Event Report

RSIS-NORWEGIAN INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES (IFS) WORKSHOP ON “NAVIES, COAST GUARDS, THE MARITIME COMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY”

16-17 November 2016
Holiday Inn Atrium, Singapore
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**Organised by:**
Institute Of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS),
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS),
Nanyang Technological University (NTU),
Singapore

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This report summarises the proceedings of the conference as interpreted by assigned rapporteurs and editor of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this report.

The conference adheres to a variation of the Chatham House Rule. Accordingly, beyond the points expressed in the prepared papers, no attributions have been included in this conference report.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Global economic interdependence and the dilemmas of geopolitics coexist in parallel. Marine resources have become an increasingly important factor in Asian countries’ strategic interests. The shift of the world’s economic and geopolitical centres towards Asia has brought forth the focus on geopolitical dynamics in the region, amongst key players such as China, India, Japan, and the United States. This and other factors have led to several maritime disputes in the region. Although great power competition exists in the contemporary world, it cannot be compared with past instances, given the different nature of these powers.

2. The need for an oceans policy flows from the challenges of managing extended maritime zones of jurisdiction. This follows the promulgation of UNCLOS, coupled with the growing interconnectedness of ocean spaces and increased human usage of the global maritime commons. There are international and regional regimes that were designed to promote oceans management; hard and soft laws. However, there are problems with such legal frameworks. Therefore, it might be necessary for governments to conceive their own oceans policies.

3. The notion of “small” as in small navies remains a relative issue and is an issue of power asymmetry. However, there has been marginalisation of small navies vis-à-vis major navies for a long time. Despite navies being commonly used to pursue national interests, deterrence at sea for small navies has been underexplored. There are twin-pronged concepts of deterrence, namely, deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Smaller, weaker navies are more likely to go for the latter. However, where governments can integrate the naval build-up effort within the broader maritime community, small but effective navies “can punch above their weight”, being able to help shape the regional or international contexts.

4. International and regional conventions as well as national guidelines for effective management of maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction have brought forth the need to strengthen maritime law enforcement in peacetime. Navies have long regarded peacetime constabulary roles with disdain. However, coast guards continue to suffer from definitional
problems; some exist as a single, unified force performing a full range of maritime law enforcement missions whereas others exist as a collection of agencies. While coast guards and navies can and should cooperate both during times of peace and war, the realities of modern conflict mean that navies will be the primary force in war, with the coast guard retained for lesser contingencies.

5. Security in the maritime domain is a challenging issue, with multiple threats and risks ranging from increases in maritime traffic and accidents at sea; to tense relationships between neighbouring countries, and issues such as disputed fisheries, etc. Balancing navies and coast guards requires greater efforts devoted to coordination between both civil and military agencies in the conduct of maritime security functions.

6. The risks of escalation at sea should not be over-exaggerated. However, the existing concerns about crisis stability at sea have largely revolved around naval/military forces. Given the fact that coast guards are increasingly observed on the frontlines of asserting national maritime claims in East Asia, an impetus must be placed on confidence-building measures (CBMs) with respect to coast guards in the region.
The shift of the world’s power towards Asia has brought forth the focus on geopolitical dynamics in the region, amongst key players such as China, India, Japan, and the United States. While the U.S. seeks to preserve its global leadership, Russia and India are two emerging sea powers that deserve attention. There are three types of regional maritime disputes: (i) “high-profile” ones, such as those in the East and South China Seas; (ii) “half-sleeping” disputes such as those surrounding the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, as well as the China-South Korea overlapping exclusive economic zones in the Yellow Sea and finally; (iii) “sleeping” disputes that lie dormant, for example those between Russia and the U.S. in the Bering Sea.

Global economic interdependence and the dilemmas of geopolitics coexist in parallel. Marine resources have become an increasingly important factor in Asian countries’ strategic interests. However, the region lacks institutionalised maritime cooperation mechanisms whereas existing ones are developing slowly because of a lack of mutual political trust. This requires an all-encompassing, inclusive concept of maritime security cooperation. As one of the major regional players, China, also needs to be considered as it had historically faced foreign invasions from the seas, and experienced gaps between its economic development and military modernisation efforts. As such, China faces strategic dilemmas between domestic needs and external anxieties. However, it should also be noted that Beijing shares common interests with many other countries.

