Boko Haram-IS Connection: Local and Regional Implications
Fr. Atta Barkindo

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Ivory Coast Attack: Africa’s Terror Footprint Expands
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In the past months, East and West African countries have experienced significant levels of terrorist attacks carried out by three primary terrorist groups: the Nigeria-based Boko Haram, which has pledged allegiance to the so-called Islamic State (IS); the Somalia-based Al Qaeda-linked Al-Shabaab; and Al Qaeda’s North African-based affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). On 15 January 2016, AQIM carried out an attack in Burkina Faso, which claimed 30 lives. On the same day, Al Shabaab attacked an African Union army base in El Adde, Somalia, killing over 60 soldiers. On 30 January, Boko Haram launched attacks in Dalori, Nigeria, leaving over 80 people dead. Since then, there have been further terrorist attacks, with the latest being an attack by Boko Haram in Kuda, Nigeria on 16 June, which resulted in the deaths of 24 people.

In all, porous borders, weak governance, undertrained and ill-equipped militaries, and flourishing drug trades have facilitated the staging of terrorist attacks by local Islamist militant groups across Africa. Regional troops operating under the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have worked to push back Al-Shabaab militants from taking over the country. In Nigeria, significant efforts, along with outside support, have worked to blunt Boko Haram’s operational strength.

Notwithstanding stark differences between the regional threat milieu in Africa and elsewhere, the links between IS or Al Qaeda with local militant groups like Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab provide some lessons for governments and security agencies. This is particularly so, as IS’ and Al Qaeda’s reach and appeal extend beyond the Middle East and Africa; IS and Al Qaeda have also expressed a clear interest in either establishing links or merging closely with local militant and terrorist groups in the Indian sub-continent, as well as in southern Philippines and parts of Indonesia.

In this issue, Fr. Atta Barkindo discusses how the recent alignment between Boko Haram and IS has led to increased recruitment and terrorist attacks by Boko Haram in the country. In addition, the proximity of Boko Haram’s support base to Libya also provides IS with the opportunity to move easily across borders and embed itself within the local militant movements there in order to expand its reach and influence in the African region.

Our focus on the implications of terrorism on regional security is amplified by views shared by Eric Watkins, who highlights the economic implications of terrorism, in particular, by Al-Shabaab, on the Kenyan government’s ambitious pipeline project. Watkins explains how concerns about terrorist attacks by Al-Shabaab militants was one of the primary contributing factors for the decision by Uganda and the relevant oil companies to divert the pipeline project to Tanzania’s port, instead of Kenya.

In light of the March 2016 attack by Al Qaeda al-Jihad in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) on a beach resort in West Africa’s affluent Ivory Coast, and earlier attacks in Mali and Burkina Faso, Rohan Gunaratna explores the growing presence of AQIM in the region and notes that the competition for power and influence between Al Qaeda and the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) in Africa will substantially increase the threat of terrorism in the region. He recommends a robust international and state response predicated on intelligence-led and community-based efforts.
Nigerian security forces have intensified their offensive against Boko Haram since the group pledged allegiance to the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) in March 2015, retaking most of the territories under the group’s control and destroying their bomb-making factories. However, Boko Haram remains a security threat, both to northern Nigeria and the Lake Chad border regions. IS recruiting cells, led by Boko Haram members, have also been uncovered in Kano and Katsina states. This article assesses the local and regional security threat and Nigeria’s strategy to counter it.

Introduction

Following Boko Haram’s leader, Abubakar Shekau’s bay’ah (oath of allegiance) to the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) in March 2015, the group has changed its nomenclature to Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Some security analysts consider Boko Haram’s pledge to IS as mere propaganda posing no security threat (Derek Harvey, 2015). The affiliation of the two, they argue, could be undermined by sociological factors, like differences in ethnicity, geography and language. Others suggest that Shekau’s penchant for power makes it unlikely for him to cede control of his group to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. Additionally, Boko Haram may face competition from other Al Qaeda affiliates in the Sahel region, since both IS and Al Qaeda are seeking to increase their number of affiliates there. Wary of IS’ advances, Al Qaeda may target dissidents of Boko Haram, leading to possible emergence of other factions and the eventual weakening of Boko Haram’s pledge to IS. One of these factions is Ansaru – a breakaway faction of Boko Haram – with whom Al Qaeda is likely to improve relations.

