



**9TH ASIA-PACIFIC
PROGRAMME FOR
SENIOR NATIONAL SECURITY
OFFICERS: GLOCALISATION
AND NATIONAL SECURITY**

Event Report
3-8 May 2015

Centre of Excellence
for National Security

9TH ASIA-PACIFIC PROGRAMME FOR SENIOR NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICERS (APPSNO)

Report on the conference organised by:

Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Supported by:

National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS)
Prime Minister's Office, Singapore

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This report summarises the proceedings of the conference as interpreted by assigned rapporteurs and editor of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this report.

The conference adheres to a variation of the Chatham House Rule. Accordingly, beyond the points expressed in the prepared papers, no attributions have been included in this conference report.

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BACKGROUND AND AIMS OF THE CONFERENCE

National security is today a complex domain, encompassing matters ranging from the challenges of homeland security management, to designing coping strategies for a wide variety of traditional and non-traditional threats. National security, especially in a rapidly changing and complex environment, remains a key concern for countries worldwide.

In line with this, and with the aim of promoting a multi-agency and networked government approach as an important response to today's complex and uncertain security milieu, the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), a research unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) with the support of the National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS), within the Prime Minister's Office, organised the 9th Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO). APPSNO is targeted at senior government officials from the Asia-Pacific and beyond with responsibilities for national security matters. It is hoped that APPSNO will become an important tool for promoting the analytical frameworks, mindsets and skills needed for effective national security management.

APPSNO is driven by two primary objectives:

1. Enhance exposure to global best practices in national security

Participants will be given the opportunity to learn about the trends and global best practices in national security issues through lectures and informal discussions. Over the years, prominent speakers have been invited to speak on topics related to national risk assessment and management, strategic and crisis communication, cyber security, and countering violent extremism and radicalisation. The small-group interactive discussion format enables participants to share ideas, anecdotes and experiences that will be of broad professional interest.

2. Facilitate an international network of national security experts and practitioners

APPSNO will provide the platform for participants to network with global national security experts as well as develop stronger relationships with their regional counterparts. Interaction will be facilitated through field visits, educational and study tours and social activities.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

WELCOME REMARKS

Ambassador Ong Keng Yong, Executive Deputy Chairman, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore

In his welcome remarks, **Ong Keng Yong** emphasised the relationship between “glocalisation” and national security. Globalisation has given rise to unexpected challenges for national security. Universal approaches to tackling crises are therefore no longer effective. National security practitioners have to adapt to these realities, and national responses to what might seem to be universal threats have to take into account context and local factors. Ong noted the topics to be discussed in this year’s APPSNO included national identity, governance and communication, radicalisation, as well as practical case studies. APPSNO 2015 would also discuss new subjects not traditionally in the domain of national security, such as social media trends/analytics and crisis communications. He noted the sharing of ideas and experiences among participants would constitute the most meaningful takeaway from APPSNO.

OPENING ADDRESS

Mr Teo Chee Hean, Deputy Prime Minister, Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs

In his Opening Address, **Teo Chee Hean** emphasised “glocal” measures are necessary to address contemporary challenges to national security due to the inextricable link between local and global developments. Increasingly, national security officials will need to possess keen awareness of global developments. They would also need to be cognisant of local contexts in crafting the appropriate responses to national security challenges. The solutions would therefore be ones aligned with global circumstances, yet adapted to suit local conditions. Teo suggested three crucial areas in which decision-makers could respond to the present and future challenges of glocalisation: (a) Reaching out: learning from international best practices in managing challenges and crafting its implications for the local context; (b) Reaching across: establishing cooperation and collaboration between governments, international organisations, the private sector, and academia so as to

address threats by pooling resources and sharing research and intelligence; and (c) Reaching in: establishing social resilience within their own countries in order to recover quickly from incidents.

SESSION I: GLOCALISATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY: FUTURES

Go Glocal: The Global Need for New Thinking and New Efforts to Enhance Local Security

David F. Heyman, former Assistant Secretary for Policy, Department of Homeland Security, USA; President & CEO, Tektonics Global LLC, USA

David Heyman discussed the challenges globalisation has brought when local (country-specific) security issues are tackled. He emphasised the world is witnessing today qualitative changes in the nature of the threats faced. These threats are increasingly transnational and are more difficult to detect and contain within state borders. Newer methods of attacks, such as cyber-hacking, are also prevalent. In this regard, Heyman suggested today’s threats can be considered ‘glocal’ – they manifest locally within states but can show global characteristics. Therefore, conventional methods in addressing such threats only at the governmental level may not be enough. He suggested the integration of efforts by individuals, private organisations, local communities and the state may be fruitful in better ensuring local security.

Secure and Resilient Government and Telecommunication Infrastructure

Jacqueline Poh, Managing Director, Infocomm Development Authority, Singapore

Jacqueline Poh explained the increasing reliance on technology and the wired nature of society meant that the telecommunications infrastructure within any country should be protected against cyber and technological attacks. Poh noted various threats exist globally and can affect Singapore’s own national security. Therefore, there has been more awareness in the Singapore government about the ‘glocal’ nature of issues confronting the country. Poh shed light on some challenges which the telecommunications industry

faces and emphasised the intense connectivity that links the networks of government, society and business may be compromised if precautions are not taken. She then described several initiatives which Singapore has implemented to minimise the effects of cyber-attacks and to monitor such activities.

A Tale of Three Risks – A Perspective on the Future of Australia’s National Security

David Connery, Senior Analyst, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia

David Connery surveyed the future of Australia’s national security from three key vantage points. First, he defined how ‘national security’ is typically understood in Australia. Second, Connery assessed the probable risks to Australia’s national security, by looking at the risks of military attacks, terrorism and other organised crimes. Third, Connery suggested Australia’s greatest security threat is ensuring public confidence in the government’s ability to maintain national security in a cost-effective and proportionate way. He then made suggestions on how the national security conversation between the government and the public could be improved. Connery underlined Australians too have to be clearer of the country’s national security risks, so as to shape their own political views and drive the proper allocation of legislative tools and resources needed. This would help instil public confidence in the government’s ability to maintain national security.

SESSION II: NATIONAL IDENTITY

How Germany Became an Immigration Country

Reiner Klingholz, Director, Berlin Institute for Population and Development, Germany

Dr Reiner Klingholz’s presentation examined the challenges faced by Germany as an immigration nation. Confronted with a number of demographic issues such as the low fertility rate and an ageing population, immigration is needed to maintain a stable and growing population. However, there are internal and external factors affecting the arrival and integration of immigrants; in particular, inconsistent results of efforts to integrate certain groups have been a source of social tensions. Two pressing issues currently dominate the attention of policymakers: the increasing demand from the labour

market for more skilled foreign workers, and the rising number of asylum-seekers. The latter in particular pose a national security challenge, with the situation becoming increasingly dynamic as more seek to enter the country through human trafficking channels.

The Impact of Diversity on Social Cohesion: Implications of Positive and Negative Intergroup Contact

Miles Hewstone, Professor of Social Psychology and Director, Oxford Centre for the Study of Intergroup Conflict, University of Oxford; Fellow of New College, Oxford, United Kingdom

Miles Hewstone’s presentation examined the role of intergroup contact as an important component of social cohesion and nation-building. Direct intergroup contact has been found to be crucial for the promotion of integration; hence, more effort is needed to promote such contact from the bottom-up. Furthermore, contact established in neighbourhoods and extended forms of contact through an individual’s social network is shown to bring about positive effects on attitudes towards different ethnic groups. However, negative contact can also occur in diverse neighbourhoods. A crucial undermining factor of social cohesion is the perception of discrimination among minority groups; thus programmes for the promotion of social contact must take place in an environment supportive of equal opportunities and social justice.

The Nexus between National Identity and National Security

Norman Vasu, Deputy Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore

Norman Vasu’s presentation explored the concept of national identity as an important pillar of national security, relating this to the case of Singapore. National identity – whether conceptualised as a primordial form of identity or a modern conception by states – has been important in the promotion of a unifying form of nationalism. However, in recent times, these shared identities have come under pressure from the forces of globalisation, with potentially adverse impact. In the case of Singapore, this is manifested through the beginnings of an embryonic “Singaporean-ness” different from that which the government has sought to cultivate.

To manage the effects of globalisation, a possible alternative is the promotion of a civic national identity, based not on ethnicity but on active participation in local communities. Such a civic form of nationalism has the potential to promote a substantive, stable and inclusive national identity and is a basis for ensuring national security.

5TH APPSNO ALUMNI DISTINGUISHED DINNER LECTURE

Crisis: An Opportunity to Learn the Truth about Yourself and Your Organisation

Ronald K. Noble, immediate past Secretary-General, INTERPOL

Ronald K. Noble shared the lessons he learned during his career as INTERPOL Secretary-General from 2000 to 2014. Noble looked back at the crises he faced such as the September 11 terrorist attack, the 2004 tsunami, and various cybercrimes. He stressed these events had a profound impact on modern society and the national security of many countries around the world. Noble also discussed the importance of border security with regard to national and global security. He observed that the use of stolen, fraudulent, and fake passports by terrorists and dangerous criminals crossing borders is an “invisible crisis” that should be addressed. Noble also imparted insights shaped by his experiences during his supervision of various United States law enforcement agencies such as the US Secret Service, the US Customs Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms prior to his tenure at INTERPOL. He explained the attacks on the United States made him realise “national security is ultimately about protecting your country’s citizens from harm.”

DISTINGUISHED LUNCH LECTURE

Strategic Surprise and Good Governance

Peter Ho, Chairman, URA Board; Senior Advisor, Centre for Strategic Futures and Senior Fellow, Civil Service College, Singapore

In his presentation, **Peter Ho** noted that strategic surprise represents a big challenge for national security and its proper management thereby contributes to

good governance. Events such as the attacks on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 had been a game changer with cumulative effects on both the international and local fronts. The interconnection of local and global events has seen a rise in the frequency of strategic shocks that needs to be handled effectively. Decision-makers will therefore need to be increasingly aware of the effects of glocalisation, or the local impact of global events in their individual countries. He evinced the view that a whole-of-government approach that is flexible, adaptive and collaborative is the most effective method to deal with the impact of strategic surprise on the local level. A networked approach to problem-solving would counteract cognitive biases and thus allow for better anticipation of unexpected threats.

SESSION III: GOVERNANCE AND COMMUNICATION

Ripped Apart – The Story of a City in Chaos in New Zealand’s Biggest Natural Disaster

Sir Robert Parker, former Mayor, Christchurch, New Zealand

Sir Robert Parker shared his personal experience in the aftermath of the earthquakes of 2010 – 2012 in his capacity as the Mayor of Christchurch. He examined the methods by which the Christchurch City Council dealt with the disaster, through: (a) communication; (b) coordination; (c) compassion; and (d) innovation. Parker emphasised the importance of community engagement from the ground up as such engagement would foster closer ties in the community and strengthen social resilience. He stressed the importance of emergency preparedness by the city council and community. Elaborating, Parker noted the importance of having city council members enrolling in civil defence initiatives.

Reflections on Government Communications in Singapore - and What it Means for You

Janadas Devan, Chief of Government Communications, Ministry of Communications and Information, Singapore

Janadas Devan spoke about the increased diversity in Singapore as a result of immigration and globalisation. He discussed the shaping of identity and nationhood in Singapore in recent years. The intensity of the spirit of Singaporean nationhood was evident from the number of Singaporeans who paid tribute to the late Mr Lee Kuan Yew at his funeral. Devan highlighted the complexity

of government policy and the need for government policy making to be inclusive and persuasive for the general public to adopt such policies. With the fractured media landscape in today's globalised world, media platforms are a lot more diverse. Devan stressed the importance of direct face-to-face communication with the public, and raised the example of the government outreach efforts of the Pioneer Generation package to Singaporean senior citizens aged 65 years and above. He also discussed the implications that direct, door-to-door tailored communication can have on political campaigns, giving the example of Barack Obama's communications strategy in the 2012 US presidential campaign.

CHANGI AIRPORT SITE VISIT

APPSNO participants visited Changi Airport and had the opportunity to learn more about the aviation and airport security management and practices of the Airport Police Division (APD) and the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS). The programme began with briefings by APD Commander Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police Zuraidah Abdullah, Deputy Superintendent of Police Liao Wee Peng, and CAAS Head of Aviation Security and Emergency Planning Division (Aviation Security & Facilitation) Cheri Lim. Besides briefings on airport and aviation security in Singapore, the visit offered a behind-the-scenes look at the Airport Operations Centre and APD Command and Control Centre and Changi's multi-layered security measures.

SESSION IV: RADICALISATION: NEW HORIZONS

Taking Stock of the Foreign Fighter Blowback from Syria

Thomas Hegghammer, Director, Terrorism Research, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), Norway

Thomas Hegghammer addressed the phenomenon of returning foreign fighters from Iraq and Syria. He emphasised the methodological challenges associated with numerical assessments of foreign fighters, and described the mechanisms by which maximum numbers tend to be favoured over lower estimates by the media. Key issues include the lack of accurate information and misinterpretation of data. Hegghammer stressed the

sole successfully executed attack involving a returning foreign fighter had been carried out in Europe since the start of the Syrian civil war. In contrast, plots involving Islamic State (IS) sympathisers are more frequent. This is due to the existence of an unprecedented large pool of IS sympathisers, as opposed to the presumed absence of foreign fighters who would be sent back to their home regions by Syria-based organisations to stage terrorist attacks.

