DEFENCE DIPLOMACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

CONFERENCE REPORT

REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ORGANISED BY THE MULTILATERALISM & REGIONALISM PROGRAMME AT THE S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (RSIS), NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, SINGAPORE

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30 NOVEMBER 2010
SINGAPORE

S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY
Contents

Welcome Remarks 5
Session I: ADMM and ADMM Plus 6
Session 2: ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Forces Informal Meeting (ACDFIM) 8
Session 3: Other Cases of Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia 10
Session 4: Great Powers and Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia 12
Appendix A: Programme 14
Appendix B: Participants 15
In his welcome remarks, Mr. Kwa Chong Guan highlighted that the use of “defence” and “diplomacy” together had been regarded as an anomaly for a long time. However, this is no longer the case. “Defence diplomacy” has become an important tool of a state’s foreign and security policy, a result of rising reliance and appreciation among states of multilateral avenues to discuss security issues both at the regional and international levels. He felt that Southeast Asia, where one had witnessed the strengthened institutionalisation of multilateral arrangements in the area of defence diplomacy, was an important region to test this claim. Indeed, this would be a significant development in a region that has been averse to discussing regional defence cooperation for a long time.

A range of multilateral arrangements have emerged—the ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting (ACAMM), ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Forces Informal Meeting (ACDFIM) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), which was convened in 2006 and expanded to include ASEAN’s dialogue partners in the form of ADMM Plus. All these multilateral arrangements around ASEAN have strengthened the 43-year old organisation’s central role in the regional security architecture. The challenge will be to make sense of how all these areas fit together and how they contribute to the regional security architecture.

The workshop was organised in an attempt to establish a framework for discussing defence diplomacy within both academic and policy settings: how should defence diplomacy be defined and what it means; what institutional venues exist in Southeast Asia to practise defence diplomacy and how they relevant are to policymaking; who the actors involved in regional defence diplomacy and how they choose to practise it. The effort was not to come up with definitive answers but to engage experts in what is hoped to become a long-running dialogue on a crucial element of Southeast Asian security: defence diplomacy.
SESSION ONE
ADMM and ADMM Plus

Carving Out a Crucial Role for ASEAN Defence Establishments in the Evolving Regional Architecture

Mr. Termsak Chalermpalanupap

Mr. Termsak Chalermpalanupap emphasised that his talk was primarily aimed at giving a factual account of the developments within the ADMM, this ministerial meeting currently being the primary venue for defence establishments to participate in regional diplomacy. He started by explaining why the ADMM emerged in the first place. Although the conventional wisdom is that ASEAN avoids steps towards defence cooperation so as not to send its partners the wrong signal of it being a military bloc, the situation started to change in the past decade through various informal meetings and discussions between representatives of ASEAN defence establishments. However, within the existing arrangements concerned with security, namely the ARF, the role of these establishments was secondary. To address this problem, steps were taken to start convening the ADMM sessions.

Having gained confidence in regional dialogue and cooperation through the ADMM (started in 2006), ASEAN defence ministers felt the need to engage ASEAN dialogue partners in this initiative—through the ADMM Plus. On the subject of dialogue partners, Chalermpalanupap singled out the European Union (EU) and Canada, since they are the two dialogue partners currently not part of the East Asia Summit (EAS) or ADMM Plus. Both have expressed the desire—and fulfilled the requirements—to join the EAS but their status with regard to the ADMM Plus remains to be resolved. According to Chalermpalanupap, the EU is currently not considered as a potential participant in the ADMM Plus because it is primarily an economic—not defence—grouping. But he felt that there is no reason to exclude Canada from the ADMM Plus in the future should it wished to join.

The ADMM Plus: What’s It for?

The key point Dr. Tim Huxley’s presentation was that experts should be realistic in their expectations of the role that the ADMM can play in the regional defence architecture. He opined that the ongoing discussion regarding the ADMM was somewhat vague and removed from reality. The reality, in a nutshell, is that Asia is not particularly stable at the moment, with the shifting positions of the great powers due to China’s rise and the U.S.’s declining presence in the region, and the middle powers finding themselves in a situation where they have to bolster their military defence in light of the great power dynamic and tensions with each other. Huxley emphasised that, against this backdrop, Southeast Asia had no hard institutional arrangements (such as arms control mechanisms) to prevent conflicts from escalating.

