



ASIA-PACIFIC PROGRAMME FOR SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS (APPSMO)

4-10 AUGUST 2008
SINGAPORE



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CONFERENCE REPORT

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S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY

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This report summarizes the proceedings of the conference as interpreted by the assigned rapporteurs and editor appointed by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this report.

The conference adheres to a variation of the Chatham House Rule. Accordingly, beyond the paper presenters cited, no other attributions have been included in this conference report.

BACKGROUND & AIMS OF THE CONFERENCE

The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, has been organizing an annual Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO) every August since 1999. In 2008, the program ran formally from 4 through 10 August with a welcome dinner on 3 August. Sixty-one senior military officers from the Asia-Pacific and Europe participated in the program, with Saudi Arabia sending their officers to APPSMO for the first time.

The academic aspect of the program was designed to stimulate the participants to consider policy matters from both theoretical and practical perspectives. Distinguished speakers from Singapore and around the world were invited to address subjects such as

the rise of private military companies, culture and military operations, maritime security, the future of warfare, terrorism and international security, the new dimensions in international security, the evolution in military affairs, the media and international conflict, conflict and violence in Southeast Asia, and the responsibility to protect.

Besides discussing policy-relevant issues, the officers also participated in a number of social activities. These included visits to the SAFTI Military Institute, Changi Naval Base, and military heritage sites across Singapore. These activities gave the officers opportunities to interact with one another and build relationships.

OPENING REMARKS



Ambassador Barry Desker, Dean of RSIS, & Director of IDSS, welcoming the participants

In his remarks, **Ambassador Barry Desker**, Dean of RSIS, and Director of IDSS, welcomed the participants of the 10th APPSMO to Singapore. He highlighted the changes that have taken place since the first APPSMO was convened in 1999, noting how the number of APPSMO participants has grown from fifty-three to over sixty over the years. He further remarked that the number of participating countries has also increased, with Saudi Arabian officers participating in APPSMO 2008 for the first time.

Ambassador Desker stated that APPSMO's aim was to help forge strong personal as well as professional relationships among the members of the defense communities in the Asia-Pacific. He underscored the importance of APPSMO as a platform where military officers can contribute towards building a more stable environment conducive to the maintenance of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific. Defense diplomacy has become even more crucial at a time when armed forces are increasingly dealing with nontraditional security threats. These new threats include terrorism, transnational crime, and natural calamities facing states in the Asia-Pacific. In that regard, Ambassador Desker discussed the various research activities undertaken by IDSS/RSIS in advancing knowledge of those threats and challenges, and how to deal with them.

In closing, the Dean thanked the sponsors—the Singapore Totalisator Board and ST Engineering—the speakers, and the participants for making APPSMO 2008 possible.

OPENING ADDRESS



Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean delivering the opening address

Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean, in his speech, shared his perspective on the current global strategic landscape. He noted that the Middle East remains tense. The security situation in Iraq appears to have improved due to Washington's surge strategy, but Iraq's stability is fragile and reversible. Similarly, inconclusive talks on Iran's nuclear program and the impasse in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process continue to threaten regional and international peace and security. The situation in Afghanistan has also not stabilized. A well-defined strategy for stabilization, reconstruction, and nation-building of the insurgency-hit country is necessary.

Minister Teo, however, described as "positive" the developments in Asia. He said the United States will continue to engage the region, which will help to provide the foundation for the evolution of stable and constructive relations between the key rising powers in the region. Discussing Sino-Japanese relations, he said the recent visit of Chinese and Japanese warships to each other's naval ports, and the holding of their first joint communications and formation maneuvering exercise signifies improvement in their bilateral relations. China's growing relations with Russia will also have a positive impact on East Asia.

Also positive are developments on the Korean peninsula where the Six Party Talks have witnessed progress. North Korea's signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) further signifies Pyongyang's desire to have closer ties with the regional and international community. Equally noteworthy are the relations between China and Taiwan. The resumption of direct chartered flights and tourism between the two countries is encouraging. The continued enhancement of economic ties between the two will also lead to mutual understanding and trust.

