Mainstreaming Counter-Terrorism
4th Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO)

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This report summarises the proceedings of the conference as interpreted by the assigned rapporteurs and editor of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this report.  

The conference adheres to a variation of the Chatham House rules. Accordingly, beyond the speakers and paper presenters cited, no other attributions have been included in this report.
Background and Aims of the Conference

National security is a complex domain today, encompassing matters ranging from the challenges of homeland security management to designing coping strategies for a wide variety of traditional and non-traditional threats. National security, especially in a rapidly changing and complex environment, remains a key concern for countries worldwide.

In line with this, and with the aim of promoting a multi-agency and networked government approach as an important response to today’s complex and uncertain security milieu, the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), a research unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), and the National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS), part of Singapore’s Prime Minister’s Office, is jointly organising the 4th Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO). APPSNO is targeted at senior government officials from the Asia-Pacific and beyond with responsibilities for national security matters and seeks to promote the analytical frameworks, mindsets and skills needed for effective national security management.

APPSNO is driven by two primary objectives:

1. Enhance exposure to global best practices in national security. Participants will be given the opportunity to learn about the trends and global best practices in national security issues through lectures and informal discussions. The theme for APPSNO 2010 is “Mainstreaming Counter-Terrorism”. As such, prominent speakers this year were invited to speak on topics such as “The Evolving Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia”, “Mainstreaming Counter-Terrorism in Police and Law Enforcement”, “Mainstreaming Counter-Terrorism for Whole-of-Government” and “Mainstreaming Counter-Terrorism in the Wider Society”. The format of small-group interactive discussions enabled participants to share ideas, anecdotes and experiences that will be of broad professional interest.

2. Facilitate an international network of national security experts and practitioners. APPSNO will provide the platform for participants to network with global national security experts as well as develop stronger relationships with their regional counterparts. Interaction will be facilitated through field visits, sight-seeing trips and social activities.
Ambassador Barry Desker, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), welcomed guests and participants to the Fourth Asia Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO), which was jointly organised by the Centre of Excellence for National Security—a centre within RSIS—and the National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS) of the Prime Minister’s Office. The theme of this year’s APPSNO is mainstreaming counter-terrorism.

Ambassador Desker noted that since 9/11, most governments have focused their efforts on counter-terrorist work. Hence, much attention and resources have been channelled towards traditional security agencies specialising in creating a hostile operating environment for terrorists. However, attention has now shifted to the area of counter-terrorism, where governments are striving to prevent future attacks by incorporating greater elements of government and society to deny terrorists opportunity, support and manpower.

Counter-terrorism work is multi-faceted and it is thus necessary to involve all layers of government and society. Hence mainstreaming counter-terrorism involves the process of systematically implementing appropriate security policies into the daily activities of all levels of the populace. Through the act of mainstreaming counter-terrorism, an extensive security web can be fabricated.

Ambassador Desker noted that policies might alter according to security needs but mindsets, attitudes and behaviours do not change as swiftly or easily. Hence, Ambassador Desker stressed that it was crucial to bring together national security professionals and thought-leaders to deliberate the approaches that offer the most utility, which is the objective of APPSNO.
Opening Address

Professor S Jayakumar, Singapore’s Senior Minister and Coordinating Minister for National Security, delivered the opening address.

The multiple bomb attacks against Jakarta-based hotels and the foiled NW253 aviation incident in 2009 are grim reminders of terrorists’ ability to adapt and adjust their tactics to outwit and overcome security advances. As such, Professor Jayakumar stressed that, to stay ahead of the adversary, states needed to innovate and expand their defences. This included measures to “harden” communities through mainstreaming counter-terrorism. Mainstreaming counter-terrorism involves more than just the cooperation of non-security-related government bodies, the private sector and the public with security agencies. It required engaging the wider community to establish a cultural norm of vigilance and the rejection of violent extremism.

In relation to the private sector, mainstreaming involves engaging businesses, the media and the general public. First, business leaders have been engaged through regular national security dialogues and exercises with the aim of getting them to be more willing in committing resources towards ensuring their security and training their employees to be prepared and ready for emergency situations. Second, engaging the media involves apprising them of security and operational sensitivities so as not to compromise counter-terrorism operations when crises are being covered. Third, the general public plays an important role in enhancing national security, as they are the first line of contact and casualties in most terrorist incidents. Hence their ability to react and respond effectively depends in a large part on their level of preparedness and resilience.

In conclusion, Professor Jayakumar underscored that radical violent extremism was the enemy, and not cultures, communities, ethnic groups or religions. Moreover, there is a need to ensure that mainstreaming efforts do not foster paranoia or policy over-reactions. Properly executed, mainstreaming counter-terrorism should enhance and not degrade the character, fabric and dynamism of societies.
Sean Lee provided an overview of Singapore’s National Security Strategic Framework.

Singapore is a small city-state with a multi-racial and multi-religious population. Moreover, as one of the region’s key transport hub and financial centres, Singapore is an attractive terrorist target. While the Singapore arm of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has been disrupted, organised terrorist groups and their operations in the region continue to pose a threat to Singapore. Another threat to Singapore pertains to the phenomena of self-radicalised individuals such as Abdul Basheer, Muhammad Zamri Abdullah and Maksham Mohd Shah.

Following this, Singapore’s National Security Strategic Framework uses a three-pronged approach. First, the organisational framework is premised on an integrated whole-of-government networked approach towards security policy and crisis response coordination. Inter-ministry committees, for instance, have been established within the framework to focus on specific areas of security concerns through collective and collaborative work of all relevant government ministries.

Second, physical hardening and capacity-building measures are incorporated as part of a broader critical infrastructure protection plan. For instance, a multi-agency team comprising policymakers and officers from various agencies are tasked with the protection of key infrastructures such as Jurong Island, where major petrochemical plants are situated, to ensure security layering.

Third, as security is not limited to the protection of physical infrastructure, the framework recognises that social and economic resilience are crucial aspects of national security as well. The Community Engagement Programme (CEP) and Corporate First Responder Scheme, for instance, aim to involve citizen and business enterprises in crisis prevention and safety-and-security exercises. The overall objective of national resilience is to foster strong and deep networks of trust and vigilance within the community through the adoption of a holistic whole-of-society approach to crisis prevention, response and recovery.

In conclusion and in line with APPSNO’s theme, Singapore’s National Security Strategic Framework emphasises the importance of multi-agency collaborations and engages the public in the fight against terrorist networks.

**Discussion**

Several participants expressed their interest in Singapore’s Community Engagement Programme (CEP) and wanted to know the challenges faced in its implementation. In response, Lee mentioned that the greatest challenge would be the changing of mindsets, as security was traditionally a domain that was managed by select agencies and information sharing was limited. The CEP, however, calls for changes in security management styles and the removal of silos in order to facilitate collaboration. It was thus difficult to have agencies and organisations rethink and approach security differently in the initial stages of the CEP. However, the initial hiccups eased with the 7 July 2005 terrorist bombing in London, as a key lesson learnt from the incident was the need for a multi-faceted national security approach.