Given the contemporary global strategic environment where the U.S. appears to be balancing against China, and tensions in the South China Sea (SCS), the Arctic constitutes an analogous area to look at the Soviet-U.S. geopolitical rivalry, as it was influenced by geography and technology. The Soviet Union was then a continental power and hence the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) could not use naval supremacy alone to defeat it in times of war. However, the Arctic provided vital sea access to NATO for striking at the Soviet heartland, while at the same time also serving as a safe sanctuary from where Moscow could carry out submarine-launched ballistic missile strikes against the U.S..
In summary, the Soviet maritime strategy was essentially defensive and territorial. It did not challenge NATO’s overall maritime supremacy but aimed at eliminating any real strategic advantages that NATO could gain from command of the seas. The main aim was to use the sea for deterrence and ensure the Soviets’ ability for nuclear retaliation. It is important to note that the Cold War context is different from the current one, in the same way the China of today and the Soviet Union are wholly different. For example, China remains focused on the region, not vying for global hegemony like the latter. China also just wanted to increase its military expenditures for defensive reasons, not for pursuit of hegemony. However, even if that were the case, it is evident that China is increasingly evolving into a global sea power with growing overseas maritime interests and hence is expanding its maritime presence in distant waters beyond the region.
OCEANS POLICY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

The need for an oceans policy stems from the challenges of managing extended maritime zones of jurisdiction. This follows the promulgation of UNCLOS, coupled with the growing interconnectedness of ocean spaces and increased human usage of the global maritime commons. There are international and regional regimes that were designed to promote oceans management: (i) “hard laws” such as general global conventions, sectoral regional and global conventions and; (ii) “soft laws” such as non-binding codes, guidelines, principles. However, there are problems with these legal frameworks, such as the lack of ratification, lack of implementation, different memberships, lowest common denominator, lack of a holistic approach, the lack of an ecosystem approach and finally, implementation based on national jurisdiction/obligations. It might therefore be more feasible for governments to conceive of their own oceans policies.

Two distinct levels of an oceans policy are in order: (i) national and (ii) regional. Maritime security and an oceans policy have become so intertwined, since the Blue Economy depends on good order at sea. Yet conceptualising and implementing an oceans policy remains problematic. Stove-piping and turf wars between agencies and jurisdictions; industry resistance; and perceptions of increased government regulations could pose challenges to this exercise. However, with growing international interest in pursuing a Blue Economy, a fundamental importance needs to be attached to oceans management.

There are definitional issues regarding what constitutes the “maritime industry”. Various constituent actors such as shipping, offshore and fishery sectors have different aims, even if they share a common focus on profit maximisation in a maritime context. These non-security actors also have distinct interests which maritime security organisations need to consider. There is also a need for maritime security organisations to liaise with commercial actors in the maritime industry and for regional agencies to work together more closely.

Another aspect of oceans policy pertains to shipbuilding. While individual governments attempt to build indigenous naval shipbuilding industries, such endeavours entail potentially high risks, as they consist of high entry and
low returns. It is therefore more plausible to seek niche areas. Almost every East Asian country has shipbuilding-related industries, with three tiers being noted. The first is the “high tier” characterised by sheer size and modernity, as well as volume of contracts. The “middle tier” is characterised by a certain amount of high-tech capabilities yet at the same time facing certain limitations. The “low tier” constitutes governments that maintain such capacities more for political expediency. There are also high levels of defence industry (including shipbuilding) protectionism in almost every country. Shipbuilding is a tough field to be in, yet this does not stop regional shipbuilders with low volumes of contracts which are at the same time making losses from persisting in maintaining their capacities instead of winding them up. Moreover, the maintenance, repairs and overhaul (MRO) sector could be an alternative business model, especially for shipbuilders with low volume of contracts for newly built vessels.
The notion of “small” for small navies remains a relative issue and is an issue of power asymmetry. However, small navies have long been marginalised in the shadows of the major navies such as the Chinese and U.S. navies. Deterrence at sea for small navies continues to be an underexplored topic, even though navies are commonly employed as flexible tools in the pursuit of national interests, including deterrent purposes. There are twin-pronged concepts of deterrence, namely, deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. The former remains a struggle for small and weaker navies to employ.

