The conference adheres to a variation of Chatham House rules. Accordingly, beyond the points expressed in the prepared papers, no attributions have been included in this conference report.
Barry Desker, Director of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) warmly welcomed the participants to the inaugural workshop of the Institute’s recently established Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) entitled: “Learning from London: Exploring Social Resilience in Singapore”. Referring to the debate on contemporary approaches to multiculturalism, he commented that the general perspective was one in which differences between communities and cultures should be permitted to flourish but that communities have to work together regardless of their differences in order for society to progress. Although a seemingly obvious and simple approach, the past few years have demonstrated, however, that it not an easy one to carry out in practice. Mr. Desker cited several events that served as a reminder that issues of identity, multiculturalism and social cohesion are of particular concern: the London bombings, ethnic riots in France, ethnic clashes on the beaches of Sydney and the Danish cartoon controversy. As a consequence, states are therefore forced to review their practices on questions related to multiculturalism. Mr. Desker highlighted that Singapore has not been exempt from this exercise. He noted that a key question asked within this review has been: “How do we organize ourselves in order to get along”?

Mr. Desker expressed his hope that the workshop—held slightly over a year after the London bombings and coinciding with Racial Harmony Month in Singapore—would contribute to answering the question. He added that although identity issues are often very difficult to discuss as they hit close to home, are highly personal and sometimes raise questions of ourselves that we are uncomfortable with, such discussions are necessary for society to propel forward.
In her presentation, Carole Johnson outlined the development of multiculturalism in the U.K. prior to the London bombings of 7 July 2005 (7/7) and sought to examine how that strategy has changed post-7/7. The event was a defining moment in London’s history and a tremendous shock, not so much because it happened, but rather due to the nature of the attack—suicide attacks by home grown U.K. citizens. Although there was a short-lived increase in racially and religiously motivated attacks in the immediate aftermath of the bombings, normalcy was promptly restored.

Johnson attributed this success to five strategies adopted by the U.K. prior to 7/7:

- decades of integration to develop an integrated society;
- the setting up of Runnymede, an independent think tank to build bridges between various ethnic communities and policymakers;
- the Parekh Report in 2000;
- the establishment of the Race, Faith and Cohesion Unit in the Home Office; and
- the work undertaken on inter-faith relationships.

In addition, responses in the immediate aftermath of the bombings were targeted at reinforcing social resilience. These responses comprised police schemes to help victims of hate crimes, government initiatives which included a series of consultative meetings and the establishment of seven working groups under the umbrella of “Preventing Extremism Together”, greater engagement with the youth and supporting communities, the setting up of a National Advisory Council of Imams and Mosques, responsible reporting by the media,

---

Carole Johnson outlining the development of multiculturalism in Britain
and the continuation of the criminal justice system to condemn racially and religiously motivated offences.

Two fundamental post-7/7 changes were identified: (a) there is now a greater engagement with the Muslim community; and (b) faith is becoming a marker for identity. She remarked that although the U.K. has a much larger racial and religious mix than Singapore, both countries have various races and religions living together in harmony. She stressed the importance of recognizing that the seeds of community cohesion in a multi-faith and multicultural society have to be sown and nurtured ahead, and not in the aftermath, of a terrorist attack. Johnson added that the process of multicultural integration is in constant evolution. Successful strategies will be crafted from multiple experiences and developed in the years to come.

II. SOCIAL RESILIENCE AND ITS BASES IN MULTICULTURAL SINGAPORE

Gillian Koh defined social resilience as “staying together and moving ahead”, and posed the question of whether Singaporeans are able to explore other ways in which they understand one another and build a space that goes beyond the Chinese/Malay/Indian/Others (CMIO) model.

A survey on measuring social resilience in Singapore indicated that the resonance of the issues of social resilience were different for different ethnic groups. In addition, the combination of age and house type was found to be statistically significant to levels of social resilience.

Four elements of social resilience were identified: (a) political participation; (b) the evaluation of government performance; (c) social capital via both formal and informal networks; and (d) a sense of rootedness. The key levers to strengthening social resilience would be improving political participation and engaging the community in issues of national interest, building social networks between the state and its people, and developing a greater sense of rootedness. The gaps in Singapore’s current approaches revealed limitations of the CMIO model, hence the need to re-examine this framework as well as to strengthen the ethnically neutral civil society space.