It was further asked if any measures were in place to gauge the effectiveness of the CEP and how its success might be assessed or defined. Lee opined that not all results could be measured or quantified. In retrospect, a possible measure of the effectiveness of the CEP was the level of awareness that the community displayed towards national security.
concerns and the contrast in the way people perceived threats before and after the implementation of the programme.

A participant applauded Singapore’s ability to implement the CEP but stressed that it might be difficult to apply a similar programme elsewhere as it might give rise to “racial profiling”. Lee clarified that the CEP did not teach the community to be wary of one another. Rather, it focused on the reporting of abnormal or suspicious behaviours or activities in the community. The programme also creates platforms where members of the community can interact and exchange views on a range of issues.

Session II:

The Evolving Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia

Rommel Banlaoi spoke on the evolving threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia, focusing primarily on the terrorist threats emanating from the Philippines. His presentation covered concepts of terrorist threats in Southeast Asia before and after 9/11, the extent to which terrorist threats have evolved in Southeast Asia and lessons learnt from these terrorist threats.

Noting that current discourses on “terrorism” and its threats differed according to context and perspectives and thus posed a challenge to conceptualising “terrorism”, Banlaoi argued it was nevertheless necessary to define the term in order to understand the phenomena. In his analysis, he categorised the terrorist threat in Southeast Asia into two phases: pre-9/11 and post-9/11. He stated that terrorist threats have existed in Southeast Asia as far back as the 1990s, when threats began to emanate from growing Islamic fundamentalism. The region’s insurgencies were characterised by several local armed rebels who frequently resorted to the use of terror. However, terrorist threats in Southeast Asia were internationally recognised only as a low-level threat before 9/11. The 9/11 incident in 2001, followed by the Bali bombing of 2002, effectively drew international attention towards the issue of terrorism. In addition, it was discovered that terrorists had already developed their own network connections not only between different local terrorist groups but also between terrorist groups in different countries in Southeast Asia. Subsequently, the governments of Southeast Asia began to acknowledge the virulence of its regional terrorist threats and terrorism became a key security concern.

Regarding the evaluation of the current terrorist situation and the extent of its threat in Southeast Asia, Banlaoi opined that although counter-terrorism measures of individual countries since 9/11 had weakened the operation of terrorist groups to a certain extent, Al-Qaeda operatives had not been fully eliminated from the region. Moreover, the network between terrorist groups in Southeast Asia has grown more complex and their ability to recruit new members, especially juveniles, has grown significantly. In addition, they also maintain sympathisers from vulnerable populations through a combination of material inducement and ideological indoctrination.

Banlaoi noted that 9/11 and the Bali bombing in 2002 instigated a regional cooperation for counter-terrorism efforts. However, cooperation still remains rather limited. Moreover, networking between ASEAN countries has largely been on a superficial basis with limited information sharing. Following from this, Banlaoi opined that more improvements must be made in intelligence sharing between ASEAN members.
**Discussion**

A participant asked for Banlaoi’s assessment of the ongoing Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) peace process between MILF and the Philippine government. Banlaoi answered that the MILF peace process was limited to the central MILF leadership and the Philippine government and excluded other MILF commanders. Moreover, it is very difficult to amicably conclude the peace process because these commanders profit from these conflicts and are therefore not willing to end the fight.

Another participant questioned whether there were any counter-measures in place to deter young radicals from joining terrorist groups. Banlaoi answered that while there was no definite answer to this, promoting good governance in the security sector would be a good start to complement the absence of proper governance in Mindanao.

Another question concerned the logistical abilities of terrorist groups and the role of religious schools in Southern Philippines in promoting radical ideology. Banlaoi answered that the government’s efforts to track the connections between different organisations remained weak. Moreover, most of the insurgent groups obtain funds from kidnapping and extortion. He added that religious schools did play its role in propagating religious fundamentalist ideologies but the possibility of these ideologies translating into an actual act of violence still remains unclear.

**Distinguished Dinner Lecture:**

**Mainstreaming CT: Lessons from the U.K. and Irish Experience**

Lord John Alderdice spoke on the topic of mainstreaming counter-terrorism and its challenges based on his experience from U.K. and Northern Ireland. He said that although mainstreaming counter-terrorism was indeed an attractive idea, its implementation into a nationwide policy would not be easy, mainly due to the obstacles that currently exist in governments and society. Nevertheless, he stated that in spite of this difficulty, it was crucial for governments and society to recognise the significance of mainstreaming counter-terrorism because it had the potential to establish in society a norm against terrorist attacks.

Lord Alderdice opined that the general public was mainly driven by emotions rather than rational thinking and, in this regard, the issue of terrorism might sometimes be misconceived, especially through the rate and intensity of it being reported in the media. He stated that due to the tendency of politicians to focus on attracting the public’s favour based on their emotions, they might stray away from promoting social resilience and logical thinking, which was crucial for preparing for future terrorist attacks. Hence it is important to frame a realistic picture instead of leaving people to be swayed by their own emotions.
Lord Alderdice said that while mainstreaming counter-terrorism was ideal to educate society to be vigilant and cultivate a sense of responsibility for their security, it required long-term planning to successfully implement it into society. He mentioned that the United Kingdom did take the issue of counter-terrorism very seriously, as indicated by the increase in resources allocated to counter-terrorism strategy from 2008 to 2009. However, one of the reasons that make mainstreaming counter-terrorism difficult is the fact that not everyone is convinced that they are getting their money’s worth for this effort. Another reason is that mainstreaming counter-terrorism involves bringing people from different and conflicting backgrounds for a common purpose, which is an onerous task.

Lord Alderdice concluded that mainstreaming counter-terrorism was all about engaging the community and promoting a cooperative relationship between the government, law enforcement agencies and the general public. Policing should not be accomplished as a service that is done “to” the community but rather “with” or “within” the community. One way to this end is through continuous dialogue between the different stakeholders from different levels. Noting that terrorist threats fundamentally emanated from a sense of injustice and unfairness within the community, Lord Alderdice argued that mainstreaming counter-terrorism efforts should address local issues. However, this should not be at the expense of international cooperation and intelligence sharing between countries.

**Discussion**

A participant asked Lord John Alderdice about his views on the utility of governments using force to weaken terrorists before a negotiation in order to bargain from a position of power. Lord Alderdice answered that if a military solution could put a government in a better position to win the negotiation, it would be inclined to do so. However, in most cases, should a military success not materialise in five to six years, the odds of establishing security are likely to diminish. When this happens, governments will have no choice but to resort to alternative methods such as talks but not from a position of power. From his observations, military approaches to protracted conflicts do not lead to successful resolutions.

