



# THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE MARITIME SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

Event Report  
8 March 2017

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SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE INDO-PACIFIC**

**8 March 2017  
Holiday Inn, Singapore**

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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This workshop discussed the trajectory of the future maritime environment in the Indo-Pacific. It flagged key strategic dynamics within the region, including the escalating rivalry between China and the United States, differing visions of the emerging regional order, the role of middle powers (such as Japan and India) on regional stability, and the issue of building strategic trust among all players within the region. The general attitude of the participants on the future maritime security environment was cautious optimism, anticipating progress on certain fronts and envisioning strategic deadlock in others.

The workshop also assessed key issues that are expected to influence the future maritime environment, including China's One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, technological developments, the ability of regional organisations to manage challenges in the maritime domain, and marine environmental threats. Concerns were expressed with regard to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its related forums, on becoming increasingly irrelevant in regional affairs, for diffusing great power strategic rivalry or managing maritime incidents. At the same time, reasons for optimism were highlighted, including the complex web of regional order sustained through bilateral and multilateral arrangements, significant milestones reached by ASEAN, including the ASEAN Economic Community and progress on the Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea.

A number of key recommendations were made in the interests of future maritime security and stability in the region. These include the need to invest more in defence diplomacy, especially through the ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus; and to draw up guidelines for cooperation under the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF), which takes the form of an all-encompassing agreement that helps manage and prevent all categories of maritime incidents, involving all types of vessels and aircraft, whether military or civilian.

## INTRODUCTION

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The aim of the workshop was to assess the future maritime environment in Asia, including the implications of recent developments in the region, and to think about ways and means of overcoming current levels of uncertainty and distrust. While most participants of the last workshop held in 2015 were optimistic about the future maritime environment in the region, reservations and uncertainties were also apparent. If anything, the uncertainties have increased over the past year, especially with the recent Presidential election in the United States, and the ruling from the arbitration tribunal in The Hague on the case between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea.

The geographical scope of the workshop's considerations was East Asia, the Western Pacific, South Asia and Northern Indian Ocean, or what is now often referred to as the Indo-Pacific, but omitting the Eastern Pacific and Gulf sub-regions.

## SESSION 1: STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

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The first session of the workshop addressed the perceptions, expectations, and strategies of major regional stakeholders, with speakers providing views from the United States (U.S.), China, India, Japan, and Southeast Asia.

Key questions for the session were: How are these stakeholders seeking to promote their long-term interests amid uncertainties over the future of the regional strategic environment? What are the factors that may prevent the achievement of these interests?

The event that is expected to herald a sea change in the regional security dynamics is the recent presidency of Trump and his “America First” slogan. In assessing the likely implications of changes in his foreign policy with this transition of power on the Indo-Pacific, the institutional challenge within the U.S. was highlighted, i.e., how Congress and the judiciary react to developments within the executive branch. The key pillars of Trump’s foreign policy were identified as economic nationalism; extreme homeland security; amoral transactionalism—where the U.S. feels that it has been short-changed for promoting a liberal order at the expense of its own wellbeing; and the resulting reduced concern for human rights and promotion of democracy. The key threat perceptions that are driving the policymaking agenda were identified as unfair trade deals; radical Islamist terrorism (from the Middle East); and immigration.

The potential policy implications of such a foreign policy were identified as a move towards isolationism or at least bilateralism; trade protectionism and currency wars; increased military spending; and adverse implications for commitment to climate change mitigation. The U.S. is unlikely to increase its engagement in Asia without a big demand signal from the region. Nevertheless, it is likely to maintain its military forces in the region and maintain bilateral alliances, including in its approach to maritime security in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S.’ policy towards China seems to assume a different, more aggressive rhetoric under the current administration. The maritime element of this bilateral relationship will be in the forefront. Much of any strategic competition between the two is likely to be played out at sea.

Meanwhile, the challenge for China remains that of ensuring safe access to sea lanes in the region, while addressing the tensions in the South China Sea. It is in the interests of China to do so, as it is a major trading power. From China’s perspective, the leading sources of insecurity in the region are

its looming strategic rivalry with the U.S. and unsettled maritime disputes. The real challenge, therefore, is for the navies of the two countries to ensure operational stability, so as to prevent incidents between warships. Moreover, as China's warship capabilities expand, there may emerge a new missile gap crisis which can have alarming political and psychological ramifications. However, the likelihood of China establishing an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea was assessed as low.

