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RSIS Policy Report

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The Indonesian Presidential Election: How will the Balance Tip?

Abstract

With the Indonesian presidential election coming to an end, the race between Jokowi-Kalla and Prabowo-Hatta have intensified considerably with both teams battling neck-to-neck with only a miniscule margin that separates the two. According to latest poll results, about 10 per cent of the electorate still remains undecided. This report intends to provide an analysis on the developments within the electoral competition that may tip the balance to either side. It highlights three crucial aspects that may inevitably determine the winner of the election: (i) Image Cultivation; (ii) Islamic Credentials; and (iii) Party Machinery. The report will conclude with a scenario-analysis of either a possible post-election Prabowo government or a Jokowi one with the intention of extrapolating how each hypothetical administration will play out and the immediate implications of either presidential aspirants coming to power.

The Indonesian Presidential Election: How will the Balance Tip?

While the presidential election looks like it was Joko Widodo's (Jokowi's) to lose just two months earlier, recent polls have painted a strikingly different picture. Latest results from the Indo Barometer survey conducted between 16 and 22 June 2014 reflected a narrowing margin between front-runner Jokowi and rival Prabowo Subianto with their respective vice-presidential candidates. Support for Jokowi-Kalla had plateaued at around the 46 per cent mark while Prabowo-Hatta rose to 42.6 per cent. The difference stood at a mere 3 per cent. Other surveys including the Lembaga Survei Indonesia and the Pol-tracking Institute have also indicated a similar trend.¹ Riding on a momentous surge in the electability ratings of the Prabowo-Hatta team, the Democratic Party (PD), under the leadership of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), withdrew its prior neutral stance and officially threw its weight behind Prabowo-Hatta in a dramatic turn of events. This brought the current coalition under Prabowo-Hatta to 7, amounting to a grand adjusted total of 57 per cent of national votes and 353 seats in the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR). This stood in contrast to Jokowi-Kalla's 4-party strong coalition with a total of 40 per cent of national votes and 207 seats in the DPR.

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The Prabowo-Hatta coalition now comprised of the Greater Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), the National Mandate Party (PAN), the Justice and Prosperous Party (PKS), the United Development Party (PPP), the Moon and Star Party (PBB), the Golkar Party (Golkar) and PD. Nonetheless, this does not mean all is gone for the Jokowi-Kalla team. With a much slender coalition consisting of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), the National Democrat Party (Nasdem), the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the National Conscience Party (Hanura), they will have to convert the remaining 10 per cent of undecided voters to their side. Reeling from negative campaigns and false allegations directed primarily at Jokowi himself, there is much ado for Jokowi's "Success Team" (Tim Sukses) to regain Jokowi's standing and Islamic credentials among the unpersuaded.² On the other hand, Prabowo's growing electoral clout had raised concerns among international observers given his track record of suspected human rights abuses. In particular, his virulently nationalistic rhetoric and fire-brand politics had received criticism from international investors and foreign observers. While Prabowo's electability had been seen to be growing domestically, alarms had been raised by international media and foreign correspondents. Some of the alarming issues for them are a barrage of revelations and expose regarding human right violations in Timor as well as his tenuous relationship with the United States (U.S.).³

¹ See Sara Schonhardt in "Indonesian Candidates Under Pressure As Gap Between Them Narrows", *The Wall Street Journal* (WSJ), 22 June 2014.

² See Yuliasri Perdani in "'Obor Rakyat' founder stands ground, attacks Press Council", *The Jakarta Post*, 24 June 2014. Retrieved: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/06/24/obor-rakyat-founder-stands-ground-attacks-press-council.html?utm_source=Daily+News+on+the+Southeast+Asian+Region+25+June+2014&utm_campaign=Info+Alert+20140625&utm_medium=email.

³ See Allen Nairn's expose of Prabowo in <http://www.allannairn.org/>. See also US Ambassador to Indonesia Robert O. Blake Jr. calling on the Indonesian government to look into reports of human rights abuses allegedly committed by Prabowo before and around the fall of his former father-in-law and president Soeharto in May

At present, the presidential contest is still a closely fought one. Past elections have yielded clear winners. In the 2009 presidential election, SBY-Boediono came out tops with more than a 30 per cent margin over second place Megawati-Prabowo. Although there were two rounds of elections in 2004, the SBY-Kalla pair eventually came out tops with more than 20 per cent of votes over the Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi pair. Legitimacy will certainly be a crucial factor in the 2014 presidential election. As both candidate teams seek to pull out further from one another, they attempt to court undecided voters a week before official voting commences. This paper seeks to examine how such a move can be carried out by both pairings covering their existing strategies, policy platforms and possible deficiencies in their campaigns. In general, this paper touches on three critical aspects that may possibly tilt the balance to either side. As it focuses purely on the domestic vote, aspects that may concern international observers such as foreign policy bias will be left out. The aspects covered include (i) Image Cultivation; (ii) Islamic Credentials; and (iii) Party Machinery. The paper will conclude with a scenario-analysis of either a possible post-election Prabowo government or one with Jokowi, with the intention of extrapolating how each hypothetical administration will play out and the immediate implications of either presidential candidates coming to power.

Image Cultivation

In an interview with Channel NewsAsia's Sujadi Siswo that was posted on 1 July 2014, Jokowi had indicated his preference and approach to the conduct for the rest of his campaign. When questioned whether Jokowi would press on with his campaign style, Jokowi replied, "For me, what's more important is to go to the people and convince them that Jokowi-JK doesn't only provide grand plans and rhetoric. The important thing for me is how Jokowi-JK can quickly implement our plans -- this will ensure that the people can enjoy the benefits."⁴ While Jokowi's prior *blusukan* [impromptu visits] approach involving impromptu door-to-door visits have yielded much political cache and brought him to where he is, such tried-and-tested folksy methodology may not be as effective at the national level. While his campaign tagline of being "honest, clean and with a 'down-to-earth' simplicity [*jujur, bersih dan sederhana*]" personifies Jokowi and his approach rather aptly, it may not gel well with voters looking for characteristics that are more inclined towards assertiveness.

On the other end of the spectrum, Prabowo excels in the attributes of decisiveness and firmness [*tegas*].⁵ While he may not be seen as "the man of the people", he certainly stands out for his extravagant attempt to play the part of a leader with authority and charisma, modelled after the likes of Sukarno. Clad in a trademark "Sukarnoist" white attire with a *peci* [cap], Prabowo has been cultivating himself as the latest instalment of a line of successive Indonesian leaders that exudes power [*berwibawa*]. Prabowo had been prone to ratchet up such an image with pomp and grandiosity. For instance, prior to the presidential election back in March, he entered the Bung Karno Stadium on his thoroughbred *à la* military-style for his first rally.⁶ He continued to project such a persona with his strong rhetoric filled with a

1998 in Margareth S. Aritonang "Prabowo upset, happy with US media", *The Jakarta Post*, 26 June 2014. Retrieved: <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/06/26/prabowo-upset-happy-with-us-media.html>.

⁴ See "Jokowi to prioritise clean govt, education and health if elected" in *Channel News Asia*, 1 July 2014. Retrieved: <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/jokowi-to-prioritise/1226714.html>.

⁵ See Sara Schonhardt in "Decisive, Honest: What Indonesian Voters Like About Their Presidential Choices", *The Wall Street Journal*, 9 June 2014.

⁶ See Margareth S. Aritonang in "Prabowo grandstands in his party's military-style rally", *The Jakarta Post*, 24 March 2014. Retrieved: <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/03/24/prabowo-grandstands-his-party-s-military-style-rally.html>.

populist, anti-imperialist streak including his recent comments on a return to indirect elections of the president via the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) – one that is based on an Indonesian interpretation of democracy.⁷ While many found such displays of flagrant nationalism and authoritarianism distasteful, it may very well have captured the hearts of some sectors of the Indonesian electorate nostalgic of the past regimes of Indonesia under dictatorial strongmen.⁸

There will be difficulties if either candidate deviates from their respective images they have portrayed to the public. Nonetheless, Prabowo's authoritarian image seemed to incur more identification with the Indonesian electorate than Jokowi's mild-mannered approach as the presidential election runs its final course. The contrasts in persona could not be more starkly seen during the crucial series of the presidential debates that were televised nationwide.⁹ While Jokowi came off relatively favourably, he could not shake off his rather stiff image and apparent handicap when it comes to presenting his policies eloquently in front of an audience. Compared with Prabowo, Jokowi was evidently out of his comfort zone. On the other hand, while Prabowo may not match with Jokowi's meticulous reiteration of his policy platform, he certainly traded such an inadequacy in his oration of macro-populist and protectionist measures that was intended for the consumption of the Indonesian people. If anything, Prabowo raised the ante of nationalistic fervour in his claims of "leakage" [*kebocoran*], stating that the best defence for Indonesia is the people's prosperity. It is more surprising that some of his speeches came close to a vision of the Indonesian state akin to that of an autarky [*berdikari* – or standing on your own two feet].¹⁰ Although both candidates tout a more or less nationalistic approach to their respective economic plans, Prabowo stands out as the more fervently nationalistic of the two. In addition, while Jokowi's stance of being clean [*bersih*] had the unintended effect of shackling or even displacing the existing power structure present in industries, Prabowo's offer was more amenable and did not target any power groups or mafia.¹¹

Although both Prabowo and Jokowi have propositioned themselves as the antidote to SBY, their images have been seen to be vastly dissimilar.¹² Jokowi's appeal may be his temperance (Mental Revolution, the "Kampung Face", etc.) with his credibility as the ultimate administrator, but Prabowo's message of firm resolve and national dignity ignites the frustrated masses over the previous administration's inability to tackle difficult decisions or show resolute leadership.¹³ Another consistent feature of the presidential race is the inherent claims from Prabowo's supporters of Jokowi being a "puppet" and a political "light-weight" due to the circumstances of Jokowi's rather contentious rise as presidential representative of PDIP under the auspices of party chairwoman Megawati Sukarnoputri. It

⁷ See Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner in "Prabowo vote for me, but just the once" in *New Mandala*, 30 June 2014.

⁸ See William Pesek in "Dictator Nostalgia in Indonesia", *BloombergView*, 26 June 2014.

⁹ See SP/Carlos Paath & Erwida Maulia in "Presidential Debate May Have Swayed Undecided Voters, Survey Shows", *The Jakarta Globe*, 11 June 2014. Retrieved: http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/presidential-debate-may-swayed-undecided-voters-survey-shows/?utm_source=Daily+News+on+the+Southeast+Asian+Region+11+June+2014&utm_campaign=Info+Alert+20140611&utm_medium=email.

¹⁰ See "Prabowo: The Best Defense is Prosperity", *Tempo.co*, 23 June 2014. Retrieved: <http://en.tempco.co/read/news/2014/06/23/055587202/Prabowo-The-Best-Defense-is-Prosperity>.

¹¹ See "Jokowi Eliminates Mafia, Prabowo Cuts Fuel Subsidy", *Tempo.co*, 22 June 2014. Retrieved: <http://en.tempco.co/read/news/2014/06/22/055587049/Jokowi-Eliminates-Mafia-Prabowo-Cuts-Fuel-Subsidy>.

¹² See also Jeffrey A. Winters in "Jokowi and Prabowo reflect a decade of frustrations with SBY", *New Mandala*, 2 July 2014. Retrieved: <http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2014/07/02/jokowi-and-prabowo-reflect-a-decade-of-frustrations-with-sby/>.

¹³ See "Jokowi, the 'kampung face' loved by many", *The Straits Times*, 30 June 2014.

may be difficult to counter such allegations throughout the campaigns including questions of firmness and autonomy. Nonetheless, defensive reactions and counter-arguments from Jokowi's team may not be helpful in converting sceptical voters to their side.¹⁴

What can be observed so far is that Prabowo's campaign has been gaining momentum. A credible image projection is perhaps of paramount importance at this juncture of the election, and it remains to be seen whether the majority of the Indonesian electorate prefers Prabowo's or Jokowi's style of leadership.

Islamic Credentials

With the backing of several Islam-based political parties and influential *kyais* [Islamic Clerics], Prabowo may have the upper hand among Muslim voters. While being plagued by a controversial human rights record, this was not a stumbling block for Prabowo in garnering the Islamic vote. This is a surprise given his background as a Muslim-convert after his marriage to Titiek Soeharto. Prabowo's brother Hashim Djojohadikusumo – his main financier – is a Christian. On the other hand, Jokowi had been at the

On the other hand, Jokowi had been at the firing-line of numerous malicious "black campaign" attacks mainly in the form of tabloid pieces that had painted him uncharacteristically as a Chinese, a Christian and a stooge.

firing-line of numerous malicious "black campaign" attacks mainly in the form of tabloid pieces that had painted him uncharacteristically as a Chinese, a Christian and a stooge.¹⁵ These insinuating posts have mainly been circulated in the rural areas of Central and West Java.¹⁶ The unwarranted pronouncement of a campaign member from the Jokowi-Kalla team of removing the religion status on the national identification card did not bode well and may indeed be a catalyst.¹⁷ Shrugging off these baseless allegations, especially among those who have uncritically accepted such claims may be the least of all worries, re-establishing his credentials as an orthodox Muslim in the political-correctness of contentious identity politics in Indonesia amidst the onslaught of the more potent "negative campaigns", however, may be the bigger challenge for Jokowi.¹⁸

In a bid to court the majority Islamic vote, the Prabowo-Hatta coalition had stuck to a rigid definition of what is deemed acceptable and "orthodox", religion-wise.¹⁹ This is perhaps inevitable given the composition of their coalitions. In terms of *value infusion* among the coalitions, Prabowo-Hatta has been well represented within the Muslim camp.²⁰ While

¹⁴ See "Jokowi: Jangan Dipikir Saya Tidak Bisa Tegas", *Suara Pemburauan*, 22 June 2014. Retrieved: <http://www.suarapemburauan.com/pemilu-2014/jokowi-jangan-dipikir-saya-tidak-bisa-tegas/58036>.

¹⁵ See Sita W. Dewi and Hans Nicholas Jong in "Jokowi struggles to nix attacks questioning his Islamic faith", *The Jakarta Post*, 13 June 2014.

¹⁶ See "Timses Jokowi-JK Desak Polda Usut Obor Rakyat, [Jokowi-JK Team Asks Regional Police to Investigate Obor Rakyat]," *Republika*, 13 June 2014. Retrieved: <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/pemilu/berita-pemilu/14/06/13/n73h3c-timses-jokowijk-desak-polda-usut-obor-rakyat>.

¹⁷ See Markus Junianto Sihaloho in "Joko-Kalla Campaign Team Denies Plan of Removing Religion Status on ID Card", *The Jakarta Globe*, 19 June 2014. Retrieved: <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/joko-kalla-campaign-team-denies-plan-removing-religion-status-id-card/>.

¹⁸ See Edward Febriyatri Kusuma in "Saat Khofifah Bela Jokowi yang Diserang Black Campaign", *DetikNews*, 26 June 2014. Retrieved: <http://news.detik.com/pemilu2014/read/2014/05/26/182328/2592897/1562/saat-khofifah-bela-jokowi-yang-diserang-black-campaign?nd772205mr>.

¹⁹ See Tom Power in "Ideology resurgent in Indonesia's presidential coalitions", *East Asia Forum*, 9 June 2014. Retrieved: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/06/09/ideology-resurgent-in-indonesias-presidential-coalitions/>.

²⁰ *Value infusion* is concerned with a party's popular base and the members' identification with and sense of attachment. In particular, these parties tend to represent the aspirations of a certain societal group or are

Jokowi-Kalla had managed to capture the relatively sizable PKB (9 per cent of national votes) and gain the support of a portion of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) followers, PKB remains a hybrid party where *value infusion* had been diffused between personalism and adherence to the NU *aliran* [identity]. Founded by Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) in 1998, the party has remained one that is closely tied in with its founder although many members hail from NU. On the other hand, Prabowo-Hatta has the advantage of the majority of Islam-based parties within his coalition (PAN, PPP and PKS). This covers the scope of Islam-based groups in Indonesian society including NU, Muhammadiyah and even hardliners such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). While PKB and PAN, for instance, have decided to base their parties on *Pancasila* (the five principles, Indonesia's philosophical foundation) rather than on Islam, PPP and PKS are based on much stronger Islamic fundamentals.²¹ Referring to the Muslim vote as of paramount importance in clinching the presidency, Prabowo had recently been conferred the title of "War Commander" for Islam in Indonesia by some Islamic organisations in Yogyakarta.²² Prabowo had also received wide support from influential Islamic clerics, such as AA Gym and Arifin Ilham.²³ It is perhaps telling that based on a survey by Indo Barometer, most Indonesians who identify themselves as Muslim will cast their vote for the Prabowo-Hatta coalition.²⁴

Despite the unwarranted smear campaigns against Jokowi, he had been attempting to re-establish his Islamic credentials among the majority Muslim electorate. His weakest link is perhaps one that is being seen as too much of a "traditionalist" or a nominal Muslim [*abangan*]. This is propped up by the fact that most of his coalition is actually made up of *Pancasila*-based nationalist parties. Jokowi countered such perceptions by starting his speeches with Arabic greetings, including, during a talk with the nationalist NasDem party.²⁵ More viscerally, he pledged his recognition and support for the state of Palestine, including setting up an Indonesian Embassy in Palestine if he was elected president.²⁶ While he had brushed off speculations that he raised the issue of Palestine merely to boost his electability, it had been asserted by certain quarters that such gestures go a long way in countering the

thoroughly infused with the social-cultural or political values of the specific group. See Dirk Tomsa in *Party Politics and Democratization in Indonesia: Golkar in the post-Suharto era*, Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series, 2008, pp. 25-7.

²¹ PPP's Islamic foundation may still be debatable as it tends to rely upon the image it had inherited from the past during both the Sukarno and Suharto eras. PKS however represents a refreshing party headed in a new direction. Eschewing the traditional *aliran* norms, PKS sought to carve out a new approach ideologically with Islam as its creed. See also Dirk Tomsa *ibid*, pp. 166-172.

²² See "Prabowo: Dukungan Umat Islam Berarti, [Prabowo: Support from Muslims Important]," *Antaranews.com*, 24 June 2014. Retrieved: <http://www.antaranews.com/berita/440717/prabowo-dukungan-umat-islam-sangat-berarti>. See also "Ormas Islam Klaim Prabowo Panglima Perang, [Islamic Organizations Claim Prabowo as War Commander]," *Tempo.co*, 1 July 2014. Retrieved: <http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2014/07/01/078589443/Ormas-Islam-Klaim-Prabowo-Panglima-Perang>.

²³ See "AA Gym: Prabowo-Hatta Poros Fastabiquil Khairat [AA Gym: Prabowo-Hatta is Fastabiquil Khairat Axis]," *Republika*, 20 May 2014. Retrieved: <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/pemilu/hot-politic/14/05/20/n5vejd-aa-gym-prabowohatta-poros-fastabiquil-khairat>.

²⁴ See "Indo Barometer: Pemilih Islam Cenderung Pilih Prabowo, [Indo Barometer: Muslim Voters Incline to Prabowo-Hatta]," *Gatra*, 29 June 2014. Retrieved: <http://www.gatra.com/pemilu-capres/55772-indo-barometer-pemilih-islam-cenderung-dukung-prabowo-hatta.html>.

²⁵ See "Jokowi Awali Pidato dengan Bahasa Arab, [Jokowi Starts His Speech with Arabic]," *Tribunnews.com*, 27 May 2014. Retrieved: <http://www.tribunnews.com/pemilu-2014/2014/05/27/jokowi-awali-pidato-dengan-bahasa-arab>.

²⁶ See "Capres Jokowi Dukung Palestina Masuk PBB [Jokowi Supports Palestine's UN Membership]," *Antaranews.com*, 22 June 2014. Retrieved: <http://www.antaranews.com/berita/440402/capres-jokowi-dukung-palestina-masuk-pbb>.

debilitating “black campaigns”.²⁷ With most of the damage on Jokowi’s credibility done in the rural areas, Jokowi did a tour in Central Java in order to meet some senior Islamic clerics to draw larger Muslim voters toward his side, especially among the traditionalists.²⁸ He also made trips to several Islamic boarding schools [*Pesantren*] in West Java as an effort to bolster his credentials.²⁹ In fact, he did his first *Tarawih* [night prayers during Ramadan] prayer during the start of *Ramadan* (fasting month for Muslims) in Surabaya, which was covered by the media.³⁰

The question now remains whether the damage had been done to Jokowi’s campaign. While Jokowi’s success team [*tim sukses*] had been labouriously strategising to counter the smear campaigns and bolster his credentials, it may be too little too late.

Party Machinery

In a recent report verified by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), Prabowo was by far the richest among the four presidential and vice-presidential candidates, with a total of US\$148 million in wealth. His wealth has largely been in the form of share ownerships in 26 companies totalling Rp 1.52 trillion (US\$128.4 million) and includes four homes worth Rp 106 billion, eight vehicles worth Rp 1.4 billion, and artworks and antique items totalling Rp 3 billion.³¹ Coming in second place is Jokowi’s running mate Jusuf Kalla, whose amassed wealth is less than a third of Prabowo’s (Rp 465.6 billion or US\$38 million). Jokowi’s (Rp 29.9 billion or about US\$2.5 million) and Hatta’s (Rp 30.2 billion or about US\$2.5 million) wealth ranked far below both of them.³² Nonetheless, the influence of sheer material and wealth power even upon a democratic electorate had been well documented. With the rule of law being very much weaker even in a democratised Indonesia, some Indonesian experts have contended that oligarchic influence is still very much a significant facet of Indonesian democracy.³³ Holding office has been increasingly linked to private wealth.

Returning to the current neck-and-neck race between Prabowo-Hatta and Jokowi-Kalla, material wealth and resources inherently becomes very much a pivotal means in tipping the balance.

²⁷ See “Ini Alasan Kenapa Jokowi Masukkan Isu Palestina Dalam Debat [The Reason Why Jokowi Mentioned Palestine Issue],” *Bisnis.com*, 23 June 2014. Retrieved: <http://surabaya.bisnis.com/m/read/20140623/94/72467/inikah-alasan-jokowi-kenapa-masukkan-isu-palestina-dalam-debat>.

²⁸ See “Di Jawa Tengah, Jokowi Temui Kiai dan Relawan [In Central Java, Jokowi Met Clerics and Volunteers],” *Kompas.com*, 13 June 2014. Retrieved: <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/06/13/0842272/Di.Jawa.Tengah.Jokowi.Temui.Kiai.dan.Relawan>.

²⁹ See “Jokowi Blusukan ke Sejumlah Pesantren di Jawa Barat, [Jokowi Went to Some Pesantren in West Java],” *Republika*, 13 June 2014. Retrieved: <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/pemilu/hot-politic/14/06/13/n72gls-jokowi-blusukan-ke-sejumlah-pesantren-di-jawa-barat>.

³⁰ See “Jokowi Shalat Tarawih Pertama di Masjid Ali Akbar Surabaya [Jokowi Did first Shalat Tarawih at Ali Akbar Mosque, Surabaya],” *Tribunnews.com*, 29 June 2014. Retrieved: <http://www.tribunnews.com/regional/2014/06/29/jokowi-shalat-tarawih-pertama-di-masjid-ali-akbar-surabaya>.

³¹ See Rizky Amelia in “Prabowo Tops Candidate Rich List,” *The Jakarta Globe*, 2 July 2014. Retrieved: <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/prabowo-tops-candidate-rich-list/>. See also “Dana Kampanye, Jokowi-JK Rp. 44,9 M, Prabowo-Hatta 10 M [Campaign Budget, Jokowi JK 44,9 Billion Rupiah, Prabowo-Hatta 10 Billion Rupiah],” *Republika*, 3 June 2014. Retrieved: <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/pemilu/berita-pemilu/14/06/03/n619ex-dana-kampanye-jokowijk-rp-449-m-prabowohatta-rp-10-m>.

³² See “Laporan Harta Kekayaan: Prabowo Terbanyak, Jokowi Paling Sedikit [Wealth Report: Prabowo the most, Jokowi the little],” *Republika*, 1 July 2014. Retrieved: <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/pemilu/hot-politic/14/07/01/n813rf-laporan-harta-kekayaan-prabowo-terbanyak-jokowi-paling-sedikit>.

³³ See Jeffrey Winters in *Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia*, *Indonesia*, Number 96, October 2013, pp.11-33 (Published by Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University).

Returning to the current neck-and-neck race between Prabowo-Hatta and Jokowi-Kalla, material wealth and resources inherently becomes very much a pivotal means in tipping the balance. A tight race could very well mean that there will be an increase in bloc vote-buying behaviour as the stakes for the presidency piles up.³⁴ Magnates and tycoons may attempt to influence with their massive wealth so as to move the result a critical fraction of a percentage point in their favour. At the Jokowi-Kalla camp at least, Jokowi's reputation as an incorruptible reformer may dis-incentivise the use of funds to engage in bloc-buying behaviours. While such a move remains conjectural and can go in either direction, what is certain is that the party machinery under the Prabowo-Hatta camp has been observed to be more organisationally effective, especially with well-connected parties such as PKS, Golkar and the United Development Party in his fold.³⁵ This is notwithstanding the additional support pledged by SBY's PD as it formally backs Prabowo.³⁶ The Democrats had since instructed all branches and members to give their support to Mr Prabowo and Mr Hatta. Jokowi's coalition on the other hand has been marked by disorganised volunteer efforts.

It may be too quick to judge whether either coalition has better machinery to edge forward in the competition. However, with regards to the dimension of "systemness" used to define party institutionalisation, Prabowo certainly has the backing of Golkar and PKS – parties that are well known for their strong organisational, institutional and human resource pedigree.³⁷ Golkar, often seen as a resilient party since its New Order roots, have not backed away from its former hegemonic party status. It came in second place in the legislative elections at almost 15 per cent of national votes. A party that has no inherent ideology except that of developmentalism [*pembangunan*] and *Pancasila* democracy, it had never been on the opposition side in parliament. It is also notoriously the source of much patronage. Under the leadership of Aburizal Bakrie, a presidential aspirant that sought alliance with Prabowo in the last minute, it would seem that the stakes are high for Golkar to remain as a *de facto* party inside of parliament. PKS on the other hand, though plagued by a series of scandals under the SBY Administration, had done relatively well during the legislative election (close to 7 per cent of national votes).³⁸ While political Islam may be off the charts, PKS is still well known as a paradigm of representative Islam. PKS is also famous for its mobilisational prowess and broad spatial penetration that targeted strategic constituencies.³⁹ It is also a party that has a very organised youth base.⁴⁰

³⁴ See Aaron Connelly in "Indonesian election: Prabowo now the favourite", *The Interpreter*, 24 June 2014. Retrieved: http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/06/24/Indonesian-election-Prabowo-now-favourite-to-win.aspx?COLLCC=1138081199&COLLCC=1443458746&utm_source=Daily+News+on+the+Southeast+Asia+Region+25+June+2014&utm_campaign=Info+Alert+20140625&utm_medium=email.

³⁵ See Zubaidah Nazeer in "Prabowo banks on precise planning", *The Straits Times*, 30 June 2014. Retrieved: http://www.straitstimes.com/premium/asia/story/prabowo-banks-precise-planning-20140630?utm_source=Daily+News+on+the+Southeast+Asian+Region+30+June+2014&utm_campaign=Info+Alert+20140630&utm_medium=email.

³⁶ See Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja in "Yudhoyono's party formally backs Prabowo", *The Straits Times*, 1 July 2014. Retrieved: http://www.straitstimes.com/premium/asia/story/yudhoyonos-party-formally-backs-prabowo-20140701?utm_source=+Daily+News+on+the+Southeast+Asian+Region+1+July+2014&utm_campaign=Info+Alert+20140702&utm_medium=email.

³⁷ "Systemness" a term adopted from Panebianco refers explicitly to the organizational infrastructure and internal dynamics of a particular party. See Dirk Tomsa, *ibid*, pp. 20-1.

³⁸ See also Greg Fealy in "Resurgent political Islam, or astute Islamic parties?" *New Mandala*, 14 April 2014. Retrieved: <http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2014/04/14/resurgent-political-islam-or-astute-islamic-parties/>.

³⁹ See Kikue Hamayotsu in *The Political Rise of the Prosperous Justice Party in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia*, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 51, Number 5, pp. 971-992.

⁴⁰ See Leonard C. Sebastian, Jonathan Chen and Emirza Adi Syailendra in *Pemuda Rising: Why Indonesia Should Pay Attention to its Youth*, RSIS Monograph No. 29, 2014, pp. 34-7.

At this stage of the election with a tight two-horse race between Prabowo-Hatta and Jokowi-Kalla, coming out tops may very well boil down to a superior party machinery over the other.

Post-Election Scenario Analysis and Conclusion: A Pyrrhic Victory Nonetheless

At this point in the election, it certainly seems that the Prabowo-Hatta coalition has gathered considerable momentum. Of the three particular aspects mentioned (Image Cultivation, Islamic Credentials & Party Machinery), Prabowo-Hatta had performed better than Jokowi-Kalla to date. A more important facet is the unprecedented narrow margin between the two pairs. This may spell disaster for both sides as the victory of one over the other would not be extremely definitive. What happens if the gap is too close for comfort, leaving none of the coalitions satisfied?⁴¹ Public backlash claiming illegitimacy may be the ultimate unintended consequence. At this segment of the report, a post-election scenario-analysis will be contemplated – consisting of a Prabowo presidency and a Jokowi presidency.

A Prabowo Presidency

A bigger and fatter coalition will be an asset in this case. However, this may not be as smooth a transition. According to a report from Tempo magazine, there had been prevalent cases of horse-trading including political agreements and side deals.⁴² Prabowo-Hatta may be forced into a complicit power-sharing agreement much akin to SBY's "rainbow coalition". Prabowo-Hatta's larger coalitional size, however, could provide for an enormous advantage in parliament in terms of consolidating support within the House of Representatives.

On the other hand, Prabowo's controversial past may come back to haunt him. Already diplomatic circles have been cautioned over Prabowo's bursts of temper and his authoritarian streak. Most recently, he was lambasted by international observers for his plans of undoing democratic efforts in Indonesia by bringing back the indirect presidential elections.⁴³ It may take a while for international circles to come into acceptance of a figure like Prabowo, much like India's Narendra Modi. This of course inhibits the projection of Indonesia's foreign policy to a certain extent.

A Jokowi Presidency

Jokowi's slim coalition may give him a certain unfettered leeway in filling up cabinet positions, minus the deleterious effects of power sharing, opening the possibility for the creation of a more professional and technocratic cabinet. However, he will have to contend with a larger opposition, which may place obstructions to his presidency. PD had already announced that they are ready to play the role of an opposition party.⁴⁴ Jokowi will also have to attempt to regain support from Muslim groups that he had unconscionably alienated in the course of the campaign.

⁴¹ See John Mcbeth in "What if neither Jokowi nor Prabowo lands a solid margin?" *The Straits Times*, 30 June 2014.

⁴² See "Cabinet Promises", *Tempo*, June 2014, pp. 19-21.

⁴³ See Zubaidah Nazeer in "Prabowo vows not to undo democratic reforms", *The Straits Times*, 2 July 2014.

⁴⁴ See "Dems ready for opposition", *The Jakarta Post*, 12 March 2014. Retrieved: <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/03/12/dems-ready-opposition.html>.

Another factor that may plague a Jokowi presidency is the crippling afterthought of being seen as a “puppet president”. It is probably quite difficult to completely remove Megawati’s influence within the presidency, especially if she is now seen as Jokowi’s benefactor, a direct kingmaker. Jokowi will have to portray himself as an autonomous leader especially in the early phases in his presidency in order to quell such doubts and rumours.

In conclusion, the results of the 2014 presidential election are slated to veer in a direction that may not resemble any other election in post-*Reformasi* Indonesia. For one, it will be an election having a high likelihood of ending up without a clear, resounding winner. Second, political configuration from the legislative elections earlier that has more or less sided with either camps may come back to haunt the respective presidencies. Third, both presidential aspirants may have to deal explicitly with the baggage they carry – Prabowo being seen as an unwieldy character with a contentious human rights record, and Jokowi being seen as a “political lightweight” indebted to Megawati.

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