Family Based Intervention and De-radicalisation Tools: Introduction to Different Models across Europe

Daniel Koehler, Director, German Institute on Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies (GIRDS), Germany

Daniel Koehler presented a model of family-based de-radicalisation implemented in Germany, aimed at preventing individuals from going to Iraq and Syria which can also deal with returnees from these conflict zones. He stressed the importance of families and friends in detecting the violent radicalisation process and the key role of female figures such as mothers, daughters and sisters. A public-private partnership initiated in 2012, the German model of de-radicalisation depends on four non-governmental organisations (NGO's) and a government hotline. The method pursued by family counsellors and relatives include re-establishing emotional bonds with people experiencing violent radicalisation. It was also cited that the return of individuals from Iraq and Syria to their families does not mark the end of the process, as after-care turns out to be a crucial element of the societal re-inclusion of formerly radicalised individuals.

New Horizons: Countering 'Not-Violent Extremism' in the Age of ISIS

Kumar Ramakrishna, Associate Professor and Head of Policy Studies in the Office of the Executive Deputy Chairman, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore

Kumar Ramakrishna described the current configuration of the globalised al-Qaeda (AQ) movement and noted the centrality of a shared ideological narrative among four different organisational layers: (a) involving al-Qaeda central (AQC); (b) AQ's associates and affiliates; (c) groups with certain levels of connection with AQ, and (d) AQ-inspired lone-wolves. On the notion of extremism, Ramakrishna argued that the successful resonance of extremist narratives lies in the simplicity

of the explanations they provide and the solutions they bring to complex problems. While the non-violent extremist was pictured as an individual who permanently rejects violence, the not-violent extremist was described as an individual that momentarily relinquishes the use of violence. Therefore, Ramakrishna defined an extremist not as a non-violent individual but as a not yet violent person who could use violence under specific circumstances. He concluded by stressing the need to resist all forms of violent and not-violent extremism and to adapt global counter-strategies to local contexts.

SESSION V: GLOCALISATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY: PRACTICAL CASE STUDIES

Aviation Security in the Wake of Aviation Tragedies

Nathalie Herbelles, Assistant Director, Airport, Passenger, and Cargo Security – Asia-Pacific, International Air Transport Association (IATA), Singapore

Nathalie Herbelles presented on the advancement of aviation security in the world today and highlighted the lessons learnt in cases involving passenger aircraft in the past year. In her presentation, Herbelles started by explaining the role of IATA in global aviation security, and how IATA partners airlines through aviation security legislation. In further highlighting the role of IATA, she emphasised the opening of more IATA offices globally, reflecting the growing aviation sector and the consequent need for security in Asia. She highlighted the challenges to aviation that IATA has been looking at, warning that aviation security should be progressive in predicting future threats. Herbelles further observed that reactively securitising infrastructure after the occurrence of a major incident was counter-productive. She also touched upon the new security initiatives introduced at airports to improve advanced information sharing for both cargo and passengers, and the need to enhance the passenger experience without jeopardising national security requirements.

Lessons Learned from the Current Ebola Outbreak

David L. Heymann, Professor of Infectious Diseases Epidemiology, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine; Head of Centre on Global Health Security at Chatham House London; Chairman of Public Health, United Kingdom

David L. Heymann spoke on the challenges faced by the team fighting Ebola and took a historical approach to explain the evolving response to combating and defining the threat of Ebola. Heymann explained that there were two different perspectives to look at the current crisis: first, it is a collective health security risk; and second, an individual health risk for those living in affected countries. The global response to the current Ebola outbreak in West Africa was further broken down to analyse the preventable mistakes that could have been avoided if protocols were strictly followed. Heymann used the Ebola outbreak to reflect on the inadequacies of borders in controlling the spread of diseases, and highlight the political will needed to contain diseases. He further commented that good epidemiological common practices need to prevail and that the transmission of disease needs to be closely monitored to prevent a global pandemic.

Norway 22 July 2011 – The Terror Attacks and Lessons Learned

Per Kristen Brekke, Deputy Director-General, Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB), Norway

Per Kristen Brekke shared the Norwegian experience of a home grown right-wing terror attack perpetrated by Anders Breivik on 22 July 2011 and the investigation process that followed the incident. Brekke described the incident and explained the inadequacies of the police response and the strength of the community response to the incident. He also talked about the reconciliation process for the families involved in the incident. The findings of the 22 July 2011 commission were presented to highlight the lessons learnt from the incident. Brekke described the increased cooperation among agencies in its aftermath, and the strengthening of command structures in coordinating public security and civil protection. He stressed the need for leadership from politicians and government officials in a crisis to avoid mixed signals. Brekke praised the resilience stemming from Norwegian culture and attitudes of the public in the aftermath of the incident. He also discussed the collective Norwegian decision to protect the citizenry's right to privacy over heightened surveillance methods against terrorist attacks.

FULL REPORT

WELCOME REMARKS

Ambassador Ong Keng Yong

Executive Deputy Chairman, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU)

OPENING ADDRESS

Mr Teo Chee Hean

Deputy Prime Minister, Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs, Singapore

SESSION I: SYSTEMIC RESILIENCE: STRATEGIC FRAMEWORKS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND RESILIENCE

SESSION II: NATIONAL IDENTITY

5th APPSNO ALUMNI DISTINGUISHED DINNER LECTURE

Mr Ronald Noble

Immediate past Secretary-General, INTERPOL

APPSNO DISTINGUISHED LUNCH LECTURE

Mr Peter Ho

Chairman, URA Board; Senior Advisor, Centre for Strategic Futures and Senior Fellow, Civil Service College, Singapore

SESSION III: GOVERNANCE AND COMMUNICATION

CHANGI AIRPORT SITE VISIT

SESSION IV: RADICALISATION: NEW HORIZONS

SESSION V: GLOCALISATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY: PRACTICAL CASE STUDIES

WELCOME REMARKS

Ambassador Ong Keng Yong

Executive Deputy Chairman, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore



Ong Keng Yong

In his speech, Ong Keng Yong welcomed participants to the 9th APPSNO. Ong noted that the key purpose of APPSNO was to bring together senior national security practitioners, policymakers and academics worldwide for networking and exchange of ideas.

Ong highlighted the theme of the APPSNO 2015 - "Globalisation and National Security". Globalisation had, Ong noted, resulted in unexpected challenges for national security. Globalisation had produced surprising outcomes not only on the international level, but also in very specific manner in various locales. For example, issues such as the returned Islamic State (IS) fighters and pandemics pose challenges that had to be dealt with in different ways depending on location and context. Universal approaches to tackling crises situations were therefore insufficient. Instead, Ong suggested officers need to adapt to such

changes in their responses, dealing with such threats in consideration with their context. General prescriptions for national security would work only if the specific adaptation and understanding takes place.

To prepare participants to handle new challenges of glocalisation, Ong observed APPSNO 2015 would discuss more diverse themes than in the previous years. New subjects that were not traditionally in domain of national security, such as social media trends and analytics and crisis communications, would be raised. Ong observed Singapore has found it necessary to adapt its thinking of maintaining harmonious balance in the face of globalising forces that brought about new ideologies, aided by the new media. He noted the panels would tackle subjects ranging from national identity, governance and communication, to radicalisation. Practical case studies would also be examined. The opening panel would also "unpack" the glocalisation theme and contribute to understanding how threats elsewhere have changed risks management and looking at how countries have adapted national security frameworks either holistically or in response to specific emerging issues such as cyber-threats. Distinguished speakers had also been invited to give talks: Ronald Noble, former Secretary-General of Interpol, and Mr. Peter Ho, the former head of Singapore's Civil Service.

Since workable practices in one location might not always suffice as a solution in a different place, Ong said he believed the sharing of ideas and experiences was thereby crucial between national security practitioners and subject experts. There would be plentiful opportunities for networking, and these would be conducive to some of the most meaningful takeaways from APPSNO.

OPENING ADDRESS

Mr Teo Chee Hean

Deputy Prime Minister, Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs, Singapore



Teo Chee Hean

In his Opening Address, Teo Chee Hean emphasised glocal measures were necessary to address contemporary challenges to national security due to the inextricable link between local and global developments. He also outlined dimensions along which decision-makers may develop measures to tackle issues associated with glocalisation.

Teo observed that in national security, incidents can change course and result in far-reaching consequences within a short span of time. Policymakers will therefore need to be keenly aware of global developments, understand their implications for the local context and respond accordingly. For instance, the rapid advance of technology was a double-edged sword that had facilitated not only international trade but also infectious diseases, computer malware, and extremist ideologies. Cyberspace also posed new dangers that go beyond financial, operational, and reputational losses. Additionally, social media has become recruitment tools for terrorist groups like the Islamic State (IS). Teo noted the need for a robust partnership to address contemporary national security challenges that arise due to the porosity of physical and virtual borders, the speed at which threats evolve, and the vast variety of threats. He suggested three crucial areas in which decisionmakers could respond to the present and future challenges of glocalisation: reaching out,

reaching in and reaching across.

In 'reaching out', Teo highlighted that policymakers should examine causes and developments of security challenges as well as learn from international best practices in managing challenges and crafting its implications for the local context. For instance, the lone wolf attacks in Sydney and Paris in December 2014 and January 2015 respectively showed the challenges involved in early detection of radicalisation. To combat the problem of radicalisation, the Malaysia Jihad Concept Explanation Action Committee, for example, had brought together police, government communicators, academia, and the media to address misconception about jihad. Teo also highlighted the rehabilitation of extremists as an important area for mutual exchange of ideas. Singapore's East Asia Summit Symposium on Religious Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration that convened in April 2015 brought together practitioners and scholars to share best practices on rehabilitation, which could then be adapted to suit different local conditions.

For 'reaching across', cooperation and collaboration must be established between governments, international organisations, private sector, and academia so as to address threats by pooling resources and sharing research and intelligence. Teo highlighted the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation (IGCI), launched in April 2015, which at its core was an exercise in international cooperation to combat cybercrime. The organisation had been successful in coordinating a global operation on 9 April against the Simda botnet, which infected more than 770,000 computers worldwide, been used to steal personal details and spread malware remotely.

Teo's final point, 'reaching in', meant building social resilience in individual countries as a preventive measure to recover quickly from incidents. Teo underlined the importance of building a society where its citizens could overcome adversity with solidarity regardless of cultural differences. He noted that national security practitioners would need to develop expertise in social domains such as communications and understanding societal trends to better prepare them in establishing social resilience.

SESSION I:

GLOCALISATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY: FUTURES

Go Global: The Global Need for New Thinking and New Efforts to Enhance Local Security

David F. Heyman, former Assistant Secretary for Policy, Department of Homeland Security, USA; President & CEO, Tektonics Global LLC, USA



David F. Heyman

David Heyman discussed the challenges globalisation had brought about in the context of addressing national security challenges. He emphasised we were witnessing qualitative changes in the nature of threats today. Threats were increasingly transnational as well as more difficult to detect and contain within the borders of states. Newer methods of attacks, such as cyber-hacking, were also prevalent. In this regard, Heyman suggested today's threats can be considered 'glocal' - manifesting locally within states, but capable of showing global characteristics. Therefore, the conventional methods and procedures employed by governments currently in addressing such possible threats may not be enough.

In this respect, Heyman introduced the concept of 'hybridicity'. He defined 'hybridicity' as the state of being in which two different entities exist simultaneously as one. 'Hybridicity' here essentially is a paradigm shift, where 'hybridicity' constitutes the 'in-between' transition as one entity is changing into the other. Therefore, Heyman suggested that the changing nature of threats we observe today reflects 'hybridicity'.

Heyman stressed the need for new thinking and

new efforts in approaching future challenges more effectively. He suggested that there was a need to view newer issues and threats from a 'glocal' perspective, and govern these new threats appropriately. Heyman stated that globalisation had played a primary role in the rise of catastrophic events and threats, such as cyber-attacks and in politics and economics. Globalisation had also encouraged the inevitability for organised crimes and diseases to spread beyond the boundaries of states. In this regard, Heyman suggested that there is a growing need for states to govern these newer threats more effectively by acknowledging them as 'glocal' threats rather than just global. Viewing today's threats from a 'glocal' perspective acknowledges the decentralised nature of threats across state boundaries and provides an appreciation of how threats can manifest locally while showing global characteristics. This moves beyond just viewing threats only from the 'global' perspective, which would suggest that states prioritise a democratic control of centralised threats in its governance.