There remains, however, potential for cooperation in the region. For instance, in the case of the Philippines versus China, there is scope for diplomatic resolution following the new course of action adopted by President Duterte, despite the deadlock over the arbitral ruling. Meanwhile, China and ASEAN states are also making progress on the COC.

Similarly, while the Trump administration caused initial concern in Beijing over the 'One China' policy, it was argued that relations between China and the U.S. can be recalibrated, if both countries become more ready to be transactional, and rebuild consensus on how the South China Sea issue can be less militarised. The two powers need to accommodate their changing positions in the world. Stability would be enhanced by continued and frequent cooperation between their maritime forces. Given the cultural, operational, and technological gaps that remain between their military capabilities, the continuation of such cooperation will result in a stable relationship.

Among the middle powers in the region, India's role was viewed to be on a positive trajectory. India acknowledges that it is not an actor in the South China Sea. Its main foreign policy goal is economic growth, for which it needs a safe external environment. It therefore eschews alliances and involvement in external conflicts to retain the flexibility to engage all powers in the region. India has exhibited keenness in integration and dispute resolution with smaller neighbouring states, both bilaterally and multilaterally, in the interest of larger peace within the region. The main strategic concerns for India are the China-Pakistan alliance—with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) going through disputed territory which India claims as its own; and the increasing People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) activism in the Indian Ocean. However, it was also highlighted that this outlook is subject to changing external developments, as evidenced by the complete turnaround in its relations with the U.S. over the past decades.

India's responses to the region's strategic uncertainties involved strengthening its internal capabilities (through military modernisation and port infrastructure development); with emphasis on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) within

the Indian Ocean; and investment in capacity building across the Indo-Pacific, primarily at the bilateral level. While there appears to be an increasing convergence of interests with the U.S., India has also exhibited greater willingness to engage with Japan, Australia, and Indonesia. While such actions reflect attempts to adapt to the eventual possibility of the U.S. pulling out of the region, it may ironically work in the interests of the U.S., which has been advocating for regional states to step up their defence commitments towards ensuring regional security.

Meanwhile, several participants highlighted the increasing activism of Japan as an issue of concern. They argued that if the U.S. focused its Asia policy primarily on Northeast Asia and provided a security umbrella facilitating Japan's rearmament, the resulting implications would be highly destabilising for the region. For instance, joint Japan-U.S. patrols in the South China Sea would be provocative. They argued that two major powers crowding into the South China Sea would fuel Chinese nationalism and bring regional power dynamics into disarray. The idiom 'one mountain cannot contain two tigers' was quoted.

From the Japanese perspective, the South China Sea lanes are of immense economic and strategic importance. The estimated economic losses for the Japanese economy by oil and LNG tankers from the Middle East to East Asia being unable to transit into the South China Sea on account of severe international dispute was deliberated. Two possible options to reroute were identified: through the Malacca/ Singapore Strait to the Lombok and Makassar Strait, to navigate along the eastern coasts of Philippines northward to Japan; or around the south coast of Australia, thereafter proceeding northward to Japan. The impact on the Japanese economy in the first scenario was estimated to be US\$300 million per year, and in the second scenario around US\$1.2 billion per year. The adverse impact such an eventuality would have on global world prices and the global economy were also highlighted. Conversely, it was deliberated that if the U.S. and other countries were to gain control of the Straits of Malacca, thereby preventing ships bound for China from transiting into the South China Sea, the economic damage to China would be much more severe. It was predicted that China would respond by strengthening anti-access capabilities in the sea area between the 1st and 2nd Island Chains, while simultaneously attempting to obtain sea control in the Bay of Bengal, in order to overcome the 'Malacca Dilemma'.

Finally, the concepts of ASEAN centrality and relevance were repeatedly questioned. The region and this organisation face a number of challenges,

including maritime piracy and sea robbery, terrorism, and human security. Further exacerbating these problems were the sensitivities towards sovereignty and acute poverty in some of the ASEAN states. These preclude effective and coordinated responses both among and within the affected states. ASEAN's knee-jerk response to the Rohingya boat people was said to make a mockery of the organisation's human rights declaration. It was argued that ASEAN's lack of response based on its norms of non-interference may lead to the organisation slowly becoming dysfunctional.

Meanwhile, uncertainty in the South China Sea was argued to have triggered a spending spree for defense, especially towards acquisition of submarines. The defense budget of Southeast Asian countries has been upped by 5 per cent since 2013, and is expected to double by 2020. If the present trend continues, there would be 110 submarines in the region by 2020. This was flagged as a dangerous development, as the region does not at present possess mechanisms to assist these submarines in the case of a major accident.

On the South China Sea issue, it was recommended that claimant states should continue to engage China, while external parties stay out of the conflict. It was argued that pushing China into a corner only makes it more difficult to reach a solution on other issues requiring the country's cooperation and involvement, such as issues surrounding North Korea, climate change, nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, etc. An implementable code of conduct for the South China Sea could be a small step in rebuilding this much-needed confidence. Moreover, recent events have shown that the widespread acceptance of UNCLOS' rights and responsibilities may not extend unchallenged into the future. While last year's arbitral ruling provides claimant states with somewhat firmer legal grounds for tackling them, other bases of dispute resolution too must be explored.

## SESSION 2: INFLUENCING FACTORS

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The second session of the workshop covered a range of factors expected to influence how the regional maritime environment might evolve over the next decade. Speakers addressed specifically China's One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, technological issues, the ability of regional organisations to ensure maritime security, environmental issues, and managing maritime incidents. There were many questions to consider: How might higher levels of strategic trust be achieved? What are the implications of China's OBOR initiative? What are the environmental issues that should be addressed? What are the likely major developments with maritime technologies over the coming decade? Is a naval arms race developing in the region? How might incidents at sea be more effectively prevented and managed?

The OBOR has been a topic of much deliberation within policy and academic circles. Its abstract and non-institutionalised nature leads to many questions on its implications for regional stability and security. On one hand, it is argued as yet another economic initiative to increase trade and connectivity around the region and to relieve China's domestic market saturation. The Chinese government has emphasised that this initiative is not a one-way imposition or solo act, but should be seen instead as a symphony of many players. At the same time, there have also been speculations of a possible role for the Chinese military in the OBOR. This, however, remains at present mere rhetoric as the OBOR remains under the control of the National Reform and Development Council and Ministry of Trade and Commerce. Regional states were identified as being relatively wary of jumping on board the OBOR given their concerns on strategic leverage such economic interdependence may result in. China too faces the challenges of domestic politics within these other states, as there are inevitably constituencies that are opposed to the increasing economic and political clout gained by China in these countries.

The future maritime security environment is expected to be a technologically-intensive one. It was highlighted that the qualitative improvement of weapons systems alongside their quantitative proliferation was evident throughout the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, in the Indo-Pacific, there is a growing case of 'haves' versus 'have nots', leading to an increasingly widening gap in capabilities among regional countries. China, unlike its regional neighbours such as Japan and India, who remain constrained by finances or internal bureaucratic problems, is what further complicates the matter. While defence budgets in these countries are increasing, there still remains a lot of competition in/

between the services for scarce budgetary resources, and the inertia and vested interests that has to be overcome to recognise the importance of acquiring new technological equipment. Even small, technologically-savvy countries like Singapore, who were able to compete technologically with quality, may risk having their strategic edge undermined if they cannot keep up with the quantity.

The state of natural resources in the maritime domain is ever-changing. The importance of the South China Sea as among the richest fishing grounds of the world was highlighted. From 2005–2010, approximately 10.5 million tonnes of fish catch were obtained on average from the South China Sea annually, and China was the top country taking up 30-34 per cent of the total catch. However, the majority of the stocks or species in these seas are overfished or fully fished. An expected decrease of important fish species would result in a fish catch decline of over 60 per cent, and a decline in landed value by 55 per cent. While there remains potential for stocks to recover, conflicting maritime territorial claims and national interests preclude cooperation on a regional basis. For instance, China's marine environmental protection and sustainable fisheries policies take a backseat to the government's focus on ensuring food security within the fisheries sector. It was proposed that a more objective and scientific study be conducted on the existing fishing effort in the South China Sea, and recommendations for resolution were made on the issue. It was also suggested that individual states carry out unilateral measures within a framework of common management principles in the South China Sea, in the event that joint, regional cooperation cannot be achieved.

These developments and challenges are likely to impact how the maritime environment might evolve over the next decade. The role of regional organisations was examined against this background. The overall verdict was not an optimistic one. On issues of maritime security and marine resource management, cooperation in the Indo-Pacific remains based mainly on national interests (sovereignty and territorial issues). Even cooperation on non-traditional security issues, which are generally considered as “low-hanging fruits”, is increasingly difficult to achieve. Within ASEAN, for instance, coordination mechanisms are still lacking and there remains many overlaps between different frameworks. Moreover, while maritime security is one of the key areas in the ASEAN framework, there is a notable lack of information regarding follow-up mechanisms.

