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WITH JOKOWI FINALLY IN, WHAT'S NEXT?

Executive Summary

Chairperson of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), Megawati Sukarnoputri, officially nominated Jakarta Governor Joko Widodo (Jokowi) as the party's de facto presidential candidate for the 2014 General Elections. The declaration has changed the Indonesian political landscape dramatically, with Jokowi tipped to win the elections, based on several survey results. This report provides an analysis on the significance of Jokowi's path-breaking candidacy. In addition, it will discuss Jokowi's relations with Megawati and the PDI-P, as well as how his candidacy would affect current dynamics within the party. The paper also seeks to present several hypothetical combinations of potential vice-president candidates of Jokowi's presidential bid. Lastly the report sketches some key scenarios of likely outcomes of the 2014 General Elections – with Jokowi in the picture.

Introduction

After a long wait, the chairperson of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) Megawati Sukarnoputri finally announced Joko Widodo's (Jokowi) anticipated candidacy for presidency on the PDI-P ticket for the 2014 presidential elections¹ on Friday, 14 March 2014. Jokowi himself also formally declared his intention of running for the presidency in Marunda, one of the few *kampongs* in North Jakarta. The markets in Jakarta responded positively to the announcement of Jokowi's candidacy. In particular, the Jakarta Composite Index (JCI) rose 3.21 per cent and the value of the Rupiah appreciated momentarily against the U.S. Dollar.

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With Jokowi now formally inducted into the campaign, it becomes imperative to look at how this new development would impact the current political constellation. This report puts forward certain plausible outcomes of the 2014 General Elections in light of Jokowi's nomination, arguing that his official candidacy in the legislative and eventually the presidential elections will most probably result in a win. This report also seeks to elucidate Jokowi's symbiotic relationship with Megawati and the PDI-P, as well as the likely power plays to occur between them. Finally, the report will wager on a few likely candidates for the vice-presidency for Jokowi, assuming that Jokowi is going for the presidency – an important component within the current political development.

The Significance of Jokowi's Candidacy

Jokowi's candidacy on the PDI-P banner is important for three main reasons. First, he is by all accounts still the strongest presidential candidate based on results of several surveys. According to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a prominent Indonesian think tank, Jokowi's electability rate soared to 34.7 per cent in November 2013. Another survey, conducted by the Jakarta-based Pol-Tracking Institute, concurred with previous findings that Jokowi outperformed other candidates by a large margin, with a support base of 37.95 per cent from respondents. This is a clear sign that Jokowi is the most favoured candidate in the election.

Second, according to some analysts, Jokowi's participation in the presidential race would reduce the number of abstentions (*golput*) in the upcoming legislative election (BeritaSatu 2014, Inilah.com 2014). Based on a survey by Cirus Surveyors, the voter participation rate

¹ The Indonesia Programme of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Relations (RSIS) in its previous policy report had predicted in February 2014 that Jokowi is most likely to run on the PDIP's ticket. Since then, this scenario had been proven right. See "Indonesia's Political Outlook" Towards GE2014 - Some Trends and Observation": http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/policy_report/Indonesia_Programme_Policy_Report_16_January_2014.pdf (accessed 15 March 2014).

would increase by up to 5 per cent due to Jokowi's appearance at the polls. According to the General Elections Commission (KPU) data, there had also been a corresponding downward trend in voter turnout since the 1999 elections. This trend emerged because many Indonesians had lost faith in political parties. A survey by the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) in December 2011, suggested that the Indonesian electorate viewed political parties as among the most corrupt institutions in Indonesia. The appearance of Jokowi in the elections is probably a visceral sign that Indonesians still have faith in the democratic system to produce a credible candidate.