However, Boko Haram’s newly-declared affiliation to IS should not be taken lightly. For instance, IS’ spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani encouraged IS fighters to join Boko Haram if they are unable to travel to Syria (Dabiq 2014). This can increase Boko Haram’s fighting force and pose a significant security threat to the region. Moreover, security sources indicate that as of October 2015, 150 Nigerians have been recruited by Boko Haram to join IS (Author’s Interview, 2016). Boko Haram’s pledge of fealty was also celebrated with a parade of IS fighters across provinces of Al-Barakah, Homs, Halab (Aleppo), Al-Jazirah, Al-Furat, Al-Janub, Al-Raqqa, Al-Khayr and Diglah (BH Videos 2015).

Following Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance, the group has received logistics and support from IS. On 20 April 2016, Chadian soldiers intercepted a large cache of weapons sent from IS affiliates in Libya to Boko Haram insurgents in the Lake Chad region. Brig. Gen. Donald Bolduc, commander of US Special Operations in Africa, confirmed the deepening links between IS and Boko Haram. Bolduc said the Boko Haram’s way of conducting ambushes, setting improvised explosive devices and undertaking high-profile attacks on hotels clearly show that it shares “tactics, techniques and procedures” with IS (Sahara Reporters 2016).

Boko Haram-IS Connection

Boko Haram is recruiting fighters in Nigeria and around the region, including in Chad, Niger, Mali, Libya, Senegal and Algeria. In February 2016,
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Nigerian security forces arrested Abdussalam Enesi Yunusa in Kano for recruiting five individuals for IS. Security forces also uncovered an IS cell in Daura, Katsina state, led by Ibrahim Mohammed Daura and five of his colleagues from the Ansaru faction of Boko Haram. Earlier, the military had arrested five IS cell members in Kano; they were going to Libya with their families to join IS (Premium Times 2016). In November 2015, Makhatar Diokhané, a Senegalese national, was arrested in Niger. He was on his way to negotiate with Nigerian security services for the release of his associates who were arrested while fighting for Boko Haram. Investigations following Diokhané’s capture led to the disruption of his cell in Senegal and the arrest of other cell members. This included Diokhané’s wife, imams, and relatives of other Senegalese nationals fighting with Boko Haram. In January 2016, Malian authorities detained four West African nationals (two from Guinea Bissau, one from The Gambia and Guinea) who were travelling to join Boko Haram. In February 2016, eight more Senegalese were also arrested in Mauritania for allegedly planning to join Boko Haram. These arrested individuals claimed that at least 23 Senegalese nationals have become Boko Haram members since 2015 and confessed that the terrorist group’s membership includes some Mauritians as well (Omar 2016). In March 2015, Boko Haram members were reported to be training with IS in Mauritanian camps (Yapching 2015).

IS’ newly-established stronghold in Sirte, Libya, is also of significance as it serves as IS’ strategic centre of operations. The area is surrounded by open borders, which makes it easy to recruit from neighbouring countries, including from Niger and Chad where Boko Haram is active. The support Boko Haram is getting from IS provides the group essential services such as recruitment of fighters, production of propaganda videos, fundraising and logistical support. As such, it has enabled the group to increase the number of attacks. Between June and July 2015, Boko Haram carried out attacks in northern and central Nigeria, particularly in the cities of Zaria, Jos, Munguno and Kukawa, as well as the Malari, Alau and Miringa villages in Borno State. The attacks have killed over 500 people and injured thousands of others.

Boko Haram has also extended its reach beyond Nigeria. On 15 June 2015, twin suicide bombs exploded in the capital city of Chad, N’Djamena, where more than 23 people were killed and 80 others injured (The Guardian 2015). This was followed by another attack on 18 June 2015, when Boko Haram militants entered the state of Diffa in Niger and attacked two villages, killing more than 40 people (The Economic Times 2015). On 13 July 2015, Boko Haram fighters carried out two suicide attacks in Fotokol, northern Cameroon, killing more than 12 civilians and a Chadian soldier (Al Jazeera 2015).

Since Boko Haram declared allegiance to IS in March 2015, the group has also increased its use of female suicide bombers alongside increased number of terrorist attacks. Between March and July 2015, Boko Haram had carried out 52 suicide bombing attacks, using 126 bombers, among them, 31 young girls. As of October 2015, Boko Haram is alleged to have recruited over 150 Nigerians to fight for the so-called Islamic State (ONSA 2015).

Nigeria’s Counter-Terrorism Approach

Since the start of Boko Haram’s violent uprising in 2009, the Nigeria has used military force to counter the threat. However, the military approach neither ended the conflict nor prevented Boko Haram from changing its strategy. Apart from the military or hard approach, the government’s current strategy also involves soft approaches, like rehabilitation and community engagement.