Another participant asked whether the concept of negotiating with a terrorist group still applied to the situation in Southeast Asia, in view of the decentralised nature of terrorist groups in the region. Lord Alderdice acknowledged that the lack of central leadership and terrorist groups’ lack of interest in negotiating with the government could indeed hinder the negotiation process. Nevertheless, he emphasised that it was important to focus on local agendas that was within most government’s power to deal with. He added that negotiation tactics should be adjusted to different regional environments.

A participant asked how mediation processes, where it was against the interest of the involved parties to settle on a peace agreement, could be approached. Lord Alderdice was of the view that both parties should realise the importance of settling on an agreement within a certain timeline before the hostile relationship prolonged and attracted more obstacles that would make the peace process even more difficult. He said that everyone involved should admit that there was a price for achieving peace and it was also in their own interest to do so, rather than deeming the process as a “problem”. There will always be “spoilers” who resist the negotiation process and dealing with them requires diplomacy.
Anil Patani shared the role of the police and law enforcement in counter-terrorism in the U.K. He noted that while most countries maintained national agencies designed to look into counter-terrorism, the U.K. did not do this. Instead, they relied on the collaboration of independent police forces, which, in his opinion had its advantages and disadvantages. A result of this in the U.K. context is that politicians do not dictate what the police does. Rather, there exists a very healthy triangle of tension that informs police operations. This triangle is made up of the Home Secretary, the Chief Constable and the Police Authority.

According to Patani, the U.K. security services estimated the current likelihood of an attack to be high. In fact, the security services assessed that there were at least 2,000 possible individuals in U.K. who were deemed likely perpetrators for such an event. This, according to Patani, was unprecedented in scale and nature, with terrorist organisations maintaining global reach, not to mention the phenomenon of “lone wolves” and the increasing capabilities, resilience, sophistication, ambition and lack of restraint of those aspiring to violence. In order to combat the risk of terrorism, the U.K. has developed what is called the CONTEST strategy, which consists of four “P’s”: “prevent” terrorism by tackling violent radicalisation; “pursue” terrorists and those that sponsor them; “protect” the public and U.K. interests, and provide harder targets at home and abroad through better protective security; and “prepare” for the consequences. The people’s resilience should also be improved to cope with attacks and other major disruptive challenges. The first two of these “P’s” are aimed at reducing risk, with the latter two designed to reduce vulnerability.

Patani pointed out that, historically, law enforcement in the U.K. had seen domestic links to terrorist attacks planned abroad, specifically in areas of fundraising, facilitation and radicalisation. In Birmingham, for instance, there have been individuals who have communicated with key members of extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda in Pakistan. The presence of such individuals and the locations in which they reside have driven radicalisation and facilitated extremist connections in the U.K. For instance, Operation Gamble, carried out in January 2007, resulted in the arrest of nine people who were plotting to kidnap and behead a British soldier. Of those arrested, six were charged with providing supplies, equipment and money to those in Pakistan fighting the coalition forces. On these charges, four individuals pleaded guilty, which, according to Patani, sent a strong message to the community about the veracity of the operation and ongoing counter-terrorism efforts.

Some innovative approaches being taken towards counter-terrorism efforts by the West Midlands police include the introduction of Security and Partnership Officers. These officers transcend the Covert/Overt divide by putting forward accessible and locally accountable representatives of the Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU). These officers provide a link between the CTU, neighbourhood policing teams, communities and partners. Patani explained that each officer specialised and took the lead in their local neighbourhoods. By working in communities to develop the understanding and relationships needed to prevent violent extremism, these officers have made great headway in combating terrorism in the West Midlands area. Other approaches taking place in West Midlands include the Mosque Governance Project, the aim of which is to help build the capacity of mosque committees to improve
Gregory Saathoff presented on prisoner radicalisation in U.S. prisons. He opined that the prison system was ever evolving and the environment in prisons had changed dramatically in recent years. Saathoff suggested that in order to truly understand prisons, they needed to be examined through a systems lens. He also suggested that even though there had been substantial changes taking place, some things continued to remain the same; specifically prisons were still utilised as recruiting grounds, examples of which could be seen in Stalin's recruitment of revolutionaries to join his cause or the spread of Sayyid Qutb's writings, which stemmed from his time in an Egyptian prison. He went on to argue that there was a causal link between vulnerable individuals and charismatic leaders in the radicalisation process. In Saathoff's opinion, charismatic individuals were key to the spread of radicalisation as the contagion of such ideas could run rampant. Therefore it is vital for correctional facility personnel to maintain acute awareness of such individuals if they are to effectively counter radicalisation.

Saathoff then went on to define radicalisation as the process of having extreme views that promoted violence. Radicalisation, Saathoff warned, could take multiple forms and did not necessarily have to involve strong believers. In order to counter radicalisation in prisons, he argued that it was necessary to keep in mind the following points. First, radicalisation is neither unique to Islam nor a recent phenomenon; radicalisation is the exception rather than the rule. Second, jailhouse Islam incorporates prison culture into religious practice, which gives it an advantage in its spread throughout the system. Third, as there is an inadequate number of sanctioned Muslim religious service providers, the risk of radicalisation is increased because some of those who fill this void are part of the problem rather than the solution. Fourth, information collection and sharing between systems is integral to tracking radical behaviour of prisoners and service providers. Yet there remain resource limitations, specifically in the areas of manpower and financing, which hinder efforts to combat radicalisation. Fifth, radicalisation in prisons is not contained to any specific country but rather it is a global problem that impacts global security. Sixth, there is insufficient information at present about prisoner radicalisation to qualify the threat, a problem that can be addressed through the establishment of an information-sharing environment that supports counterterrorism efforts.

In conclusion, Saathoff pointed to an instance in the U.S. prison system where some Muslim scholars approached a prison to provide religious services and were rebuffed by a prison gang that refused to allow them into their domain. Moreover, while he lamented the reality that some returning veterans from the Iraq and Afghan wars...
would inevitably become part of the prison population, he argued that this would have a positive countering effect to those who were currently spreading radical Islam in the U.S. prison system. This is because these individuals who would command respect within the prison would also reject radicalism and thus be a force of good in vaccinating against these ideologies.

Discussion

One participant asked if having dedicated counter-terrorism officers in the U.K. was conducive to mainstreaming counter-terrorism efforts. Patani responded that having dedicated counter-terrorism officers allowed for a public face for the counter-terrorism effort in the U.K., which was vital in allowing the public to have a docking point for their concerns. To him, mainstreaming meant that there would be a point at which funding for such efforts would not have to come from the central government but instead would be sustained out of the local police budget.

Another participant asked if there were any programmes being put forward by the U.S. federal government to counter radical Islam for the inmates. In response, Saathoff said that there was a great deal of interest on the part of the federal government to provide authentic teaching of Islam to the inmates, as opposed to the “prislam” being taught in and among the inmates. In order to achieve this, the government is working to bring in serious Islamic scholars to teach Islam to those who are interested. He went on to say that there were indeed a number of efforts underway but that there needed to be a great deal more examination of the problem if these efforts were going to be effective.