In the East Asian maritime domain, not many countries face existential threats. In this context, deterrence strategies at sea are tailored according to each individual threat. Generally, small navies may still conceive of their deterrence strategies around three categories of national stakes, resources, territory and interest. Overall, a small navy can acquire limited forms of credible capabilities to improve their deterrent postures against stronger adversaries. However, conventional deterrence is inherently unstable. Thus, despite high platform costs, it is important for small navies to possess some substantial capabilities as this increases the chances of larger navies cooperating.

Many of the problems faced by small navies are also faced by major navies. The main difference is that because the latter tend to possess greater capacities, they tend to bear greater levels of regional and international responsibilities and other commitments beyond home waters. Conversely, the problems faced by small navies typically emanate from structural issues. Some of these structural issues concern the geopolitical context, which has become increasingly uncertain and thereby poses a threat. This is characterised by the growth in Great Power competition with a strong maritime dimension. The possibility of increased interstate tensions, especially with respect to the revival of “trade wars”, could reduce the importance of seaborne trade and commerce. Consequently, this undermines the incentives for navies and coast guards to cooperate to tackle threats that interfere with good order at sea. This would constitute a universal problem commonly faced by both small and big navies alike. Countries have resorted to establishing separate coast guards to deal with maritime non-traditional security (NTS) issues, so as to offload such tasks from navies.
The challenge of being small is multi-faceted for small navies, with issues such as economies of scale involving platform acquisitions and MRO services, manpower and human capital development, and the tendency to rely on foreign sources for materiel. However, some small navies have managed to balance between resources and commitments in their naval force capacity developments. They exemplify successful examples where governments can properly integrate the naval build-up effort within the broader maritime community, such as their national industry. Thus, small but effective navies “can punch above their weight”, by helping to shape the regional or international contexts.

International and regional conventions as well as national guidelines for effective management of maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction have brought forth the need to strengthen maritime law enforcement in peacetime. Since navies have traditionally focused on peacetime deterrence and wartime combat missions, they usually disdain constabulary roles, which are viewed as potentially undermining equipment, training and doctrine development. Finally, coast guards are usually regarded as a more stabilising presence compared to navies in the context of maritime disputes.

However, coast guards continue to suffer from definitional problems. Some coast guards exist as a single, unified force performing a full range of maritime law enforcement missions including fishery patrols, whereas others exist as a collection of agencies each specialising in a primary role. Also, many navies still perform maritime law enforcement duties. Small countries need to optimise their resources and avoid the duplication of functions between the navy and coast guard. In addition, they can cooperate and work with the navy and reinforce the coast guards as a defensive arm in times of war. In this regard, Asian nations can learn from countries like Norway. However, more realistically speaking, in times of conflict it would be more plausible to envisage a limited warfighting role for coast guards since conflict may erupt within a short timeframe, thereby affording little room for wartime preparation. This means that the navy would likely remain the key fighting force while the coast guard continues to play a more limited, secondary function in such contingencies.
Security in the maritime domain is a challenging issue, with multiple threats and risks ranging from increases in maritime traffic and accidents at sea, whereas there have been tense relationships between neighbouring countries, and issues such as disputed fisheries and force hybridisation. In the context of the SCS, the issue of Chinese fishing militia is often cited as an example of hybridised coast guards. There have been a growing number of incidents involving regional coast guards and fishermen. This is true in terms of China, ASEAN and non-ASEAN Countries.

Within this overarching context, it becomes necessary to revisit the narrative of Chinese fishing militia, wherein the foreign media and scholars believe that Beijing militarised Chinese fishermen to further its foreign policy aims in the SCS. Besides China, the Philippines and Vietnam have also considered fishermen as a tool for asserting their respective SCS claims. However, it is thought that Chinese fishing militia also conduct information-sharing and surveillance. For example, they monitor U.S. Navy and Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels in the East and South China Seas and relay useful information or intelligence back to shore authorities. Such peacetime duties performed for national security reasons could be considered part of general civic duty.