The hard approach involves military offensive against Boko Haram, its networks, cells and hideouts. The Nigerian government has prosecuted top military officials who are said to have embezzled funds allocated for fighting Boko Haram (Nnenna 2015). Nigeria is establishing a framework to train competent members of the local vigilante groups, hunters and members of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) for enrollment into the military and other security agencies. So far, bomb-making factories of Boko Haram have been discovered and shut down in Potiskum, Buni Yadi, Mubi, Gwoza, and Maiduguri. By April 2015, these measures enabled the troops to capture and destroy three Boko Haram camps inside the Sambisa Forest, including the notorious Tokumbere camp, where Boko Haram has carried out Sharia-based amputations and other forms of physical punishment. Moreover, Nigerian troops have managed to rescue 200 girls and 93 women. The man responsible for supplying Boko Haram food and fuel was also arrested (Nnenna 2015). On 1 April 2016, Khalid Al-Barnawi, once a deputy of
Shekau, was arrested in Lokoja, the capital of Kogi state. Khalid had close ties with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and sought to target Westerners (Raffaello and Sasha 2015). On 1 May 2016, Muhammad Ali, the leader of the Baga branch of Boko Haram, was arrested by CJTF in Kano (Security Source 2016). As this approach has also forced many Boko Haram members to lay down their arms, the Nigerian military is now putting plans together to establish camps for the surrendered members. The camps are likely to serve as a period of transition where the detainees are classified according to their radical beliefs before being sent for rehabilitation in different detention facilities (Sahara Reporters 2016).

The soft approach is centred on mitigating violent extremism and rehabilitating both victims and perpetrators of the conflict. In this context, there is a plan to establish a North-East Development Commission (Iro 2015) to rebuild the region destroyed by terrorist activities. Among the many goals of the commission is the need to create the necessary economic environment that will provide opportunities for young people and distract them from being radicalised and recruited by Boko Haram. Furthermore, the government is providing security in territories recaptured from Boko Haram, clearing them of landmines and bombs while ensuring the safe return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who had to move because of Boko Haram’s atrocities. Government agencies and local NGOs such as the Adamawa Peace Initiative (API) are coordinating local community dialogue and reconciliation programmes within and between communities of different faiths with the approval of the government. Community leaders, traditional rulers and religious groups partake in this.

Along with this, the government has also established the Presidential Initiative for the North-East (PINE) to cater for the needs of displaced people. PINE also ensures prompt and adequate delivery of relief materials, including medical supplies to them. Furthermore, in April 2016, the Nigerian government, through the Office of the National Security Adviser and with the help of the European Union Technical Assistance to Nigeria’s evolving security challenges, launched a manual for de-radicalisation of violent extremists in Abuja. The guide provides the framework for engaging with Boko Haram members in rehabilitation centres and in the military established camps. Those in camps are also being prepared for rehabilitation. This process of rehabilitation will include the classification of perpetrators to ascertain their level of ideological motivation, which ultimately determines the type of rehabilitation and intervention needed.

The pilot project began in Kuje prison on the outskirts of Abuja, the capital city, where 39 violent extremists were engaged for rehabilitation. Thirty-three of the violent extremists voluntarily accepted the programme and were selected to embrace education, arts therapy and different vocational training (Umar 2016). The Nigerian government has concluded plans to train personnel from all Federal Ministries on the significance of soft approaches and ways to counter violent extremism in schools and communities.

**Future Trajectory of the Boko Haram-IS Alliance: Local and Regional Implications**

The future trajectory of security threats posed by this alliance has implications for domestic, regional and international security. At the domestic level, thousands of Boko Haram members have surrendered either by force or as part of their conflict strategy, which is to use detention centres for further radicalisation and recruitment by targeting other inmates. They may even organise prison breaks to free other members as seen in the past (The Guardian 2010). As such, prisons and the military established camps may turn out to be incubators of radicalisation and violent extremism for Boko Haram. There is also risk of recidivism if the de-radicalisation and rehabilitation programmes are
not properly carried out.

Another security concern is the fear of reprisal attacks as displaced communities and ethnic groups return to their homes re-taken from Boko Haram territories. In some communities, Boko Haram has conducted selective destruction of homes, shops and farms belonging to non-Muslims. On occasion, this selective destruction is carried out with the support of inhabitants who did not flee. There is heightened tension given that returnees are likely to embark on revenge killings. Recent events indicate the infiltration of Boko Haram members in local communities, civilian populations and public places. The military has issued warning to young people about potential enticement by Boko Haram, using cash and other incentives. This trend is likely to continue if the government does not engage local communities.