Another regional organisation, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), while being more comprehensive in its geographical scope, faces similar

constraints. The 2017 Jakarta Concord resulting from the first IORA ministerial-level summit held this year identified maritime security as a key area, and plans to do this collaboratively with the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). However, such a task is no easy feat for as big a region as the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, there is very weak commitment by member states on tackling these challenges, due to differing interests, with no agreement even on what defines maritime security. Meanwhile, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) was commended for gaining a reputation of effectiveness, following the agreement on the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). The WPNS is looked upon as the kind of forum which could be replicated elsewhere.

Moreover, the nature of cooperation will have to vary according to the nature of the issue, the countries involved, the geographical area for cooperation, and the appropriate regional forum to have oversight of the cooperation. For instance, in cases of IUU fishing in disputed waters, the contradictory positions of the various claimant states should be acknowledged. Hence, with such issues, an overarching security framework may not be possible.

The risks of maritime incidents in the region are increasing. Regional naval forces are growing in size and capability, with more naval assets from outside the immediate region being deployed into the region. There are increasing incidents in recent years involving maritime security forces, and this is a trend that could continue. These incidents involve both naval and non-naval forces employed under law enforcement and sovereignty protection duties. In the South China Sea, a majority of maritime incidents actually involved coastguard vessels. Fishing vessels too, feature increasingly in recent incidents, in addition to when they are employed as maritime militia. Maritime incidents fuel tensions and add to strategic distrust, creating an unfavourable environment for the peaceful resolution of sovereignty disputes.

Several agreements are in place to mitigate the risk of incidents at sea. These are primarily bilateral (except for CUES), and also include measures such as hotlines, information sharing centres, and bilateral fisheries agreements. There are also a number of relevant regional forums, i.e., the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF), and various institutional Working Groups looking at maritime security issues. The ARF is the key forum for promoting regional cooperation measures that extend beyond the navies, i.e., to civil enforcement agencies. The EAMF could likely be the appropriate forum to develop arrangements to cover both military units, and ships and

aircraft operated by coastguards and other civil agencies. These forums would enable navies to communicate with coastguard vessels through agreements similar to CUES. Ideally, what is required is an all-encompassing agreement that helps to manage and prevent all categories of maritime incidents, involving all types of vessels and aircraft.

## **SESSION 3: PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE?**

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The last session of the workshop consisted of a panel discussion and open forum. There were many questions for consideration: How to build maritime cooperation in the absence of resolution of the sovereignty disputes and the presence of strategic distrust? What can be done to promote stability in relations between major powers? What concrete steps can be taken to cultivate trust and confidence as well as further enhance maritime cooperation between regional countries? What practical steps can be taken to strengthen the existing regional security arrangements and processes? What is the major threat to regional security—the situation with North Korea, Taiwan, the South China Sea, or other known unknowns?

### **Role of ASEAN**

There was much discussion on ASEAN's role in the evolving regional order, and whether it would continue to remain relevant or central to regional affairs. One speaker argued that at present, ASEAN is not considered by regional states as the primary source of security. Moreover, while ASEAN's role in regional or international politics has always been questionable due to its members' differing national interests, it was seen as becoming weaker in the face of external pressures, coupled with the internal problems it is subjected to. In aiming for greater stability, the need to invest a lot more in defence diplomacy, especially through the ADMM and ADMM-Plus was emphasised. ASEAN also needs to better define its place in an evolving regional order, and pursue new measures within an "ASEAN minus x" approach. For instance, with the South China Sea territorial disputes, it was recommended that only disputing states should be involved, rather than pushing ASEAN towards a collective position, which it is neither meant for nor prepared to assume. Moreover, bilateral/multilateral negotiations were advocated over compulsory arbitration procedures, as the former was seen as more effective and entailing actual progress.

### **Building Strategic Trust**

A catalyst or impetus is required to build a strategic trust, as intention alone is insufficient. For instance, external impetus was critical in the materialisation of the Malacca Strait Sea Patrols (MSSP). Moreover, there were suggestions that China should contribute more to regional maritime security. China is currently contributing to the Cooperative Mechanisms in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, and is a Contracting Party to the Regional Cooperation Agreement

on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), Information Sharing Centre (ISC), and the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) based in Singapore. Other avenues of building maritime cooperation include slow and steady involvement in bilateral and multilateral exercises. To build trust and confidence, and further enhance maritime cooperation among regional states, capacity building was identified as a useful starting point, i.e., through training, and making available capabilities such as hydrographic surveys, personnel, information exchange, etc., to other navies.