In the case of France, state action at sea is holistic and does not rely on one single agency, but instead on various capabilities mustered by a range of different agencies. In terms of hierarchy, French maritime security response falls under the control of a single maritime state authority. This authority is responsible for inter-agency coordination, efficiency maximisation, responsiveness, and cost-effectiveness in response to conceivable maritime security challenges.

From the Australian perspective, there are four principles in conceiving of an effective coast guard/navy nexus. The first is that complexity is a given; the second that maritime surveillance and response tasks for law enforcement are neither a purely military nor purely civilian function; third, whether capabilities should be allocated to the military or civilian agency depends on where it gives
the government the broadest set of options and flexibility; lastly, that there should be only one civil agency running the civil assets used for maritime security surveillance and response. The crux of the matter lies in greater efforts devoted into coordination between both civil and military agencies in the conduct of maritime security functions.
The origins of confidence-building measures (CBMs) can be traced back to the Helsinki processes under the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) auspices in the 1970s. Cold War CBMs focused on war prevention. In the post-Cold War era, these shifted towards and expanded in scope to include non-military security issues. However, CBMs are designed along two broad lines, namely (i) measures to reduce tensions, and (ii) measures to increase trust. There are three broad levels of CBMs: (i) political, (ii) operational and (iii) technical. It is therefore important to understand the scope and expectations of CBMs and to calibrate one's expectations on what those measures can achieve.

The risks of escalation at sea should not be over-exaggerated, as is evident from non-escalation in the case of the Soviet-U.S. encounters at sea. In the first place, the very ambiguous nature of the sea makes maritime tensions “less emotional” compared to terrestrial ones. However, existing examples of crisis stability at sea have largely revolved around naval/military forces. So far, there has been little historical data available which details how coast guards and their behaviour could lead to escalation at sea. In East Asia, coast guards are increasingly observed on the frontlines of asserting national maritime claims. Therefore, an impetus must be placed on CBMs with respect to coast guards in the region.

Where coast guard cooperation is concerned, there are numerous initiatives that can be found worldwide such as the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum and the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum. In the Asia Pacific, especially the Southeast Asian context, coast guard cooperation could potentially be a tool for stability in the region. However, it would depend on how coast guard cooperation functions at various levels within the “conflict cycle”, the type of CBMs, and the requisite need to have genuine political will amongst the participants. It is also important to note that CBMs do not require equality in military capabilities, although all partner countries should each have a minimum level of these. In addition, there is a need to find the right balance between local ownership of CBMs and managing Great Power relations. Improving coast guard capabilities could thus help to demilitarise the region. However, for this to happen, genuine political will amongst the parties concerned is essential.
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION

The Workshop concluded by noting the complexities of the maritime domain and how the promotion of coast guards over navies could de-escalate some of the issues, especially in the context of the Asia Pacific region. Some suggestions to improve maritime policy and increase cooperation between nations include:

• The employment of coast guard cooperation as confidence building measures to ensure the stability of the Asia Pacific region.
• Employing a holistic, top-down approach to maritime security to ensure the compliance of difference agencies.
• Increased cooperation with the wider maritime community to enhance maritime security.
• Integrate the naval build-up effort within the broader maritime community, such as the industry. Thus, small but effective navies “can punch above their weight”
• Pursuing oceans management strategies.
• Given that countries prefer to maintain a level of capability to build ships despite high costs, it was recommended that the sector diversifies in such cases to offset some of the costs.
Workshop Programme

Day One
Wednesday, 16 November 2016

0830 hrs  Registration and Coffee

0900 hrs  Introduction
  
  Keynote Address
  Ambassador Tormod C. Endresen
  The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Singapore

  Introduction by Chair
  Professor Geoffrey Till
  Visiting Senior Fellow, Maritime Security Programme, RSIS

  Mr Jo Inge Bekkevold
  Head of Centre for Asian Security Studies
  Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS)

0930 hrs  SESSION 1
  Comparative Maritime Environments: Comparing the Contexts for Navies, Coastguards and the Maritime Industries

  Moderator
  Dr Jo Inge Bekkevold
  Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS)

  Panellists
  Maritime Environment in the Western Pacific
  Dr Liu Qing
  Director, Department of Asia-Pacific Studies, China Institute of International Studies