On the ways to move forward, it was suggested that alternative ways of discussing multiculturalism and multiracialism be extended to encompass a multicultural ideal of “diverse
diversity”. More time needs to be invested in the bridging form of social capital driven by values of civility in order to boost social resilience. The Community Engagement Programme (CEP) provides an opportunity to bring people together to speak about the “authentic them”. In seeking to engage people with one another when they often don’t know enough about one another, greater understanding is required. Rather than having government pronouncements of what society should be, Singaporeans should discover other channels in which society can speak to one another—across the different groups—at a higher level. The goal should be towards a multicultural, not mosaic, Singapore.

III. MULTIRACIALISM AS OFFICIAL POLICY: A CRITIQUE OF THE MANAGEMENT OF DIFFERENCE IN SINGAPORE

Chua Beng Huat spoke of what multiculturalism should really denote in the Singaporean context. Singapore is perhaps the first country in the world to declare itself constitutionally multiracial. The concept of a multicultural and multiracial Singapore is continuously rolled out as a substance of being Singaporean when, in actuality, there is much to be desired. He noted that the view held by ordinary Singaporeans that Singapore is multiracial simply because of the presence of racial groups is a particularly narrow one.

The categorization of race in Singapore has allowed the government to use multiracialism as an ideology of government control. He commented that the CMIO model’s constant emphasis on the “equality of groups” sidestepped the idea that politics should really be about governing the population as individuals. The Singapore policy of implementing racial harmony as a public good creates huge amounts of anxieties on the ground and requires the policing of group boundaries.

The discourse on groups and “assumed community” made people believe that they are unable to escape their racial categories. As such, the Singaporean category is hollow as it is filled with false constructions of ethnic identities. A discourse about being Singaporean should replace the positioning of ethnicity at the very core of the Singaporean identity. This could take the form of a privatization of culture in which Singaporeans are redefined as citizens based on rights, responsibilities and obligations.

Chua Beng Huat assessing the management of difference in Singapore
DISCUSSION

The discussant Sharon Siddique queried the manner in which the state-formulated CMIO model was accepted by Singaporeans and how individuals ordered their identities. On the latter, she noted the increasingly hierarchical ordering of identities, with religion emerging as the identity of primary importance in relation to others. She highlighted that whilst there is discomfort in attaching the “fundamentalist” label to ethnic groups and identities, there is a general resonance when it is attached to religion. Siddique stressed a further examination of the intrinsic relationship between ethnicity and religion in the context of multiculturalism and how it impacts on social resilience.

While greater dialogue strengthened social resilience, a question of what trigger would cause social cohesion in Singapore to collapse was raised. As the approach of profiling race and ethnicity may have created insecurities, there was a suggestion for the profiling of citizenship instead. However, the tendency to only look at the larger categories ignored and neglected other ways of defining oneself, such as through categories of gender and disability. The relevance of the traditional notion of citizenship in an increasingly globalized city-state was debated.

Questions on the understanding the roots of the problematization of multiculturalism were also raised. It was articulated that multiculturalism with a focus on inter-racial and inter-faith relations formed an integral aspect of the republic’s early years of nation-building, prompting the question of whether contemporary Singapore has to live with the anxieties of its past.

Further observations were made by others on the limitations of the CMIO model. It was pointed out that the racial categories in Singapore are institutionalized to such an extent that one is currently unable to radically depart from them. Instead, Singaporeans are expending a tremendous amount of energy in their attempt to understand themselves in such categories. An important point raised was that the ensuing battle now lies in motivating Singaporeans beyond what they understand themselves to be, or what they are supposed to be, and eliminating the labels and stereotypes associated with racial categories. A suggestion was made for Singapore to do away with the racial category of the CMIO model and for individuals to continuously resist simplistic categorizations to allow for multiple and complex identities to flourish.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS BASED ON THE PAPERS PRESENTED AND THE DISCUSSION THAT FOLLOWED

• Strategies of social cohesion could be implemented ahead of terrorist attacks, in addition to immediate and positive responses after a terrorist attack, to ensure social resilience.