A member of the audience asked whether it was necessary in Muslim community policing to send Muslim police officers or if training should include Islamic practices. In response, Patani said that while the police force did have Muslim officers and also provided classes related to Islamic practices, engaging with the Muslim community was not limited to Muslim officers. This was because community policing requires cultivating mutual respect which cannot be achieved by engaging the public through religious lenses alone.

Distinguished Dinner Lecture:

The Global Counter-Terrorism Challenge: Some Personal Musings

Arnaud De Borchgrave and RSIS Associate Dean Joseph Liow

Arnaud De Borchgrave began his talk by saying that during his 63 years in the business of journalism he had witnessed huge technological changes, which spanned from the use of Morse key to satellite phones. However, he opined that all these bells and whistles had not enhanced our understanding of the world around us. Instead, he argued that, if anything, our understanding of the world around us had diminished perceptibly from year to year, especially since the end of the Cold War. He went on to say that the profession of journalism had failed to prep opinion, direct the attention of our political leaders and the megatrends that would keep them ahead of the geopolitical power curve. As result, he argued that it now seemed glaringly obvious that there was a growing abyss between the geopolitical, geoeconomic, geostrategic, military, scientific, technological and even elementary psychological knowledge of the masses and their representatives. This, he lamented, was problematic as this sort of knowledge was indispensable to making logical, rational and moral decisions. He then went on to explain that it was vital for
One participant asked whether the speaker thought that all of the changes that he pointed to in his talk meant that technology would negatively impact society as time went on. In response, Arnaud De Borchgrave argued that when it came to what was happening in cyberspace, there were real threats emerging. He then cited that during a recent conference he attended, one participant shared that the Pentagon had been hit by cyber attacks more than six million times in one day and that Goldman Sachs had reported to have one million such attacks. The question in De Borchgrave's mind was how many of these attacks were successful.

Another participant asked that with the rate of change getting quicker and tighter, and with much of socialising taking place on the Internet, where would the next generation of those who were going to protect the public come from. In response, De Borchgrave said that his beef was with the media, in that they should be raising the level of awareness over time, not with coverage of Tiger Woods or O. J. Simpson, but rather with news that could help our political leaders understand what was going on. He also pointed out a lack of rigour in the selection of gatekeepers, citing, for example, that news organisations today flew any individual to Moscow and then considered that a foreign bureau, which was something that needed to change.
Frank Cilluffo provided a personal review of the current counter-terrorism posture and threat landscape. He noted that history could generally place current threats into contextual perspective. The events we encounter today could be extensions of problems that had a “long take-off” period.

In providing participants with a panoramic overview of the current threat landscape, Cilluffo highlighted the domino impact that both historical events and current counter-terrorism efforts had on the operational modus operandi of the Al-Qaeda, its affiliates and its supporters. It is commonly held that the Al-Qaeda central leadership’s (Al-Qaeda Central) ability to plan massive significant attacks has been impeded over the past five years as a result of mounting counter-terrorism efforts, especially by Saudi Arabian authorities. However, this does not suggest that Al-Qaeda no longer poses a threat or has lost its influence. According to Cilluffo, Al-Qaeda Central has received much support from the Pakistani authorities in recent months and, as such, their attack capabilities have been enhanced. Having said that, the real threat lies in Al-Qaeda’s affiliates who have overtaken Al-Qaeda Central’s ability to raise funds and attract new recruits.

From a security and threat assessment perspective, the two main organisations that should be paid attention to are the Al-Qaeda affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula and Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Due to the crackdown on terrorist and extremist activities in Saudi Arabia, many Arabian affiliates of Al-Qaeda have fled to Yemen and created a new leadership base there. They are probably not as sophisticated as Al-Qaeda Central but no less destructive. This is so because they have ties and have sworn allegiance to both Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Osama Bin Laden. Moreover, Cilluffo added, that while less structured, Al-Shabaab occupied ungoverned Somali spaces and has the potential to create instability in the ungoverned areas of Yemen and Somalia. Increasingly, foreign fighters from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the United States and even Britain are known to have either trained or fought alongside Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab in Yemen and Somalia. Cilluffo stressed that this was an area of immediate and future concern for two reasons. First, this suggests that regular terrorist suspects from the FATA region could be setting up their bases in the Arabian Peninsula. Second, this provides for the development of a new terrorist recruitment and training ground. At least 24 American and 75 British passport holders have travelled to the Arabian Peninsula to receive training and to fight. The appeal of Al-Shabaab would perhaps be their level of credence among extremists and their ability to effectively reach out to potential recruits through such new media channels as websites and web-based communication tools, thereby accentuating the threat of self-radicalisation.

In view of the changes in the Al-Qaeda structure and reach, Cilluffo suggested that a recalibration of counter-terrorism efforts be done. First, extremist ideologies have to be delegitimised by respected mainstream Islamic scholars. Next, it is crucial for states to acknowledge the immense impact that defectors have on deterring extremist behaviours. Third, individual terrorist incidences should be examined as unique cases rather than categorised together as an aggregated phenomenon. While the adversaries or their actions might have global implications, counter-terrorism efforts have to be rooted in local culture. Finally, Cilluffo concluded that there was also a need to de-glamourise or expose the true harm that terrorists were inflicting on their own communities. He stressed that without a recalibration of current counter-terrorism efforts and an attempt to place events in their historical and contextual perspective, the threat of terrorism would persist.
Suleyman Ozeren presented a case study on Turkey’s counter-terrorism efforts. He noted that the treatment and sensitivity displayed towards local grievances would have an effect on the way families prevent or promote further terrorist activities. Citing findings from his research on the Turkish Hizbullah, a majority of the surveyed were jobless youths (14–17 years old) who have attained high-school education. There was also a correlation between an individual’s participation in violent extremist activities and his or her family’s existing affiliation with terrorists or radical groups. A few were influenced by the Turkish Hizbullah through contacts made in the Internet. In all, it was highlighted that most interviewees turned to extremist activities as they felt isolated from mainstream society and compelled to “practice religion” due to peer or family influence. Ozeren further stressed that sensitivity towards local fears and needs were crucial in preventing further backlash from the families of terrorist.

Ozeren emphasised that an integrated counter-terrorism approach was necessary to impede the growth of terrorism. Moreover, it is also believed that terrorism and radicalisation are indications of local frustrations and how societies have sought to construct their identities and view others through group affiliations. Therefore, in Turkey’s case, counter-terrorism is conducted with a strong focus on gaining citizens’ support and trust. Specifically, it involves the collaboration of various government agencies and ministries, non-governmental organisations and the directorate of religious affairs in the facilitation and development of, for instance, a curriculum for religious courses that aim to provide the public with a holistic perspective of what Islam truly espouses while addressing basic citizenry concerns such as health and education.

A whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach was also adopted in recognition that radicalisation is a long process and not everyone would become full-fledge terrorists or suicide bombers. Measures can thus be put in place to prevent youths from joining, for example, the Hizbullah when their grievances are addressed. Ozeren shared that the solutions adopted were not constrained to traditional security offences. In a creative attempt to engage youths, a talent development programme was designed and organised in Turkey to provide them with an avenue to develop and display their talents.

In conclusion, Ozeren emphasised the need to identify and address the micro-societal issues that provide the oxygen for radicalisation and terrorism. He asserted that chronic terrorism could not be fully countered without an understanding of local grievances and, essentially, the mindset of terrorists.

**Discussion**

A participant opined that in future Al-Qaeda might not attempt to conduct attacks that were perceived to be easy but resort to large scale and sophisticated ones and hence posed a greater threat. Cilluffo replied that should Al-Qaeda gain access to nuclear weapons, it would certainly transform the threat landscape. However, the likelihood of that happening was still low. Rather, it was suggested that what was more plausible was the usage of radiological and biological tools to conduct warfare and stage attacks as these weapons are highly capable of inflicting great psychological and physical harm.

There were concerns that suspicious activity reporting might breed paranoia. It was also added that non-security-based agencies and organisations might not be keen to engage in such activities. In response, Cilluffo noted that privacy and civil liberty were viewed and held differently from society to society. Ozeren stressed that in places where terrorism was chronically present, policing was considered a norm and communities were used to being vigilant and working hand-in-hand with law enforcers to keep their districts safe. That said, it was generally agreed that measures had to be in place to prevent paranoia.
It was also queried if suspicious activity reporting might, in effect, be a burden on the police as there would be a constant need to verify information for credibility. Ozeren responded that, on the contrary, suspicious activity reporting complemented existing counter-terrorism and intelligence gathering efforts. To his knowledge, suspicious activity reporting did not create new information but, in most cases, confirmed or disconfirmed what was already suspected.

**Session V:**

**Mainstreaming CT in the Wider Society**

**Garry Hindle** assessed the U.K. experience in engaging the public in counter-terrorism through the implementation of the Prevent Strategy. The salience of the Prevent Strategy was underscored with the widespread and available knowledge of violent extremist propaganda and the prospect of U.K.-based potential members, sympathisers and terrorists. Hence, to address the evolving threat of violent extremist ideology, the U.K. Prevent Strategy has the following seven objectives: (i) challenge violent extremist views and supporting moderates; (ii) disrupt those who promote violent extremism; (iii) provide support for individuals vulnerable to recruitment; (iv) increase communities' ability to resist violent extremism; (v) address grievances; (vi) conduct Prevent-related research and analysis; and (vii) strategic communications.

Hindle divided Prevent activities into two categories. The first—Cohesion and Soft Prevent—is aimed broadly at the Muslim community, particularly young males and their key influencers. Activities to this end include group sporting activity for Muslim youths, training for local Imams, social activities to educate females on violent extremist issues, inter-faith dialogues, Muslim attitudinal surveys, gang and crime education activities, “British” awareness and citizenship programmes, and mosque capacity building and governance projects. The second—Intervention Prevent—involves the identification of individuals or groups considered vulnerable to involvement in terrorism and the facilitation of interventions to counter this influence. Examples of such activities are deradicalisation programmes, mentoring by religious or community leaders and direct consultation with family members.

In his assessment of the three-year project, Hindle noted there were some positive structural changes with long-term and wider benefits. However, the wide-ranging programmes have also led to some counter-productive effects such as the alienation of Muslim communities and allegations of being covert intelligence gathering exercises.

Hindle forwarded four recommendations. First, de-conflict the policy and ensure that everyone is onboard. For instance, he noted that stop-and-search powers served to undermine efforts to foster engagement and cooperation. Second, the cohesion element of Prevent should be mainstreamed into a genuine, wider cohesion strategy. While good community cohesion may be beneficial to CT efforts, cohesion directed solely at a particular community has negative consequences, such as the feeding of resentment and paranoia between the target community and the wider society. Third, there
needs to be clarity as to what is expected of the public and public bodies as public engagement and demands for intelligence cooperation may come with certain risks for individuals with specific expertise. Fourth, intervention processes should serve wider issues to gain broader utility and appeal, for instance, by addressing multiple types of threats from Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism to right-wing animal rights extremism.

In sum, it is not mainstreaming terrorism in the wider society per se but cohesion and civic responsibility that determines success in the prevention of violent extremism.

Mohamed Feisal Bin Mohamed Hassan spoke on Singapore's Religious Rehabilitation Group's (RRG) efforts at terrorist rehabilitation and community engagement. Formed in 2003, the RRG is a voluntary group constituting local Islamic scholars and teachers. The RRG's scope of work involves (i) its primary objective of countering the ideological misunderstanding of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members through counselling; (ii) providing expert resources for issues of religious extremism and radical ideologies; (iii) counselling spouses and families of the JI detainees; and (iv) public education.

The purpose of religious counselling is fivefold: to (i) correct the detainees' misinterpretation of religious concepts; (ii) create awareness of their wrongful acts and for them to repent; (iii) change their mental and psychological outlook; (iv) instil understanding and appreciation of living in a plural society and a secular nation; and (v) facilitate their integration into society. The counselling process involves extricating the detainees' negatively imbued ideology, negating their misunderstood theology, replacing negative ideology with positive ones, and instilling a right understanding of Islamic theology.

In general, the detainees were noted to have a weak religious background despite their desire to become better Muslims. As a result, they were deceived and misled from the teachings of "true Islam". Many of them were radicalised through lectures, books, tapes, videos and the Internet. Although the detainees were initially unrepentant and viewed the counsellors as their enemy, many have since opened up to the counsellors and repented and even looked forward to learning about Islam from them. The detainees' spouses and families have also been grateful for the guidance, support and welfare they have received.

The RRG also reaches out to the wider public through its public education initiatives. This is achieved through dialogue sessions, talks and conventions that address issues of religious extremism, the promotion of moderation and an appreciation of living in a multi-racial and multi-religious environment.

Mohamed concluded with some lessons on the implementation of religious counselling. First, government and religious leaders need to foster and sustain close working relations. Second, there is a need to identify religious leaders who understand current realities and challenges and are sincere towards the cause of correcting misinterpretations of Islamic teachings. Third, given the sustained threat of terrorism, religious leaders and counsellors need to persevere and continually improve their capacity to engage both vulnerable individuals and the wider public. Fourth, there is a need to expand their networks with other religious leaders, experts, the media and the wider community.
Farish Noor reflected on some lessons of the 1915 Sepoy Mutiny of Singapore for governments managing the threat of terrorism today. In particular, Noor addressed the manner in which modern states and individuals managed pluralism and cosmopolitanism by examining the impact of ethnic and religious profiling on societies.