At a regional level, the growing security threat arises from mobilisation and recruitment across the region. With IS’ strongholds in Sirte, Libya, the recruitment of radical elements from Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia and other countries is likely to be on the increase if no urgent steps are taken to stop the tide. These areas have formed a strong support base for Boko Haram, which is already recruiting for IS. IS’ presence in Libya means recruitment efforts for IS will be stepped up as the latter sets its sights on expanding its reach in the region. In addition, Boko Haram’s use of female suicide bombers has increased over the last few months. Although there are fewer incidents on Nigerian side of the border, the threat of female suicide bombers has amplified in northern Cameroon. This trend is likely to remain because Boko Haram retains the capacity to abduct more people, especially women and girls to be used as suicide bombers.

At the international level, the military pressure on IS and its affiliates by the coalition of international forces is likely to bolster Boko Haram territories. As IS fighters are forced to relocate from Iraq, Syria and some parts of the Middle East, North and West Africa will be the likely destination. The Lake Chad border region – Boko Haram’s base – could become a recruitment hub for Islamic State West Africa Province, where some local Islamic sects share similar ideologies as IS. In the absence of strong regional security collaboration, and sustained military and intelligence operations, Boko Haram’s ability to move men and material across the border into Nigeria will improve and attacks may resume. Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that while the movement of militants throughout the region is of concern, with the continued military pressure in northeast Nigeria and Cameroon, the group will find it increasingly difficult to extend its reach any time soon.

**Conclusion**

When Boko Haram pledged allegiance to IS in March 2015, many critics believed the announcement was nothing more than propaganda. In November 2015, IS titled its monthly magazine *Dabiq*, ‘‗Sharia alone will rule Africa’ (Dabiq 2015). The article praised Boko Haram’s jihad, and emphasised the importance of Boko Haram for global jihad. The operational feasibility of this alliance was invisible or limited to many, probably due to geographical distance between the Syria/Iraq and Nigeria/Lake Chad border region. But evidence of concrete operational links between Boko Haram and IS has emerged, amid an increase in the recruitment of young men in Nigeria and beyond by IS West Africa Province. To disrupt terrorist attacks by an emboldened alliance between Boko Haram and IS, regional intelligence-sharing and national community-based prevention programmes are more important than ever.

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Al-Shabaab Militancy Undermines Kenya’s LAPSSET

Eric Watkins

Cross-border attacks by the Somalia-based Al-Shabaab terrorist organisation have raised concerns among oil companies about the prospects of the oil pipeline construction, which will pass through Kenya from Uganda. The recent move by Uganda to transport its oil across Tanzania, which is considered a safer alternative than Kenya, reflected such concerns.

Background

The Somalia-based, Al Qaeda-linked terrorist group, Harakat Al-Shabaab Al Mujahiddeen (Al-Shabaab) has been a security concern for Kenya for some time now. One of the ways Al-Shabaab has impacted Kenya has been in the area of economic development. Initially, there were plans to construct a new export terminal on Kenya’s Indian Ocean coastline at the port of Lamu. The plan was to export crude oil from recently discovered fields in Uganda and northern Kenya to world markets using the Lamu Port-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET). However, recently, the Uganda government announced that it would route the line to pass through its northerly port city, Tanga, in Tanzania, instead of passing through Kenya. While certain economic considerations factored into this decision to switch the route of the pipeline from Kenya to Tanzania, the oil companies involved – principally, the French oil giant, Total SA – were especially concerned about the threat of Al-Shabaab militants to the pipeline and its workers (Hatoum & Said 2013; Reuters 2015).

Kenya views the LAPPSET project as a means of integrating regional countries via the oil pipeline. In 2006, discoveries of oil by Uganda prompted the land-locked country to look towards Kenya for export routes. In 2009, Uganda and Kenya tentatively agreed to export Uganda’s new crude oil through Mombasa, central Kenya’s main port, and onwards to world markets. Kenyan officials saw even greater economic potential in their concept of the
LAPSSET Corridor when in 2010, Toyota Tsusho, a trading arm of the Japanese carmaker, outlined preliminary plans for a 1,400-kilometre, 450,000 barrels per day (b/d) oil line from Juba in southern Sudan to Lamu, where the new port was to be completed by 2016 (Watkins 2012). Around the same time, the UK-based oil exploration and production company, Tullow Oil, which discovered Uganda’s oil in 2006, was exploring acreage in Ethiopia and in Kenya, when it discovered 600 million barrels of crude.