• More dialogue and engagement among different communities should be encouraged.

• The possibility of moving beyond the CMIO model to explore other channels of discoursing with one another in Singapore could be explored.

• Strengthening ethnically neutral civil society space can be considered.

• The multiculturalism project in Singapore could be steered towards promoting citizenship built on notions of rights and responsibilities rather than on race and ethnicity.
IV. IDENTIFYING KEY CONCERNS OF JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH (JI): THE SINGAPORE CONTEXT

Mohamed bin Ali delivered a historical account of the JI movement in Singapore from the late 1980s to the present. The main objectives of JI are to maximize the resources of its members and act as a platform for collective action against Muslim oppressors worldwide. Indoctrination is done via a combination of three factors: charismatic leadership; peer group dynamics; and an engaging ideology.

Four key motivating factors and grievances of JI members have been identified:

• Membership are largely reflected in the desire to deepen their faith.
• JI recruits equate the “search for excellence” with the “search for spiritual renewal” as part of a global Islamic revivalism to alleviate the consequences of rapid modernization and globalization.
• State oppression is perceived in their quest to preserve the Islamic identity vis-à-vis Singapore’s secular identity.
• Its recruits are increasingly disillusioned with U.S. policies, and thus Singapore’s ties with the U.S. too.

The extremists in Singapore are fringe elements that do not receive support from majority mainstream Muslims that practice a tradition of inclusion and moderate Islam. The following measures were suggested.

• Disassociate Islamic vigour from extremism.
• Redefine the notions of multiculturalism and integration.
• Create credible Muslim organizations to guide the Muslim community.
• Enlarge common spaces of interaction to counter the voices of extremists.
• Ensure policies are just and balanced to minority groups.
• Mobilize mainstream Muslims in programmes to ensure stronger bonds of trust and inter-faith understanding.

Articulating that JI’s plan is to create deep divisions between the Muslim and non-Muslim community, there is a need to build social cohesion and for moderate Muslims to play a critical role in illustrating models of Islam’s compatibility with progress. Policies should be reviewed to ensure support and not result in greater marginalization.

V. REVIEWING NATIONAL EDUCATION: CAN THE HEART BE TAUGHT WHERE THE HOME IS?

Yolanda Chin explored the state’s management of the nation’s diverse aspirations to create a cohesive national identity in Singapore through the National Education (NE) programme. NE can play a key role in strengthening social resilience by providing Singaporeans with a clear sense of where a nation stands. This is not only an effective bulwark against any social crisis, but in the event of an attack, it also aids in the reconstruction of the social fabric by pulling people together.

However, NE is very difficult to implement on the ground. A key challenge is dispelling the perception that NE is a thinly veiled exercise to further entrench the ruling government’s power. It also seeks to present the nation, its history and heritage as unproblematic and timeless through various acts of myth-making. It is a futile attempt at fixing an uncontested national identity when its very nature defies consensus that renders the path to national solidarity tenuous.

The process of implementing NE suggests a degree of disconnect between the state and its people on national issues. Although NE messages were meant to represent the collective aspirations of the people, its core values were formulated with minimal consultation with the general public. Another concern raised was the instilling of political apathy, which could further breed indifference to the institutions and values of the nation that are vital as a value point for Singaporeans in the event of a crisis.

In emphasizing that the problem of NE lies in the fact that it is trying to discipline an identity that is in constant flux, the following measures were suggested. First, consideration should be made to undo the deliberate infusion and uncritical acceptance of NE messages to allow for an honest assessment and true appreciation of the complexities in building the Singapore nation. Second, there is an urgent need to teach the processes of identity construction and encourage political debate to renegotiate differences more effectively. This is deemed critical in order to reignite the passion amongst young Singaporeans towards the nation. Third, national identity should not be instilled as an essentialized given but instead promoted as a multifaceted process of empowering individuals to negotiate with their community even before a crisis occurs.