Huxley made it clear that he understood the logic behind the ADMM, which was to start with the discussion of non-controversial issues and eventually proceed to the more serious ones. However, in his assessment, it was wishful thinking, given ASEAN’s track record. Huxley’s main criticism of the ADMM, as it stood, was it did a lot
in terms of statements of process and had little to show in terms of concrete achievements. He called experts to realise that the ADMM would never be the venue to discuss defence issues at the highest level—the strategic issues between states—because this is not the ministerial mandate. At the same time, low priority issues were of little political consequence. Therefore, in Huxley’s opinion, the ADMM could only be successful if it moved to the middle ground—concrete confidence-building measures.

**NADI’s Relevance to the ADMM**

The overarching theme of Mr. Tan Seng Chye’s presentation on how the Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI) could be helpful to the ADMM was the fact that, unlike Western institutions, the ASEAN institutional framework was composed of multiple layers, each of them being relevant, even if they were not comprehensive, in terms of issues they addressed. In light of this crucial consideration, Tan opined that NADI’s relevance was largely explained by the fact that, being a Track 2 initiative, it could discuss issues that might be too sensitive to be brought up at the ADMM. What is particularly conducive to that is that NADI participants come in their personal capacity, and not as official representatives of their respective institutions. Therefore, NADI could be a forum to provide fresh ideas and perspectives to the ADMM, thus complementing the functions of the latter. Moreover, he believed that NADI should focus on upcoming issues rather than current ones so that its insights always remained practically relevant.

Further developing the theme of a multi-layered institutional structure, Tan agreed with Huxley on the fact that the ADMM could not be a forum where strategic-level issues were discussed. Therefore, the ADMM (together with NADI) and ASEAN+8 were complementary levels of the existing institutional structure.

**Discussion**

In addressing potential issues that the ADMM Plus would have to resolve, Chalermpalanupap highlighted its relation to the ARF, saying it was currently unclear whether the two arrangements would be able to complement each other since there was a considerable overlap in their areas of concern. The other issue that he brought up was the fact that the ADMM Plus was only held once every three years, which brought the challenge of keeping the dialogue partners engaged and interested in regional diplomatic developments over the long time span.

Huxley further developed his view on the realistic expectations of the ADMM’s role. Replying to the question on the ADMM’s possible relevance to great powers, he opined that this would be expecting too much from the ADMM and that it could hardly succeed in this area, given that the ARF had not. In response to questions on specific defence problems and how the ADMM related to them, Huxley once again underscored that discussions had rarely resulted in concrete action to date, citing the failure to create the much talked-about tsunami warning system. On the same note, he mentioned that one of the areas where the ADMM could be quite helpful was discussing voluntary resource commitments from members to various defence issue areas, which would help the transition from discussion and good intentions to concrete action.

Two specific examples were cited of how NADI could be helpful to the ADMM. First, Tan acknowledged that at this point it was not entirely clear where the ADMM would end up in the regional defence architecture in terms of its role, and this was something that could be fruitfully discussed at the NADI level. Second, his general argument on NADI’s relevance was supported by Chalermpalanupap, who cited the problem of defence ministers being used to dealing with the national scope of problems. NADI, in Chalermpalanupap’s opinion, could be the forum to help broaden their framework of concern and expertise in the regional level.
Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: The View from Jakarta

Mr. Evan Laksmana’s presentation was primarily concerned with providing insights into two questions: (i) why has there been a considerable increase in defence diplomacy efforts in Southeast Asia, and (ii) why did it happen only in the past decade, and not earlier? Laksmana described the strategic situation regarding defence in Southeast Asia as characterised by the following trends: (i) most defence-issue areas were dominated by the ARF, but the influence of ASEAN as an institution was growing in that respect; (ii) non-traditional security (NTS) issues were rapidly increasing in importance; (iii) defence establishments now played a more important role in foreign policy than they used to.

Having described the backdrop, Laksmana presented his assessment of Indonesia’s understanding of the current defence diplomacy dynamics. According to him, some of the key reasons behind the recent rise in defence diplomacy initiatives could be explained by a confluence of several factors. After the financial crisis of 1997, Southeast Asian states engaged in the modernisation of their militaries and, at the same time, faced a situation of a very low level of trust between regional states, making diplomatic efforts quite necessary to improve matters. Parallel to this, NTS issues on the regional scale became considerably more important and, since the military was heavily involved in them, defence diplomacy efforts were, again, most relevant. Finally, a new great power dynamic in the region has made it necessary to engage external powers via diplomacy. In relation to this, Laksmana added that, in Indonesia’s view, bilateral and multilateral defence diplomacy were two sides of the same coin: the former being primarily concerned with specific inter-state defence problems while the latter was aimed more at soft balancing of the major powers.