**Threat of Al-Shabaab**

However, Al-Shabaab posed a considerable threat to the pipelines and the development of the LAPSSET Corridor. The group was created from Al-Ittihad Al-Islami (AIAI, or “Unity of Islam”) (Watkins 2015). AIAI was a militant Salafi group that became prominent in the 1990s civil war in Somalia, after the fall of the Siad Barre regime (1969 – 1991). With a view to rid the region of elements hostile to its aims, Al-Shabaab has carried out numerous attacks in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Somalia. For instance, in 2010, Al-Shabaab ordered two suicide bombings at an Ethiopian restaurant and a rugby club in Kampala, Uganda, killing at least 74 people and wounding more than 85 others (Stanford 2010-16). Between January 2012 and April 2015, Al-Shabaab launched attacks across Kenya, which resulted in more than 600 casualties (Scafidi 2016).

While Al-Shabaab has conducted attacks throughout the region, its primary focus has been on Kenya and areas connected with the proposed Hoima-Lamu pipeline route: in Garissa and Lamu counties. Between October 2011 and May 2014, Kenya suffered 133 attacks by Al-Shabaab, with 39% of them in Garissa County (Mateso 2016). In April 2015, Al-Shabaab undertook its most ambitious attack in the county, killing 148 people at Garissa University College. The attack was Al-Shabaab's deadliest since its assault on Nairobi's Westgate Mall on 23 September 2013, which left 67 people dead. The attacks on Garissa County are especially significant, since the town of Garissa and its surrounding environment constitute a main staging point for the LAPSSET project (Watkins 2015).

Al-Shabaab has also targeted Lamu County, where it carried out numerous attacks in 2014, including four raids that killed over 70 people. Al-Shabaab carried out two attacks in June on Mpeketoni, a town 25 kilometres from the port of Lamu, and two more in July, on Hindi and Gamba, towns near Lamu. Those attacks “proved that the militants intend to threaten a major economic project” – a reference to the projected Hoima-Lamu pipeline and LAPSSET generally (Oxford Analytica 2015). Other analysts saw the attack on Mpeketoni as signaling an even larger problem: “In these remote regions, the writ of the Kenya state has barely run for many years, and it is here that they will find Al-Shabaab’s resilience and opportunism most challenging” (Anderson and McKnight 2014).

**Kenya’s Pre-emptive Strike against Al-Shabaab**

Ironically enough, Kenya’s government hoped to meet the challenge of Al-Shabaab long ago. In October 2011, Kenya’s government launched Operation Linda Nchi as a pre-emptive military operation against Al-Shabaab. The campaign aimed to take out Al-Shabaab in Somalia and create a buffer zone to protect Kenya’s northern region, home to the LAPSSET Corridor project. But even as Kenya launched its counter-terrorism offensive, critics doubted its success. One writer for Al-Jazeera said that “creating a buffer against Al-Shabaab is a scary prospect for a country that's never been to war” and added that “Operation Linda Nchi will be a difficult win” (Marima 2011).

Not only did Kenya’s counter-terrorism operation fail to prevent the cross border attacks from Al-
Shabaab militants, it actually increased them. In 2014, a newspaper, citing Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), reported that the attacks have become more frequent and widespread since Kenya took on Al-Shabaab head on. The country has suffered attacks from Al-Shabaab 133 times since the start of Operation Linda Nchi in October 2011 (Wafula 2014).

Attacks by Al-Shabaab in Kenya have continued unabated since the start of Operation Linda Nchi. For instance, in November 2014, Al-Shabaab operatives attacked a bus with 60 passengers traveling from Mandera to Nairobi, executing 28 passengers, including those who could not recite Koranic verses and others who resisted the attack. In December 2014, Al-Shabaab launched another attack in the northern Kenyan town of Koromei, killing at least 36 Christian workers. In April 2015, Al-Shabaab conducted its worst attack in years, killing 148 people at Garissa University College (Stanford 2010-16). In January 2016, Al-Shabaab topped the body count of the Garissa slaughter, killing 180 Kenyan troops stationed in Somalia and dragging bodies through Mogadishu streets (Laing 2016).

Risks of Investment by Oil Companies

Initially, the Hoima-Lamu route seemed to be the most likely to be constructed, especially after Tullow Oil discovered oil in northern Kenya. Adding to Tullow’s findings in Uganda, the new Kenyan deposits supported the commercial viability of the Hoima-Lamu route. However, the increased attacks from Al-Shabaab, and the failure of Kenyan forces to deter them, were not lost on the oil companies operating in the region – especially those faced with the decision to run an oil pipeline from Uganda. Therefore, other than the initial route of Hoima in Uganda to Lamu in Kenya, two alternative pipeline routes eventually emerged for consideration: (1) from Hoima in Uganda to Mombasa in Kenya; and (2) from Hoima in Uganda to Tanga in Tanzania.