Continuing his first point, Heyman suggested states should review their overall national security frameworks to respond promptly to the changing nature of threats. He cited the usefulness of homeland security strategies when governing in a 'glocalised' world, which focuses on more grassroots and local government involvement as well as a whole-of-society approach. In this regard, Heyman suggested for greater integration of efforts between governments and societies to combat these newer 'glocal' threats from occurring within society. These efforts should be accomplished by garnering the cooperation of individuals, private organisations and communities within the society.

Heyman then gave the example of countering violent extremism, to explain how the homeland security model can be operationalised to counter 'glocal' threats. Many individuals involved may re-enter their countries of origin after being radicalised overseas; there is a possibility of these individuals carrying out terrorist activities within their countries thereafter. In this regard, tools employed only at the government level

may not be suitable; it would be necessary to activate homeland security strategies instead which would empower the local communities to take responsibility for their society. Garnering the support of these local communities may be more effective too as they are attuned to the local contexts. Local businesses and individuals can monitor suspicious activities occurring in their respective neighbourhoods, in their bid to ensure the security of their society.

All in, a more globalised world would lead to unprecedented issues and threats. Therefore according to Heyman, there is a growing necessity to 'Go Glocal' to enhance local security.

Secure and Resilient Government and Telecommunication Infrastructure

Jacqueline Poh, Managing Director, Infocomm Development Authority, Singapore



Jacqueline Poh

Jacqueline Poh explained that the increasing reliance on technology and the wired nature of society meant that the telecommunications infrastructure within any country should be protected against cyber and technological attacks. She alluded to the various threats existing globally that could affect Singapore's own national security. At the same time, she observed local issues may also have global implications and can contribute to global trends. Therefore, there has been more awareness by the Singapore government about the 'glocal' nature of issues confronting the country.

In her presentation, Poh first outlined four different nodes within Singapore's telecommunications network

which might be vulnerable to attacks. Firstly was the 'Internet of Things' that encompassed the increased sophistication of basic appliances such as refrigerators and microwave ovens – all the things which made a 'smart home'. These appliances were built for function but not security. This means that there is no data encryption in these appliances. Secondly, Poh highlighted traffic control systems. These included smart nation vehicle systems such as the Electronic Road Pricing, which may experience data transfer issues as vehicular information may be stolen if these systems were compromised. Thirdly, point-of-sale transactions may also be exposed to malware. Personal data might be sent to or shared with unauthorised persons or groups, when credit cards are used in such transactions. Finally, Poh highlighted the threat of mobile data sniffing. This might take place when data and/or source and destination addresses were illegally captured or 'read' while being transmitted through a network.

Poh next illustrated the impact of a compromised telecommunications network on parties connected to the network. She described how any organisation could be affected through defacement, disruption and data breaches with the accompanying reputational and monetary costs. For example, consumer data theft had plagued several major companies such as EBay, JP Morgan, Target, and Sony. Firms in Singapore may also be compromised, as seen in the KBox saga where customer's personal information were stolen and leaked. Poh alluded that a firm who is victim to data theft may also be an offender, for not safeguarding customers' data properly.

Poh then also emphasised how technology can be used for any individual's or group's objectives. This can be seen in some 'hactivist' examples stemming from a singular political incident, which may thereafter grow in size within the state. This includes 'Anonymous' hacks in the Philippines, the 'Anonymous'-launched 'Operation Ferguson' which sought to reclaim justice for an unarmed teenager killed in a fatal killing, and 'Anonymous' hacking the sites of the National Security Agency of the United States.

In this regard, Poh illustrated how Singapore has moved to implement several initiatives to minimise and monitor the possibility of such hacking activities in Singapore. Measures taken include the formulation of National

Cyber Security Masterplan 2018, the setting up of the IDA's Monitoring and Operation Command Centre, the appointment of several Chief Security Information Officers at various ministries responsible for infocomm security management, and the passage of the Personal Data Protection Act. Singapore had also launched a dedicated agency for national cyber security, the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore, to strengthen its safeguards against possible cyber malware and attacks.

A Tale of Three Risks – A Perspective on the Future of Australia's National Security

David Connery, Senior Analyst, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia



David Connery

David Connery surveyed the future of Australia's national security from several key points. He examined the possibility of military attacks, terrorism and organised crime activity in Australia as traditional sources of national security risks. Connery suggested Australia's greatest security threat was in fact ensuring public confidence in the government's ability to maintain national security in a cost-effective and proportionate way. He then made suggestions on how the national security conversation between the government and the public could be improved.

First, Connery explored the Australian understanding of 'national security'. 'National security' covered the protection of the state (Australia), the social community, the safeguard of Australia's international concerns, and the individuals residing within its boundaries. Some wide-ranging factors affecting Australia's national security risk levels today include espionage and foreign

interference, instability in neighbouring developing and fragile states, malicious cyber activities, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Second, Connery assessed the probable risks to Australia's national security, by looking at the risks of military attacks, terrorism and other organised crimes. He suggested the risk of a military attack on Australia is low, but added that the consequences of such a putative attack would be severe and should still be given priority in Australia's defence planning. He also highlighted the persistent threat of terrorism, noting the increasingly home-grown dimensions this threat has assumed, with a concomitant substantial risk of an attack occurring. Connery commented that international efforts in combating terrorism could help to reduce the likelihood of attack in Australia. At the same time, serious and organised crimes are also pertinent threats to Australia. He contended that the increasingly transnational and 'everyday' nature of these crimes makes its risk highly probable. Connery then explained that there is a need to properly assess the likelihood of these three risks occurring and their consequences to Australia, so as to adequately allocate resources needed for these purposes.

Third, Connery suggested Australia's greatest security threat is actually ensuring public confidence in the government's ability to maintain national security in a cost-effective and proportionate way. This relates to the government's efficiency (or lack thereof) in implementing national security strategies with the changes within Australia's immediate geo-political, social, technological and economic environment. Connery alluded to the inertia found within government and pressed the need for strong legislation to move Australia forward on this matter. There is also the need to build a consistent 'whole-of-nation' approach. Diverse sectors such as education, healthcare and social services all had to be brought into the broader security dialogue. In addition, key players – government, businesses, and communities - should share information and take part in highlighting Australia's national security risks.

In this regard, society needs to publicly discuss risks such as terrorism and other crimes within Australia. Its people have to be clearer of Australia's national security risks, so as to shape their own political views and drive the proper allocation of legislative tools and resources

needed. This would help instil public confidence in the government's ability to maintain national security.

Syndicate Discussions

One significant point raised early in the discussions was how globalisation permitted more individuals to air their views and opinions freely over social media platforms. The speaker acknowledged that there might be issues of social cohesion when content over social media platforms is not controlled. The implications might be not just local but even international. In this regard, both the soft (rehabilitation and education) and hard (law) approaches should be taken when such content is found.

One participant enquired how immigration and ethnic minorities can influence specific problems within any state, and how these problems have been addressed. In response, it was emphasised that immigration is a key component contributing to the make-up of most countries, with many countries having minority groups from various socio-religious backgrounds. It had to be acknowledged, however, that certain individuals within an immigrant diaspora might be involved in or influenced by international terrorist activities. In this regard, the country would have to evaluate how 'high risk' an individual is and if he or she had had a history of terrorist-related activities. Some countries have also criminalised certain activities and have given more monitoring power to law enforcement authorities over suspicious activities. In some of these cases, basic freedoms of the individuals suspected of criminal and/or terrorist activities - such as the freedom to travel - might need to be curtailed.

A question was raised on who should be accountable for the 'de-radicalisation' of terrorists within a state, and under whose purview should this effort be. Law enforcement units and the military, for example, might not be the most suitable in carrying out this function. In response, it was noted that there should be more trust - trust in the role of civil society to take part in the 'de-radicalisation' process (together with the government and relevant authorities). Community vigilance and socio-economic improvement programmes might also be useful to address radicalisation stemming from social exclusion and economic issues.

A question was raised on commonly misunderstood aspects of terrorism, radicalisation and religious discourse, and how the state can improve upon these misconceptions. One observation (in reply) was that the meaning of 'jihad' has been misunderstood. One possible answer (the reply continued) was for the state to adjust the syllabus within Islamic schools, to have a clearer understanding of the concept.

Another idea raised: early warning behavioural indicators to be developed, to monitor possible self-radicalised individuals or lone wolves. This could be tied in with a community partnership model, which would encourage members of the society to be attentive to suspicious behaviours as delineated by the indicators. This may not necessarily be de-radicalisation programmes *per se*, but a scheme to promote some cooperation within the society.

More generally, there was discussion on the role of community-based initiatives within broader national security strategies. Local communities should be involved in dealing with current and future threats. This would allow each individual to have a shared responsibility in the security of the country, and would bring in the societal perspective in respective countries' national security strategies. This would also encourage a 'whole-of-nation' collaborative approach.

One participant asked if there should be more regional collaboration to learn from other countries' lessons in managing security threats. The response was that collaboration should be encouraged and that this can be done by setting up regional law enforcement offices for regular exchanges. This should be accomplished through more dialogues to discuss national security issues, and a coherent information-sharing mechanism that can be utilised by the countries involved. This should be based on in-depth analyses of the diverse risks and threats that are present in the various countries, and the sharing of these countries' best practices.

SESSION II:

NATIONAL IDENTITY

How Germany Became an Immigration Country

Reiner Klingholz, Director, Berlin Institute for Population and Development, Germany



Reiner Klingholz

Reiner Klingholz's presentation focused on challenges faced by Germany as an immigration nation. The presentation began with an outline of a number of demographic challenges and the role played by immigration in stabilising population growth. This was followed by an examination of the factors affecting the arrival and integration of immigrants, and the impact of the increasing number of asylum-seekers entering the country.

Germany had for a long time been confronted with a number of demographic issues. For the past 40 years, the country experienced below replacement fertility rates which currently stand at 1.4 children per woman. In terms of the population pyramid, calculations show that by 2025, every cohort entering the pensionable age bracket will be larger than the cohort entering the working age bracket. Hence, immigration is needed to maintain a stable population as well as to provide sufficient workers to meet demand coming from the German labour market.

There were three main advantages in the growth of the migrant population. First, migrants made up a small percentage of those dependent on the pension system. Second, more of them are of working age and are able

to meet labour market demands provided they have the requisite educational background and level of skills. The third advantage was the fact that migrants tended to have more children, thus contributing significantly towards lifting the national fertility rate.

However, affected by internal as well as external factors, the flow of immigrants into the country had been erratic over the years. There are high levels of circular migration from surrounding European Union countries, with large numbers leaving Germany after a few years. Many of the migrants who end up staying were guest workers with low or minimal qualifications and were often joined by family members through family reunion processes. Efforts to integrate migrants began late and the results were inconsistent due to the reluctance of Germany to admit that it had become an immigration nation. Certain migrant groups are better integrated than others. Those who were the most successful in integrating into mainstream German society were from other European nations while the least successful have been migrants of Turkish descent.

Another challenge was the rising number of asylum-seekers and refugees entering Germany. While not unexpected, there are concerns such sharply rising numbers could pose social and national security challenges for the country with the situation becoming increasingly dynamic as more sought to enter the country through human trafficking channels. Klingholz concluded by noting that while immigration remained an important means of arresting population growth in Germany, integration also brought with it challenges to building a cohesive and equal society.

The Impact of Diversity on Social Cohesion: Implications of Positive and Negative Intergroup Contact

Miles Hewstone, Professor of Social Psychology and Director, Oxford Centre for the Study of Intergroup Conflict, University of Oxford; Fellow of New College, Oxford, United Kingdom



Miles Hewstone

Miles Hewstone's presentation focused on the importance of ethnic diversity and examined the role of intergroup contact as an important component of social cohesion and nation building. The presentation introduced three different types of intergroup contact and the effect such forms of contact have on improving group relationships. The presentation then explored the negative effects of group contact and concluded by arguing that intergroup contact may be integral to fostering nation-building and citizenship programmes.

Hewstone highlighted prevailing research that diversity in a society promoted greater levels of threat perception, which in turn drove down the levels of trust between groups. However, such research did not take into account the role of contact between groups. According to Hewstone, the promotion of contact under positive, cooperative conditions had the effect of changing attitudes and improving relationships. He noted that direct contact, measured in terms of the quantity and quality of contact between different groups, had been found to be most effective in promoting more positive attitudes regarding diversity. Another form of contact, referred to as the "secondary transfer effect", sees a "knock-on" or "trickle-down" effect occurring where contact with one group produces more positive attitudes towards other different groups. A third type, known as the "extended" contact, measured positive effects on individuals when members of their own social network established contact with other groups. This third type of contact in particular, could be used in social intervention programmes to help people who were initially apprehensive or nervous in having direct contact with certain groups.

Overall, contact had been shown to be important for promoting positive intergroup relationships and more effort was needed to promote such initiatives from the bottom-up in social settings and organisations, such as in schools and organisations. However, attention must also be paid to the effects of negative contact experiences as increasing diversity in a group presents opportunities for both positive and negative contact. For minority groups, the single most important factor undermining positive contact is the perception of discrimination, which undermines the good work done in promoting intergroup contact.

In terms of nation building and citizenship programmes, intergroup contact had been successfully implemented in a number of state programmes such as the Malaysian National Service Programme. In the same vein, positive intergroup contact could be a vital part of programmes aimed at dealing with national security challenges such as the fight against radicalisation. Hewstone observed that good work could be undone through negative contact experiences and efforts at re-segregation of certain segments of the population. Efforts in promoting social contact must take place in an environment that is supportive of equal opportunities and social justice.

The Nexus between National Identity and National Security

Norman Vasu, Deputy Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore



Norman Vasu

Norman Vasu's presentation explored the importance of national identity as a pillar of national security and the changes wrought by the forces of globalisation to this symbiotic relationship. The presentation outlined two ways in which national identity was conceived, and its crucial role in building national security. The case of Singapore was considered in terms of how national identity was articulated and impacted by the forces of globalisation. The presentation concluded with an argument for a more effective and inclusive means of nation building, through the establishment of a civic form of national identity.

National identity – whether conceptualised as a primordial form of identity or a modern conception by states – had been an important means in the promotion of a unifying form of nationalism. While primordial forms of national identity emphasised shared bloodlines, cultural ties or religion, a different means of creating national identity is employed by states to foster unity among the population. In terms of national security, strong national identity could be used to promote a strong sense of solidarity; this legitimises and motivates the protection of “us” against a common enemy. However, national identities based on specific criteria such as ethnicity or religion have also been instrumental in excluding others, which may eventually lead to the fragmentation of the society. In sum, the creation and propagation of a strong sense of national identity was potentially a double-edged sword.

The pressures of globalisation had initially raised fears that national identities would be eroded through the homogenisation of culture as the world became more interconnected. This proposition has since given way to the realisation that centrifugal forces of globalisation itself comes under the pressures of a centripetal force of resistance, from local culture, tribalism and religious fundamentalism. The contention now is the world is increasing “glocalised”, with people experiencing the “local” and “global” simultaneously. In the case of Singapore, racial diversity had been embraced as a platform for building a shared national identity through the formulation of the Chinese-Malay-Indian-Other (CMIO) model. However, in recent times, this shared identity has come under pressure from globalisation, manifested through the breaking-down of racial categories and the beginnings of an embryonic “Singaporean-ness”. The new permutation differs from

the official CMIO model, presenting a point of departure to the underlying basis of national identity established by the government.

In seeking to manage the effects of globalisation on national identities, there was an option open to states: promoting of a civic national identity. This permutation is not based on primordial or state articulated forms of identity, but on active participation in local communities. The promotion of a civic national identity is stable and inclusive, allowing for people of different backgrounds to be drawn together. Such a civic form of nationalism has the potential to promote a substantive, stable and inclusive national identity and is a basis for ensuring national security.

Syndicate Discussions

A question was raised concerning the challenges faced by Germany in integrating immigrants into the society as well as the most effective ways of promoting integration. In response, for Germany approximately 30 years was needed for immigrants to integrate into society. For the first generation of immigrants, this was a more difficult process as many were keen on maintaining their own cultural practices. In terms of effective means to promote integration, the education system is crucial as indicators have shown higher levels of education led to better integration. Another factor was the availability of jobs; the socio-economic class of an immigrant improved through employment, promoting more interaction and reducing the perception of threat associated with an immigrant.

A question was posed on the consequences to Germany's national security from the recent influx of asylum-seekers and refugees. As the number of asylum-seekers and refugees in Germany increases, there was the possibility of the infiltration of those who were involved in violence in their own home countries or have affiliation with terrorist groups. There have also been instances where immigrant groups brought religious and ethnic conflicts to their new countries. Proper mechanisms are needed to uncover and track such asylum-seekers and immigrants.

A participant queried whether the approach taken by Singapore was to promote a general or targeted

immigration policy. A speaker replied that the overall approach was to maintain the racial composition of the country, as a means of sustaining communal harmony. While unlikely to be altered, the policy has not taken into account problems such as cultural differences between new immigrants and locals from similar ethnic groups. As a result, there have been minor cultural clashes in the day-to-day lives of immigrants and citizens. These cultural clashes can eventually be resolved through shared experiences such as through the national education system.

A question was raised concerning the possible indicators that an immigrant has successfully integrated into the host society. A speaker explained that one of the biggest challenges for Singapore in integrating foreigners is the fact that there is no consensus as to what this entails. There are two approaches in defining integration: the first is by means of structural components such as equality and social rights, while the second is by means of cultural indicators. In the context of Singapore, there was more emphasis on integration at the cultural level. However, such efforts remain challenging as there

is as yet no clear articulation or consensus on what constitutes the successful integration of immigrants on a cultural level.

A participant raised a question regarding the salient components of civic nationalism. A speaker replied that civic nationalism involved developing an identity as a citizen through voluntary participation in shared interests such as involvement in charitable causes or animal welfare issues. This form of national identity is stable and inclusive; the focus on civic participation is broad-based and does not create an out-group.

A question was raised on whether different education standards have had an impact on intergroup contact, and whether common interests could be used as a platform for building national identity. A speaker responded by noting that while there has not been much research into the effects of education on levels of intergroup contact, there are indications education levels have an impact on trust. Further, shared interests in activities such as sports, have been found to be effective in bridging divides.

5th APPSNO ALUMNI DISTINGUISHED DINNER LECTURE

Crisis: An Opportunity to Learn the Truth about Yourself and Your Organisation

Ronald K. Noble, immediate past Secretary-General, INTERPOL



Ronald K. Noble

In his lecture “Crisis: An Opportunity to Learn the Truth about Yourself and Your Organisation,” **Ronald Noble** shared the insights he gained from the last 20 years in his duties involving national security.

Noble noted that when he led agencies such as the US Secret Service, the US Customs Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms prior to his tenure at INTERPOL, he realised “national security is ultimately about protecting your country’s citizens from harm.” Critical events such as the 1993 World Trade Center blast, Waco siege, Oklahoma City bombing, and 1994 White House south lawn attack left indelible marks on Noble and defined his leadership and approach to crises. The priorities Noble had to attend to during the crises included supporting and sharing the grief of the loved ones of those who died, organising a joint investigation between US law enforcement agencies, and making US citizens feel safe again.

Noble commented that as INTERPOL Secretary-General from 2000 to 2014, he had to face crises that threatened the national security of several countries. He elucidated that although the September 11 terrorist attacks struck the United States, it had a profound impact on the security and economies of countries worldwide. Separately, the 2004 tsunami and various cybercrimes

in different countries threatened the infrastructure of societies.

Noble highlighted the use of stolen and fake passports by terrorists and criminals to cross borders and referred to it as an “invisible crisis” that should be attended to. Illustrating the danger of terrorists having access to fraudulent passports, Noble highlighted the case of Ramzi Yousef, a terrorist who entered the United States with a false Iraqi passport and bombed the World Trade Center in 1993. Noble noted INTERPOL had expanded its stolen travel documents database, and there had been an uptick in the number of searches and hits. However, increasing the number of member countries who screen passports against INTERPOL’s database continued to be a challenge. Not screening passports against INTERPOL’s database results in gaping holes in the border security of hundreds of countries and enables terrorists like Yousef to use stolen passports to travel and hurt innocent civilians. The failure to protect borders leads to threats to national and international security.

Noble suggested that willingness to learn from others and exposing oneself and one’s organisation to scrutiny in times of crises would ultimately be beneficial. He also confirmed security gaps can rest dormant for years until they led to a major terrorist incident. Therefore, it was for relevant public and private institutions to work together and share tools and information with each other to make one’s country and the rest of the world a safer place.

Question and Answer Session

During the Question and Answer session, a participant asked about conflicting priorities when dealing with crises. Noble explained when INTERPOL member countries experience crises, they are usually under the impression that their priorities are different from those of INTERPOL’s. Consequently, they do not want to share information with INTERPOL and other member countries due to the fear of becoming more vulnerable. Noble shared that during his tenure one of his main objectives was to always view an issue from a local

perspective and try to persuade the country in crisis that its national priority is in line with INTERPOL's global priority. It was challenging and the accomplishment of such an objective was infrequent. However, every time it was realised, "it was always rewarding," Noble emphasised.

Information sharing as regards trust with other countries was also discussed. Noble acknowledged the lack of trust between some INTERPOL member nations

might mean a reluctance to share information with INTERPOL. Noble explained INTERPOL's system allows a country to decide who it wants to share information with. However, Noble warned this could make countries vulnerable, limiting sharing brought with it limitations to subsequent searches – searches that could otherwise have helped seize criminals and terrorists. Countries should therefore be pragmatic in their decisions regarding information sharing.

DISTINGUISHED LUNCH LECTURE

Strategic Surprise and Good Governance

Peter Ho, Chairman, URA Board; Senior Advisor, Centre for Strategic Futures and Senior Fellow, Civil Service College, Singapore



Peter Ho

In his lecture, **Peter Ho** noted that strategic surprise represented a big challenge for practitioners of national security. Its proper management therefore contributed to good governance. Global events have had implications at the local level for many countries around the world. A networked approach to governance would help plan for the effects of globalisation, through for example, the sharing of resources and the considering of upcoming challenges from fresh perspectives.

Ho commented that incorporating long term, strategic foresight had traditionally been a challenge in governance. Events such as the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001, had

been 'unknown unknowns': such occurrences had not been previously anticipated and had cumulative impacts on both the international and local fronts. The interconnection of local and global events, or globalisation, has seen a rise in the frequency of strategic shocks that had to be addressed by policymakers worldwide. In essence, decision makers would need to be increasingly aware of the effects of globalisation on national security and craft appropriate responses. Ho showed how security practitioners were faced with the challenges of Al-Qaeda as an organisation being replicated at the local level in places such as the Africa and the Indian subcontinent. More recently, the Arab Spring uprising of December 2010 had not only led to the collapse and changes of several governments in the Middle East, but also caused unforeseen impacts, such as the rise of the Islamic State (IS), which had in turn found local-level support for its extremist cause in various countries including those in the Southeast Asian region. The full implication of the rise of IS was currently unknown, Ho noted. However, countries such as the US have acknowledged the IS threat had been severely underestimated and more had to be done to contain it in individual countries.

Ho believed a whole-of-government approach that is flexible, adaptive and collaborative would be the most effective method to deal with the impact of strategic surprise on the local level. A networked approach to problem solving would counteract cognitive biases and thus allow for better anticipation of 'wicked problems'. Wicked problems are issues that are highly complex and where causes and effect might not be

easily determined. The whole-of-government approach was also appropriate for engagement with multiple stakeholders as well as suitable for localised multi-dimensional operations. It will also help to overcome institutional silos and thereby counter tendencies among organisations to only share information on a need-to-know basis through net assessment. Additionally, this approach would also allow the government better ability to forecast 'black swans' by allowing them to see across traditional boundaries and exploring fresh and innovative ways to deal with present and future issues.

Ho noted in summing up that Singapore's whole-of-government approach has enabled it to conduct horizon scanning that pinpointed emerging strategic issues pertinent to the future of the country. Coupled with an improved approach to scenario planning, the networked approach had helped plan for some previously unforeseen challenges and thereby proved a boon to governance.

Question and Answer Session

One participant asked Ho for his thoughts on scenario planning. In response, Ho observed that short-term scenario planning exercises is less challenging and tend to yield more precise results. However, it was crucial to

consider unforeseen scenarios for long-term planning. For instance, public attitudes towards policies may turn into security challenges if not managed properly. Ho also noted that local-specific contexts should be taken into account for effective scenario planning. For example, gender imbalance was an issue of concern for the People's Republic of China. The rise in sea water levels was, on the other hand, a challenge to overcome for low-lying countries. In addition, new technologies such as 3D printing, data analytics, artificial intelligence with deep-learning capabilities simulating the human brain will produce both new capabilities and new challenges.

Ho was also asked about creative problem solving in the light of budgetary constraints. He suggested the engagement of policy gaming exercises to allow decision-makers to consider worst-case scenarios. In addition, scenario planning exercises would help decisionmakers understand potential challenges and examine assumptions. Policymakers might also consider conducting public discussions akin to the UK's National Risk Register, which incorporated discussion for 150 major risks. Observing that risk is a social construct which can only be resolved when subjected to public discussion, he noted its importance in reaching a form of consensus as a means of identifying the most crucial issue to target.

SESSION III:

GOVERNANCE AND COMMUNICATION

Ripped Apart – The Story of A City in Chaos in New Zealand’s Biggest Natural Disaster

Sir Robert Parker, former Mayor, Christchurch, New Zealand



Sir Robert Parker

Sir Robert Parker shared his experiences in the aftermath of the New Zealand earthquakes from the period of 2010 – 2012. Parker noted the 2011 earthquake was the first national emergency declared in New Zealand. Measuring 6.3 on the Richter scale, the earthquake struck 5km beneath the heart of Christchurch City.

Parker examined the methods in which the Christchurch City Council dealt with the disaster. Firstly, communication by the city council and the community was crucial. With extensive infrastructure damage during the earthquake, the challenge was keeping in touch with those affected. Thousands of volunteers from the country went house to house to check on people to provide aid or relief wherever possible.

Secondly, coordination between government networks meant people knew whom to approach for various issues in times of crises. Emergency roles were well defined. Parker stressed the importance of emergency preparedness, noting that every civil servant who joined the city council is automatically enrolled and trained in civil defence.

Thirdly, compassion was vital in relief efforts. Parker commented it was imperative the community knew the authorities empathised and understood the challenges they faced. Leadership had to remain visible to the community and be seen as locally directed. One of the lessons learnt was to empower the community and not to overwhelm them. Engagement helped to build trust and cohesion in the city council and within the community.

Finally, the innovative methods adopted by the city council assisted in fostering a greater sense of community engagement. Commercial offices were moved to areas out of town due to liquefaction, and 6 months later, over 90% of businesses in Christchurch were still functioning. Parker stressed the importance of engaging and collaborating with business owners and employees, who supported the council’s recovery efforts. The council recognised the importance of a community-driven recovery vision and the power of transitional projects. The “Share an Idea” initiative was successful as residents shared with the city council what they envisioned for the future of Christchurch. The initiative served a three-fold purpose of providing the council with a plan for the future, strengthening the engagement with the people and providing a shared and inclusive vision for Christchurch.

Parker noted Christchurch had since come out stronger after the earthquake, with NZ\$45 billion investment in rebuilding efforts, a GDP of 10%, a low unemployment rate of 2%, and a city which is constantly growing in population size. Parker concluded one should never underestimate the strength and resilience of the local community to offer assistance to others in times of crises.

Reflections on Government Communications in Singapore – and What It Means For You

Janadas Devan, Chief of Government Communications, Ministry of Communications and Information, Singapore



Janadas Devan

Janadas Devan spoke about the factors determining what government communications should be (and should be about). These are: (a) sources of diversity; (b) government policy, and (c) diversity of media landscape. With regards to the first source of diversity, immigration; Devan noted Singapore has always had a diverse society, with immigrants to Singapore arriving from culturally similar countries. The four main races in Singapore - Chinese, Malays, Indians and Eurasians - identified themselves as Singaporean and had more in common with each other than immigrants. Devan added he was surprised at this as he had not expected the Singaporean identity to take shape this rapidly. A recent showcase of the Singapore identity could be seen in the number of Singaporeans who paid tribute to the late Mr Lee Kuan Yew. This showcased the intensity of the sense of Singaporean identity to a degree which would have been unforeseen 20 – 30 years ago.

The second source of diversity is globalisation. For the past 30 years, the core citizen population has remained steady – with Chinese, Malays and Indians making up 77%, 13% and 7% of the population respectively. As a result of immigration, the core Singaporean citizen population had declined. This has introduced elements of uncertainty and diversity into the national social fabric.

The third source of diversity is the economy. The difference in income inequality had become

extraordinarily stretched. This was not a Singaporean peculiarity: it was a global phenomenon seen in countries ranging from the United States and China, to Finland and Sweden. This poses a serious problem as it is harder now to maintain social harmony. In the Singaporean context, social mobility is better in most countries, as there is movement up the income and societal ladder. Singapore is a meritocracy with social income inequality, and there is a danger this might be 'hereditary', in which parents may pass disparities down to their children.

On government policy, Devan noted it had become increasingly complex as a result of globalisation and development. Devan noted the challenges faced by the government of the late Mr Lee Kuan Yew were elemental and existential in nature (e.g. mobilisation of the population to create an armed force to prevent threats to nation's sovereignty), whereas current policies could no longer be presented in such stark terms. Policies should be inclusive and discursive: the people have to be persuaded to sign on to the policy in question.

Finally, Devan touched on the media landscape. This has become increasingly diverse and fractured, with the global secular decline of mass media and increased proliferation of alternative media. This poses severe challenges to government communications. Devan noted the effectiveness of micro casting helped influence undecided voters to cast their ballot for Barack Obama's 2012 presidential campaign, using targeted communications. Devan noted government communications had to go beyond media relations and focus on direct communications. For example, when communicating with senior citizens about the Pioneer Generation package, direct face to face communication with senior citizens had proved vital. Devan concluded that with an increasingly diverse and educated population, governments, political parties, businesses and the media all had to find better ways to adapt and connect with the population.

Syndicate Discussions

A participant asked about emergency preparedness of Christchurch. The speaker commented the federal government provided national aid to assist in recovery

efforts when a state of emergency was declared in Christchurch. The city council was constantly in touch with the community and with affected people requiring assistance. The speaker added the earthquake caused panic and fear but it also demonstrated the resilience of the people, and heightened the awareness for a greater extent of emergency preparedness in the event of future disasters. International and local relief aided tremendously in recovery efforts as well.

A participant raised the question of potential disruptions to social cohesion in Singapore with the fractured media environment. A speaker raised the example of the passing of the late Mr Lee Kuan Yew, where the sheer number of Singaporeans who paid tribute surprised the government. The speaker added the significance of the huge turnout demonstrated the sense of nationhood and solidarity which galvanised a nation, especially during times of crisis.

A speaker highlighted the fact that despite the age of digital communications, the use of individualised, face-to-face communication is still important for government communication. He cited the digital communication strategy of Barack Obama's 2012 presidential campaign as an example, as this involved the identification of potential voters using behavioural science, analysis and direct targeting by volunteers going door-to-door to reach out to voters. A Singaporean example of this would be the efforts of volunteers in educating senior citizens about the Pioneer Generation package through direct communications such as house-to-house visitations.

Another participant wanted to know if different methods should be used when communicating to different generations. A speaker mentioned that a mix of traditional and alternate media should be deployed such as newspapers and social media. Communications should be targeted and catered to the audience. While traditional media like the broadsheet is declining,

digital subscriptions of the newspapers are rising.

A participant asked if the traditional media was a good source of information in relation to emergency planning for a crisis. The speaker observed the traditional media was a good source of information as inaccurate or biased reporting (which is sometimes associated with new media channels) could create a destabilising effect on society. In times of crisis, citizens look to the government for information. An example was raised about the increase in audience for network news channels in America in the wake of 9/11 as there was a need to find and understand verified information about the incident. It was also noted, however, that governments are turning to alternate sources of media to disseminate information and with the proliferation of new media, communication is now instantaneous. The speaker highlighted in a national emergency or crisis a direct, face-to-face approach should be used in tandem as well.

One participant queried if the media could polarise groups of people instead of uniting them together. The response was some people are not open to alternate viewpoints: this was reflected in the media they consume. This might in turn have political consequences.

Another participant commented that government in Singapore was historically perceived as having a strong sense of mission towards society, and wanted to know a metaphor to describe the current level of governance in Singapore is having now. The speaker observed it is no longer possible for any government to consider policy apart from politics, unlike the period of the 1960s where policies were created as a 'one-size-fits-all' strategy. The speaker concluded the world has changed faster than politics and governments have to ensure policies made will need to keep up with the evolving needs of their constituents.



9TH ASIA-PACIFIC PROGRAMME FOR SENIOR NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICERS (APPSNO)
4th - 8th May 2015, Singapore

Organised by

RSiS
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SCHOOL OF
INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES
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With the Support of

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Left to Right
Sitting
Mr Lim Hui Kwan, SUPT Teng Lip Chiang, Dr Miles Hewstone, Dr David Connery, Mr Per Kristen Brekke, Sir Robert Parker, Dr Norman Vasu, Assoc Prof Ralf Emmers, Mr Eddie Teo, DPM Teo Chee Hean, Amb Ong Keng Yong, Mr Gabriel Wong, Mr Peter Ho, Mr Ronald K Noble, Dr Shashi Jayakumar, Assoc Prof Kumar Ramakrishna, Hon David Heyman, Dr Reiner Klingholz, Mr Gilbert Hu Toh Teck

2nd Row Standing
Ms Elsie Toh, POL COL Than Win, COL Marco Schmidlin, SLTC Lau Hee Teck Jack, Mr Ng Cheong Gay Calvin, Mr G Alagirisamy, ME7 Liow Sin Hwa, Mr Uyanga Gelenkhuu, Dr Ng Gee Wah, Ms Tarja Laitinen, Ms Catriona Robinson, Mdm Signe Astrup Arnesen, Ms Maxie Chopard, Mr Duk Hee Ryu, Ms Siow Chin Yee, Mr Dexter Tan Wui Teck, SUPT Lim Sze Yuk, Mr Kum Chee Meng, Mr Lee Chee Kwong, POL LT Xayyaphone Douangmany

3rd Row Standing
Mr Azman Iskandar Ariffin, Mr Roedy Widodo, Mr Hamzah Ishak, Mr Gerard Sandanasamy, Mr Lee Ying Loong, SUPT Marc E Kwan Szer, COL Luong Ngoc Thanh, Mr Tony Hong, SLTC Mohd Fahmi Aliman, Mr Vera Urairat, Dr Chandra Jeet, ME6 Alexander Ling, GEN Laurent Demolins, MAJ GEN Noel I Khokhar, MAJ GEN Sudantha Ranasinghe, Mr Tan Yee Chieh, Ms Joyce Lim, Ms Jennifer Teo, Mr Dominic Seah Kwang Hwee, COL S M Imranuzzaman, LTC Ng Yu Loon

4th Row Standing
Mr Rashed Al-Shamsi, Mr Mohamed Qasim Abdelkarim, Mr Jumaa Alqubaisi, Mr Chong Zunjie, SUPT Dominic Chua, Mr Lim Hwee Kwang, Mr Yee Wee Leong, SLTC Tan Hock Leong, Mr Craig C Healy, Mr Tan Chee Seng, Deputy Chief SUPT Martin Dinesen, Mr Kng Eng Kiat, MAJ Ibrahim Otaif, Mr Arsenio Rianzares Andolong, Mr Dy Vichea, Mr Wong Choon Bong, Mr Kandhavel Periyasamy, Mr Simon Smalley, Dr Liu Qun



CHANGI AIRPORT SITE VISIT

Managing Airport Security, Airport Police Division

The Airport Police Division (APD) under the Singapore Police Force maintains law and order at Changi Airport through its multi-layered security checks, integrated programmes, and high-end equipment. Deputy Superintendent of Police Liau Wee Peng presented on how the APD aims to make one of the busiest airports in the world one of the safest as well. Liau explained the APD performs a series of security checks in order to avoid threats and crimes at Changi Airport. Through checking passports, boarding passes, and hand luggage, it is possible to spot suspicious travellers, and those deemed as such would be requested to undergo questioning. The APD observes traveller behaviour and remains watchful of clues such as excessive sweating, avoidance of eye contact, restlessness, and nervousness. All pieces of baggage undergo a high-end screening system which determines whether a baggage should be put under additional multi-level checks. APD also conducts explosives, firearms, and drugs searches with the help of K-9 dogs.

The APD recognises the value of infrastructure and technology in safeguarding Changi Airport. Together with its partner agencies, it has set systems such as cable catchers and glass panels coated with anti-shatter film which could protect people from glass fragments in the event of an explosion. Bollards have also been installed to prevent vehicles from crashing into the terminals. In addition, Changi Airport has a perimeter intrusion detection system which tracks any form of ground intrusion.

Liau highlighted the fact that members of the airport community work with the APD in protecting Changi Airport from crimes and attacks through the Threat-Oriented Passenger Screening Integrated System (TOPSIS). Cleaners, counter staff, retail staff, cashiers, and trolley retrievers are trained to observe, detect, identify, and report threats. Through TOPSIS, they are the APD's "eyes and ears" for monitoring suspicious passengers and travellers lurking in the airport. The APD continues to work with the airport community and build solid relationships with the Immigration & Checkpoints Authority of Singapore, Civil Aviation

Authority of Singapore, and the Changi Airport Group to ensure safety at Changi Airport.

Overview of Aviation Security in Singapore, Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore

The Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS) aims to provide a safe, vibrant, and highly-developed civil aviation system that ensures the success of Singapore in the aviation industry. Cheri Lim, the CAAS Head of Aviation Security and Emergency Planning Division (Aviation Security & Facilitation), discussed CAAS' various programmes and services which help maintain Singapore's reputation as a world-class aviation hub.

CAAS regards safety as one of its top priorities and thus it promotes a robust safety outlook that is on par with international best practices. Through providing top-notch safety and security, CAAS is also able to maintain a strong relationship with its aviation industry partners. CAAS' solid partnership with industry players contributes to the continuous development of Singapore as a key air hub. The commitment of CAAS to safeguard the position of Singapore as a top aviation hub is met through air services agreements, airline policies, and well-maintained airport infrastructure.

CAAS is also responsible for providing air navigation services which cover aircraft movements and air traffic flow. Aside from guaranteeing safety and security for all flights, CAAS also gathers and circulates vital information for air navigation and traffic flow. The expertise of CAAS is not confined within the organisation. CAAS shares knowledge through its training programmes and courses. CAAS aims to make Singapore a centre of excellence in aviation information and development. CAAS also contributes to the development and improvement of the international aviation community's policies and standards. Singapore became a member of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 1966 and since then it has cooperated with other member states in endorsing a safe, secure, and efficient civil aviation. Singapore remains to be an active participant in ICAO panels and a consistent contributor to the improvement of international standards in

aviation safety and security, air traffic management, aviation medicine, and international aviation law. Lim also discussed the international accords CAAS adheres to such as the 1999 Montreal Convention Act and the Tokyo Convention Act, which protect the welfare of passengers and travellers.

Discussion

Questions were raised regarding the handling of airplane-related attacks such as hijacking and disturbance. Liao, together with the Commander for APD, Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police Zuraidah Abdullah, stressed that although the APD is responsible for law and order in Changi Airport, it works closely

with other police divisions and thus it has the necessary backing and support in the event of large-scale crimes.

A participant also brought up the issue of drones which has started to gain popularity in the mainstream market. He argued the danger of criminals and terrorists obtaining drones to conduct investigations and plot heinous crimes exists. Liao, Abdullah, and Lim explained their organisations work closely together to prevent creative and high-tech security breach from occurring. Drone-related security risks are on the radar of the APD and CAAS as Changi Airport uses a high-level perimeter intrusion detection system. Any unmanned aerial vehicle that infiltrates Changi Airport's double-layered perimeter fence will be detected and investigated.

RADICALISATION: NEW HORIZONS

Taking Stock of the Foreign Fighter Blowback from Syria

Thomas Hegghammer, Director, Terrorism Research, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), Norway



Thomas Hegghammer

Thomas Hegghammer examined the threat of returning foreign fighters from Iraq and Syria. He explained the blow-back effect, i.e. foreign fighters who returned to their home region to plot terrorist attacks, is uncertain as, firstly, historically the blow-back had varied greatly between conflict zones involved and, secondly, it was too early to make assertions on this issue. However, Hegghammer emphasised the blow-back as real, with most recent uncovered plots taking place in Europe. At the same time, however, the blow-back rate was very low, with IS sympathisers having so far been involved in more plots than returning foreign fighters.

Methods and data used in counting foreign fighters were discussed. Open-source information such as official statements and local newspaper reports are used by most academics who then aggregate these numerical observations. However, it was pointed out that researchers have some scepticism about the accuracy of their own estimates. The media tended to highlight the upper limit of the ranges involved, which further contributed to uncertainty. Likewise, off-the-record information affects the way figures are reported as unofficial maximum estimates catch a great deal of media attention. Adding to the confusion

were the majority of estimates referring to the total number of individuals who left, while not reflecting the number of people involved on the ground at a specific moment. Hegghammer underlined the existence of a grey area surrounding the definition of a plot, which generated substantial coding problems for researchers. Two elements were said to distort the interpretation of a presumed plot: firstly, the lack of accurate information and secondly, the process of “gravity bias”. The latter refers to the way serious-looking data tend to attract all the attention. For example, information such as the presumed involvement of plotters with IS will attain a great deal of attention even if such data is refuted afterwards.

To illustrate the low blow-back rate, Hegghammer examined serious terrorist plots which have occurred in Europe since 2011. He noted 95 “core plotters” were involved in 41 attempted attacks. Out of these 41 conspiracies, 10 plots included individuals who had previously been related to the Syrian conflict zone, of which only a single attack had been successfully executed. Nine plots involving IS sympathisers had been counted in Europe since 2011, with a higher execution rate. These perpetrators typically express strong sympathy with a group such as IS during the period preceding the attack. In explaining this low blowback rate, Hegghammer highlighted the presumed lack of Syria-based organisation that would send foreign fighters back for the purpose of leading terrorist attacks. By contrast, the activism of IS sympathisers is due to the existence of a large pool of supporters. These individuals are particularly responsive to IS’ call to lead homegrown terrorist attacks. They are more likely to develop feelings of sympathy for IS, based on the “achievements” of foreign fighters, some of whom they may know personally. The relationship between the two groups was thus described as an osmosis process by which foreign fighters have a significant influence on sympathisers.

Family Based Intervention and De-radicalisation Tools: Introduction to Different Models across Europe

Daniel Koehler, Director, German Institute on Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies (GIRDS), Germany



Daniel Koehler

In his presentation, **Daniel Koehler** tackled the issue of family-based intervention programs for de-radicalisation. The primary objectives of these programs were to prevent individuals from leaving for conflict zones and to assist them in returning from such places. According to German official estimates, 680 people have left for Iraq and Syria since 2011. Of 230 returnees, 50 individuals have been singled out by the German authorities as potential threats. The key role of families in identifying violent radicalisation and reintegrating individuals was emphasised, as they provided individuals with a safe haven to come back to. However, most families lacked information on how to cope with the radicalisation process. Some relatives were also reluctant to contact police authorities for fear of culpability. Cooperation with police forces in dealing with terrorist-related cases was central, but the mediating role of counsellors between families and security agencies was increasingly important, as families often looked for an outsider's perspective.

The government hotline used to report cases of violent radicalisation was declared a success, based on calls received. Relatives, friends, teachers and police officers went through an initial counselling session before being referred to one of the 4 NGOs in charge of the program. Family counsellors helped relatives in diagnosing and understanding the violent radicalisation process. As dialogue is a key facet of the

process, Koehler said answers brought by the families must rely on a comprehensive and thorough analysis of the communication used by radicalised individuals. All means of contact were put to use, including letters, emails, Skype sessions and face-to-face meetings in 'neutral' countries. The ultimate objective of the intervention programs was to get closer to radicalised individuals and to give families a voice to express their views.

The prevention of radicalisation was said to be particularly effective when it relied on deradicalised individuals and mothers who lost relatives. While the former were well-placed to explain why they joined and left a violent extremist movement, the latter had a credible and emotionally powerful voice. Koehler drew from his own counselling experience to explain that he was led to work with mothers, sisters or daughters of potentially highly radicalised foreign fighters in a large majority of the cases. The return of individuals from conflict zones did not mark the end of the program. Families have to be prepared to deal with complex issues such as potential post-traumatic stress disorders (PTSD); medication; legal proceedings and social stigma.

New Horizons: Countering 'Not-Violent Extremism' in the Age of ISIS

Kumar Ramakrishna, Associate Professor and Head of Policy Studies in the Office of the Executive Deputy Chairman, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore



Kumar Ramakrishna

Kumar Ramakrishna examined the distinction (first drawn by Prof Alex Schmid) between non-violent

and not-violent extremism. He described the four dimensions of the globalised al-Qaeda (AQ) movement made up of firstly, Al-Qaeda central, which comprise the remnants of the pre-9/11 AQ organisation; secondly AQ-associated and affiliated groups, including franchise subgroups and subnetworks; thirdly groups with a certain level of exposure to AQ and AQC, fourthly lone wolves who have no connections to AQ but are prepared to carry out attacks consistent with the agenda of AQ and associated groups. Describing the shared ideological narrative linking these elements, Ramakrishna emphasised the importance of a binary vision pitting the Muslim world against what is often referred to as the 'Jewish-Crusader alliance' in the al-Qaeda narrative. A key ideological element lay in the shared perceived responsibility of Western allies in 'oppressing' Muslims. Likewise, the principle of reciprocity where civilians of an enemy country are targeted in retaliation for 'attacks' against fellow Muslims was said to be a recurring feature of Jihadist propaganda.

Shifting to related concepts of extremism, ideology and radicalisation/de-radicalisation, Ramakrishna stated an extremist strongly believes in the existence of a single truth which he is convinced to possess. Ideologies for the extremist: (a) define the problem(s); (b) explain who is responsible; and (c) provides solutions, including religious justifications for actions against the enemy, in the case of religiously-inspired terrorism. Among many models used to describe the radicalisation process, the report prepared in 2007 by New York Police Department (NYPD) was said to be particularly influential through the definition of four different stages of radicalisation and the emphasis put on the experience of a crisis, be it of a personal or socio-economic nature. A deradicalised extremist was identified not as a non-violent extremist, but as a not-violent extremist. As opposed to non-violent – which is a permanent and complete renunciation of violence – not-violent is the pragmatic, tactical and momentary abandonment of violence. Therefore, not-violent would be more accurately called not-now/ yet violent. Ramakrishna concluded by quoting an op-ed of Maajid Nawaz, former extremist and founding member of the Quilliam Foundation, who had warned against the risks of infiltration of Muslim associations from not-violent radicals. The latter were then given unchallenged platforms to promote their message to vulnerable audiences. Ramakrishna criticised those who

argue in favour of deals with not-violent extremists. This was deemed to be an unsuitable method to engage violent extremists. Instead, Ramakrishna encouraged governments to challenge and resist all forms of violent and not-violent extremism. He concluded by stressing the need to adapt global policies to local contexts.

Syndicate Discussions

A participant asked whether reasons leading foreign fighters to leave for the Syrian conflict zone differ from one country to another. The speaker emphasised the lack of integrated datasets on foreign fighters outside the intelligence community. As detailed characteristics of populations involved are unknown, the precise distribution of motivations remains unclear. Data would not provide all the answers, as foreign fighters might conceal their real motives; they might not even be aware of their own motivations.

A participant enquired about the possibility that foreign fighters might join other battle fronts. The speaker referred to the precedent of the Soviet-Afghan war to underline how many foreign fighters of different nationalities, banned from their own countries, became stateless activists. Opportunism was said to be central in the decision leading a foreign fighter to favour a battlefield over another. After the Afghan conflict, many foreign fighters joined places as diverse as Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, in what seems to be random migrations. In the present era, Libya and Yemen were suggested as potential destinations of choice for foreign fighters leaving Syria.

A participant wanted to know about assessment tools used to measure radicalisation and the success of de-radicalisation projects and initiatives. The speaker listed different variables on which the measure of success in de-radicalisation programs was based. These were said to include the effective reaching out to families affected by violent radicalisation as well as the appropriate distinctions made between different cases. The latter relies on the accurate assessment of the levels of radicalisation which an individual undergoes. The speaker observed that the lack of scientific basis in assessing the success/failure of de-radicalisation projects and initiatives was a major handicap.

Another participant asked about the time spent by family counsellors with families facing the radicalisation of one of their members. The speaker stressed that it depends on the level of radicalisation counsellors have to deal with. An individual in an early phase of the radicalisation process would require less time than another who would already be in Syria. In the latter case, constant surveillance and substantial human resources were needed. The speaker stated family counselling programs and, more generally, de-radicalisation initiatives, were long-term approaches. Ultimately, the final verdict had yet to be given on their efficacy levels.

A participant asked whether former radicals should be involved in de-radicalisation programmes. The speaker cited the necessity of finding the right kind of “formers”. Such individuals could provide useful counter-narratives and play an equally important role as ‘moderate’ religious scholars in shaping an alternative discourse. There was also a growing movement which aims at involving victims of terrorist attacks, as illustrated by the Victims’ Voices Project implemented in Indonesia.

Asked about the different kind of measures to be taken between sympathisers and returning foreign fighters, a speaker emphasised that the prominent role of the former should not lead policy-makers to stop focusing on the latter. Similarly, homegrown extremists should not be forgotten by decision-makers. He added, authorities should re-establish dominance over the Internet and the Islamic State’s (IS) strategic intentions have to be monitored, even if IS’ leadership does not currently have the strategy of targeting the West.

A question was raised on the possible role of religious authorities in reintegrating returning foreign fighters back into society. A speaker underlined the fact that in some cases, religious leaders may have been responsible for the radicalisation process in the first place. He also emphasised most youths were not necessarily interested in studying religion, which makes it difficult for religious leaders to speak to them about religion. As a potential course of action, he underlined that it is probably more workable to talk through practical issues of living life according to an acceptable form of religiosity.

A participant asked about the definition of a ‘not violent’ terrorist. The term was coined by Professor Alex P. Schmid in response to the policy adopted by some governments which support the use of “good” extremists to talk to “bad” extremists. Contrary to the idea that non-violent extremists should be used in de-radicalisation programs, some have argued that such individuals are ‘tactically’ non-violent, in the sense that they deem violence to be counter-productive in a specific context. As a matter of fact, no full proof methodology allows one to establish with any certainty that an individual is a non-violent extremist.

Asked if socio-economic marginalisation could be considered a root cause of extremism in a society, a speaker noted such connections did exist, observing that it was rare to find individuals exclusively radicalised through ideology. Another catalyst towards extremism was said to be the lack of space for religious practices. Most individuals involved in terrorist-related activities were said to find ideological answers through religious meetings, or through the Internet.

SESSION V:

GLOCALISATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY: PRACTICAL CASE STUDIES

Aviation Security in the Wake of Aviation Tragedies

Nathalie Herbelles, Assistant Director, Airport, Passenger, and Cargo Security – Asia-Pacific, International Air Transport Association (IATA), Singapore



Nathalie Herbelles

Nathalie Herbelles presented on the advancement of aviation security in the world today, also highlighting the lessons learnt in cases involving passenger aircraft over the previous year. She explained that glocalisation is not a new concept to IATA and is reflected in the recent opening of six regional offices – one of them being Singapore – to supplement its headquarters in Geneva and Montreal. IATA and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) realised early on that a one-size-fits-all mode of regulation was not feasible and local conditions and cultures needed to be taken into consideration to create a holistic regulatory framework.

Herbelles noted that every aviation accident was different and unique lessons can be drawn from each incident. Using three aviation accident cases, Herbelles showed how responses to different accidents needed varied responses. The first case was the missing Malaysia Airlines 370. The near-impossible nature of a plane going missing in a technically advanced world led ICAO to swiftly set up a tracking taskforce in charge of garnering recommendations to better track aircraft around the world in the wake of the incident. The second case was the downing of Malaysia Airlines 17 over Ukraine. The imperfect information sharing

network among airlines and states may have led the flight to take unknown risks by overflying a conflict zone. She shared that in the aftermath of the Malaysia Airlines 17 incident, ICAO created an online portal for information sharing. However, she said states were reluctant to come forth to share information and she understood the sensitivity of high level information being freely disseminated. The third case was the deliberate pilot action involving Germanwings 9525. After 9/11, cockpit ingress mechanisms have been strengthened, allowing the co-pilot of Germanwings 9525 to take sole control of the plane while the pilot was out of the cockpit. The pilot had ironically been locked out because of the security measures put in place after 9/11: cockpit entry override mechanisms and reinforced cockpit doors. Herbelles noted that airlines have implemented a two-man rule in the cockpit after the incident, but she warned this too may bring security risks as cabin crew members are vetted to a lower level compared to flight crew.

Herbelles said aviation security should be progressive in predicting future threats. She proposed an intelligence-based, capacity building approach to aviation security. She noted that currently, aviation security is approached from a largely reactive manner as most security measures were implemented after major incidents. These include baggage reconciliation after Lockerbie, the Liquids and Gels (LAGs) restrictions after the bomb plots of 2006, and implementation of land-side security measures after Glasgow Airport attacks in 2007. Looking forward, Herbelles identified cyber threats, person-borne improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and MANPADs as the key threats to aviation security in the near future.

In closing, Herbelles shed light on the new security initiatives introduced in collaboration with Airports Council International (ACI) at several airports worldwide to improve passenger baggage scanning methods and enhance the passenger experience without jeopardising national security requirements. She challenged participants to re-think the need for security checkpoints by adopting risk-based screening measures

while enhancing detection capabilities of threats to aviation security.

Lessons Learned from the Current Ebola Outbreak

David L. Heymann, Professor of Infectious Diseases Epidemiology, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine; Head of Centre on Global Health Security at Chatham House London; Chairman, Public Health England.



David L. Heymann

David L. Heymann explained two different perspectives to understanding the current Ebola crisis: first, it may be seen as a collective cross border issue, and second, it may be viewed as an individual health risk for those living in affected countries. He used the history of combating the spread of Ebola to give an in-depth perspective onto how the current Ebola outbreak was being fought.

Heymann recounted that the first documented outbreak of Ebola was in 1976 in Yambuku, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) as a series of nosocomial infections at first and later into the community. This epidemic started in the hospital though a combination of the unknown nature of the disease – to which medical staff treated symptomatically as malaria presented with dysentery and epistaxis – and the use of the same set of non-sterile medical equipment in the outpatient and maternity departments. He noted that this outbreak could have been prevented if equipment were not re-used and properly sterilised.

Heymann documented two other outbreaks caused by different strains of Ebola viruses at the same time, one in Zaire and another in Sudan. He observed that

in the Sudan case, the infected seemed to have caught the virus at the same time, whereas the Zaire case was an initial case that multiplied into an outbreak. Investigations after the outbreak showed that the infections stopped once communities learnt how to prevent the spread of the disease by staying away from victims. A further study done from 1981 to 1985 concluded that Ebola does occur periodically, but do not normally cause major outbreaks, given that some of the study subjects presented with antibodies to Ebola.

Heymann also used the case of another outbreak (Zaire, 1995) to show that some outbreaks were wholly preventable. In this case health workers had not been not properly protected from bodily fluids when dealing with patients. The spread of the virus into the communities was compounded by the cleaning of infected bodies for burials. Heymann shared that the lessons learnt in the 1995 Ebola outbreak was the practice of three basic epidemiological common sense techniques: first, to identify, isolate, and protect the patients and the health workers to prevent further spread of the disease; second, trace the contacts of the infected person for signs of the virus; and third, community understanding in handling the outbreak. Heymann stated that these techniques have prevented 27 outbreaks so far, and could have prevented the current outbreak had these techniques been robustly implemented at the start. Cases of known contacts of Ebola patients dying from the virus were still happening in Guinea and Sierra Leone. Heymann also shared other problems in tackling and tracking the virus. For example, virus transmission through sexual activity was possible as the virus was found in ejaculate months after recovery. Heymann described the current Ebola outbreak as a Swiss cheese event where risk factors inexplicably line up to cause a public health crisis and advised that states strengthen their public health systems and protocols to prevent outbreaks.

Norway 22 July 2011 – The Terror Attacks and Lessons Learned

Per Kristen Brekke, Deputy Director-General, Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB), Norway



Per Kristen Brekke

Per Kristen Brekke presented on the terror attacks in Oslo and Utøya on 22 July 2011 and the lessons learnt. Brekke started by describing the attacks as a big wake-up call for Norway, detailing the events on the fateful day from the initial bomb attack on a government building in Oslo to the massacre of youths on the island of Utøya where a youth camp by the Labour Party was being held. Brekke noted that Anders Behring Breivik, the perpetrator, was able to procure large amounts of fertiliser to manufacture a bomb because he had rented a farm and ostensibly needed the material for farming purposes. Brekke acknowledged that when the attacks occurred, suspicion was first cast on Islamist radicals, and not Breivik who was a right-wing extremist.

Brekke shed some light on the extraordinary response of people in times of crisis. People who were holidaying near Utøya sailed across to the island in boats to rescue the wounded both on the island and those who were swimming to safety. Collective scenes of grief, not hatred, were seen all over Norway. Brekke shared his own experience of bringing and speaking to the survivors and families who lost members onto the island, after the incident as part of the healing process. He praised the response of the then-Norwegian Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg, in reaffirming Norwegian values in the aftermath of the incident while stoutly rejecting the hate message that Breivik espoused.

An international commission comprising of individuals

with no government links was set up to answer three questions: what happened, why it happened, and how Norwegian society let this happen. The committee found that the initial bomb blasts could have been prevented; vehicular access to government buildings had been identified as a potential threat as early as 2004, but access was still possible in 2011. The commission also found the authorities' response to the attacks on Utøya inadequate. Brekke recounted that the Norwegian Police had simulated many exercises and planned procedures since 2004, in the wake of the Madrid and London attacks. Brekke shared that the police were still acting in exercise mode, choosing to approach the incident methodically and lacking urgency. Brekke said the problem was fitting a ready-made solution to unique problem, and this incident in particular was an almost inconceivable scenario. Compounding the problem, Brekke said, was plans made were not utilised by the police, and although there were adequate resources (from other agencies) to deal with the situation, these resources were not activated.

Brekke shared that in the aftermath of Breivik's attacks, the coordinating role of the Ministry of Justice on public security was strengthened, interagency cooperation between the police and the armed forces deepened, and stricter control mechanisms were placed on explosive material. Brekke highlighted the ordering of large amount of fertiliser by Breivik on the Internet having been flagged by international intelligence, but was deemed not extraordinary enough to warrant intervention by Norwegian authorities.

Breivik concluded by noting that the main lesson learnt from this incident was the importance of maintaining of public trust, which predicated on striking the right balance between individual freedom and national security needs.

Syndicate Discussions

Several questions arose with regards to aviation safety. Firstly, a question with regards to the screening of air crews and pilots was posed. In response, the speaker said that pre-screening and background checks of the flight crew had become particularly important. Flight crews currently undergo intensive screening prior to flights. They are also subject to additional vetting by

the countries they fly into. Pre-screening processes are generally viewed as robust. However, there was still scope for more frequent reassessment of suitability of flight crew. Another participant asked if the placement of air marshals could contribute to the protection of aircrafts. The response was that air marshals could deter potential hijackings and could protect the cockpit from intrusion. Some countries are already using them on higher-risk flights. The speaker believed, however, that the main focus should be on ground measures to prevent incidents.

The participants also engaged in questions about prevention tactics for violent incidents such as the Norway shootings by right-wing extremist Anders Breivik in 2011. For instance, the Mandate Commission had listed the Utøya Island as being a soft target; if the police had done all the right things in the right order they could have been on the island 20 minutes earlier and apprehended Breivik in time. The speaker acknowledged the existing weakness of the Norwegian police, which had failed to note some early warning signs prior to the attack. For instance, the police was aware of Breivik's purchase of fertiliser and uniform used during the attack, but did not act on the information. They also did not act on a tip-off by a civilian who reported Breivik's strange behaviour.

The importance of a national crisis prevention plan, with clearly defined roles and responsibilities for each department, was also highlighted during the discussion. The speaker believed that if the police had systems in place to disseminate and coordinate the information, the attack might have been prevented. The commission report had stated that the police response to the incident was found wanting, criticising the delay in the police requesting cooperation from other security agencies. During acts of terror, the Norwegian police was in charge of direction, coordination and delegation of duties and responsibilities. While papers and plans for crises management were in place, they were less than robust in several key areas. It is therefore crucial to identify and learn key takeaway lessons from each incident. It is also important that the authorities be given stronger mandate to ask various agencies to evaluate their status of preparedness for emergency situations.

On the positive note, the speaker believed that the resilience of the society was one aspect that helped deal

with the consequences of the attacks. He emphasised preparation for crises should take place long before actual incident.

The participants also discussed how to balance cross border travel with prevention of spread of virus such as the Ebola. One panellist replied that some countries like the UK had responded by setting up screening at the airport and promoting public confidence in the system. However, in the event that symptoms are not present, existing border security would be less able to detect and prevent crossing. Instead, the panellist believed that investing in national public health system should be the key cornerstone in detection and response to epidemic spread across borders.

The participants were also interested in finding out about recommendations for establishing a global safety net to work towards strengthening the public health system. The speaker noted that there is first of all need for top level certification system. Only then would countries be able to take part in simulation exercise whenever there is global call for it. The speaker believed the private sector, NGOs and civil society all had a role to play in establishing the global safety net for public health by working with the local government to provide resilience platform. The private sector had shown a lot of interest in contributing to the resilience platform, with a major role for industries to provide support for governments to keep necessary equipment coming in during crises, for example.

The session also discussed future medical challenges. The speaker observed that the outbreak of previously unknown medical conditions should be particularly noted. The speaker recounted when it was first discovered, the HIV virus was an unknown unknown threat that was passed from human primates to humans. It was only noted by officials when it spread in the urban setting due to sexual practices in the area. Ebola was another example of previous case of unknown unknown medical condition. In 1976, blood samples with Ebola virus was taken and stored in the US Centre for Disease Control. These were later taken out for testing to find out how to deal with it in future. The testing gave rise to some good public health practices such as handwashing and quarantine of patients to prevent spread of the disease, which was observed in hospital practices during Ebola outbreak.

PROGRAMME

Sunday, 3rd May 2015

0000 – 2359hrs Arrival of Speakers & Participants

Venue : Marina Mandarin Singapore (MMS)

1500 – 1830hrs Registration of Speakers & Participants

Venue : Conference Secretariat
@ Libra & Gemini
Ballroom, Level 1, Marina Mandarin
Singapore (MMS)

1830 – 2100hrs Welcome Dinner & Cocktail Reception

Venue : Pool Garden, Pavilion, Level 5,
Marina Mandarin Singapore (MMS)

Attire : Casual (short-sleeved shirt/polo
t-shirt and long pants) and
equivalent attire for women

Hosted by : **Ong Keng Yong**, *Executive Deputy
Chairman, S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies (RSIS),
Nanyang Technological University
(NTU), Singapore*

Gabriel Wong Ee Chung, *Senior
Director, National Security
Coordination Centre (NSCC), Prime
Minister's Office, Singapore*

Monday, 4th May 2015

0630 – 0845hrs Breakfast

Venue : AquaMarine, Level 4,
Marina Mandarin Singapore (MMS)

0815hrs Arrival of guests

Venue : Marina Mandarin Ballroom (MMB),
Level 1, Marina Mandarin Singapore
(MMS)

Attire : Military attire/service dress (jacket
with tie and head-dress) for officers;
Lounge suit with tie for male and
equivalent attire for female civilians

0850hrs

Venue

Attire

All guests to be seated

: MMB, Level 1, MMS
: Military attire/service dress (jacket
with tie and head-dress) for officers;
Lounge suit with tie for male and
equivalent attire for female civilians

0855hrs

Venue

Attire

Arrival of Guest-of-Honour

: MMB, Level 1, MMS
: Military attire/service dress (jacket
with tie and head-dress) for officers;
Lounge suit with tie for male and
equivalent attire for female civilians

0900 – 0930hrs

Welcome Remarks

Welcome Remarks by **Ong Keng
Yong**, *Executive Deputy Chairman,
S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies (RSIS),
Nanyang Technological University
(NTU), Singapore*

Venue

Attire

: MMB, Level 1, MMS
: Military attire/service dress (jacket
with tie and head-dress) for officers;
Lounge suit with tie for male and
equivalent attire for female civilians

0900 – 0930hrs

Opening Address

Opening Address by
DPM Teo Chee Hean, *Deputy
Prime Minister, Coordinating Minister
for National Security and Minister
for Home Affairs, Singapore*

Venue

Attire

: MMB, Level 1, MMS
: Military attire/service dress (jacket
with tie and head-dress) for officers;
Lounge suit with tie for male and
equivalent attire for female civilians

0930 – 1040hrs

Venue

Reception / Coffee Break

: MMB Foyer, Level 1, MMS

0930 – 1000hrs

Venue

Attire

Group Photo-taking

: Vanda Ballroom, Level 5, MMS
: Military attire/service dress (jacket
with tie and head-dress) for officers;
Lounge suit with tie for male and
equivalent attire for female civilians

1045 – 1100hrs **Introduction to RSIS, CENS and APPSNO**

Venue : MMB, Level 1, MMS

Attire : Military attire/service dress (jacket with tie and head-dress) for officers; Lounge suit with tie for male and equivalent attire for female civilians

Presenter : **Shashi Jayakumar**, *Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore*

1100 – 1200hrs **Session I : Glocalisation and National Security: Futures**

Venue : MMB, Level 1, MMS

Attire : Military attire/service dress (jacket with tie and head-dress) for officers; Lounge suit with tie for male and equivalent attire for female civilians

Chairperson : **Shashi Jayakumar**, *Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore*

Speakers : **David F. Heyman**, *former Assistant-Secretary for Policy, Department of Homeland Security, USA; President & CEO, Tektonics Global LLC, USA*

Jacqueline Poh, *Managing Director, Infocomm Development Authority, Singapore*

David Connery, *Senior Analyst, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia*

1200 – 1300hrs **Lunch**

Venue : MMB Foyer, Level 1, MMS

1300 – 1415hrs **Syndicate Discussions**

Syndicate 1

Venue : MMB, Level 1, MMS

Attire : Casual (APPSNO T-Shirt and long pants) and equivalent attire for women

Syndicate 2

Venue : Pisces Ballroom, Level 1, MMS

Attire : Casual (APPSNO T-Shirt and long pants) and equivalent attire for women

Syndicate 3

Venue : Aquarius Ballroom, Level 1, MMS

Attire : Casual (APPSNO T-Shirt and long pants) and equivalent attire for women

1430hrs **Travel to City Tour**

1500 – 1700hrs **City Tour**

Attire : Casual (APPSNO T-Shirt and long pants) and equivalent attire for women. No shorts and slippers please.

1700 – 1800hrs **Return to Hotel**

1830 – 2030hrs **Networking Dinner**

Venue : AquaMarine, Level 4, MMS

Attire : Casual (short-sleeved shirt/polo t-shirt and long pants) and equivalent attire for women

Tuesday, 5th May 2015

0630 – 0845hrs **Breakfast**

Venue : AquaMarine, Level 4, Marina Mandarin Singapore (MMS)

0900 – 1000hrs **Session II : National Identity**

Venue : Marina Mandarin Ballroom (MMB), Level 1, Marina Mandarin Singapore (MMS)

Attire : Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women

Chairperson : **Caitríona H. Heini**, *Research Fellow, Centre of Excellence for National Security, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore*

Speakers	: Reiner Klingholz , <i>Director, Berlin Institute for Population and Development, Germany</i>	Facilitators	: Perspectivity Foundation
	Miles Hewstone , <i>Professor of Social Psychology and Director, Oxford Centre for the Study of Intergroup Conflict, University of Oxford; Fellow of New College, Oxford, United Kingdom</i>	1630 – 1745hrs	Freshen up / Networking Time
	Norman Vasu , <i>Deputy Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore</i>	1745 – 1830hrs	Depart for APPSNO Alumni Distinguished Dinner Lecture at Resorts World Convention Centre
1000 – 1030hrs	Coffee Break	Attire	: Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women
Venue	: MMB Foyer, Level 1, MMS	1830 – 1930hrs	APPSNO Alumni Distinguished Dinner Lecture
1030 – 1145hrs	Syndicate Discussions Syndicate 1	Venue	: Gemini 1-2, Resorts World Convention Centre, Resorts World Sentosa (RWS)
Venue	: MMB, Level 1, MMS	Attire	: Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women
Attire	: Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women	Chairperson	: Shashi Jayakumar , <i>Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore</i>
	Syndicate 2	Speaker	: Ronald Noble , <i>immediate past Secretary-General, Interpol, USA</i>
Venue	: Pisces Ballroom, Level 1, MMS	1930 – 2130hrs	Cocktail Reception followed by Dinner
Attire	: Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women	Venue	: S.E.A. Aquarium, Resorts World Sentosa
	Syndicate 3	Attire	: Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women
Venue	: Aquarius Ballroom, Level 1, MMS	Wednesday, 6th May 2015	
Attire	: Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women	0630 – 0845hrs	Breakfast
1145 – 1300hrs	Lunch	Venue	: AquaMarine, Level 4, Marina Mandarin Singapore (MMS)
Venue	: MMB Foyer, Level 1, MMS	0900 – 1200hrs	Presentation on Homeland Security Management (HSM)
1300 – 1630hrs	Perspectivity Game (On-going with tea break)		Purpose : To get to know one another's professional backgrounds and functions
Venue	: Vanda Ballroom, Level 5, MMS		
Attire	: Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women		

(Format: 3 groups of 20 in Breakout rooms in parallel, with foreign participants dispersed evenly)
[Note: On-going with tea break]

Group 1 : Australia, Cambodia, Finland, Korea, Republic of, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka & United States of America

Venue : MMB, Level 1, MMS
Attire : Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women

Group 2 : Bangladesh, China, France, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Thailand & United Arab Emirates

Venue : Pisces Ballroom, Level 1, MMS
Attire : Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women

Group 3 : Brunei, Denmark, India, Indonesia, New Zealand, Philippines, Switzerland & Vietnam

Venue : Aquarius Ballroom, Level 1, MMS
Attire : Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women

1200 – 1400hrs **Distinguished Lunch Lecture**
Venue : Vanda Ballroom, Level 5, MMS
Attire : Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women

Chairperson : **Kumar Ramakrishna**, Associate Professor and Head of Policy Studies in the Office of the Executive Deputy Chairman, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore

Speaker : **Peter Ho**, Chairman, URA Board; Senior Advisor, Centre for Strategic Futures and Senior Fellow, Civil Service College, Singapore

1400 – 1500hrs **Session III : Governance and Communication**

Venue : MMB, Level 1, MMS
Attire : Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women

Chairperson : **Damien D. Cheong**, Coordinator, Homeland Defence Programme, Centre of Excellence for National Security, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore

Speakers : **Sir Robert Parker**, former Mayor of Christchurch, New Zealand

Janadas Devan, Chief of Government Communications, Ministry of Communications and Information, Singapore

1500 – 1530hr **Coffee Break**
Venue : MMB Foyer, Level 1, MMS

1530 – 1645hrs **Syndicate Discussions Syndicate 1**
Venue : MMB, Level 1, MMS
Attire : Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women

Syndicate 2
Venue : Pisces Ballroom, Level 1, MMS
Attire : Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women

Syndicate 3
Venue : Aquarius Ballroom, Level 1, MMS
Attire : Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women

1645hrs **Free and Easy (Networking Time)**

Thursday, 7th May 2015

- 0630 – 0745hrs **Breakfast**
Venue : AquaMarine, Level 4, Marina Mandarin Singapore (MMS)
- 0800 – 0845hrs **Travel to Site Visit (Changi Airport)**
- 0900 – 1200hrs **Site Visit (Changi Airport)**
Venue : Changi Airport, Terminal 2
Attire : Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women
- 1200 – 1245hrs **Lunch**
Venue : CAAS Auditorium, Level 3
- 1245 – 1330hrs **Return to Hotel**
- 1400 – 1550hrs **Session IV : Radicalisation: New Horizons**
Venue : MMB, Level 1, MMS
Attire : Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women
- Chairperson : **Bilveer Singh**, *Adjunct Senior Fellow, Centre of Excellence for National Security, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore*
- Speakers : **Thomas Hegghammer**, *Director, Terrorism Research, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), Norway*
- Daniel Koehler**, *Director, German Institute on Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies (GIRDS), Germany*
- Kumar Ramakrishna**, *Associate Professor and Head of Policy Studies in the Office of the Executive Deputy Chairman, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore*

- 1550 – 1615hrs **Coffee Break**
Venue : MMB Foyer, Level 1, MMS
- 1615 – 1730hrs **Syndicate Discussions Syndicate 1**
Venue : MMB, Level 1, MMS
Attire : Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women
- Syndicate 2**
Venue : Pisces Ballroom, Level 1, MMS
Attire : Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women
- Syndicate 3**
Venue : Aquarius Ballroom, Level 1, MMS
Attire : Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women

1730hrs **Free and Easy (Networking Time)**

Friday, 8th May 2015

- 0730 – 0845hrs **Breakfast**
Venue : AquaMarine, Level 4, Marina Mandarin Singapore (MMS)
- 0900 – 1000hrs **Session V : Glocalisation and National Security : Practical Case Studies**
Venue : MMB, Level 1, MMS
Attire : Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women
- Chairperson : **Bernard Loo**, *Associate Professor and Coordinator of MSc (Strategic Studies) Programme, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore*
- Speakers : **Nathalie Herbelles**, *Assistant Director, Airport, Passenger, and Cargo Security - Asia-Pacific, International Air Transport Association (IATA), Singapore*

David L. Heymann, *Professor of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine; Head of Centre on Global Health Security at Chatham House, London; Chairman of Public Health England, United Kingdom*

Per Kristen Brekke, *Deputy Director-General, Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB), Norway*

1000 – 1020hrs **Coffee Break**
Venue : MMB Foyer, MMS

1020 – 1130hrs **Syndicate Discussions**
Syndicate 1
Venue : MMB, Level 1, MMS
Attire : Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women

Syndicate 2

Venue : Pisces Ballroom, Level 1, MMS
Attire : Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women

Syndicate 3

Venue : Aquarius Ballroom, Level 1, MMS
Attire : Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women

1200 – 1430hrs **Lunch (Friday Prayers Concurrent)**
Venue : MMB Foyer, Level 1, MMS

1430 – 1830hrs **Free and Easy (Networking Time)**

1830 – 1900hrs **Cocktail Reception**
Venue : MMB, Level 1, MMS
Attire : Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women

1900 – 2130hrs **Certificate Presentation Ceremony and Closing Dinner**
Venue : MMB, Level 1, MMS
Attire : Smart casual (long-sleeved shirt without tie) and equivalent attire for women

Hosted by : **Benny Lim**, *Permanent Secretary, National Security and Intelligence Coordination, Singapore*

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ABOUT CENS

The **Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)** is a research unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Established on 1 April 2006, CENS raison d'être is to raise the intellectual capital invested in strategising national security. To do so, CENS is devoted to rigorous policy-relevant analysis across a range of national security issues.

CENS is multinational in composition, comprising both Singaporeans and foreign analysts who are specialists in various aspects of national and homeland security affairs. Besides fulltime analysts, CENS further boosts its research capacity and keeps abreast of cutting edge global trends in national security research by maintaining and encouraging a steady stream of Visiting Fellows.

ABOUT RSIS

The **S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)** is a professional graduate school of international affairs at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. RSIS' mission is to develop a community of scholars and policy analysts at the forefront of security studies and international affairs. Its core functions are research, graduate education and networking. It produces cutting-edge research on Asia Pacific Security, Multilateralism and Regionalism, Conflict Studies, Non-Traditional Security, International Political Economy, and Country and Region Studies. RSIS' activities are aimed at assisting policymakers to develop comprehensive approaches to strategic thinking on issues related to security and stability in the Asia Pacific.

For more information about RSIS, please visit www.rsis.edu.sg.

ABOUT NSCS

The **National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS)** was set up in the Prime Minister's Office in July 2004 to facilitate national security policy coordination from a Whole-Of-Government perspective. NSCS reports to the Prime Minister through the Coordinating Minister for National Security (CMNS). The current CMNS is Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs Mr Teo Chee Hean.

NSCS is headed by Permanent Secretary (National Security and Intelligence Coordination). The current PS (NSIC) is Mr Benny Lim, who is concurrently Permanent Secretary (National Development) and Permanent Secretary (Prime Minister's Office).

NSCS comprises two centres: the National Security Coordination Centre (NSCC) and the National Security Research Centre (NSRC). Each centre is headed by a Senior Director.

The agency performs three vital roles in Singapore's national security: national security planning, policy coordination, and anticipation of strategic threats. It also organises and manages national security programmes, one example being the Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers, and funds experimental, research or start-up projects that contribute to our national security.

For more information about NSCS, visit <http://www.nscs.gov.sg/>