Observations of Defence Diplomacy in Action

During his talk, Mr. Eddie Lim presented his account of a specific defence diplomacy initiative that he studied: the Heads of Defence Universities/Colleges/Institutes Meeting (ARF HDUCIM). In Lim’s assessment, the most prominent characteristic of HDUCIM was that both academics and the military participated in the meetings. Furthermore, even though this initiative was explicitly concerned with defence, it was the military personnel that often got rotated, whereas participants from academia tended to remain the same, thus providing institutional continuity.

According to Lim’s observations, the interest of the military in HDUCIM was primarily explained by their aim to gain knowledge and educate future military leaders. They were not there to participate in the defence diplomacy proper. In this regard, he cited ASEAN’s decision made in 2008 to expand HDUCIM’s mandate beyond military education, making it more relevant to broader defence diplomacy efforts.

Lim explained that the key strengths of HDUCIM were it was an important forum for defence networking and a place for open and sincere discussions of politics between both the military and academics. At the same time, he opined that HDUCIM being essentially an academic
setting, albeit one existing within a military framework, was a source of some tension, and it remained unclear how the issue could be addressed.

Making Asia-Pacific Security Regionalisms Hang Together: Building Coherence and Community Out of Clutter

Associate Professor Tan See Seng spoke on the problem of how multiple institutional arrangements in the Asia Pacific related to each other and “hung together”. He began by describing the recent trend of institutional proliferation in the region and the fact the political leaders seemed to be increasingly aware of the need for such arrangements to function together in some coherent manner. There are multiple obstacles to this, since some institutions overlap in their functions with others while some are in competition with each other. The key question raised was whether greater coherence was possible. And no less important was: Is it really necessary?

Tan named three major constraints in the way of regional institutions “hanging together”: (i) “regionalism-lite”—defence relations expanded, but without deep institutionalisation or strong commitments from their participants; (ii) “regionalism-elite”—Asian regionalism tended to involve only governmental elites and rarely concerned the lower levels; and (iii) “regionalism-polite”—the ASEAN Way of conducting diplomacy had become the standard in the Asia Pacific, and so few binding obligations were ever expected from states, consensus was privileged over decisiveness, non-interference remained one of the central diplomatic norms, making institutional reforms considerably slower and more difficult.

Tan emphasised that these three areas being constraints was itself a problematic notion that merited further discussion.

However, to the degree that one did see them as constraints, he proposed the following guidelines in addressing the existing issues: (i) political leaders needed greater coordination of their efforts, and institutional arrangements needed to be conceived to be complimentary; (ii) Asian regionalism should move beyond its present elitism and become participatory; (iii) diplomatic efforts should move beyond mere dialogue to practical cooperation, and stated objectives need to be regularly fulfilled.

Discussion

Laksmana was asked how much attention Indonesia had planned to devote to defence diplomacy during its upcoming ASEAN chairmanship. He responded that, at this point, Indonesia’s concern was still primarily logistical and the focus was on preparing for its chairmanship, and specific policies had not been discussed in great detail yet. Laksmana was also asked why, according to some of the materials he provided during his presentation, there was a decline in defence diplomacy efforts in ASEAN in 2009 and 2010. He believed this was primarily due to the global economic crisis, which shifted everyone’s attention from defence to the economy. A secondary reason might be related to Vietnam’s chairmanship of ASEAN, which saw fewer activities in all areas—including defence—due to Vietnam’s limited internal resources.

In addressing questions regarding the nature and definition of defence diplomacy and its relation to preventive diplomacy, Lim felt that the latter was more difficult to conduct because it was more strictly institutionalised. Defence diplomacy, on the other hand, was more open and there was more freedom for discussion. Tan added that leaders disliked the terminology of preventive diplomacy because it often implied intervention. On the other hand, actual efforts in preventive diplomacy were still needed. Therefore, these efforts tended to shift under the umbrella of the defence diplomacy terminology.

In response to questions on the necessity of greater institutional coherence, Tan noted that the desire for streamlining the existing institutional structure emanated from Asian leaders. In his personal opinion, such streamlining might not be absolutely necessary. Each of the existing institutional arrangements had emerged in response to a particular need present at that moment and later tried to find a new raison d’être for itself, often successfully. At the same time, maintaining these institutions did not present a big problem or involve large costs. Tan, therefore, concluded that it might be acceptable that existing institutions did not all “hang together”.

