Sino-US competition for influence and leadership in the region?
(ii) What roles do and could ASEAN and its member states play in the evolving regional order?

Moderator/Discussant

Dr Mely Caballero-Anthony
Associate Professor and Head of the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, RSIS
Speakers

Dr Thitinan Pongsudhirak  
*Associate Professor, Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University*

Professor Dewi Fortuna Anwar  
*Distinguished Visiting Professor, RSIS*

Dr Tran Viet Thai  
*Deputy Director-General, Institute for Strategic Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam*

1700 – 1705 hrs **Closing Remarks**

Dr Bhubhindar Singh  
*Associate Professor and Coordinator of the Regional Security Architecture Programme, IDSS, RSIS*

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SPEAKERS AND DISCUSSANTS

Professor Dewi Fortuna Anwar
_Distinguished Visiting Professor, RSIS_

Dr Mely Caballero-Anthony
_Associate Professor and Head of the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, RSIS_

Dr Andrew Carr
_Senior Lecturer, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University_

Professor Khong Yuen Foong
_Li Ka Shing Professor of Political Science, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore_

Professor Joseph Liow
_Professor of Comparative and International Politics; and Dean, RSIS_

Dr Kaewkamol (Karen) Pitakdumrongkit
_Assistant Professor and Deputy Head, Centre for Multilateralism Studies, RSIS_

Dr Thitinan Pongsudhirak
_Associate Professor, Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University_

Dr Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
_Senior Fellow and Head, Nuclear & Space Policy Initiative, Observer Research Foundation_

Dr Bhubhindar Singh
_Associate Professor and Coordinator of the Regional Security Architecture Programme, IDSS, RSIS_

Professor Tan See Seng
_Professor of International Relations, Deputy Director and Head of Research, IDSS, RSIS_

Professor Takashi Terada
_Professor, Department of Political Science, Doshisha University_
Dr Tran Viet Thai
Deputy Director-General, Institute for Strategic Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam

Mr Hideshi Tokuchi
Senior Fellow, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Japan

Professor Tu Xinquan
Dean and Professor, China Institute for WTO Studies, University of International Business and Economics

Dr Feng Zhang
Fellow (Senior Lecturer), Department of International Relations, Australian National University
PARTICIPANTS

Ms Alexandra Burton
Student Research Assistant, Regional Security Architecture Programme, IDSS, RSIS

Ms Jane Chan
Research Fellow and Coordinator of the Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS

Dr Chong Ja Ian
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences, National University of Singapore

Dr Daniel Chua
Assistant Professor, Military Studies Programme, IDSS, RSIS and Deputy Head of Graduate Studies, RSIS

Mr Benjamin Ho
Associate Research Fellow, China Programme, IDSS, RSIS

Mr Shawn Ho
Associate Research Fellow, Regional Security Architecture Programme, IDSS, RSIS

Dr Hoo Tiang Boon
Assistant Professor, China Programme, IDSS, RSIS

Dr Kei Koga
Assistant Professor, Public Policy and Global Affairs Programme, School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University

Mr Leong Wai Peng
Senior Policy Officer, Defence Policy Office, Ministry of Defence, Singapore

Dr Lye Yue
Assistant Professor, China Institute for WTO Studies, University of International Business and Economics

Mr Navjeev Singh
Desk Officer, ASEAN Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore
Dr Tang Siew Mun  
*Head of the ASEAN Studies Centre and Senior Fellow, Regional Strategic and Political Studies Programme, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute*

Ms Sarah Teo  
*Associate Research Fellow, Regional Security Architecture Programme, IDSS, RSIS*

Mr Henrick Z. Tsjeng  
*Associate Research Fellow, Regional Security Architecture Programme, IDSS, RSIS*

Mr Kamal Vaswani  
*Visiting Senior Fellow, RSIS*

Dr Wu Fengshi  
*Associate Professor, China Programme, IDSS, RSIS*

Ms Yeo Seow Peng  
*Director (Defence Policy), Defence Policy Office, Ministry of Defence, Singapore*

Ms Zhang Junyu  
*Desk Officer, ASEAN Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore*
About the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies

The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) is a key research component of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). It focuses on defence and security research to serve national needs. IDSS faculty and research staff conducts both academic and policy-oriented research on security-related issues and developments affecting Southeast Asia and the Asia Pacific. IDSS is divided into three research clusters: (i) The Asia Pacific cluster – comprising the China, South Asia, United States, and Regional Security Architecture programmes; (ii) The Malay Archipelago cluster — comprising the Indonesia and Malaysia programmes; and (iii) The Military and Security cluster — comprising the Military Transformations, Maritime Security, and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) programmes. Finally, the Military Studies Programme, the wing that provides military education, is also a part of IDSS.

For more information, please visit www.rsis.edu.sg/research/idss.

About the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

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