Noor noted that the notion of ethnic and religious profiling was not a new phenomenon in Asia. He contended that such forms of profiling could be traced back to the colonial era where it was introduced to manage differences within the various communities. A key challenge facing the colonial powers then was to instil loyalty to the British Empire from the disparate subjects who at the same time harboured primordial loyalties to their own cultural and religious communities. The Sepoy Mutiny incident served as an example of the failure of the state to effectively manage the multiple loyalties of its target group of subjects. In this incident, Indian Muslim soldiers (sepoys) of the British colonial troops during the First World War were incited to mutiny against the British authorities as Britain was at war against Turkey, which was then considered the final bulwark of Muslim power. While the mutiny was successfully suppressed by the British, it nevertheless resulted in British distrust towards their Indian subjects.

Noor was of the opinion that the colonial administrators then could not reconcile the need to maintain a large empire that necessarily called upon the services of native subjects with the reality that those native subjects would themselves be cosmopolitan individuals who had many different identities at the same time. The mutiny demonstrated to the British that the sepoys’ primordial attachments to homeland and religion superseded their contractual bonds with their employer, the British colonial army. As such, the British came to realise that ethnic and religious bonds could not be weakened despite years of military training and discipline. Consequently, the colonial subjects of Indian origin were expected to demonstrate their loyalty to the British Empire time and again, and new laws and regulations were introduced to police, monitor and control the behaviour and activities of the colonial subjects. The categorising of the Indian subjects as the “suspected Other” further marginalised and alienated the community, breeding resentment within.

In relation to the current “war on terror”, Noor argued that strategies of ethnic and religious profiling had done little to assuage the concerns of Muslims worldwide, who feel that their membership with the international fraternity of nations was probationary. Moreover, as long as the identity of Muslims is deemed problematic, Muslims who choose to be Muslim or cannot abandon their Muslim identity will be faced with the false choice of conforming to some Western standard of acceptable behaviour or to defend their religious identity on their own terms. This does little to value add genuine dialogue and an acceptance of difference as a reality of the cosmopolitan world we live in.

Noor suggested that a way forward would be for states to accept the fact that, while identities are discursively constructed, they need not be couched solely or primarily in oppositional terms against the ‘Other’. Rather, there is a need to accept the fact that identities are never essentialised but rather composite and complex.

Discussion

Two key issues were debated during the discussion. The first pertain to the role of ex-radicals who have renounced violent extremism, such as Maajid Nawaz of the Quilliam Foundation and Indonesia’s Nasir Abbas. In the British context, Hindle noted that some ex-radicals had been helpful at the ground level, although they tended to be very low-key individuals. In contrast, those with high public profiles, especially when endorsed by the government, tended to alienate the public.
The second issue pertained to the metrics of success for de-radicalisation. Based on his observations in the U.K., Hindle was of the opinion that without clear criteria for measuring vulnerability, change could not be measured. Although some projects currently measure it in terms of individual risk assessments, these evaluations are very subjective. Moreover, there are no scientific evaluations to date to prove that any de-radicalisation project in the U.K. has been effective. Mohamed pointed out that in Singapore, a key goal was to integrate the detainees back into mainstream society and it was acknowledged to be a long-term process. Noor was sceptical that de-radicalisation programmes that rely on discursive approaches were effective as the tendency was for both parties to talk past each other. For instance, the concept of jihad referred to by terrorists and pacifists were often from different passages and contexts in the scriptures, even though the same terminology was used. Hence, he deemed such discourses as superficial. Moreover, given that there were multiple interpretations of every religion, Noor questioned the basis on which state-sanctioned clerics claimed that their interpretation was the “correct” one as opposed to that of the radicals. He pointed out that, in reality, states had the necessary power to close the inconclusive debate. However, this creates a dilemma for states as it requires acknowledging that states have to exercise force and violence too, be it through hard or soft power, in order to achieve stability. Hence, what eventually determines the success of such programmes is how much coercive power states possess.

Session VI:
Mainstreaming CT in Action: Exercise Northstar VII Presentation

Hence it is important for businesses to build up their in-house contingency management plans to deal with incidents before emergency responders arrive. Second, the Mumbai attacks highlighted the need to regulate access by the media and citizen journalists to the incident site. This would involve putting in place broadcasting guidelines and legislation for media reporting during a crisis situation and engaging the media to communicate to them the media regulations. Third, there is a need to enhance the security and counter-terrorism awareness of citizens.

Following from this, Exercise Northstar VII was modelled after the new trend of swarm terrorist attacks. Its objectives were threefold. First, it aimed to enhance inter-agency coordination. Multiple attacks were simulated at hotels, retail malls and public transport nodes to allow the testing and demonstration of response processes and protocols of the various supporting agencies. The second objective was to involve the various public and private stakeholders in building up their in-house crisis management capabilities. The third objective was to provide reassurance to the public at large that government agencies are able to manage such large-scale terrorist attacks at multiple locations.
In his conclusion, Wong surmised that while the exercise demonstrated that the responding forces could respond swiftly to such terror attacks, the success in mitigating the consequences of such attacks was contingent upon the close collaboration between the authorities and the community. First, the authorities must have early warning of the attacks. A strong community intelligence network between the communities and the authorities must exist for this to happen. Second, the community must be well equipped to respond to such crisis before the arrival of the authorities. The staff of each organisation should be security attuned and familiar with the organisations’ emergency response, which will require organisations to put in place a robust set of protocols on crisis response. Third, both the authorities and the community must have strong pre-established ties and networking to ensure crisis communication and coordination do not fail.

Discussion

Participants sought clarity on the roles of the various government agencies in Exercise Northstar VII.

On the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Wong explained that a lesson from Mumbai was that many victims were foreign nationals. Hence, the role of the MFA is to be in touch with the various embassies and consulates to brief them on the protocols for crises in Singapore. Wong also pointed out that representatives from some of the embassies were invited to participate at relevant points of the exercise to familiarise themselves with the protocols for an actual crisis.

On the role of the military, Wong noted that the civil authority alone would not have enough manpower to deal with the aftermath of an actual attack. As a result, the Singapore Armed Forces Act was amended to allow for the SAF to assist the civil authorities in dealing with terrorist incidences. Joint exercises between the police and the military have since been carried out and standard operating procedures (SOPs) put in place. In general, the police will be overall in charge of the incident sites while the SAF will provide the necessary support.

On the role of the intelligence agencies, Wong stated that they were primarily involved in the tabletop exercises behind closed doors.

To surmise, different committees and agencies have a different role to play in the exercise to reflect their actual roles in a real incident.

Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Presentation

Patrick Nathan presented the Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS) programme. RAHS was initiated in 2004, which was the year when the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) broke out. However, Nathan noted that even before SARS, there were a number of major strategic shocks occurring rapidly over a short period of time, such as the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. These strategic shocks naturally gave rise to the political necessity of a thorough and coherent risk management scheme that enabled interested parties to assess risk and develop possible scenarios to be prepared for future shocks. RAHS was initially focused on
the field of national security and terrorism, but it gradually expanded its implementation into wider fields, such as education. Nathan stated that RAHS served to identify, synthesise and prioritise emerging issues and risks that could have a strategic impact on Singapore.