  Northern Waters During the Cold War
  CDR Tor Ivar Strømmen
  Lecturer, Norwegian Naval Academy

  Discussion

1030 hrs  Coffee Break
1045 hrs

SESSION 2
An Oceans Policy: Problems and Prospects

Moderator
Professor Geoffrey Till
Visiting Senior Fellow, Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS

Panellists
The Concept of an Oceans Policy
Dr Sam Bateman
Adviser and Senior Fellow, Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS

The Maritime Industries as Stakeholders?
Rear Admiral (Ret.) James Goldrick
Royal Australian Navy

Defence Industries and Maritime Security in East Asia
Mr Richard Bitzinger
Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Military Transformations Programme, IDSS, RSIS

Discussion

1200 hrs

SESSION 3
Small Navies and International Stability

Moderator
Rear Admiral (Ret.) James Goldrick
Royal Australian Navy

Panellists
What are Small Navies for?
Dr Ian Bowers
Associate Professor, Centre for Asian Security Studies Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS)

Challenges for Small Navies
Professor Geoffrey Till
Visiting Senior Fellow, Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS

Discussion
1300 hrs  |  Lunch

1400 hrs  |  SESSION 4
| Coastguards: An Introduction

**Moderator**
Dr Sam Bateman
Adviser and Senior Fellow, Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS

**Panellists**
*Norwegian Coastguard Experiences During the Cold War*
ADM (Ret.) Jo Gade
Senior Advisor
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS)

*The Coastguard and East Asia’s Maritime Security Environment*
Dr Sam Bateman
Adviser and Senior Fellow, Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS

Discussion

1530 hrs  |  Coffee Break

1545 hrs  |  SESSION 5
| Coastguard/Navy Nexus – Finding the Balance Between the Two?

**Moderator**
Dr Collin Koh
Research Fellow, Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS
Panellists
The Navy as a Maritime Focus
CPT (N) Jean-René Degans
FR ILO Information Fusion Centre Singapore
FR ILO Regional HADR Coordination Centre Singapore
FR Deputy Defence Attaché (N)
Coastguard/Navy Jointness as Response to Hybrid Threats
Rear Admiral (Ret.) James Goldrick
Royal Australian Navy
The Challenge of the Hybridised Coastguard
Mr Zhang Hongzhou
Research Fellow, China Programme, IDSS, RSIS

1700 hrs End of Day One

Day Two
Thursday, 17 November 2016

0900 hrs SESSION 6
Case Studies
Moderator
Professor Geoffrey Till
Visiting Senior Fellow, Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS

Panellists
Indonesia
Mr Muhamad Arif
Researcher, The Habibie Center

Malaysia
Mr Dzirhan Mahadzir
Freelance Journalist, IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security

Singapore
Dr Collin Koh
Research Fellow, Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS

Discussion
1030 hrs  |  Coffee Break
1045 hrs  |  SESSION 7
             |  Case Studies
             |  **Moderator**
             |  Dr Collin Koh
             |  Research Fellow, Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS
             |  **Panellists**
             |  **Vietnam**
             |  Dr Vu Truong Minh Huy
             |  Director, Saigon Center for International Studies (SCIS),
             |  University of Social Sciences and Humanities
             |  **Arctic States**
             |  Mr Andreas Østhagen
             |  Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS)
             |  **Discussion**

1300 hrs  |  Lunch
1400 hrs  |  SESSION 8
             |  Case Studies
             |  **Moderator**
             |  Dr Ian Bowers
             |  Associate Professor, Centre for Asian Security Studies
             |  Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS)
             |  **Panellists**
             |  **China**
             |  Colonel Liu Lin
             |  Academy of Military Sciences, People’s Liberation Army
Japan
Vice Admiral (Ret.) Fumio Ota
National Defence University, Japan

South Korea
Captain (Ret.) Sukjoon Yoon
Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy

Discussion

1530 hrs  Coffee Break
1545 hrs  SESSION 9
Defending the Maritime Community: Cooperation and Confidence-Building Measures

Moderator
Professor Geoffrey Till
Visiting Senior Fellow, Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS

Panellists
Coastguard Cooperation as Confidence-building Measure
Mr Jo Inge Bekkevold
Head, Centre for Asian Security Studies
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS)