Among the three oil companies working in Uganda and involved in the pipeline project, Total SA became most concerned. This is because of the three, only Total SA has had experience with terrorist attacks. For more than 25 years Total SA has operated in Yemen where, in the 1990s, one of its exploration bases was attacked by terrorists. Even today, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula continues to cast a long shadow over Yemen and the wider region, including the Horn of Africa. More recently, in 2013, following attacks on a natural gas field in Algeria, Total SA announced it would increase its security spending in the Middle East. At the time, Arnaud Breuillac, Total’s president for Middle East exploration and production, said the firm was “taking extra care now” and that “it is not only about the money…[but] about the people, the risk and the work” (Hatoum & Said 2013). Following the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, Total SA underscored its determination to safeguard its personnel and facilities (Rascouet 2015). Nonetheless, in February 2016, terrorists linked with the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS), killed a dozen workers in an attack on a Total SA oilfield in Libya (Faucon 2016). By then, though, Total SA had already arrived at a decision about the pipeline route for Uganda’s oil.

Although Uganda had earlier signed a tentative agreement with Kenya for the Hoima-Lamu pipeline route, it caused a stir in October 2015 by announcing it had signed an agreement with Tanzania to consider the Hoima-Tanga pipeline route (Musoke 2015). That announcement coincided with remarks by Total SA CEO Patrick Pouyenne that his firm was considering the Hoima-Tanga route due to security concerns about the Hoima-Lamu route (Reuters 2015).

Kenya Proposes a Wall

In November 2015, in an effort to win back the Hoima-Lamu route, Kenya announced the construction of an 800-kilometre wall along its border with Somalia. The purpose of the wall is to secure the northern region, prevent attacks by Al-Shabaab, and to protect the planned oil pipeline from terrorist attacks (Argus 2015).

However, as one observer noted, Kenya’s proposed wall amounts to a “mediaeval containment strategy” that was “unlikely to impress the Total board of directors” (Young 2015). Indeed, even promises of a wall comprised of concrete barriers, towers, ditches and observation posts, failed to win back support for Kenya’s preferred pipeline route. On 22 December 2015, in a meeting with Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni, Total SA’s CEO, Patrick Pouyanne expressed his firm’s desire to transport the crude oil via the Hoima-Tanga route (Total SA 2015). On 2 March 2016, Uganda formally announced its decision in favour of the Hoima-Tanga route at a summit of the East African Community Bloc. Two weeks later,
Tanzania announced that Total SA had the funds available for the project and that work on the pipeline would commence “soon” (Nyambura-Mwaura 2016).

Kenya officials attempted to put a brave face on Uganda’s decision, insisting they would proceed with a pipeline on their own to transport oil from their Turkana region across the country to the as-yet undeveloped port of Lamu (Njini 2016). Such a proposition is unlikely to be fruitful, as Kenya’s oil reserves are somewhat smaller than Uganda’s, with just under one billion barrels of oil. Its oil is also waxy, which means any pipeline constructed to transport it will have to be heated. This makes it an expensive project, especially amid the current era of low oil prices. Moreover, Ethiopia’s decision to source up to 240,000 b/d of oil products via a 550-kilometre pipeline from neighbouring Djibouti has also been a setback for Kenya’s LAPSSET Corridor (Burkhardt 2015). With regard to Uganda’s decision, one observer noted: “The overall political and social stability of Tanzania, in contrast to Kenya’s periodic political upheavals and occasional violent incursions by Somalia-based militants could see it emerge as a viable alternative transportation and logistics hub to Kenya” (Perey 2016).

Conclusion

Kenya’s counter-terrorism strategy has failed militarily, resulting in substantial economic and commercial implications. The hoped-for buffer zone aimed at keeping LAPSSET investments safe from terrorist attacks never emerged. Not only did Kenya’s Operation Linda Nchi fail to stem Al-Shabaab’s cross-border attacks, Al-Shabaab became further emboldened to carry out more raids. Many of those attacks, which occurred in and around Lamu, gave at least one of Uganda’s oil developers – Total SA – pause to reflect on the implications for the security of its projected pipeline, personnel and capital. As a result, Total SA gave Uganda little alternative but to back out of its earlier agreement with Kenya and opt for the new one with Tanzania.