As part of the RAHS programme, the task of the Horizon Scanning Centre is to use risk management as a tool to promote resilience. The first step of RAHS is environment scanning. This entails identifying questions that are critical to one’s organisation and its domains of interest, and deciding on the sources of information to observe. There are diverse environment scanning products from those that are as accessible as Google Read to those that are as sophisticated as RAHS 1.6. Nathan said that, within environment scanning, overall emerging strategic issues must be observed before focusing on identifying risks so as to enable identifying opportunities as well. Other issues under environment scanning are identifying indicators to assess and monitor risks, and analysing risks also known as “Skan to Trend”. The next step is to investigate the signals caught from environment scanning for the purpose of risk treatment and risk evaluation. This stage of investigation, called Foresight to Strategy, comprises three components: establishing context, scenario development and strategy development. This stage facilitates devising optimal strategies in response to possible scenarios under specific external and internal environment.

Nathan stated that the main challenges of RAHS lay in conceptualising risk and its related terms and the existence of cognitive bias. To address the challenge of cognitive bias, Nathan opined that it was necessary to look for not only confirming evidence, but also evidence that challenged one’s hypothesis.

Discussion

A participant asked if there was a procedure to constantly check for the reliability of information and question the reliability of information extracted from the media to eliminate bias. Nathan acknowledged that bias had always existed and therefore it was important to understand the source, for instance, who owned the press and the inclination of their overall opinion. In addition, the person who writes or reports an article should be assessed and also the position that he has consistently taken over a wide range of issues analysed. He noted that the skill of analysing the credibility and bias of information took time to develop because of the need to study the source over a long period of time. It is impossible to fully eliminate bias, and the focus should be put on trying to remove and mitigate bias as much as possible.

Another question was whether there were any risks involved in having too much faith in the existing model for risk assessment. Nathan answered that models acted as good proxies to test hypotheses, but the problem came from abusing the model instead of using it as a tool. Another weakness of the models arises when it is not checked against reality. Therefore, it is important to identify evidence that may challenge one’s hypothesis to minimise bias. In addition, it is also important to update and regularly review existing models.
## Conference Programme

### 4th Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers

11–16 April 2010  
The Sentosa Resort and Spa, Singapore

### Sunday, 11 April 2010

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<tr>
<td>1900 – 2130</td>
<td>Welcome Dinner hosted by Joseph Liow, Associate Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and Lee Ark Boon, Director, National Security Coordination Centre (NSCC)</td>
<td>Kumar Ramakrishna, Head, CENS, RSIS</td>
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### Monday, 12 April 2010

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<tr>
<td>0930 – 1000</td>
<td>Opening Remarks by Ambassador Barry Desker, Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)</td>
<td>Iqbal Singh Sevea, Assistant Professor, RSIS</td>
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<tr>
<td>1000 – 1015</td>
<td>Foreign Participant Presentations on Homeland Security Management</td>
<td>Rommel Banlaoi, Chairman of Board and Executive Director, Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, Philippines</td>
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<td>1015 – 1045</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
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<td>1045 – 1215</td>
<td>Session II: The Evolving Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Iqbal Singh Sevea, Assistant Professor, RSIS</td>
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### Tuesday, 13 April 2010

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<tr>
<td>1200 – 1315</td>
<td>Session I: Singapore’s National Security Strategic Framework</td>
<td>Kumar Ramakrishna, Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), RSIS</td>
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<tr>
<td>1315 – 1430</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
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<td>1430 – 1500</td>
<td>Syndicate Discussion</td>
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<td>1500 – 1630</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
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<td>1630 – 1800</td>
<td>Free and Easy</td>
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1730 – 2130  Cocktails Reception followed by Distinguished Dinner Lecture

Distinguished Dinner Lecture:
Mainstreaming CT: Lessons from the U.K. and Irish Experience

Speaker:
Lord John Alderdice, Member, House of Lords, U.K.

Chairperson:
Kumar Ramakrishna, Head, CENS, RSIS

End of Day 2

Wednesday, 14 April 2010

0900 – 1030  Foreign Participant Presentations on Homeland Security Management

1030 – 1045  Coffee Break

1045 – 1300  Session III: Mainstreaming CT in Police and Law Enforcement

Speakers:
Anil Patani, Assistant Chief Constable, West Midlands Police HQ, U.K.

Gregory Saathoff, Executive Director, Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG), University of Virginia, USA

Chairperson:
Richard Bitzinger, Senior Fellow, RSIS

1300 – 1415  Lunch

1415 – 1515  Syndicate Discussion

1515 – 1545  Coffee Break

1545 – 1630  Free and Easy

1730 – 2130  Cocktails Reception followed by Distinguished Dinner Lecture

Distinguished Dinner Lecture:
The Global Counter-Terrorism Challenge: Some Personal Musings

Speaker:
Arnaud De Borchgrave, Director (Transnational Threats), Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), USA

Chairperson:
Joseph Liow, Associate Dean, RSIS

End of Day 3

Thursday, 15 April 2010

0900 – 1030  Foreign Participant Presentations on Homeland Security Management

1030 – 1045  Coffee Break

1045 – 1300  Session IV: Mainstreaming CT for Whole-of-Government

Speakers:
Frank Cilluffo, Associate Vice President and Director (Homeland Security Policy Institute), George Washington University, USA

Suleyman Ozeren, Director, International Centre for Terrorism and Transnational Crime, Turkish National Police Academy, Turkey

Chairperson:
Bhubhindar Singh, Assistant Professor, RSIS

1300 – 1415  Lunch

1415 – 1515  Syndicate Discussion

1515 – 1545  Coffee Break
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<tr>
<td>1545 – 1700</td>
<td>Presentation of Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS)</td>
<td>Speaker: Patrick Nathan, Deputy Director (RAHS), National Security Coordination Centre (NSCC), Prime Minister’s Office, Singapore</td>
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<td>Kumar Ramakrishna, Head, CENS, RSIS</td>
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<td>1545 – 1745</td>
<td>Session VI: Mainstreaming CT in Action: Exercise Northstar Presentation</td>
<td>Speaker: Wong Hong Kuan, Chief of Staff, Singapore Police Force, Singapore</td>
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<td><strong>Chairperson:</strong></td>
<td>Norman Vasu, Deputy Head, CENS, RSIS</td>
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**Friday, 16 April 2010**

1030 – 1300  | Session V: Mainstreaming CT in the Wider Society                    | Speaker: Garry Hindle, Head, Security and Counterterrorism, Royal united Services Institute (RUSI), U.K. |
|              | **Speakers:**                                                       | Mohamed Feisal Bin Mohamed Hassan, Secretariat, Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), Singapore |
|              | **Chairperson:**                                                    | Farish Noor, Senior Fellow, RSIS                                                  |
| 1300 – 1415  | Lunch                                                                |                                                                                  |
| 1415 – 1515  | Syndicate Discussion                                                |                                                                                  |
| 1515 – 1545  | Coffee Break                                                        |                                                                                  |
| 1545 – 1745  | Session VI: Mainstreaming CT in Action: Exercise Northstar Presentation | Speaker: Wong Hong Kuan, Chief of Staff, Singapore Police Force, Singapore         |
|              | **Chairperson:**                                                    | Norman Vasu, Deputy Head, CENS, RSIS                                               |

1745 – 1800  | Course Evaluation                                                   |                                                                                  |

1900 – 2130  | Cocktail Reception followed by Certificate Presentation Ceremony and Closing Dinner hosted by Peter Ho, Permanent Secretary for National Security and Intelligence Co-ordination (NSIC), Singapore |                                                                                  |

End of Programme
The Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) is a research unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Established on 1 April 2006, CENS is devoted to rigorous policy-relevant analysis of a range of national security issues. The CENS team is multinational in composition, comprising both Singaporean and foreign analysts who are specialists in various aspects of national and homeland security affairs.