Associate Professor Tan See Seng
The Role of the FPDA in the Southeast Asian Security Architecture

Associate Professor Ralf Emmers’s presentation asserted that the FPDA would continue to be relevant to regional defence diplomacy for years to come. Emmers explored its relevance by comparing and contrasting recent examples of defence diplomacy, namely the ADMM, ADMM Plus and Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP). He remarked that the FDPA and ADMM potentially overlapped in areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief but the two processes tended to mutually exclude one another. The ADMM’s inception was mostly to address non-traditional security issues and humanitarian relief but the FDPA was more experienced with professional response than the ADMM in these areas because of the joint-exercises dimension. Where the ADMM Plus was concerned, it was still an embryonic programme, unlikely to overshadow the FPDA anytime soon. In contrast, the FPDA continues to be relevant to the MSP initiative because of its defence dimension. It holds a long tradition of joint exercises that the MSP cannot yet provide. Thus the FPDA fills the gap in enhancing the significance of what is ongoing in the MSP programme.

Although the scope of collaborations of the FPDA is similar to bilateral cooperation with the United States, Singapore and Malaysia gain from the FPDA what they do not from defence ties with the United States. The FPDA views Singapore’s and Malaysia’s security as a common set of issues and hence caters to Singapore and Malaysia defence relations in a unique joint structure of defence cooperation. It also remains the best instrument to build confidence between the armed forces of Singapore and Malaysia. In addition, the FPDA has significance for Australia because it gives Australia another vital role in Southeast Asia, one that is independent of being the “deputy sheriff” of the United States within the region. Hence, the FPDA offers diplomatic benefit.

The Shangri-La Dialogue: Thriving but not Surviving?

In Dr. Brendan Taylor’s paper, he considered whether the Shangri-La Dialogue would eventually compete with the ADMM Plus or complement it. It included the examination
of the impressive rise of the Shangri-La Dialogue in becoming an important fixture in the landscape of Asia security and the significance of the ADMM Plus. Many have argued that the institutional overlap between the two is unproblematic and poses no negative consequences. Taylor, however, advocated the potential danger of institutional duplication. What would appear as growing cooperation might actually be a reflection of increased competition, particularly between the great powers. Despite the best intentions of the Shangri-La Dialogue and the ADMM Plus institutions to co-exist peacefully, it cannot be taken for granted that this peace will emerge by itself. He observed that a study of similar regional institutions in the past would produce precedence of how great powers had utilised overlapping institutions to counteract one another’s influence in the region.

As there was potential for unbeneﬁcial institutional competition between the Shangri-La Dialogue and ADMM Plus in the larger architecture of regional security perspective, Taylor suggested how this competition could be managed if it were to emerge. Firstly, develop a concept paper that would suggest options for a division of labour between the Shangri-La Dialogue and the ADMM Plus. Functional differentiation is gaining priority for institutional architecture to work coherently as Asia’s institutional landscape gets more crowded. Secondly, better efforts could be made to initiate, perhaps even institutionalise, creative mini-lateral interactions on the sidelines of the ADMM Plus and the Shangri-La Dialogue. Mini-lateral conversations conducted under the auspices of multilateral groupings could serve as forums that discussed specific security concerns.

Discussion

Huxley commented that two pivotal reasons should be highlighted regarding the formation of the FPDA: (i) memories of Konfrontasi were fresh and the FPDA provided a context for defence collaboration in support of the sovereignty of Malaysia and Singapore; and (ii) the FPDA was an important channel of communication between Singapore and Malaysia on defence matters, as well as external parties that wished to see Singapore and Malaysia on good terms. From the Australian and New Zealand perspectives, the FPDA served the same purpose in times when their relations with Singapore and Malaysia were not rosy.

Dr. Farish Noor noted that there were several dialogues working simultaneously to address concerns but questioned if there was a consideration for the process that generated consensus during such meetings. In such a process of hegemonic consensus, crucial issues might get overlooked, for example, the rise of religious extremism was unobserved until it hit the region from 2000. His concern was how the generation of consensus could address true problems and not block out other variables that might return as bigger troubles. Additionally, Dr. Chong Ja Ian observed that the process of consensus making may side-step crucial problems that require attention due to political sensitivities of certain issues. He was unclear how institutions in Southeast Asia, which had a strong political preference to find consensus, could redress the crowding out of sensitive issues that really required the discussions of differences in an open manner.