Third, people perceived Jokowi as a new hope for Indonesia, heralding a new breed of Indonesian leaders that have their origins at the grassroots level. The so-called "Jokowi effect" is really not related to the man Jokowi alone, but can be used to describe the nascent rise of a new breed of people-oriented leaders within the regions. Such leaders are starting to exert an influential hold on the Indonesian society. Mrs Tri Rismaharini (Risma), the Mayor of Surabaya, is a strong female leader who started her career as a local bureaucrat. During her tenure, she succeeded in transforming Surabaya into a more liveable city. Mr Ganjar Pranowo of Central Java is well-known for his progressive and constructive comments as a legislator and the province's governor. The Mayor of Bandung (West Java) Ridwan Kamil is also another budding leader with a significant presence in local politics. There is anticipation that if Jokowi were to succeed in leading the country as president, it will undoubtedly set a precedent for future regional leaders following in his footsteps of good governance.

With such significance, Jokowi's candidacy is more than a mere popularity contest for a new leader of Indonesia for the next five years. More importantly, his candidacy would rejuvenate hope and restore confidence in the people of a stronger and more reliable democracy.

Jokowi, Megawati and the PDI-P

Nonetheless, one must not be carried away by the euphoria of Jokowi's announced candidacy. We must remember that Jokowi is obligated to Megawati's blessing. The RSIS Indonesia Programme reported that the possibility of Jokowi running as presidential candidate on another party's ticket is close to impossible, as he is a loyal supporter of the PDI-P. The underlying pre-requisite of Jokowi's nomination was in effect the boosting of support for the PDI-P. A survey by Pol-Tracking Institute in January 2014 stated that if the PDI-P did not nominate Jokowi as the party's presidential candidate, their electability rate would only be 22.44 per cent. Even so, this was a high figure that only misses the presidential threshold by a few percentage points. On the other hand, if Jokowi were to be nominated, Pol-Tracking Institute indicated a very significant increase in PDI-P's electability rate that could go up to more than 30 per cent of the total votes.

Therefore, Megawati's decision to nominate Jokowi came quite possibly at the right time. It was just two days before the three-week campaign began. With Jokowi spearheading the PDI-P campaign, it will be much easier for PDI-P to garner votes from swing voters. Some analysts predicted that if Jokowi were to run in the elections, his personal appeal would bring swing voters' to the side of PDI-P earlier rather than later. Personal appeal had steadily evolved to be the single most important factor in determining the voting behaviour of the electorate (Liddle and Mujani 2007). This is probably where Jokowi's charm would come in as the quintessential "guy-next-door", playing an important role in cultivating voter support for PDI-P. Based on a survey by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta in November 2013, if PDI-P were to nominate Jokowi in the upcoming election, the party's electability rate would jump significantly from 17.6 per cent to 29.9 per cent, in addition to 24.8 per cent of swing voters. With this situation in mind, PDI-P would surpass the 30 per cent mark of total votes in the next legislative elections – replacing the Democratic Party (PD) as ruling party.

In such a scenario, the mentor-mentee relationship between Megawati and Jokowi will be intriguing to observe. If Jokowi wins the presidency, his main political support in the parliament would have to come from PDI-P, currently under Megawati's control. Megawati essentially still holds the reins over all matters of the party, and the party's elites in Jakarta are Megawati's closest acquaintances.

This will be the first time since post-Suharto Indonesia that an elected president is not a founder or a member of the party's board of patrons, or even the chairman of a political party. Such a scenario is quite unprecedented in all previous elections. Starting in 1998, Habibie was seen as a temporary continuation of an interim leader after the fall of Suharto. Other than that, most presidents had at one time or another been chairpersons of organisations or their own respective parties. The late Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) was one of the founders of the National Awakening Party (PKB). Megawati was and still is the chairwoman of PDI-P. President Yudhoyono was the face of the Democratic Party (PD) and is the party's incumbent chairman. Gus Dur, Megawati and Yudhoyono all have a relatively strong presence over their parties in support of their own policies. Jokowi on the other hand is not even a senior member within the PDI-P's central command. The *Jakarta Post* reported that Jokowi joined PDI-P in 2005, when he was subsequently appointed as mayor of Surakarta (Solo) (TJP 2014a). Prior to joining the PDI-P, Jokowi tried to approach other parties such as the PD, the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). All of them turned down his request (TJP 2013). In a sense, Jokowi did not possess the strong ideological lineage and grassroots-cum-elite support within PDI-P. Megawati had actually assisted in building up his credentials as a loyal PDI-P member. As demonstrated earlier, Megawati made herself out to be Jokowi's mentor by infusing in him a stronger ideological linkage with the party,

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particularly in the development of Jokowi's credentials as a loyal Sukarnoist. On several occasions, Megawati took Jokowi on visiting trips to the public as well as among the PDI-P's cadres. Megawati also made sure that Jokowi understood the significance of PDI-P as "the party stemming from an illustrious family lineage" when they both visited Sukarno's grave in Blitar, East Java, two days before Jokowi's nomination. In return, Jokowi reciprocated by displaying his loyalty towards Megawati.

Based on the observations prior, Megawati will still have an over-arching influence on a possible Jokowi presidency. Although Jokowi may possess presidential powers, the real power still lies in Megawati's hand. Megawati's imprint will nonetheless be present in every aspect of Jokowi's presidential bid as well as in his administration in the future. Selection of a potential vice-presidency for Jokowi would have to come under the aegis of Megawati's consent. This will include ministers in Jokowi's cabinet. In turn, Megawati herself relies largely on an inner circle of confidantes including senior party members Tjahjo Kumolo, Sabam Siriat and Hasto Kristianto. Jokowi is also likely to seek Megawati's consent when it comes to selecting his ministers. While it is still too early to speculate, there will be suspicions whether Jokowi can be independent of Megawati's overweening influence.

Will Jokowi ultimately take over the reins of the party from Megawati? Although plausible, one must remember that he is after all indebted to Megawati for her endorsement. In addition, the PDI-P is also seen as the party of Sukarno's lineage/descendants. If there was to be a succession, the next chairman would most likely come from the Sukarno family. This would mean that either Puan Maharani (Megawati's daughter) or Prananda Prabowo (Megawati's son) would be the most likely candidates to be future chairperson of PDI-P.

Unravelling Jokowi's Vice-Presidency Candidate: Coalition exigency, Technocrat or Military-man?

With Jokowi's candidacy in the electoral race confirmed, many are beginning to speculate on a suitable vice-presidency that can be paired with the wildly popular PDI-P candidate. Arie Sudjito of Gajah Mada University suggests that Jokowi would need a compatible running mate with strong "leadership qualities as well as resources" to accompany him in managing the government (TJP

If one traces the pattern of Jokowi's career as mayor of Solo and governor of Jakarta, it can be observed that Jokowi had been more of a "solidarity-maker" and a "legitimacy-producer" than anything else.

2014b). On the other hand, there is also a consideration that Jokowi – as someone who lack experience in the affairs of the country – would prefer a technocratic figure to shore up his inexperience. Nonetheless, how is a "strong" candidate defined and how can such a candidate fill up the experiential void in someone like Jokowi? If one traces the pattern of Jokowi's career as mayor of Solo and governor of Jakarta, it can be observed that Jokowi had been more of a "solidarity-maker" and a "legitimacy-producer" than anything else. His deputies were the ones that take strong stances whereas Jokowi remains more of a populist figurehead.

Although national-level politics may differ from local politics, this paper would like to present a few permutations of possible “strong” pairs applicable to a Jokowi-led team.

First, one could associate “strong” by way of political coalition or union. A Jokowi presidency would require solid legislative support in ensuring the implementation of his desired vision and plans. Without Jokowi in the race, PDI-P would not have surpassed 50 per cent of total votes in the upcoming election. Assuming PDI-P will get 30 per cent of total votes – that is, translated into approximately 150-160 seats in the parliament – the party will need at least another 120 additional votes from other parties to come out tops in the legislative race.² In a multi-party system like Indonesia, the winning party of the election is often obligated to build coalitions with other political parties.

Under this context, potential coalitional parties may want to put forward their vice-presidential nominees for Jokowi. Nonetheless, it is still too early to predict which parties will fit into PDI-P’s preference of a coalition. Although coalition formation will only be more tangible after the legislative elections, Jokowi’s nomination had irrevocably forced other political parties to re-adjust their strategies. Already in Golkar, Jokowi’s nomination had created waves. Two of its members have openly declared that Golkar should nominate a vice-presidential candidate in support of Jokowi, much to the chagrin of Aburizal Bakrie.