Why CENS?

In August 2004 the Strategic Framework for National Security outlined the key structures, security measures and capability development programmes that would help Singapore deal with transnational terrorism in the near and long term.

However, strategising national security policies requires greater research and understanding of the evolving security landscape. This is why CENS was established to increase the intellectual capital invested in strategising national security. To this end, CENS works closely with not just other RSIS research programmes, but also national security agencies such as the National Security Coordination Secretariat within the Prime Minister’s Office.

What Research Does CENS Do?

CENS aspires to be an international research leader in the multi-disciplinary study of the concept of Resilience in all its aspects, and in the policy-relevant application of such research in order to promote Security within and beyond Singapore.

To this end, CENS conducts research in four main domains:

Radicalisation Studies
The multi-disciplinary study of the indicators and causes of violent radicalisation, the promotion of community immunity to extremist ideas and best practices in individual rehabilitation. The assumption being that neutralising violent radicalism presupposes individual and community resilience.

Social Resilience
The systematic study of the sources of – and ways of promoting – the capacity of globalised, multicultural societies to hold together in the face of systemic shocks such as diseases and terrorist strikes.
**Homeland Defence**
A broad domain encompassing risk perception, management and communication; and the study of best practices in societal engagement, dialogue and strategic communication in crises. The underlying theme is psychological resilience, as both a response and antidote to, societal stresses and perceptions of vulnerability.

**Futures Studies**
The study of various theoretical and conceptual approaches to the systematic and rigorous study of emerging threats, as well as global trends and opportunities – on the assumption that Resilience also encompasses robust visions of the future.

**How Does CENS Help Influence National Security Policy?**
Through policy-oriented analytical commentaries and other research output directed at the national security policy community in Singapore and beyond, CENS staff members promote greater awareness of emerging threats as well as global best practices in responding to those threats. In addition, CENS organises courses, seminars and workshops for local and foreign national security officials to facilitate networking and exposure to leading-edge thinking on the prevention of, and response to, national and homeland security threats.

**How Does CENS Help Raise Public Awareness of National Security Issues?**
To educate the wider public, CENS staff members regularly author articles in a number of security and intelligence-related publications, as well as write op-ed analyses in leading newspapers. Radio and television interviews have allowed CENS staff to participate in and shape the public debate on critical issues such as radicalisation and counter-terrorism, multiculturalism and social resilience, as well as the perception, management and mitigation of risk.

**How Does CENS Keep Abreast of Cutting Edge National Security Research?**
The lean organisational structure of CENS permits a constant and regular influx of Visiting Fellows of international calibre through the Distinguished CENS Visitors Programme. This enables CENS to keep abreast of cutting edge global trends in national security research.

For more information on CENS, log on to [http://www.rsis.edu.sg](http://www.rsis.edu.sg) and follow the links to “Centre of Excellence for National Security”.


The **S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)** was officially inaugurated on 1 January 2007. Before that, it was known as the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), which was established ten years earlier on 30 July 1996. Like its predecessor, RSIS was established as an autonomous entity within Nanyang Technological University (NTU). RSIS’ aim is to be a leading research institution and professional graduate school in the Asia-Pacific. To accomplish this mission, RSIS will:

- Provide a rigorous professional graduate education in international affairs with a strong practical and area emphasis
- Conduct policy-relevant research in national security, defence and strategic studies, international political economy, diplomacy and international relations
- Collaborate with like-minded schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence

**Graduate Education in International Affairs**

RSIS offers an exacting graduate education in international affairs, taught by an international faculty of leading thinkers and practitioners. The teaching programme consists of the Master of Science (M.Sc.) degrees in Strategic Studies, International Relations, International Political Economy and Asian Studies. Through partnerships with the University of Warwick and NTU’s Nanyang Business School, RSIS also offers the NTU-Warwick Double Masters Programme as well as The Nanyang MBA (International Studies). Teaching at RSIS is distinguished by its focus on the Asia-Pacific region, the professional practice of international affairs and the cultivation of academic depth. Over 180 students, the majority from abroad, are enrolled with the School. A small and select Ph.D. programme caters to students whose interests match those of specific faculty members.

**Research**

Research at RSIS is conducted by five constituent Institutes and Centres: the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, and the Temasek Foundation Centre for Trade & Negotiations (TFCTN). The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region. The School has three endowed professorships that bring distinguished scholars and practitioners to teach and do research at the School. They are the S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies, the Ngee Ann Kongsi Professorship in International Relations, and the NTUC Professorship in International Economic Relations.

**International Collaboration**

Collaboration with other professional schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence is an RSIS priority. RSIS maintains links with other like-minded schools so as to enrich its research and teaching activities as well as adopt the best practices of successful schools.

For more information about RSIS, visit [www.rsis.edu.sg](http://www.rsis.edu.sg)
The National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS) was set up in the Prime Minister’s Office in July 2004 to facilitate national security policy coordination from a Whole-Of-Government perspective. NSCS reports to the Prime Minister through the Coordinating Minister for National Security (CMNS). The current CMNS is the Senior Minister Professor S. Jayakumar.

NSCS is headed by Permanent Secretary (National Security and Intelligence Coordination). The current PS(NSIC) is Mr. Peter Ho, who is concurrently Head of Civil Service and Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

NSCS provides support to the ministerial-level Security Policy Review Committee (SPRC) and Senior official-level National Security Coordination Committee (NSCCom) and Intelligence Coordinating Committee (ICC). It organises and manages national security programmes, one example being the Asia-Pacific Programme for National Security Officers. NSCS also funds experimental, research or start-up projects that contribute to our national security.

NSCS is made up of two components: the National Security Coordination Centre (NSCC) and the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre (JCTC). Each centre is headed by a director.

NSCC performs three vital roles in Singapore’s national security: national security planning, policy coordination, and anticipating strategic threats. As a coordinating body, NSCC ensures that government agencies complement each other, and do not duplicate or perform competing tasks.

Visit the www.nscs.gov.sg for more information.