VI. MULTICULTURALISM: THE CANADIAN APPROACH

In stressing that her presentation was centred on the Canadian approach, and not a model, Annie Legault made the point that evolving approaches needed to be targeted to the distinctive local circumstances of individual countries. Multiculturalism was defined as a “policy of inclusion” based on the equality of rights, respect for and promotion of diversity, and an acceptance of multiple identities actively contributing to society. As such, multiculturalism is an asset that promotes teamwork and innovation.

Multiculturalism is reflected in all aspects of Canadian society, with diversity extending well beyond language, ethnicity, religion and race to also encompass gender, sexual orientation and disabilities. The same approaches that had helped Canada achieve multiculturalism are now helping break down the barriers for individuals
to fulfil their true potential. It was highlighted that the Department of the Canadian Heritage’s Multiculturalism Program that undertakes work on research and policy development also implements outreach campaigns and provides funding to civil society. In addition, the 2005 Cross-cultural Roundtable on Security and the Muslim Communities Working Group were identified as key initiatives to enhance greater policy capacity and coordination in relations across communities.

Targeted immigration policies, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the fact that Canada does not have exclusive ethnic ghettos are important contributors to the country’s successful multiculturalism. Despite Canada’s achievement, the Canadian approach is faced with four challenges: (a) the increasing rate of diversity; (b) the difficult economic integration of newcomers; (c) ongoing racism; and (d) heightened domestic security measures that have led to concerns of the profiling and targeting of certain groups.

Canada’s future depends on maintaining its capacity to include different people and develop a peaceful society where the culture and heritage of all individuals are not compromised. The challenge will be to balance the rights and freedoms of Canadian citizens whilst at the same time demand a clear commitment to the country. In this regard, there is a need to both venture into new areas and keep the strengths of Canada’s current approach. The strengths include the freedom to choose one’s own identity, make institutions representative of diversity and support the initiatives of grassroots organizations. It was concluded that diversity should be promoted and not managed.

DISCUSSION

Drawing from his previous experiences and the presentations in Panel Two, discussant Tom Quiggin noted that a common feature was the construction of the concept of conflict with the “other” as embodied in the dehumanization of the “other”. The simplicity and ease in which a group of ordinary people could be transformed into collective killers who would very efficiently eliminate the other group was observed. Moreover, the hardening of categories enabled greater justification for dehumanization, subjection and eventual killing. The need to soften these groupings, to blur the lines and to view different people as people and
not as categories was advocated. However, multiculturalism and multiracialism—where diversity is open, forward and honest—are only partial antidotes to the contemporary global disease of constructing “the other”.

The following questions were discussed. On JI, would blurring the categories make it more difficult for the recruitment of new JI members? With respect to education in the Singapore context, could a unified national identity be created with more engagement of the people in defining it? Finally, does the Canadian approach result in a greater likelihood of softening the categories and promoting the equality of people?

It was opined that the motivating factor of JI recruits is religion, and not race. It is the appeal of religion and ideology that drives JI members in the Singapore context.

It was noted that the definition of multiculturalism in Singapore is largely limited to ethnic relations primarily under the CMIO model. This results in a worldview that forces Singaporeans to look at others as unchanging and silences the ability to think about one’s identity introspectively. There is thus a need to approach identity not as an essentialized entity but one that can be negotiated. There was a general consensus that it would be more difficult to create dehumanized out-groups if a society has multiple and overlapping identities.

The differences between the Canadian and Singaporean approaches to multiculturalism were highlighted. The former is a liberal one that emphasizes the individual as the basic unit of citizenship whilst the latter perceives differences as fault lines that need to be constantly policed. In this respect, until Singapore adopts a more liberal approach towards citizenship, the relevance of the Canadian experience will be limited.

The dangers of religious stereotyping and rigidifying categories were also reflected in the discussion. A point was made that although there is a common recognition that declaring the inequality of races is politically incorrect, it is more challenging to consistently enforce this in the religious realm. This is compounded by the difficulty in engaging in inter-faith dialogue at different levels.