While the choice of Jokowi’s vice-presidency may be determined pragmatically by coalitional preferences, there is a chance that Jokowi’s agency in the matter takes priority. Selection of a suitable candidate may likely be based upon a criterion of expediency and complementarity. Jokowi needs support from someone who knows how to handle the bureaucratic apparatus, preferably a technocrat with a competent economic background. Apart from the acute corruption issue, economic and bureaucratic reforms are the two biggest challenges that the next Indonesian president is expected to face. The next president must also be able to retain and achieve higher economic growth in order to attract investors. More importantly, he should ensure that people at the grassroots level enjoy the benefits from Indonesia’s growth. He would perhaps require the expertise of someone who has had extensive experience with issues of national-level significance. The first name that comes to mind having such a capacity is Jusuf Kalla. Jusuf Kalla is a Buginese who had built his fame and fortune in Makassar (South Sulawesi). He also has a proven track-record as an effective vice-president during President Yudhoyono’s first term. Another potential candidate is Hatta Rajasa – a South Sumatran who is well known as a competent lobbyist. Hatta Rajasa is a potential candidate because he is an experienced politician who had served in three ministerial positions.

The current Indonesian Central Bank (BI) governor Agus Martowardojo is also seen as a potential candidate as Jokowi’s vice-president. Agus enjoys a good track record as former

² This is a very rough estimation because the mechanism of finalizing winning seats had to be based on the number of total remaining seats calculated from each electoral district.

Minister of Finance and BI governor. He is known to be a disciplined state treasurer with a reputation for being tough. Agus Martowardojo's Achilles heel may be his lack of political affiliation. Former Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati, the current Managing Director at the World Bank, while encumbered by problems similar to Mr Martowardojo, is also a plausible option. It must be noted however that the selection of technocrats Martowardojo or Sri Mulyani, who are vulnerable to attacks by vested interests in Parliament, could potentially put the Jokowi administration at a greater risk.

Finally, there could be a possibility of Megawati having an overweening influence in Jokowi's decision-making process. With her dedication to the concept of "*negara kesatuan*" [unity of the nation], there may be an inclination, on Megawati's part, to select a military man as a natural fit for the vice-president candidacy. Top of the mind candidates under this category include Major General (Ret.) Pramono Edhie Wibowo (former Army Chief of Staff), the current TNI Commander General Moeldoko, and former Army Chief Ryamizard Ryacudu. Pramono Edhie Wibowo is a potential candidate because he is able to galvanise support within PD in a PDI-P dominated parliament. In addition, Mr Pramono Edhie Wibowo was Megawati's Presidential Aide in 2001. Nonetheless, major obstacles still stand in the way of such a union. Mr Pramono Edhie Wibowo is President Yudhoyono's brother-in-law and relations between Megawati and Yudhoyono have been acrimonious since 2004. For General Moeldoko's case on the other hand, as a serving officer, his candidacy while a possibility, could lead to conflicts of interest – bringing unwanted public attention to the state of military professionalism in Indonesia. Ryamizard Ryacudu may have the last laugh in such a scenario. He is known to be close to Megawati but it remains to be seen whether he is the better choice out of the three.

Jokowi should realise that his candidacy in particular has raised the emotions and temperature of the electorate going into the ballot. Nevertheless, nothing is certain until the legislative results are in. The above mentioned permutations represent merely the mapping of possible outcomes that is still conjectural.

Observing current trends in Indonesia, it is clear that Jokowi's candidacy had substantially altered the political landscape of the 2014 general elections. His candidacy also provided a new impetus to the electorate of a new, promising face in parliament. Undoubtedly, Jokowi's nomination brings new optimism to Indonesia. With Jokowi's nomination, there is a high possibility that he will ultimately clinch the top prize of president – that is, unless something unexpected occurs. Whether coalitional preference, Jokowi's agency or Megawati's decision ultimately triumphs at this period is still debatable. There could be a high chance that all of these factors will work towards the selection of a suitable vice-presidency candidate.

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