



# ASIA PACIFIC SECURITY CONFERENCE 2014 CONFERENCE REPORT

10 February 2014  
Raffles City Convention Centre  
Singapore

Co-organised by



**S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL  
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**  
A Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University

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Asia Pacific  
Security  
Conference

# **ASIAN SECURITY DYNAMICS AND THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER**

**REPORT OF THE ASIA PACIFIC SECURITY CONFERENCE CO-HOSTED BY  
THE S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (RSIS)  
AND EXPERIA EVENTS PTE LTD**

**10 FEBRUARY 2014  
RAFFLES CITY CONVENTION CENTRE  
SINGAPORE**

**S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (RSIS),  
NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY**

**RAPPORTEUR: KALYAN M. KEMBURI**

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*This report summarises the proceedings of the conference as interpreted by the assigned rapporteur and editor. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this report.*

# INTRODUCTORY ADDRESS

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*Ambassador Barry Desker*

**Ambassador Barry Desker**, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) highlighted that the subjects of Asian security and airpower are inescapably intertwined. Regional security dynamics increasingly drive airpower needs, while developments in airpower – together with trends in naval power – increasingly influence and shape regional security in the military sphere. He noted that the emergence of China as a military and political power, and its impact on the regional primacy of the United States, and consequently, on the Sino-American strategic relationship is likely to have the greatest impact on the future of Asian security. This issue therefore bears the most scrutiny.

He underlined that airpower increasingly entails more than just the purchase and operation of

fighter jets, but also involves the application of numerous less visible air-based systems, including drones and unmanned vehicles, and air-to-air refuelling planes. Particularly in Asia, airpower also means the acquisition of advanced air-delivered precision-guided munitions, greatly expanding the range and destructive capability of regional air forces.

Ambassador Desker concluded that these technological developments, together with new concepts for joint air and maritime operations – as epitomised in emerging U.S. “AirSea Battle” strategies – have important repercussions for regional security making.

## KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY GUEST-OF-HONOUR

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*Mr Chan Chun Sing*

**Mr Chan Chun Sing**, Minister for Social and Family Development and Second Minister for Defence, noted that with rapid economic development and accompanying political and social developments, the Asia Pacific is living in interesting times. Economic growth has lifted millions from poverty and improved the lives of many more. The fast-changing regional demographics further add elements to the already interesting times. However, these very same factors can also cause nations to face competing demands for resources in order to meet the rising aspirations of their people. These factors can also lead to other contests in the perception of “might is right.” Rapid growth can breed confidence as much as assertiveness.

To navigate away from strife towards shared interests, Minister Chan underlined the importance of having strong and wise leaders who appreciate that there is much more to gain through cooperation than conflict. There is also a need for courageous leaders who do not succumb to domestic pressures or nationalistic pursuits, which work against the greater good of the region. Leaders who do not succumb to the notion that might is right are precisely what is needed. The mark of a powerful country is not

how it is able to use its might to get its way. The mark of a truly powerful country is how it is able to restrain itself and not have to use its might to get its way and yet convince others to come along its side.

The potential for tensions to spiral out of control in today's strategic environment cannot be underestimated. As regional economies grow, countries have also gained the wherewithal to acquire more advanced war fighting platforms. Last year, for the first time, Asia spent more on defence than Europe, and this trend is projected to continue. For airpower in particular, there will be a temptation to use it as the instrument of choice in any contest or demonstration of national will, given its reach and the seeming ease of forward deployment, in order to tackle threats and perceived threats away from population centres.

Minister Chan concluded that the conversations and exchanges at APSEC 2014 will spur ideas and possible initiatives that can help encourage constructive dialogue and practical cooperation. It is through such efforts that a future of peace and prosperity founded on mutual trust, respect and shared interests can be built.

# PANEL 1

## Rethinking Sino-American strategies: Implications for regional security



*Mr Andrew J. Shapiro*

**Mr Andrew J. Shapiro**, Managing Director of Beacon Global Strategies LLC, and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, highlighted two issues that have been prevalent in discussions on and in Asia. First, is the U.S. pivot/rebalance to Asia for real? Is the U.S. here to stay? What does it mean if President Obama or the Secretary of Defense had cancelled or rescheduled their visits to the region due to domestic exigencies? The second issue involves issues related to the rise of China. Is the pivot/rebalance about managing China? Would Washington be able to handle the complexities involved with this rise?

In discussing these two issues, Shapiro started by briefly discussing the genesis and contours of the U.S. pivot/rebalance policy. The 2011 Foreign Policy article by Secretary Hillary Clinton noted that the “United States stands at a pivot point,” and “one of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment—diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise—in the Asia Pacific region.” Initially, there was hesitation in certain sections of the U.S. Administration, especially in the Pentagon, to use the word ‘pivot’, given that the U.S. is continuing its engagement with other parts of the world. The preference was for ‘rebalance’ instead. However, during the presidential debates in 2012, Obama

himself used the word ‘pivot’, indicating that either term can be used to describe the renewed U.S. policy focus towards Asia. As Secretary Clinton noted in her article, U.S. policy towards Asia is not all about security and military; it has substantial diplomatic, economic and political initiatives. Even in the security and military initiatives, it is not all about China. The emphasis is to build important partnerships with a critical region of the world, where Washington has strong economic interests that are important for the U.S. economy. This will lead to more visits, more engagement, and more efforts to establish trade agreements. An important part of the rebalance is—while maintaining engagement with Northeast Asia—a greater emphasis on Southeast Asia through enhanced support initiatives with U.S. partners in the region.

On the second issue, what does the pivot mean to the relations with China? Shapiro underlined that not every announcement or policy initiative undertaken by Washington should be viewed as targeted against China. The U.S. shares many common interests with China at the regional level such as stability on the Korean peninsula, transnational issues such as peacekeeping operations, anti-piracy missions, etc. At the same time, there is concern within the region about Beijing’s behaviour on territorial disputes. Any unilateral claims by the stronger claimant might eventually create instability in the crucial sea lanes, which are vital to the world economy. In this regard, Washington supports a rules-based approach in dealing with these disputes, and highlights the need to establish a dispute settlement mechanism. The U.S. wants to engage and work with China on these issues, and one of the crucial areas where the U.S. is currently looking to further enhance relations is in military-to-military interactions.

Shapiro closed his remarks by underlining the importance of understanding how unified the Chinese government is on critical foreign and security policies. In this regard, he noted we need to establish trust and dialogue to avert crisis, and for this, it is important to identify the right interlocutors within the Chinese government.

## PANEL 1

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*Dr Ruan Zongze*



*Mr Richard Bitzinger*

While discussing the background of U.S.-China relations, **Dr Ruan Zongze**, Vice President of the China Institute of International Studies, identified some of the main challenges facing U.S.-China relations and suggested ideas to strengthen the relationship. 2014 marked 35 years of the normalisation of diplomatic ties between China and the U.S., which changed the strategic landscape of Asia. During the Cold War, the shared threat emanating from the Soviet Union brought these two countries closer. Now in a different world, shared interests could help transcend differences and enable the building of a new model of relations. This was the focus of

the Obama-Xi Summit in 2013.

Ruan discussed briefly the joint report published by the China Institute of International Studies and the Atlantic Council. The report evaluated how U.S.-China relations would be in 2030 and the initiatives to be undertaken to further strengthen this relationship. The report identified three potential scenarios in 2030. First, the lack of adequate cooperation on critical issues between the U.S. and China, and conflict over security and natural resources, might lead to global drift. Second, it is a zero-sum game, a nightmare for these two countries, which also does not bode well for the world. The third scenario involves global re-vitalisation and cooperation. To escape the perils of either global drift or a zero-sum game, leaders in the U.S. and China should work together and manage the global challenges. There is no alternative to working together on global issues, and the 2013 Sunnyland Summit is a good start in this direction.

Although there are many global challenges such as Syria, nuclear issues pertaining to Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and other transnational challenges like climate change and cyber security, Ruan highlighted the issue of most immediate concern for China: Japan's revisionist moves, which he claimed are posing a significant challenge to peace and stability in the region. Ruan expressed concern that the U.S. pivot might unintentionally be emboldening these moves. While China would be cooperative to maintain peace and stability in the region and would play a constructive role, it is the collective vision that is required from the countries of the region in order to achieve an Asian century.

One of the most dangerous challenges facing the Asia Pacific is strategic ambiguity on the part of the U.S. and China. How they relate to each other is ultimately of paramount importance to regional security, and therefore it is crucial that they make their intentions crystal clear, not only to each other, but to the other nations of the Asia Pacific as well. **Mr Richard Bitzinger**, Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Military Transformations

# PANEL 1

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Programme at RSIS, addressed how vagueness and indistinctness in military policy and doctrine on the part of these two great powers are hurting cooperation and security in Asia.

Despite recent efforts at transparency, it is difficult to fully fathom Chinese strategic intentions. Its military modernisation in the past decade has been extremely worrisome, mostly because Beijing has done such a poor job justifying its actions to the outside world. Its defence budget has grown at least five-fold over the past 15 years, which has enabled the acquisition of advanced military weapons systems. This military build-up was matched in recent years by a new assertiveness in pressing its territorial claims in the South and East China seas. Indeed, China's recent behaviour is increasingly perplexing to neighbours. For its part, the U.S. has fared equally poorly in explaining the full meaning of its "return to Asia," and especially its military component, AirSea Battle (ASB). ASB has been embraced as a novel approach to warfare intended to counter twenty-first century threats. However, the lack of substance or detail surrounding ASB has permitted wide-ranging speculation as to what it really is.

While ASB appears to be inherently designed to limit China's emerging anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems and capabilities, its proponents go out of their way to deny that ASB specifically targets China. For example, in a 2010 briefing on ASB done by the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Affairs (a well-known Washington think tank that has done considerable work on ASB), it explicitly stated that "ASB is NOT about war with China or containment of China", but rather is "part of a larger 'offsetting strategy' aimed at preserving a stable military balance and maintaining crisis stability in East Asia." Yet almost in the same breath, the briefing also described the PLA's acquisition of A2/AD capabilities as the "most stressful case" for an ASB strategy. It then goes on to describe, in excruciating detail, how ASB would be employed to fight a war against China, including attacks on the Chinese mainland. The challenge for ASB is that it is either too vague

to be sufficiently discussed as a conceivable war fighting construct, or else too apparently focused on being simply a "counter-China" strategy so as to be credible.

Bitzinger concluded that ambiguity is a challenge not just for the Sino-American strategic relationship, but also something that affects all of the Asia Pacific. Many U.S. allies in the region are justifiably wary of ASB, to a large part because the U.S. has not clarified the link between ASB and its "re-balancing strategy" in the Asia Pacific, nor what particular aspects of ASB will be relevant for future allied inter-operability requirements and involvement. This operational uncertainty in turn translates into broader strategic uncertainty, which could adversely affect future alliance solidarity and effectiveness.

## Panel 1 Q&A

The first question concerned whether the U.S. is worried about the recent revisionist moves by Japan, and what the potential U.S. response might be. The U.S.-Japan relationship is the cornerstone of security interests in Asia. Currently, Washington is of two minds. Firstly, in an era of declining budgets, it wants its partners to undertake more responsibilities. Secondly, it is also mindful that Japan has a history in the region, which does have implications on Tokyo's foreign policy initiatives.

The second question discussed was whether increasingly the three governments in Northeast Asia—China, Japan, and South Korea—are becoming prisoners of domestic nationalism. While agreeing that domestic nationalism plays a role in influencing foreign policy behaviour, it was noted that in the case of Japan, it is the potential tilt of this nationalism towards right wing tendencies that causes concern. While not disagreeing with Japan's moves towards normalisation, it was also stressed that Tokyo needed to address some of the concerns of its neighbours such as how it would deal with the issue of atrocities during the Second World War.

# PANEL 1



*Mr Peter Ho (right) moderating the panel discussion on "Rethinking Sino-U.S. Strategies in East Asia: Implications for Regional Security"*

Similarly, it was underlined that more than the on-going military modernisation, it is the possible right wing tilt among some of the political and military leaders in Japan that is disturbing. Although Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has spoken about the door being open for talks with China, by simultaneously saying that there is no territorial dispute, the door was automatically closed. It was speculated that the U.S. pivot to Asia might have acted as a catalyst for the recent hard-line moves by Tokyo. The other view on this issue was relatively less pessimistic as it noted the disconnect between the rhetoric and deeds of the Abe Administration, which might eventually help to attenuate some of the tensions. Abe might be saying all the wrong things, but the ability of his administration to substantially increase Japan's defence capabilities is limited by budgetary constraints, by Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, the precarious state of the economy, and increasing social welfare commitments given the ageing population.

The session concluded with a discussion on the Code of Conduct (CoC) for the South China Sea.

It was cautioned that the Declaration on the CoC should not be seen as dated, and that a new binding CoC need not necessarily help to better manage relations in those waters. Irrespective of the future trajectory of the CoC, the agreement is not a prescription to solve territorial issues in the South China Sea. The CoC only helps to provide a congenial environment to manage relations among the claimants. Therefore, prudence dictates moderation of expectations from the CoC. During the discussion on the CoC, it was also reiterated that China's behaviour in the South China Sea and the maritime initiatives, such as the rigid stance towards the nine-dash line and the reorganisation of the maritime agencies, have created uncertainties among its neighbours. It was underlined that sea lanes passing through the South China Sea are critical not only for Asian economies but also for global trade and commerce. It is therefore in the interest of everyone to resolve the territorial disputes in a peaceful manner.

## PANEL 2

### Airpower modernisation trends: The impact of new technologies



*Mr Richard Aboulafia*

**Mr Richard Aboulafia**, Vice President of Analysis at Teal Group Corporation discussed the recent developments in military aircraft market and the emerging trends in airpower technology. He underlined that the main driver for aircraft acquisitions remains threat perceptions prevailing among the nations. Nevertheless, other factors are also responsible, such as the changing nature of conflict, the enduring utility of manned aircraft, the rejuvenation of older platforms with new technologies, and rising defence budgets around the world.

The global fighter jet market has remained healthy, with a strong and consistent demand for both export and domestic orders; between 2010 and 2013, the value of this market averaged over US\$15 billion a year, with around 350 aircraft deliveries per year. Domestic markets remain the main source of fighter sales, with export markets capturing around 35 per cent of the US\$18 billion worth of total fighter jet sales in 2013. However, Asian markets are increasingly becoming an important source of sales, a trend that will likely

continue to remain strong in the coming decades. The last decade witnessed the average price of an export fighter jet hovering at around US\$50-60 million, while with the advent of such advanced fighters as Rafale and F-22, the cost of fighter jets destined for the domestic market has increased to around US\$70-80 million each.

Aboulafia divided the world fighter export market structure into four categories. At the highest end are fighters costing more than US\$65 million each, of which there have been only seven customers; this is followed by the second-highest category of US\$50-65 million per aircraft, also with only seven purchasing countries. It is in the middle segment, with per-unit fighter costs of US\$35-50 million, that are found the majority of most customers. At the same time, however, and contrary to the prevailing market preference for fighter jets in the mid-range price, the national fighter developments strategies of most major powers, such as the U.S., have tended to favour the most expensive systems and technologies.

In his analysis of evolving trends in airpower and technology in Asia, Aboulafia noted that in 1960s only one country in Asia—Saudi Arabia—acquired a high-end (i.e., US\$65 million+) fighter jet. By the present decade, five more countries have joined this list: Australia, Israel, Japan, Singapore, South Korea; India, with its likely purchase of the French Rafale, might be the seventh country to join this high-end fighter jet club. Another cost-effective trend is the preference to equip the fourth-generation platforms with fifth-generation upgrades. Surprisingly until now, the region has relatively a small market for force multipliers such as radar and early warning aircraft, as well as mid-air refuelling aircraft. Aboulafia concluded by warning about the potential for instability in the region, given that many of the new technologies may be perceived of as favouring the offense, especially if coupled with battlefield concepts such the AirSea Battle.

## PANEL 2

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*Mr Jeong Lee*

**Mr Jeong Lee**, a freelance military writer, presented on South Korea's air strategy. Since the late 1990s, the South Korean (ROK) military has attempted to transform itself into an independent military that is capable of dealing with hybrid threats emanating from North Korea on the one hand, and its rivalry with its powerful neighbours, namely Japan and China, on the other. The most important determinant that has shaped this transition has been its evolving alliance with the U.S.

Given this threat scenario, ROK air strategy has involved the following four objectives as stated in the ROK Air Force (ROKAF) official website: deterrence; protection of the ROK airspace; victory in war; and furtherance of national interests and contribution to world peace. Of the

four, particular attention must be given to the first, second, and fourth objectives, because they closely mirror the strategic and operational mind set of ROK Air Force (ROKAF) officers at the level of lieutenant colonel and above.

To redress the deficiencies inherent in ROKAF operational and strategic thinking, Lee offered three recommendations. First, the U.S. Air Force might need to continuously mentor its ROKAF counterparts by providing strategic guidance until the latter is capable of formulating and implementing on its own. Second, rather than insist upon fielding stealth capabilities only, the ROKAF must develop flexible and wide-ranging capabilities, including ISR and aerial refuelling capabilities. It must also complement stealth fighter capabilities with fourth-generation fighters to prevent structural disarmament; that the ROKAF has recently contracted BAE Systems to upgrade its fleet of KF-16s speaks to this fact. Third and most importantly, the ROKAF must ultimately come up with its own coherent operational doctrines and strategy. One way of doing this, similar to U.S. Navy's Rapid Innovation Cell, is for the ROKAF Chief of Staff to select the brightest and the most promising majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels, and to have them debate, test, and formulate their own operational doctrines according to the specific needs of the service. This ensures not only pragmatism, but also fosters creative thinking. These aforementioned approaches may somewhat alleviate existing deficiencies inherent within the ROKAF.

## PANEL 2



*Dr Mark A. Lorell*

**Dr Mark A. Lorell**, Senior Political Scientist at RAND Corporation, analysed the U.S.' ability to maintain its airpower capabilities in a constrained budgetary environment. The 2007 financial crisis, followed by "sequestration" (involving about US\$1 trillion in U.S. defence budget cuts), coupled with rising weapons systems, personnel, and operations and support (O&S) costs, has forced the U.S. Air Force to cancel, defer, or stretch-out important programmes such as F-35, NG JSTARS, T-X, and TSAT. Although sequestration envisioned a 31 per cent reduction in defence budget, the defence budget continues to remain above historical average. While agreeing that the budget is under-going major cuts, Lorell pointed that this should be viewed in the context of large increases in the early 2000s. In this regard, he noted that RDT&E and procurement funding hit a 30-year high in 2010. Similarly, in spite of defence budget cuts, key programmes will likely survive and therefore significantly increase U.S. and allied airpower capabilities. Moreover,

key existing and new programmes are likely to maintain RDT&E and production funding at levels close to their 1980-2010 averages.

Therefore, the quintessential question would be how these programmes would be funded. The initial congressional commitment to sequestration appears to be declining; for example, the December 2013 budget deal reduced 2014 sequestration by approximately 50 per cent. Some lower priority programmes will be cancelled or continue to be deferred, and procurement of other programmes such as F-35 may be stretched out. Most importantly, the acquisition process is being overhauled for greater efficiency, with a focus on affordability. The DoD Acquisition Efficiency Initiatives are showing results. For example, the F-35's average acquisition programme cost growth has stabilised and even begun to decline. Moreover, over next five years, new advanced programmes should keep the momentum in funding levels. Among these, the top priority programmes for the USAF are next-generation long-range strike/bomber aircraft, along with the F-35 and the KC-46A tanker. Other significant new programmes include the T-X advanced trainer, the UCLASS carrier-based surveillance and strike UAV, and several next-generation long-range standoff munitions. Over the next decade, plans are for developing a sixth-generation fighter, as well as new generations of C4ISR land, air, and space assets.

In conclusion, Lorell noted that, in spite of increasing costs and defence cuts, future U.S. forces would continue to contribute important new capabilities to the Pacific theatre. U.S. RDT&E and procurement funding will likely remain at or near the 1980-2010 average, and therefore add significant new airpower capabilities.

## PANEL 2

### Panel 2 Q&A

The first issue was what should be done differently in airpower modernisation to make the procurement process more efficient and more capable of catering to emerging security needs. One way is through harmonisation of systems and subsystems in the context of broader architectural requirements. The Asian defence industry should consider looking into ways to standardise systems and subsystems, so that there is room for future collaborations. The second question was about the organisational changes and challenges that the militaries in Asia would face in operationalising the new technologies. It was noted that induction of new technologies should not end up distorting existing doctrines or security requirements, i.e., technology should not be the driver. In this context, it was also highlighted that historically, technology is driven by the defence industry, and not necessarily by operational or security requirements.

Third question was on the implications from the proliferation of low-cost stealth, especially in the context of China developing J-20 and J-31 fighter jets, and offering the aircraft for exports. The panellists responded by noting that it is uncertain how cheap these new fighter jets might actually be, and whether countries like China could keep

down the costs associated with maintenance and operations as well. Lastly, the discussion was on the evolving role of cyber and its connection to airpower, and how this interaction would affect regional security and stability. Putting this in a broader context, it was noted that cyber, along with other new emerging technologies have an inherent danger of making the “cult of offensive” an attractive option, something that could be very destabilising for the entire region.

Third question was on the implications from the proliferation of low-cost stealth, especially in the context of China developing J-20 and J-31, and offering the aircraft for exports. The panellists responded by noting that it is uncertain how low would cost of these new stealth systems would be, and whether countries like China could keep down the costs associated with maintenance and operations as well. Lastly, the discussion was on the evolving role of cyber capabilities and its connection to airpower, and how this interaction would affect regional security and stability. Putting in the broader context, it was noted that cyber capabilities along with other new emerging technologies have an inherent danger of making the “cult of offensive” an attractive option, an option that would be very de-stabilising for the entire region.



*Professor Pascal Vennesson (right) moderating the panel discussion on “Airpower Modernisation Trends: The Impact of New Technologies”*

## DISTINGUISHED LUNCH TALK

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*General Herbert J. "Hawk" Carlisle*

**General Herbert J. "Hawk" Carlisle**, Commander of US Pacific Air Force (US PACAF) spoke about the shared interests, challenges, and responsibilities facing the countries in the Asia Pacific. He gave a preview of how the US PACOM, together with its partner militaries in the region, are approaching these challenges and sharing the responsibilities.

On shared interests, he noted that the region is home to five of the ten largest economies in the world, eight of ten busiest air routes, and 60 per cent of the world's population. The region also faces challenges that cut across borders, such as natural disasters, terrorism and organised crime, drug and human trafficking, and the tyranny of distance. Given these interests and challenges, GEN Carlisle stressed the need for sharing responsibilities, in the form of maintaining and ensuring access and freedom of movement, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and security cooperation. In this regard, he stressed

that security cooperation need not be a zero-sum game, and through dialogue and cooperation, security could be enhanced in the region.

Moving towards the approaches in dealing with these challenges, GEN Carlisle highlighted some of the initiatives undertaken by the PACAF with its partners in the region. First, he mentioned Operation Christmas Drop, which involves providing humanitarian supplies to Micronesia every December. This was even more important in December 2013, as many of these islands were severely devastated by Typhoon Haiyan, and which reiterated the importance of airpower in undertaking missions of this magnitude. Second, he noted anti-piracy missions in Strait of Malacca; from 50 attacks per year in 2005, piracy attacks have come down to 5 per year, due to cooperation among Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, along with Thailand and the U.S.. Third, he noted tackling drug and human trafficking as another area where airpower plays an increasingly important role. In particular, he singled out PACOM's Joint Interagency Task Force (West), which is working with many countries in the region to control and eradicate drug and human trafficking. Finally, the general noted how several countries in the region, following Typhoon Haiyan, undertook a shared responsibility to provide humanitarian assistance; due to the speed, range and flexibility provided by airpower, these countries were able to provide prompt humanitarian assistance and alleviate further death and disaster.

GEN Carlisle concluded by highlighting growing global inter-dependency and stressed that no nation could operate independently in facing the challenges. The main task in front of the governments in the region is to provide safety, security, stability, and opportunity for prosperity throughout the Asia Pacific.

# CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

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**Sunday, 9 February 2014**

**Welcome Dinner**

**1900hrs Registration**

**1930hrs Welcome dinner**

**Monday, 10 February 2014**

**0800hrs Registration**

**0830hrs Introductory Address**

*Ambassador Barry Desker  
Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of  
International Studies (RSIS)*

**0835hrs Keynote Address by  
Guest-of-Honour**

*Mr Chan Chun Sing  
Minister for Social and Family  
Development and Second  
Minister for Defence*

**0850hrs Panel 1**

**Rethinking Sino-U.S. strategies  
in east asia: Implications for  
regional security**

East Asia's security environment is driven by broader changes in the strategies and force postures of the United States and China. While the U.S. policy calls for "strategic re-balancing", China is looking for a "new type of relationship between major powers." Underlying both strategies is deepening economic interdependence as well as steadily improving military capabilities in the region. How will the resulting Sino-U.S. strategic balance evolve, and what are the implications for other countries in the region?

**Speakers**

- *Mr Andrew Shapiro, Managing Director, Beacon Global Strategies LLC; former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs*
- *Dr Ruan Zongze, Deputy President, China Institute of International Studies*
- *Mr Richard Bitzinger, Senior Fellow and Coordinator, Military Transformations Programme, RSIS*

**Moderator**

*Peter Ho, Senior Adviser, Centre for Strategic Futures*

**1020hrs Tea Break**

# CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

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**1050hrs**

## **Panel 2**

**Airpower modernisation trends:  
The impact of new technologies**

Asian airpower is typically on the forefront of modernisation; for example, fifth-generation fighters are already being slated to enter many regional air forces. How might new and future airpower technologies – stealth, air-carried precision-guided weaponry, new sensors, and new means of fusing and distributing information – impact future air forces, and how might that in turn affect regional military match-ups?

### **Speakers**

- *Mr Richard Aboulafia, Vice President, Analysis, Teal Group Corporation*
- *Mr Jeong Lee, Freelance Military Writer*
- *Dr Mark Lorell, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation*

### **Moderator**

*Dr Pascal Vennesson, Professor of Political Science, RSIS*

**1220hrs**

## **Distinguished Lunch Talk**

*GEN Herbert Carlisle, Commander Pacific Air Forces (PACAF)*

### **Moderator**

*Professor Joseph Liow, Professor of Comparative and International Politics, and Associate Dean, RSIS*

**1415hrs**

**Video of the Republic of Korea Airforce Black Eagles, presented by Korea Aerospace Industries**

**1430hrs**

**End of conference**

# ABOUT RSIS

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The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) is a professional graduate school of international affairs at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. RSIS' mission is to develop a community of scholars and policy analysts at the forefront of security studies and international affairs. Its core functions are research, graduate education and networking. It produces cutting-edge research on Asia Pacific Security, Multilateralism and Regionalism, Conflict Studies, Non-Traditional Security, International Political Economy, and Country and Region Studies. RSIS' activities are aimed at assisting policymakers to develop comprehensive approaches to strategic thinking on issues related to security and stability in the Asia Pacific.

For more information about RSIS, please visit [www.rsis.edu.sg](http://www.rsis.edu.sg).



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