A final comment was posed by Group Capt. Brian Edwards on the importance of defence diplomacy and how it should not be underestimated. Defence diplomacy is indispensable to Singapore and Malaysia in the form of the FPDA. It is also a powerful tool in regulating relations between Australia and Malaysia, as well as Australia and China. Today, all FPDA nations are in Afghanistan working collaboratively. The FPDA is challenging because it has to maintain a five-way relationship but the key to its success is the regular meetings that facilitate the understanding of differences, which is the essence of defence diplomacy. Even so, Australia’s participation in the FPDA has nothing to do with the absence of the United States in the grouping but more to do with regional factors.
Great Powers and Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia

U.S. Defence Diplomacy towards Southeast Asia

Mr. Richard Bitzinger began by describing the objectives of U.S. defence diplomacy: (i) to build relationships that promote U.S. security interests; (ii) to develop partner and allied states’ military capabilities for self-defence; (iii) to improve information exchange and intelligence sharing; (iv) to harmonise views on security challenges; and (v) to provide support for U.S. forces in the region. He went on to explain that specific requirements were essential in meeting the objectives. These included operational access, operational capacity and capability building, as well as interoperability. Intelligence and information sharing, regional confidence building, security sector reform, defence technology cooperation, international suasion and collaboration were also on the list of requirements.

Bitzinger pointed out that a vital component of U.S. defence diplomacy was the International Military Education and Training (IMET). Foreign military personnel, often funded by the United States, are permitted to attend U.S. military schools, or undergo specific military training. Other forms of training under the auspices of the Defence Department with State Department funding include International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Global Peace Operations Initiative, Disaster Response and, more significantly, the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Programme, which has risen in scope and now operates in some regional centres. Additionally, he highlighted that all of the forces of the U.S. military were heavily involved in joint exercises in the region. The most important joint exercise for the United States is Cobra Gold, which is now the world’s largest annual multinational military exercise involving land, sea and air forces.

Bitzinger concluded that the U.S. military probably had the largest, most extensive and longest-standing forms of defence diplomacy in the world. Approaches are broad-based, ranging from hard to soft power. Defence diplomacy is definitely an important component in promoting U.S. power and influence. U.S. defence diplomacy bears a significant impact on the region as it touches almost every Southeast Asia nation in one way or another.

China’s Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia

Dr. Ian Storey stated from the outset that Chinese defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia was lesser in scope compared to that of the United States. It was also less transparent. Unsurprisingly, military security ties are less developed than economic and political relations. Close defence relationship is dependent on trust but there is an absence of high levels of trust between ASEAN and China, particularly in the countries that have territorial claims in the South China Sea. The modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) lacks transparency, inducing mistrust in its intentions among Southeast Asian nations. There are also practical barriers in defence cooperation between Southeast Asia militaries and the PLA, such as language difficulties, interoperability and the absence of framework agreements that govern defence relations.

Nonetheless, China has been much more pro-active with defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia since 2000. The reasons are that defence diplomacy facilitates regular security dialogue with Southeast Asia; provides China with an opportunity to push its “peaceful development” message and assuage regional concerns on its rising power; and helps China gain a better understanding of Southeast Asian countries’ security perspectives through these dialogues. The PLA also gains operational insights
into Southeast Asian militaries in combined exercises while arms sales and military assistance increase China’s influence in the region and, to a limited extent, generate revenue. Notably, China has also used foreign military assistance to drive a wedge between certain Southeast Asia states and the United States. Storey ended by observing that Sino-Southeast Asia defence security ties were growing, albeit incrementally. There are hurdles and limitations to overcome as building trust takes time and arms sales will remain modest until quality issues are addressed. Combined military exercises may increase but sensitivities will persist, especially with countries that have close defence relations with the United States.

**Discussion**

Tan pointed out that 1995 seemed to be the year of many U.S. defence diplomacy projects and questioned if defence diplomacy towards Southeast Asia was a major policy for the Clinton administration, which was in power at the time. Bitzinger replied that the noticeable surge of defence diplomacy projects in 1995 was presumably a remedy to the lack of U.S. presence in the region after the closure of Subic Base in the Philippines during the early 1990s. On mitigating anti-Americanism within local populations, permanent U.S. military presence usually maintained a low profile in Southeast Asia countries. For example, the Sembawang logistic offices in Singapore retained a small group of personnel that operated in civilian attire in a tightly controlled environment. The U.S. government has grasped that such an arrangement is the best option militarily and diplomatically in Southeast Asia, in that access but not bases support U.S. military activities in the region.