The merits of a heightened awareness of race and an increased dialogue about difference were also debated. A point was made that in the Singapore context, the discourse has resulted in Singaporeans fitting themselves into prescribed categories. However, it was noted that Singapore is able to manage the problem of “dehumanizing ‘the other’” because of the high level of tolerance of its people and the legal instruments that are in place to deter such actions. On this issue, it was expressed that the celebration of difference enriches society as
the more one learns about other people, the less “different” they become. The merits of the dialogue on differences are also dependent on how that awareness is managed. The awareness of difference should be complemented with an understanding of the process of discrimination construction.

The need to ask oneself “Who am I as a person?” is vital to a better understanding of oneself in relation to others. This was articulated as a key factor towards achieving the bridging process of social capital. Recognizing that multiculturalism is failing in some European countries, the issue of whether Western liberal democracies could be drawn from the multicultural experience in Singapore was raised. While there are lessons to be drawn, much depended on whether Western societies were ready for them.

**POLICY IMPLICATIONS BASED ON THE PAPERS PRESENTED AND THE DISCUSSION THAT FOLLOWED**

- Continued support for the establishment of enlarged spaces of interaction between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities to allow for greater interfaith dialogue and understanding is recommended.

- Within the Muslim community itself, the continued mobilization of mainstream moderate Muslims to guide the community and counter the voices of the extremists should be encouraged.

- More dialogue and engagement between the government and younger Singaporeans on national issues could be encouraged.

- A more critical approach to citizenship education to include awareness of the complex process of identity construction and the negotiation of differences could be explored.

- More attention could be paid to balancing both the responsibilities and rights of citizens.

- Public institutions should continue to be representative of the nation’s diversity.

- Continued support for the initiatives of grassroots organizations is recommended.

- Explore approaches to soften the hardened categories of race and religion to promote the equality of people.
Sir Richard Dearlove remarked that social resilience after a terror attack is only one aspect of a much larger problem. Instead, the key issue is the ripple effect after the onslaught of a terrorist attack. The reaction to an attack is as important as the attack itself as every reaction is manifested within the religious, racial and political lens of the individual. The attacks in London provoked a particular type of shock because the suicide bombers were second-generation young British Muslims, begging the question why such a group would feel compelled to enact indiscriminate murder on its citizens.

Whilst all forms of terrorism should be condemned, a distinction is made between the phenomena of terrorism which is understood and that which society has no clear political understanding of. Defined as “a type of terrorism that lacks scale”, the latter form of terrorism encompasses the 9/11, London and Madrid attacks. The international Jihadist movement is an “ideological virus” imported into societies and a problem that needs to be managed. One should caution against the exaggeration of the importance of the terrorist act as it only serves to reinforce the intentions of the terrorist. The issues should be kept in perspective to avoid the danger of projecting them from the micro scale to the macro scale and obliging conclusions to be drawn that may not have any macro validity.

The issue of resilience was also explored. Resilience must operate within a risk-management system that should not deny an individual the conduct of normal life. The building of resilience could easily spiral out of control and become very heavy-handed and difficult to manage. With respect to the Singapore context, the country can be considered a successful vibrant city-state. It was warned that “too much resilience is as bad as too little”.

Civil society can also play an important role in building an environment where extremism is less likely to thrive, as countries with weak civil societies are more susceptible to become breeding grounds for extremism. It was concluded that civil society has a dual role in building racial harmony and integration in societies like Singapore, and in providing the greatest inoculation against extremism.
CLOSING REMARKS

Kumar Ramakrishna noted that the global religious revival dictated the need for nation building and the creation of social resilience. He stressed that religious fundamentalism should not be equated with religious extremism and posed the question of how Singapore should manage its approach to difference. Two schools of thought were identified on this matter. The first, embodied in the CMIO model, assumes that ethnic differences are real fault lines that can fall apart. The second school perceives ethnic differences as unfixed and constructed. It argues that the CMIO approach paradoxically perpetuates precisely the ethnic identity silos that the people in Singapore are trying to avoid. In conclusion, there is a need to emphasize Singapore citizenship and promote ethnically neutral categories in seeking to uncover a solution.

Kumar Ramakrishna, Acting Head of the Centre of Excellence for National Security, reflecting on the key issues in his concluding remarks.

Rapporteur
Beverley Loke
Edited by
Yolanda Chin and Norman Vasu
# Conference Programme

## 28 July 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0815 – 0830</td>
<td>Arrivals and Registration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0830 – 0840</td>
<td>Welcome Remarks&lt;br&gt; Ambassador Barry Desker&lt;br&gt; Director, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 0840 – 0920 | Panel One<br> **Strengthening the Social Fabric:**<br> Fundamental Change in Fundamentalist Times?<br> Chair:<br> Kumar Ramakrishna<br> Acting Head of Centre of Excellence for National Security, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies  
Multiculturalism in the U.K.: The Impact of the 7 July 2005 London Bomb Attacks<br> Carole Johnson<br> Director of Political Affairs, British High Commission  
Social Resilience and its Bases in Multicultural Singapore<br> Gillian Koh<br> Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Policy Studies  
Multiracialism as Official Policy: A Critique of the Management of Difference in Singapore<br> Chua Beng Huat<br> Professor, Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore |
| 0920 – 0935 | Comments by discussant<br> Sharon Siddique<br> Director, Sreekumar Siddique & Co. |
| 0935 – 1010 | Q & A / Discussion                                                       |
| 1010 – 1025 | Coffee break                                                            |
| 1025 – 1105 | Panel Two<br> **Diversity and its Discontents:** Reviewing the Management of Difference in Singapore<br> Chair:<br> Norman Vasu<br> Coordinator, Social Resilience Programme, Centre of Excellence for National Security, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies  
Identifying Key Concerns of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI): The Singapore Context<br> Mohamed bin Ali<br> Research Analyst, International Centre of Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies  
Reviewing National Education: Can the Heart be Taught Where the Home is?<br> Yolanda Chin<br> Associate Research Fellow, Centre of Excellence for National Security, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies  
Multiculturalism: The Canadian Perspective<br> Annie Legault<br> Counselor – Political and Public Affairs, Canadian High Commission, Singapore |
| 1105 – 1120 | Comments by discussant<br> Tom Quiggin<br> Coordinator, Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning, Centre of Excellence for National Security, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies |
| 1120 – 1200 | Q & A / Discussion                                                       |
| 1210 – 1330 | Lunch / Talk<br> *Final Thoughts on Preserving Social Resilience after a Terrorist Strike*<br> Sir Richard Dearlove<br> Master of Pembroke College, Cambridge University |
| 1330 – 1340 | Closing Remarks<br> Kumar Ramakrishna                                    |
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

1. Mohamed bin Ali
   Research Analyst
   International Centre of Political Violence and Terrorism Research
   Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies

2. Yolanda Chin
   Associate Research Fellow
   Centre of Excellence for National Security
   Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies

3. Chua Beng Huat
   Professor
   Asia Research Institute and Department of Sociology
   National University of Singapore

4. Sir Richard Dearlove
   Master of Pembroke College
   Cambridge University

5. Barry Desker
   Director
   Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies

6. Carole Johnson
   Political Director
   British High Commission, Singapore

7. Gillian Koh
   Senior Research Fellow
   Institute of Policy Studies

8. Annie Legault
   Political and Public Affairs Counsellor
   Canadian High Commission, Singapore

9. Tom Quiggin
   Coordinator of Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning
   Centre of Excellence for National Security
   Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies

10. Kumar Ramakrishna
    Acting Head
    Centre of Excellence for National Security
    Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies

11. Sharon Siddique
    Director
    Sreekumar Siddique & Co.

12. Norman Vasu
    Coordinator of Social Resilience Programme
    Centre of Excellence for National Security
    Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
## List of Participants

### Other Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization/Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Mohamed Redhza bin Abdul Rahim</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Albakri Ahmad</td>
<td>Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Ro haiza Bte Ahmad Asi</td>
<td>Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Sharifah Farah Aljunied</td>
<td>Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Yoganathan Ammayappan</td>
<td>Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Jansen Ang</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Ang Zhong Ren</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Arun Mahizhnan</td>
<td>Institute of Policy Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Asri Aziz</td>
<td>Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Paul Broom</td>
<td>British High Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Benjamin Cher</td>
<td>Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Candice Chiang</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Kerris Colclough</td>
<td>British High Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Jeanne Conceicao</td>
<td>Institute of Policy Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Judith d’Silva</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Kendra Davidson</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs, Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Diong Siew Maan</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Ralf Emmers</td>
<td>Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Cherian George</td>
<td>Nanyang Technological University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Muhammad Haniff Bin Hassan</td>
<td>Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Abdul Razak Bin Hassan Maricar</td>
<td>Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Freddy Hong Beng Hong</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Huang Yuanqin</td>
<td>Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Farah Hussain</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Bohari Jaon</td>
<td>Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Thavamalar Kanagarathnam</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Yang Razali Kassim</td>
<td>Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Majeed Khader</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Kho Ee Moi</td>
<td>National Institute of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Khoo Ming Fern</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Sheila Koh</td>
<td>Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
32. Koh Kew Soon  
Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts

33. Koh Wai Kit  
Ministry of Home Affairs

34. Alfian Kuchit  
Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS)

35. Kwa Chong Guan  
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies

36. Julian Kwok  
Ministry of Home Affairs

37. Lai Ah Eng  
Institute of Policy Studies

38. Lee Kim Eng Christine  
National Institute of Education

39. Lee Sing Ai  
Ministry of Home Affairs

40. Nicholas Lee Wee Ann  
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies

41. Lian Hui  
Ministry of Education

42. Lim Cheng Tju  
Ministry of Education

43. Selina Lim  
Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts

44. Lim Yuin Chien  
National Security Coordination Centre

45. Lisa White  
New Zealand High Commission

46. Beverley Loke  
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies

47. Simon Mafoot  
Business Times

48. Clare McIntyre  
Foreign Affairs, Canada

49. K. U. Menon  
Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts

50. Clement Mesenas  
Today Newspaper

51. Patrick Nathan  
National Security Coordination Centre

52. Evon Ng  
Ministry of Home Affairs

53. Ng Gee Tiong  
Ministry of Home Affairs

54. Ng Sue Chia  
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies

55. Kapoor Niraj  
Ministry of Home Affairs

56. Kenneth George Pereire  
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies

57. Bina Rai  
Ministry of Defence

58. Somarajan Priya, Sarah  
Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts

59. Bouchaib Silm  
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies

60. Bilveer Singh  
National University of Singapore

61. Sharmila Sivalingam  
Ministry of Education

62. S. P. Harish  
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies

63. Geraldine Soh  
MediaCorp Radio
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Tony Soh</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Sharifah Aminah bte Syed I. A.</td>
<td>Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Cheryl Tan</td>
<td>Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Eugene Tan</td>
<td>Singapore Management University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Pauline Ann Tan</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Raymond Tan</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Tan Wai Lan</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Tan Wanjing</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>Tan Wen Sze</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Tay Swee Yee</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Joyce Indira Thomas</td>
<td>Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Serene Toh</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Toh Siong Meng</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Somo Vendesan</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Anthony Yap</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) is a research unit of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Established on 1 April 2006, CENS is devoted to rigorous policy-relevant analysis of a range of national security issues. The CENS team is multinational in composition, comprising both Singaporean and foreign analysts who are specialists in various aspects of national and homeland security affairs.

WHY CENS?
In August 2004, the Strategic Framework for National Security outlined the key structures, security measures and capability development programmes that would help Singapore deal with transnational terrorism in the near and long term.

However, strategizing national security policies requires greater research and understanding of the evolving security landscape. This is why CENS was established—to increase the intellectual capital invested in strategizing national security. To this end, CENS works closely with not just other IDSS research programmes but with also national security agencies such as the National Security Coordination Secretariat within the Prime Minister’s Office.

WHAT RESEARCH DOES CENS Do?
CENS currently conducts research in three key areas of national security:

- **Risk Assessment / Horizon Scanning**
  The art and science of detecting “weak signals” emanating from the total security environment so as to forewarn policymakers, the private sector and the public about approaching “shocks” such as terrorism, pandemics, energy crises and other easy-to-miss trends and ostensibly distant events.

- **Social Resilience**
  The capacity of globalized, multicultural societies to hold together in the face of systemic shocks such as diseases and terrorist strikes.

- **Transportation Security**
  The security of land-based, aviation and maritime transport networks and increasingly, the total supply chain vital to Singapore’s economic vitality.

HOW DOES CENS HELP INFLUENCE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY?
Through policy-oriented analytical commentaries and other research output directed at the national security policy community in Singapore and beyond, CENS staff members promote greater awareness of emerging threats as well as global best practices in responding to such threats. In addition, CENS organizes courses, seminars and workshops for local and foreign national security officials to facilitate networking and exposure to leading-edge thinking on the prevention of, and response to, national and homeland security threats.

HOW DOES CENS HELP RAISE PUBLIC AWARENESS OF NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES?
To educate the wider public, CENS staff members regularly author articles in a number of security- and intelligence-related publications, as well as write op-ed analyses in leading newspapers. Radio and television interviews have allowed CENS staff to participate in and shape public debate on critical issues such as risk assessment and horizon scanning, multiculturalism and social resilience, intelligence reform and defending critical infrastructure against mass-casualty terrorist attacks.

How Does CENS Keep Abreast of Cutting-edge National Security Research?
The lean organizational structure of CENS permits a constant and regular influx of Visiting Fellows of international calibre through the Distinguished CENS Visitors Programme. This enables CENS to keep abreast of cutting-edge global trends in national security research.

For more information on CENS, log on to [http://www.idss.edu.sg](http://www.idss.edu.sg) and follow the links to “Centre of Excellence for National Security”.

ABOUT CENS
The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) was established in July 1996 as an autonomous research institute within the Nanyang Technological University. Its objectives are to:

- Conduct research on security, strategic and international issues.
- Provide general and graduate education in strategic studies, international relations, defence management and defence technology.
- Promote joint and exchange programmes with similar regional and international institutions, and organize seminars/conferences on topics salient to the strategic and policy communities of the Asia-Pacific.

Constituents of IDSS include the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) and the Asian Programme for Negotiation and Conflict Management (APNCM).

**RESEARCH**
Through its Working Paper Series, IDSS Commentaries and other publications, the Institute seeks to share its research findings with the strategic studies and defence policy communities. The Institute’s researchers are also encouraged to publish their writings in refereed journals. The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region. The Institute has also established the S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies (named after Singapore’s first Foreign Minister), to bring distinguished scholars to participate in the work of the Institute. Previous holders of the Chair include Professors Stephen Walt (Harvard University), Jack Snyder (Columbia University), Wang Jisi (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), Alastair Iain Johnston (Harvard University) and John Mearsheimer (University of Chicago). A Visiting Research Fellow Programme also enables overseas scholars to carry out related research in the Institute.

**TEACHING**
The Institute provides educational opportunities at an advanced level to professionals from both the private and public sectors in Singapore as well as overseas through graduate programmes, namely, the Master of Science in Strategic Studies, the Master of Science in International Relations and the Master of Science in International Political Economy. These programmes are conducted fulltime and part-time by an international faculty. The Institute also has a Doctoral programme for research in these fields of study. In addition to these graduate programmes, the Institute also teaches various modules in courses conducted by the SAFTI Military Institute, SAF Warrant Officers’ School, Civil Defence Academy, and the Defence and Home Affairs Ministries. The Institute also runs a one-semester course on “The International Relations of the Asia Pacific” for undergraduates in NTU.

**NETWORKING**
The Institute convenes workshops, seminars and colloquia on aspects of international relations and security development that are of contemporary and historical significance. Highlights of the Institute’s activities include a regular Colloquium on Strategic Trends in the 21st Century, the annual Asia Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO) and the biennial Asia Pacific Security Conference. IDSS staff participate in Track II security dialogues and scholarly conferences in the Asia-Pacific. IDSS has contacts and collaborations with many international think tanks and research institutes throughout Asia, Europe and the United States. The Institute has also participated in research projects funded by the Ford Foundation and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. It also serves as the Secretariat for the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), Singapore. Through these activities, the Institute aims to develop and nurture a network of researchers whose collaborative efforts will yield new insights into security issues of interest to Singapore and the region.