Escalation Management and Clashes at Sea
Dr Ian Bowers
Associate Professor, Centre for Asian Security Studies
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS)

Discussion

1700 hrs  Wrap-up and Concluding Remarks
Professor Geoffrey Till
Visiting Senior Fellow, Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS
List of Participants

Ms Sunniva Abrahamsen
Second Secretary, The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Singapore

Mr Muhamad Arif
Researcher, The Habibie Center

Dr Sam Bateman
Advisor and Senior Fellow, Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS

Mr Jo Inge Bekkevold
Head, Centre for Asian Security Studies, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS)

Mr Richard Bitzinger
Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Military Transformations Programme, IDSS, RSIS

Dr Ian Bowers
Associate Professor, Centre for Asian Security Studies, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS)

Lieutenant Commander Chit Maung Maung
Myanmar Navy

Assistant Professor Chong Ja Ian
National University of Singapore

Captain (N) Jean-René Degans
French ILO Information Fusion Centre Singapore, French ILO Regional HADR Coordination Centre Singapore, French Deputy Defence Attaché (N)

Mr Philipp Martin Dingeldey
Research Analyst, Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS

Dr Peter Dombrowski
Professor, Strategic & Operational Research, US Naval War College

Ambassador Tormod C. Endresen
The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Singapore
Admiral (ret.) Jo Gade  
Senior Advisor, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS)

Ms Rajni Gamage  
Research Analyst, Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS

Rear Admiral (ret.) James Goldrick  
Royal Australian Navy

Lieutenant Commander Arief Kurniawan Hertanto  
Indonesian Navy

Dr Collin Koh Swee Lean  
Research Fellow, Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS

Dr Christopher Len  
Fellow, Energy Studies Institute

Colonel Liu Lin  
Academy of Military Sciences, People’s Liberation Army

Dr Liu Qing  
Director, Department of Asia-Pacific Studies, China Institute of International Studies

Mr Dzirhan Mahadzir  
Freelance Journalist, IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security

Commander Jesus A. Menacho Pierola  
Peruvian Navy

Mr Ahmed Nazwan  
Student Research Assistant, Maritime Security Programme, IDSS, RSIS

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National Defence University, Japan

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Professor Geoffrey Till  
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Commander (ret.) Shishir Upadhyaya  
PhD candidate, University of Wollongong, Australia

Dr Vu Truong Minh Huy  
Director, Saigon Center for International Studies (SCIS), University of Social Sciences and Humanities

Mr Alvin Wong  
Ministry of Defence, Singapore

Captain (ret.) Sukjoon Yoon  
Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy

Mr Zhang Hongzhou  
Research Fellow, China Programme, IDSS, RSIS

Lieutenant Commander Zhang Li  
People’s Liberation Army Navy
ABOUT THE INSTITUTE OF DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) is a key research component of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). It focuses on defence and security research to serve national needs. IDSS faculty and research staff conducts both academic and policy-oriented research on security-related issues and developments affecting Southeast Asia and the Asia Pacific. IDSS is divided into three research clusters: (i) The Asia Pacific cluster – comprising the China, South Asia, United States, and Regional Security Architecture programmes; (ii) The Malay Archipelago cluster – comprising the Indonesia and Malaysia programmes; and (iii) The Military and Security cluster – comprising the Military Transformations, Maritime Security, and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) programmes. Finally, the Military Studies Programme, the wing that provides military education, is also a part of IDSS.

For more information, please visit www.rsis.edu.sg/research/idss.

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The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) is a professional graduate school of international affairs at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. RSIS’ mission is to develop a community of scholars and policy analysts at the forefront of security studies and international affairs. Its core functions are research, graduate education and networking. It produces cutting-edge research on Asia Pacific Security, Multilateralism and Regionalism, Conflict Studies, Non-Traditional Security, International Political Economy, and Country and Region Studies. RSIS’ activities are aimed at assisting policymakers to develop comprehensive approaches to strategic thinking on issues related to security and stability in the Asia Pacific.

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RSIS-NORWEGIAN INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES (IFS) WORKSHOP ON “NAVIES, COAST GUARDS, THE MARITIME COMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY”