On 2 May 2011, a team of United States (U.S.) Navy Seals and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives swooped down on a private compound in Abbotabad, Pakistan in an operation which led to the killing of Osama Bin Laden. The death of Bin Laden is perhaps the single most important success the U.S. has had in its war against the Al Qaeda but it had a limited impact on the global terror network. After it was disrupted in Afghanistan Al Qaeda became a decentralized global movement wherein loosely coordinated groups are linked by a shared ideology rather than a top-down command and control bureaucracy. In recent years, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has almost replaced Al Qaeda Central in spearheading terror attacks against the West. These include plots aimed directly at the U.S. such as the Christmas Day plot in 2009 and the parcel bomb plot in October 2010.

**In Focus: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Yemen Uprisings**

Aaron Ng

The Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is emerging as one of the most serious terrorist threats today. There are legitimate concerns that the group is set to make Yemen its safe haven. With the recent uprisings in Yemen, and the AQAP’s ability to maintain the strongholds it has established in the country, the AQAP is believed to be in a good position to strike Western targets and interests.

Photo of a protest rally in Sana’a, Yemen on 3 February 2011

Photo Credit: Sallam http://www.flickr.com/photos/31319626@N00/
Ever since Al Qaeda militants from Saudi Arabia and Yemen announced it would be operating under the unified banner of the AQAP in Yemen in January 2009, the group had consolidated several strongholds in the country. It can be recalled that between 1990 and 2000, Al Qaeda became such a threat to the West mainly because it was able to breed in its safe haven in Afghanistan. Today, the AQAP is growing in menace because of the safe haven it has found in Yemen. On 15 April 2011, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Assistant Director Mark Giuliano said, the AQAP is “the most serious threat to U.S. homeland today.”

The domino effect of the Arab uprisings has led to the call for the resignation of Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh. While AQAP would like to see Saleh’s regime fall, the secular and democratic theme of the uprising effectively put AQAP in the sidelines. AQAP has been relatively silent on the uprisings and devotes little attention on it. One of the few propaganda came from Anwar al Awlaki who said that “The outcome doesn’t have to be an Islamic government for us to consider what is occurring to be a step in the right direction.” And that the “rest of the Muslim world will get a chance to breathe again after three decades of suffocation.” While it certainly found not much room to maneuver in its propaganda, AQAP’s operations is benefiting from the anarchic situation in Yemen. Since the uprising started, it has established several strongholds in the country, launched many attacks against the country’s security forces and expanded its scope of operations by declaring war against the al Houthis. Whatever the outcome would be from the popular uprising, and whoever comes to rule in Yemen, will face daunting problems. The country is besieged by a multitude of challenges that ranges from security to the economy, a scenario wherein the AQAP can continue to thrive in the near future.

AQAP and the Yemeni Uprising

Counterterrorism operations against the AQAP have been put on hold since the start of the uprising in Yemen. The Yemeni regime has summoned more soldiers back to Sana’a to help suppress the protests. There are also unverified reports of Yemeni soldiers abandoning their post to join the protest. The Republican Guard and the Central Security Forces, which is the main counterterrorism forces in Yemen, have been redirected to stop the popular revolt. On 29 March 2011, counterterrorism forces that were stationed in Abyan were withdrawn from the province, effectively ceding control to the AQAP. Many analysts thought that it is unlikely that the poorly equipped AQAP was behind the troop withdrawal. It was likely to be both a move from the president to summon more forces back to Sana’a and also demonstrate to the U.S. the effects a collapse of his regime would have. Since the troop withdrawal, the AQAP has declared a separate emirate in Abyan which is governed by the Shariah law and is effectively out of government control. Other strongholds of AQAP include the northeast province of Ma’arib and the southeastern province of Shabwa.

As of May 2011, the AQAP has taken advantage of the current situation and there was an increase in attacks on Yemeni security forces. The targets include security headquarters, checkpoints and Yemeni security personnel. The AQAP has made extensive calls for recruitment in Yemen and the Arab world since the revolts began. However, it is unlikely to gain any significant increase of support. This is because anti-regime
demonstrators are calling primarily for a secular and democratic government, which is not in line with the AQAP’s objectives. There are also unconfirmed reports of foreign jihadists who had taken advantage of the current political turmoil and travelled to Yemen to join the AQAP. However, intelligence officials are divided over the presence of foreign jihadist fighters in Yemen.

A more pressing concern is that the AQAP is plotting attacks against the United States in the coming months. U.S. officials are saying that there has been an increase in the number of intelligence related to this. The AQAP is said to be more determined to strike the U.S. after the failed attempts in 2009 and 2010. With the anarchic situation in Yemen and the strongholds it has established in the country, AQAP is in a better position than before to strike the U.S. homeland and its interests abroad.

AQAP and al Houthis

In January 2011, Said Ali al-Shihri, the deputy leader of AQAP made a statement declaring a “holy war” against the al Houthis. In an audio message posted on the internet, Al-Shihri justified the AQAP’s war. He claimed that the Shiite rebels attacked and displaced many Sunni families in the north. This is an important indication of the growing of strength of the group.

The AQAP’s war on the al Houthis, which was announced amidst the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, has a dual purpose in that it attacks ideological enemies and simultaneously builds support among the northern Sunni tribes. The AQAP intends to capitalize on the grievances of the northern tribes. The destruction of homes, farms and schools during the Yemen government’s war with the al Houthis has left many northern tribes disgruntled. Combined with lack of development and unemployment, the situation is fertile ground for the AQAP to exploit. The young and poorly educated population in Yemen offers an attractive recruitment pool for the organization. Beside recruitment, alignment and establishing linkages with local tribes is critical for the AQAP. This was also a key factor for the leadership of Al Qaeda Central to hide successfully in Pakistan’s tribal areas for many years.

Implications of the Current Uprising

The 9/11 attacks paved the way for the United States and Ali Abdullah Saleh’s government to forge a strong relationship hinged on counterterrorism efforts. An example of this cooperation is the 2002 assassination of Al Qaeda leader, Ali Qaed Senyan al-Harthi. With the assistance of the Yemeni government, al-Harthi was killed in a missile attack from a U.S. Predator drone.

Yemen fell off the scope of the U.S. after 2002 as the latter was bogged down with battling insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. After the 2009 Christmas Day plot, the U.S. took notice of the growing strength of AQAP and renewed its counterterrorism partnership with the Yemeni government. The U.S. now has Special Forces trainers and support personnel in Yemen, as well as a number of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives. Before the uprising, the U.S. have been working closely with Yemeni counterterrorism forces and conducted many successful raids on suspected AQAP members. However, since the revolts began, the Yemeni government has turned the switch off on its counterterrorism efforts and is more focused on controlling the uprising.

President Barack Obama’s administration is a strong ally of the Yemen government but it is currently in a dilemma as it tries to find the balance between the people’s democratic aspirations and unhampered counterterrorism operations. Throughout his 33 year old regime, Ali Abdullah Saleh has consolidated power by placing his family, relatives and people from his tribes into key positions in government. Saleh’s son and nephews are in charge of Yemen’s main security, counterterrorism agencies and armed forces. His eldest son, Ahmed commands the Republican Guard. His nephew Amar Saleh is Deputy Chief of the National Security Bureau (NSB), an intelligence agency designed to work in closer cooperation with foreign governments on counterterrorism. Another nephew, Yahya Mohammed Abdullah Saleh, is Chief of Staff of the Central Security Organization (CSO), a division of the Ministry of the Interior which maintains an elite U.S.-trained Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU). Amar and Yahya have extensive experience in
fighting terrorism and have cooperated with the US in counterterrorism initiatives. If they were to be removed in the collapse of the regime, Yemen’s counterterrorism efforts would no doubt suffer in the transitional period.

On 05 June 2011, President Ali Abdullah Saleh left Yemen for Saudi Arabia to undergo medical treatments for injuries he received in an attack on the presidential compound. Though it is unclear if he will return to Yemen, this medical trip is possibly a facade as a face-saving way for him to step down, engineered by the Saudis. If President Saleh does not return to his reign in Sana'a, a new battle for power will begin. While President Saleh’s eldest son, Ahmad, is still in the country, it is unclear whether he would allow a peaceful transition or continue to suppress the revolt. The main players trying to take control in this power vacuum are Vice President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, head of the powerful Hashid tribal federation, and General Ali Mohsen, who defected to the protesters in the middle of March. Whoever eventually comes into power, will face a daunting task in reversing the tide from Yemen’s descent into chaos.

**Conclusion**

To eradicate the problem of terrorism in Yemen, the United States and the international community must view the solution through the prism of state building. Yemen has, for many years, been on the brink of state failure. The Middle East revolts offer hope for the Arab countries to build democratic governments and create opportunities for the population that would curb Islamic extremism and terrorism. Any new regime in Yemen must improve governance, increase its social service in rural areas, run an effective public campaign against terrorism, and respond to the needs of the tribes. However, such reforms would require time to take root and be institutionalized. Thus any reforms by the regime will have little or no direct threat to AQAP in the near future. Any new regime in Yemen will not drastically alter the environment in which the AQAP currently thrives in. The group will continue to remain the most active branch of the Al Qaeda global terror network and the most serious threat to the West in the near future.

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Topical areas of interest are terrorism and political violence, terrorism and organized crime, homeland security, religion and violence, internal conflicts and terrorism, and all other areas of security broadly defined.

Article length could be anywhere between 800 to 1500 words. Submissions must be made before the 15th of every month for editing purposes and for inclusion in the next month’s edition.

Electronic copies of the articles (MS Word format) may be submitted to the editors at the following addresses: isarabinda@ntu.edu.sg or isdiane@ntu.edu.sg
The Demise of Bin Laden and the Endgame in Afghanistan
Khuram Iqbal

Pakistan has been at the receiving end of the damaging effects of the war in Afghanistan. There has been much speculation that the country has become the epicenter of global terrorism even before the killing of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan- the country is now besieged with a number of terrorist groups which emerged in the aftermath of the US-led operations in Afghanistan.

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The killing of Osama Bin Laden in the garrison town of Abbotabad, Pakistan marks the beginning of a new chapter in regional geo-politics. The core mandate of an international intervention in Afghanistan was to dismantle the Al Qaeda, the group responsible for a number of high-profile terrorist attacks around the world. Although the death of Bin Laden is said to be merely symbolic, it has provided United States President Barack Obama with a strong reason to reassert his decision to pull out the American troops from Afghanistan starting July 2011. A recent letter written to President Obama by 81 progressive lawmakers signals an emerging political narrative in Washington. The letter, which was a follow up to an earlier letter sent on 16 March 2011, notes "In the wake of Osama bin Laden’s death, now is the time to shift toward the swift, safe, and responsible withdrawal of U.S. troops and military contractors from Afghanistan." In a White House press conference on 2 May 2011, U.S. Homeland Security Adviser John Brennan commented on Bin Laden’s death saying "We are going to try to take advantage of this to demonstrate to people in the area that Al Qaeda is a thing of the past, and we are hoping to bury the rest of Al Qaeda along with Osama bin Laden."

The spill-over effects of the Afghan war has proved to be extremely damaging for Pakistan. A number of terrorist outfits emerged in Pakistan in the aftermath of the United States’ “Operation Enduring Freedom.” These groups seek to justify their existence on the pretext of “a brotherly country being occupied by the infidels.” Groups like the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which is responsible for unleashing waves of terror in the country, rose to power by manipulating significant popular support for the Afghan Taliban. Many Pakistanis still regard the Afghan Taliban as a legitimate guerrilla force fighting against a “foreign occupation.” There is a dominant, rather influential, segment of Pakistani establishment, political leadership, media barons and public, which have always regarded American presence in Afghanistan as the root cause of domestic terrorism. Many believe that U.S. departure from Afghanistan will help reduce the alarming rise of religious militancy in Pakistan.

The post-U.S. Afghanistan might be a subject of extensive brainstorming in different capitals of the region. Beijing, Tehran and Moscow would ponder President Obama’s political approach involving a gradual demilitarization to fix the quagmire in Afghanistan. However, this strategic shift in the regional geo-
politics does not necessarily entail desired outcomes for Islamabad. The fact that the world’s most wanted terrorist was detected and killed under the nose of the Pakistani Army and a few kilometers away from the capital has given rise to the speculations that the epicenter of global terrorism is now in Pakistan. Islamabad’s response to the prevailing situation after the death of Bin Laden will determine the future of Pakistan’s relations with the Western world, particularly the United States.

Renewed domestic and international pressure on Islamabad demands an urgent and dispassionate analysis of the country’s counterterrorism policies. Pakistan’s policy makers need to be aware that the American pullout from Afghanistan will have little or no impact on militant groups operating within the country. These groups have long transformed from “anti-U.Ss occupation” to “anti-Pakistan” and “pro-global Jihad” entities. The cause to liberate Afghanistan from foreign occupation is not the raison d’être anymore for these groups. Instead, they seek to bring down the existing socio-political order in Pakistan which they perceived as un-Islamic and corrupt.

An example of this is the TTP. The group has veered away from its original agenda of strengthening the Afghan Taliban. It is now an entity that vociferously endorses Al Qaeda’s agenda of a global Jihad. The TTP rarely mentions Afghanistan in its propaganda material and lays more emphasis in disposing of the “un-Islamic regime” in Pakistan to set the foundation for a global Khilafat. It will be naïve to assume that the TTP would fade away or cease its operations once the international forces leave Afghanistan.

Similarly, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a group which existed even before the international intervention in Afghanistan, is seen to be the least affected by the U.S. withdrawal. The LeJ has evolved to become one of the deadliest urban terrorist groups in recent times. The group is now known as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Aalmi and along with the modifications to its name the group has diversified its goals and turned more lethal and sophisticated. Aside from Shias of Pakistan, the group now targets religious minorities, shrines, Western interests and state institutions. The addition of “al-Aalmi” (international) in its title also illustrates LeJ’s intentions and increasing capabilities to expand its areas of operation beyond Pakistan. The group maintains indigenous sources of recruitment, finances, weapons and training facilities. It was also suspected of involvement in some of the deadliest terrorist attacks in Pakistan none of which can be described as a reaction to the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s alleged support to the Haqqani Network must also be addressed as part of repairing frayed ties with the West. It appears that following the assassination of Colonel Imam at the hands of the TTP and the Haqqani Network’s inability or unwillingness to pressure the TTP to secure the release of one of the former officer of ISI, has led the Pakistan military to rethink its policies. It has become increasingly clear that no one is in control in the rugged mountains of FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas). In such a situation, when Pakistan is seeking a proactive political engagement with Afghanistan, the military establishment stands to gain nothing for supporting an ineffective entity at the cost of its relationships with the Afghans and Americans. Therefore, it is just a matter of resources and time before the armed forces move into North Waziristan. Further, the Pakistan Army also needs to ensure that their operations against Haqqanis will be complimented by the allied forces on the other side of border and the militants would not be allowed to escape from North Waziristan into Afghanistan.

Faced with the ultimate necessity of finding some solution to Afghan quagmire and the threat of global terrorism emanating from Pakistan, the U.S and other regional players will urgently need a fresh start with Pakistan. Strained relationship between Islamabad and Western capitals can become a hurdle in achieving a peaceful Afghanistan and taking the war on terror to its logical end.
The Philosophy of Sayyid Qutb Will Persist as Al Qaeda’s Intellectual Heritage

Lisa M. Allen

With the death of Osama Bin Laden, there have been much speculations as to who would take his place as the leader of the Al Qaeda. It is highly likely that the next leader will be someone who has a deep and profound allegiance to the teachings of Sayyid Qutb. Through the years, the Al Qaeda has consistently used Qutb’s ideas to further its aims of a global jihad.

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Qutb’s teachings had on key Al Qaeda members such as Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Anwar al Awlaki. While the long-term successor to Al Qaeda leadership remains unannounced, the probability that Qutb will continue as a cornerstone of Al Qaeda’s ideology is almost undeniable.

Qutb spent almost two years in America and when he returned he was even more radical than when he left. It is not a coincidence that many jihadists became radicalized after being displaced from their home country. They defined themselves as radical Muslims while they were living in the West, much like Qutb did. This was the case for four men living in Hamburg, Germany who would later join the Al Qaeda and ultimately become key players in 2001 September 11 attacks. One of these men was Mohammad Atta, the pilot of American Airlines Flight #11 that struck the World Trade Center. Writer and journalist Lawrence Wright wrote, “the odious qualities that Sayyid Qutb had detected in America—its materialism, its licentiousness, its spiritual falsity—were also spectacularly on display in Hamburg, with its clanging casinos, prostitutes in shop windows, and magnificent, empty cathedrals.” Modernity was present in Europe

Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian radical thinker, is seen as the principal ideologue of modern Sunni Islamic radicalism and the most important theorist of the extremist Salafis. Qutb viewed that Islam made armed resistance to ostensibly Muslim rulers who were deemed to be anti-Islamic not only permissible but mandatory. Qutb believed the West’s secularism posed a threat to the Middle East, much like Osama Bin Laden did until his death. Many views of Al Qaeda can be traced back to Qutb such as a distrust of modernity and the idea of an offensive jihad. In some cases these beliefs resulted from the personal impact

as well, and just as in the case of Qutb in America, today’s members of Al Qaeda had strong adverse reactions to those same modern values—secularism, materialism, and tolerance, to name a few.

Qutb and Osama

Qutb and Bin Laden had similar views on women, sexuality, and immorality. Qutb described Americans as “a reckless, deluded herd that only knows lust and money.” In his letter from October 6, 2002, bin Laden criticized aspects of American society, stating, “You are a nation that permits acts of immorality, and you consider these acts to be pillars of personal freedom...You are a nation that exploits women like consumer products or advertising tools, calling upon customers to purchase them...” It was not America in particular that Qutb despised, but modernity in general. Qutb’s central concern about modernity is the values it imparted in the form of secularism, rationality, democracy, subjectivity, individualism, mixing of the sexes, tolerance and materialism. He was convinced that these values had infected Islam through the agency of Western colonialism and that America now stood for all of that. As Bin Laden held many of the same views of Western society as Qutb, it follows that the ideology of Al Qaeda is based on these same teachings.

Outlook on Jihad

A key aspect of both Sayyid Qutb and Al Qaeda’s philosophies is their similar outlook concerning jihad. Both Qutb and Osama Bin Laden believed that jihad is a long-term struggle, and therefore did not expect an immediate conclusion to it. “The scope of this struggle is not limited to this earth or to this life. The observers of this struggle are not merely a generation of men,” says Qutb. In early 2002, Suleiman abu Gaith, a spokesman for Bin Laden, reaffirmed this idea: “We believe we are still at the beginning of this war...So if we are killed or captured or the enemies of Allah manage to achieve one victory...we should not forget that this path is long and it is a path that the Muslims have to walk upon until judgment day.” The Qur’an clearly states “there is no compulsion in religion.” That would seem to forbid waging war against non-Muslims to convert them to Islam by force and against Muslims who hold different beliefs. Qutb, however, scorned the view that jihad should only be used for defensive purposes in order to protect the umma. He believed that Muslims could overthrow a ruling power. “Islam is not merely ‘belief’,” Qutb wrote, “Islam is a declaration of the freedom of man from the servitude to other men. Thus it strives from the beginning to abolish all those systems and governments which are based on the rule of man over men.” In his book Milestones, Qutb explicitly states the acceptable reasons for performing jihad: “to establish God’s authority in the earth; to arrange human affairs according to the true guidance provided by God; to abolish all the Satanic forces and Satanic systems of life; to end the lordship of one man over others, since all men are creatures of God and no one has the authority to make them his servants or to make arbitrary laws for them. These reasons are sufficient for proclaiming jihad.” An offensive jihad can only be declared by a Caliph, but Bin Laden claimed that Al Qaeda’s jihad is a defensive one in reaction to attacks by the United States against the Muslim world. However, many people worldwide still see Al Qaeda’s jihad as offensive. If one assumes that Bin Laden was actually calling for an offensive jihad this could be seen as another idea stemming from Qutb’s ideology.

Bin Laden’s Successor?

Predictions are swirling now as to who will succeed Bin Laden as the leader of Al Qaeda. One such rumored successor is the long-time second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Through Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s strong connection to Qutb persists. Zawahiri was the leader of al-Jihad and is often called the ideological leader of Al Qaeda. At the age of fourteen he joined the Muslim Brotherhood and became a student and follower of Qutb. A major turning point in Zawahiri’s life was Qutb’s execution. Zawahiri was fifteen at the time.
Another potential new leader of Al Qaeda is Anwar al Awlaki, an American-born Muslim cleric. While al Awlaki is more of a “freelancer” than a proven Al Qaeda leader, through his incendiary public statements he may have the potential to become a global symbol of Al Qaeda, following in Bin Laden’s footsteps. In May 2010, a video was released by a Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda in which al Awlaki called for the killing of U.S. civilians. Al Awlaki has become a main Al Qaeda proponent and in 2011 became the first U.S. citizen to be placed on a CIA list of terrorists approved for targeted killing. In the May 2010 video, al Awlaki states, “In addition, I call upon [all] Muslims to follow in his [Hasan’s] footsteps, and to wage Jihad by speech or by action. Nidal Hasan set a wonderful example, and I ask Allah to make it a beginning, and that many other Muslims will follow in his footsteps…” This message sounds very familiar, with a striking resemblance to past mobilizations issued by Bin Laden. It is no coincidence that al Awlaki claims to have avidly studied Qutb during his imprisonment in Yemen. The Saudi cleric Sheikh Ubayd al-Jabiree, admonished al Awlaki in a speech to US Salafis in November 2009, stating, “He [al-Awlaki] does not know anything about the jihad which is from the well-planned obligations which Allah has established…[He has been] polluted by the ideas of Sayyid Qutb.” As al-Jabiree declared, “Sayyid Qutb is flag-bearer of takfir….this Sayyid has declared the entire Ummah kaffir falsely.”

As Lawrence Wright claims, “The international Salafist uprising might have occurred without the writings of Sayyid Qutb or Abdullah Azzam’s call to jihad, but Al Qaeda would not have existed.” Al Qaeda is the organization that it is today because of its members and leaders, however, it is clear that there is a concrete connection between the philosophy of Sayyid Qutb and the intellectual legacy that Al Qaeda still follows to this day. Al Qaeda’s usage of Qutb’s compelling ideas will continue to aid in the recruitment of willing participants in a global jihad.

GLOBAL PATHFINDER II

The ICPVTR Terrorism Database – Global Pathfinder - is a one-stop repository for information on the current and emerging terrorist threat. The database focuses on terrorism and political violence in the Asia-Pacific region – comprising of Southeast Asia, North Asia, South Asia, Central Asia and Oceania.

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For further inquiries please email Ms. Karen Law Yu Ling at ISYLLaw@ntu.edu.sg
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- **Pakistan: Terrorism Ground Zero** (Reaktion Books, 2011) by Dr. Rohan Gunaratna and Mr. Khuram Iqbal
- **Ethnic Identity and National Conflict in China** (Palgrave Macmillan 22 June 2010) by Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, Dr. Arabinda Acharya and Mr. Wang Pengxin
- **International Aviation and Terrorism: Evolving Threats, Evolving Security** (Routledge 2009) by Dr. John Harrison
- **Targeting Terrorist Financing: International Cooperation and New Regimes** (Routledge 2009) by Dr. Arabinda Acharya