Even with looming strategic rivalry, the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and China also has significant cooperative elements. For instance, the two countries agree on the need for information and intelligence sharing with regard to North Korea. Radical Islamism and joint anti-piracy patrols (in the Sulu Sea, along with other regional states, for instance) are other common issues of concern. However, cooperation on these fronts is currently precluded by numerous political obstacles, particularly the lack of trust between these major powers. At the same time, the U.S. needs to be aware that its actions in the past have led to the perception that it is taking sides against China. While in reality, this is one among many competing narratives within the region, it is important to be cognisant that public opinion (informed or not) drives domestic politics and can have regional implications. This situation would be exacerbated if the U.S. opts to exert less political and economic influence in the region while building up its military strength.

Furthermore, China's current focus is primarily on domestic issues, where it is undergoing transformation and some degree of power reconfiguration. It was argued that its present grand strategy remains predictable, and should therefore be no cause for serious concern for other states in the region. It was also pointed out that China has a large learning curve to cover in the coming years, and the other states can assist in helping it shape and adhere to norms that facilitate regional security and stability.

Looking into the future, it is envisioned that bilateral agreements on cooperation will become increasingly important and easier to achieve, especially if they are to be of a binding nature. At the national level, it is important to have a coordinated, "whole-of-government" approach towards maritime issues and incidents, possibly achieved with some form of national maritime security coordination committee. Finally, the importance of personal interface between naval and coast guard was emphasised, along with the practice of following-up on incidents to determine lessons learnt and best practices.

## **Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies**

The development of paramilitary forces in the Indo-Pacific region was highlighted. Their non-threatening nature has been argued as making them more suitable for cooperative efforts among some regional countries. However, it was also brought to attention that not so long ago, it was navies that were being commended for their ability to encourage regional cooperation. While the heads of ASEAN coastguards do meet periodically, the level of cooperation in Southeast Asia is deemed to be less developed compared to their Northeast Asia or South Asia counterparts. States in the region are still endeavouring to manage maritime space on the basis of sovereignty. A change in mind-set is needed, as the maritime domain and resources do not adhere to the concept of sovereign boundaries.

## **Economic Prospects**

Amidst the emerging strategic tensions in the region, it was highlighted that East Asia is making a lot of progress in terms of economic integration, e.g., through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement, and OBOR. One reason for this is that there is still strong support among domestic constituencies for more economic integration. The de-globalisation rhetoric is actually espoused by the U.S. and Europe, and not East Asia. More worrisome are actions by the U.S. and Japan, such as opting to stay out of the AIIB. It was argued instead that the best way to address concerns of the AIIB becoming a China-dominated institution was to join it. Rhetoric of China's economic slowdown as being indicative that its economy was collapsing was dismissed. Doubts of prospects for sea-borne trade in the future were expressed for the following reasons and may have significant economic implications for regional states: consumption patterns being affected by stagnant wages in developed states and slowdown in others; shifting production patterns in sea-borne trade with more assembly and manufacturing taking place closer to customer bases; increased land-based connectivity, such as the establishment of a rail freight service between Europe and China through Central Asia, and the Sittwe-China oil and gas pipeline project; and the potential for opening of Arctic trade routes.

## WAY AHEAD

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Despite the overall cautious optimism of most participants at the workshop about the future maritime environment, the region is unfortunately still on a trajectory for more competition than cooperation. With considerable reservations and apparent uncertainties, some key questions remain unanswered. Participants saw merit in regular workshops of this nature to address unresolved issues and areas of uncertainty. These issues include building strategic trust in the region in a context of increasing uncertainties and ambiguities in the major powers' foreign policies, finding a solution to the South China Sea in a manner cognisant of national and regional concerns, and creating mechanisms that move from beyond preventive diplomacy to conflict resolution. While no new regional forums were suggested, it was important that the major forums—the ARF, ADMM-Plus, and EAMF—concentrated on their key areas of interest and responsibility, and avoid overlapping issues.

## Workshop Programme

0800 - 0830 hrs

**Registration**

0830 - 0945 hrs

**Opening Address**

Professor Ralf Emmers

*Associate Dean; Professor of International Relations; and Head of Centre for Multilateralism Studies, RSIS*

**Scene Setters**

Chair: Dr Sam Bateman

*Advisor, Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS*

Speaker: Associate Professor Bhuhindar Singh

*Coordinator of Regional Security Architecture Programme, IDSS, RSIS*

*Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century - the Big Picture*

Dr Jack McCaffrie

*Visiting Fellow, Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, University of Wollongong*  
*Thinking about the Future Maritime Environment*

**Discussion**

0945 - 1045 hrs

**Session 1 – Strategic Outlook**

Chair: Ms Jane Chan

*Research Fellow; and Coordinator of Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS*

Speaker: Mr Carl Baker

*Director of Programs, Pacific Forum CSIS*  
*Honolulu U.S. Perspective*

Professor Zhu Feng

*Executive Director, China Center for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea, Nanjing University*  
*Chinese Perspective*

Assistant Professor Anit Mukherjee

*South Asia Programme, IDSS, RSIS*  
*Indian Perspective*

1045 - 1100 hrs

**Teabreak**

1100 - 1230 hrs

**Session 1 – Strategic Outlook (Con’t)**

Chair: Ms Jane Chan  
*Research Fellow; and Coordinator of Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS*

Speaker: Rear Admiral Kazumine Akimoto (Rtd)  
*Senior Research Fellow, Ocean Policy Research Institute of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Japan*  
*Japanese Perspective*

Dr B. A. Hamzah  
*National Defence University of Malaysia*  
*Southeast Asian Perspective*

**Discussion**

1230 - 1330 hrs

**Lunch**

1330 - 1530 hrs

**Session 2 – Influencing Factors**

Chair: Dr Jack McCaffrie  
*Visiting Fellow, Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, University of Wollongong*

Speaker: Ms Irene Chan  
*Associate Research Fellow, China Programme, IDSS, RSIS*  
*One Belt One Road*

Mr Richard Bitzinger  
*Senior Fellow; and Coordinator of Military Transformations Programme, IDSS, RSIS*  
*Technological Issues*

Dr Shafiah Fifi Muhibat  
*Senior Fellow, Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS*  
*Ability of Regional Organisations*

Professor Raphael Lotilla  
*Chairman, Center for the Advancement of Trade Integration and Facilitation*  
*Environmental Issues*

Dr Sam Bateman  
*Advisor, Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS*  
*Managing Maritime Incidents*

**Discussion**

1530 - 1545 hrs

Tea Break

1545 - 1730 hrs

**Session 3 – Panel Discussion**

Chair: Dr Sam Bateman  
*Advisor, Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS*

Speaker: Dr Geoffrey Till  
*Advisor, Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS*

Professor Zhu Feng  
*Executive Director, China Center for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea, Nanjing University*

Dr Jack McCaffrie  
*Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, University of Wollongong*

Professor Raphael Lotilla  
*Chairman, Center for the Advancement of Trade Integration and Facilitation*

Associate Professor Bhubhindar Singh  
*Coordinator of Regional Security Architecture Programme, IDSS, RSIS*

1830

**Dinner (for invited participants only)**

Venue: Kintamani Indonesian Restaurant  
Furama RiverFront, Singapore  
405 Havelock Road Singapore 169633

## **ABOUT THE INSTITUTE OF DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES**

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The **Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)** is a key research component of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). It focuses on defence and security research to serve national needs. IDSS faculty and research staff conducts both academic and policy-oriented research on security-related issues and developments affecting Southeast Asia and the Asia Pacific. IDSS is divided into three research clusters: (i) The Asia Pacific cluster – comprising the China, South Asia, United States, and Regional Security Architecture programmes; (ii) The Malay Archipelago cluster – comprising the Indonesia and Malaysia programmes; and (iii) The Military and Security cluster – comprising the Military Transformations, Maritime Security, and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) programmes. Finally, the Military Studies Programme, the wing that provides military education, is also a part of IDSS.

For more information about IDSS, please visit [www.rsis.edu.sg/research/idss](http://www.rsis.edu.sg/research/idss).

## **ABOUT THE S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

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The **S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)** is a professional graduate school of international affairs at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. RSIS' mission is to develop a community of scholars and policy analysts at the forefront of security studies and international affairs. Its core functions are research, graduate education and networking. It produces cutting-edge research on Asia Pacific Security, Multilateralism and Regionalism, Conflict Studies, Non-Traditional Security, International Political Economy, and Country and Region Studies. RSIS' activities are aimed at assisting policymakers to develop comprehensive approaches to strategic thinking on issues related to security and stability in the Asia Pacific.

For more information about RSIS, please visit [www.rsis.edu.sg](http://www.rsis.edu.sg).



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