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References:


Ivory Coast Attack: Africa’s Terror Footprint Expands

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The recent attack by Al Qaeda al-Jihad in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) on a beach resort in Ivory Coast, as well as earlier attacks in Mali and Burkina Faso, indicate AQIM’s growing influence and reach in West Africa. With the growing instability providing opportunity for the so-called Islamic State (IS) and Al Qaeda to establish a foothold in the African continent, the response to terrorism and extremism requires both preventive intelligence-led and pre-emptive community-based security approaches.

Background

On 13 March 2016, Al Qaeda al-Jihad in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) attacked a beach resort near Abidjan in Ivory Coast, a former French colony. Witnesses claim that armed men carried out the attack on L’Etoile du Sud hotel and hotel Nouvelle Paillote at Grand Bassam’s tourist resort, killing 16 civilians and three soldiers and injuring 24 others. Among the civilians were eight Ivorians, four French, a German, a Lebanese, a Nigerian and one Macedonian (Voc Peccavi 2016; Pearson 2016). Although the intent was to massacre French and other Westerners, most of those killed were Muslims. The gunmen were eventually killed in clashes with Ivorian security forces (Weiss 2016). A day later, AQIM posted photos of the Ivory Coast attackers and a brief statement claiming responsibility for the attack in Arabic, English, French and Spanish on its Telegram and Twitter accounts. The three suicide attackers were identified as belonging to AQIM’s Sahara unit and Al-Murabitoon, an Al Qaeda-affiliated militant group based in northern Mali. AQIM referred to the Ivory Coast hotels as the “den of espionage and conspiracies” (SITE Intelligence Group 2016).

AQIM’s origins can be traced back to the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armé/GIA), an Algerian terrorist group that fought the government during the Algerian civil war. Currently, AQIM is based in the Sahara Desert, with West African countries as its primary targets. The Grand Bassam incident is the third major attack that has been claimed by AQIM and its splinter group, Al-Murabitoon (Gaffey 2016). It was preceded by similar attacks in Mali and Burkina Faso.
In December 2015, Al-Murabitoon, led by Mokhtar Belmoktar, merged with AQIM following a joint attack carried out by Al-Murabitoon and AQIM’s Sahara branch. The joint attack took place in November 2015 at the Radisson Blu Hotel in the Malian capital of Bamako, with 170 people taken hostage and 20 killed. In January 2016, three AQIM terrorists also attacked Burkina Faso’s four-star Splendid Hotel and its nearby Cappuccino Café in Ouagadougou, killing 29 people. AQIM referred to the Burkina Faso hotel as “one of the most dangerous dens of global espionage in the west of the African continent” (BBC 2016).

**AQIM’s Message**

The Grand Bassam attack was intended to threaten the Sahel G5 group of African states (viz. Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger), which are coordinating anti-terror operations to oust Islamist militants operating in the Sahel region. According to AQIM, the group mounted the attack on Ivory Coast to “pluck the heads of the mighty criminals” and take revenge for Ivory Coast’s handover of terrorist captives to Mali. It was also to remind and warn the “Crusaders” that the anti-terrorist Operations Serval and Barkhane were not welcomed. In its warning to Westerners, AQIM states: “[W]e remind you each time that security in the world is a total and indivisible matter: either you leave us safe in our lands, or we will destroy your security and the security of your citizens, the same as you destroy our security. Know that the time of occupying our lands and looting our fortunes without [consequence] has gone without return” (SITE intelligence Group).

Al-Andalus Foundation for Media Production, the media wing of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) also released a message in praise of the attackers and their supporters, calling them “distinguished heroes” and conveying best wishes to them for repelling the “Crusaders” and avenging the deaths of their fellow fighters (Zelin 2016). Prior to the Grand Bassam attack, French soldiers operating in northern Mali had killed few members of AQIM and Al-Murabitoon. AQIM had called on countries involved in the French intervention in Mali to withdraw from the counter-insurgency operation.

France has been involved in anti-terrorist campaign in Africa’s Sahel region, codenamed Operation Barkhane, since August 2014. The operation comprises a 3,000-strong permanent force, headquartered in N’Djamena, Chad. Designed to combat the threat in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, Operation Barkhane is the successor to Operation Serval (2013 – 2014), the French intervention in Mali (Latorraca 2015). France also has a permanent military base in Ivory Coast, which it has used to conduct counter-insurgency campaigns in the Sahel Region, south of Maghreb. While the governments involved in the French-led counter-insurgency campaign refer to itself as the ‘Sahel G5,’ the terrorists refer to it as “the Satanic coalition.”