On the subject of Chinese influence, Storey said that China had leveraged its economic prominence in Southeast Asia to gain national interests on selected issues but this was not attributed to military influence at all. Still, when any country sells weapons to another, it is a given the two will be locked in future deals because arms sales influence doctrine, which is difficult to change. China had in the past also used military aid to buttress ruling regimes, such as Myanmar in the 1990s and Cambodia after 1997. Military aid provided to Cambodia was used exclusively to arm Hun Sen’s personal praetorian guards.

Bitzinger ended by stating that defence lobbying did not influence the U.S. government into arms sales with Southeast Asia. Both the defence industry and the U.S. government generally hold the policy that arms sales are beneficial for the receiving country, in that it will get a well-made piece of equipment as well as working relations with the United States. He then commented that sentiments of anti-Americanism were oftentimes undeserved, irrational and driven by local political forces, even if there were cases wherein U.S. soldiers had misbehaved in their individual capacity. Nonetheless, as more efforts were made on defence diplomacy, such misconceptions might hopefully diminish.
## APPENDIX A
### Programme

### 29 November 2010

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<tr>
<td>19.00</td>
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### 30 November 2010

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<th>Time</th>
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<tr>
<td>8.45–9.00</td>
<td>Registration</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.00–9.10</td>
<td>Welcome Remarks                       Kwa Chong Guan                                Head, External Programmes, RSIS</td>
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| 9.10–10.40  | Session One  ADMM and ADMM Plus  
  Chairperson: Tan See Seng (RSIS)  
  Termsak Chalermpalanupap (ASEAN Secretariat)  
  Carving Out a Crucial Role for ASEAN Defence Establishments in the Evolving Regional Architecture  
  Tim Huxley (IISS)  
  The ADMM Plus: What’s it for?  
  Tan Seng Chye (RSIS)  
  NADI’s Relevance to the ADMM  |
| 10.40–11.00 | Coffee break                                                                               |
| 11.00–12.30 | Session Two  ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Forces Informal Meeting (ACDFIM)  
  Chairperson: Ralf Emmers (RSIS)  
  Evan Laksmana (CSIS, Indonesia)  
  Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: The View from Jakarta  
  Eddie Lim (RSIS)  
  Observations of Defence Diplomacy in Action  
  Tan See Seng (RSIS)  
  Making Asia Pacific Security Regionalisms Hang Together: Building Coherence and Community Out of Clutter  |
| 12.30–14.00 | Lunch                                                                                      |
| 14.00–15.20 | Session Three  Other Cases of Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia  
  Chairperson: Joseph Liow (RSIS)  
  Ralf Emmers (RSIS)  
  The Role of the FPDA in the Southeast Asian Security Architecture  
  Brendan Taylor (ANU)  
  The Shangri-La Dialogue: Thriving but not Surviving?  |
| 15.20–15.40 | Coffee break                                                                               |
| 15.40–17.00 | Session Four  Great Powers and Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia  
  Chairperson: Bhubhindar Singh (RSIS)  
  Richard Bitzinger (RSIS)  
  U.S. Defence Diplomacy towards Southeast Asia  
  Ian Storey (ISEAS)  
  China’s Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia 3  |
| 17.00       | Closing remarks                                                                            |
| 19.00       | Closing dinner  Straits Kitchen, Hyatt Hotel                                               |
APPENDIX B

Participants

Chairpersons/Presenters/Discussants
*in alphabetical sequence according to last/family names

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The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) was officially inaugurated on 1 January 2007. Before that, it was known as the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), which was established ten years earlier on 30 July 1996. Like its predecessor, RSIS was established as an autonomous entity within Nanyang Technological University (NTU).

The School exists to develop a community of scholars and policy analysts at the forefront of Asia-Pacific security studies and international affairs. Its three core functions are research, graduate teaching and networking activities in the Asia-Pacific region. It produces cutting-edge security related research in Asia-Pacific Security, Conflict and Non-Traditional Security, International Political Economy, and Country and Area Studies.

The School’s activities are aimed at assisting policymakers to develop comprehensive approaches to strategic thinking on issues related to security and stability in the Asia-Pacific and their implications for Singapore.

For more information about RSIS, please visit www.rsis.edu.sg