**The Aftermath and Regional Implications**

The international community and government leaders condemned the attack on Grand Bassam’s tourist resort. The attack took the Ivorian security forces by surprise. Days before the Grand Bassam attack, the Moroccan security services had informed their counterpart in Ivory Coast of an imminent attack against the tourist resorts on the relatively affluent West African nation of Ivory Coast (McKenzie 2016). The failure of the authorities in Ivory Coast to act upon the intelligence received raised questions about the level of preparedness by the country for a terrorist attack.

In a show of resilience by the business community, the hotels that were attacked reopened within days, with the government providing security. However, Ivory Coast might struggle to keep the tourism industry afloat due to tourist apprehensions about security. In response, President Alassane Ouattara is making efforts to restore investor confidence by introducing new security measures in Grand Bassam. While the number of tourists visiting Ivory Coast might get affected, Vice President of the US Chamber of Commerce has given assurances that the terrorist attack will not deter...
their investment in key industries including tourism, energy, agrifood business, education, healthcare, etc (Quist-Arcton 2016).

The terrorist attack on Ivory Coast demonstrates the need to develop a robust international and state response to a rising Al Qaeda and IS threat in Africa. After driving out the terrorists from northern Mali, which hosted AQIM, France reduced its involvement and handed over control to the Malian army and the United Nations peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) (United Nations 2013).

However, with the rise of IS and revitalisation of Al Qaeda, Africa is emerging as another hotbed of international terrorism, with both Al Qaeda and IS, competing for power and influence in the region. Terrorism, extremism and insurgency are especially prevalent in the northern, western and eastern parts of the African continent. While IS is strong in Egypt’s Sinai, several parts of Libya, and Nigeria’s northeast, Al Qaeda’s so-called Emirate of the Desert operates between Mali, Niger and Algeria. A third of the world’s Muslim population lives in Africa. With the unchecked growth of terrorist groups, the potential of IS and Al Qaeda to politicise and radicalise the Muslim community in Africa is growing. The rise of extremism and terrorism in Africa will have major regional security implications.

West Africa, including Ivory Coast, is witnessing the spillover effects of Western intervention in Libya. Following the fall of the Gaddafi regime, the flow of fighters and weapons from Libya to neighbouring countries, including Mali, has increased. The threat of terrorism has proliferated throughout the Sahel and beyond. IS has filled the power vacuum in Libya and gathered strength in the Maghreb. It has built its terror infrastructure from Egypt’s Sinai to Libya and now its networks and cells are threatening Tunisia and Morocco. Since Boko Haram declared allegiance to IS and renamed itself IS’ West African Province (ISWAP), the group has also expanded from north-eastern Nigeria to western parts, including Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. In east Africa, the Al Qaeda-linked Al-Shabaab is the most dominant group, with networks spread out in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Djibouti.

Conclusion

The attack on Ivory Coast signifies AQIM’s attempt to stake claims on African territories. Against this backdrop, both AQIM and IS compete for influence in Africa. AQIM’s strength in the Maghreb has been eroded due to counter-terrorism operations in Algeria by government security forces and in Mali by the French. To survive, the group operates between Mali, Niger and Algeria. While AQIM’s strength is in the desert, IS’ influence is growing in the urban and rural areas.

The threat of terrorism and extremism in Africa is likely to increase should IS and Al Qaeda-centric groups unite. There is an increased likelihood that the competition between these groups will diminish if either IS’ self-styled Caliph, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, or Al Qaeda’s leader Dr Ayman al Zawahiri is incapacitated or replaced. The current discord between IS and Al Qaeda is more along leadership rather than ideological lines. If there is unity between the IS and Al Qaeda-centric groups, the groups will cooperate and coordinate, thereby significantly increasing the threat to African regimes and communities.

The key to containing, isolating and eliminating the threat is to develop high quality intelligence, build platforms for security and intelligence collaboration and strengthen emergency response mechanisms. Although France’s Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve recently announced that France would deploy a paramilitary police Special Forces battalion to Burkina Faso with the mandate of providing a rapid-response capability in the event of terrorist attacks anywhere in the West African sub-region, it is also important for regional governments to
develop their own tactical strike and response capabilities.

Africans are known for their resilience and will fight if their governments engage them. Ivorian musicians, in a spectacular show of community resilience, defied the terrorists when they filmed on the very beach the terrorists attacked and released a song "Meme Pas Peur" (not a bit afraid). The lyrics, sung in French, carry the lines: "you kill innocents for lost causes" and "you won't go to paradise" (BBC 2016, Ivory Coast song defies al-Qaeda after Grand Bassam attack). According to the song’s producer, the song sends out a message that Ivory Coast might have been hit but it will not fall.

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**References:**


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