There remain complex and multifaceted security challenges confronting the region, however. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, cyclones, the outbreak of viral pandemics as well as security threats related to the proliferation of WMDs or terrorist threats emanating from failed states can arise unexpectedly and from multiple directions. The potential for instability will be magnified should the sub-prime financial crisis lead to a global economic slowdown. This might fuel nationalism, undermine regional cooperation, and provoke interstate confrontation over longstanding territorial and other disputes.

Minister Teo then highlighted the role the military can play in responding to nontraditional security threats and challenges. While armed forces are traditionally not trained or equipped to fight such threats, the militaries tend nevertheless to be the only organizations which can competently and adequately react to such challenges. The regional armed forces should consequently cooperate to address the nontraditional challenges that currently confront the region. In addition, it is important that the regional militaries continue to build their relationships through military exercises such as Exercise Cobra Gold. The ASEAN Regional Forum has further helped to deepen regional military-to-military collaboration.

Military officers also need to acquire a new set of skills to meet the changing nature of security threats and challenges facing nation-states and their militaries. Besides, defense forces are increasingly likely to find themselves working in a multinational environment with militaries from different countries. Minister Teo underscored the importance of military officers learning how to operate within a multilateral environment in a whole range of different roles from peace support,

countering conventional threats, and disaster management.

In conclusion, Minister Teo said he was confident the military officers will find APPSMO professionally useful. The personal relationships built at APPSMO will undoubtedly also advance opportunities for regional armed forces to cooperate at a deeper level.

SESSION I

New Dimensions in International Security



Professor Steve Smith addressing the officers

Steve Smith discussed the various theories that officials and analysts deploy to understand international security. He argued that policymakers tend not to be mindful of the assumptions and theories that they hold about the world. They should be cognizant of them. Their views about security should also be broadened. How one perceives what matters in global security affairs ultimately influences how one acts in international politics.

Smith began with the dominant theory: realism. Realists advance a number of arguments. They maintain that states are the main actors in international affairs; nonstate actors are of limited importance; and domestic actors are rarely important in determining a state's

external behavior. Realists further argue that the international system is anarchic; the anarchic system shapes state behavior; and states need to look after their own vital interests. The realist world, in short, is a self-help world.

Despite possessing significant explanatory power, realism has limitations. The first is that the theory focuses narrowly on states as the key actors in global politics, ignoring the important role played by nonstate actors in security matters. Another limitation is that realism cannot account for change in international affairs. Realism further exaggerates the importance of relative rather than absolute gains.

The three main alternatives to realism are constructivism, human security studies, and critical security studies. Constructivism argues that the fabric of human relations is determined by shared ideas rather than material forces. Human security analysts maintain that security should be focused on the individual rather than the state. Critical security studies, which focus on the individual and not the state, make the case that security can only be achieved when people have economic and political freedom. Together, these three alternatives offer a more comprehensive view of security.

SESSION II

The Media & International Conflict



Mr. Nik Gowing delivering his lecture

Nik Gowing noted that with the rise of information technology, the media has played an increasingly vital role in influencing those in power. As such, traditional assumptions of how the media function are insufficient due to the proliferation of new media platforms. Increased access to technology such as mobile phones with built-in cameras and the internet have enabled ordinary civilians to become members of the media. The masses have, moreover, employed the new media during crises to relay messages for help, and to capture the attention of domestic and international public opinion much quicker and more effectively than ever before.

Nevertheless, while the new media have resulted in information being swiftly disseminated nationally and internationally, the phenomenon also raises questions about accountability, credibility, vulnerability, and the nature of governance. The Israeli defense forces have, for example, been put under pressure by the new media, which film and upload incidents of high-handed actions taken by Israeli forces against Palestinians. When Hurricane Katrina struck the United States, the new media had also overtaken American government

agencies in providing intelligence to rescue crews. President George W. Bush acknowledged the power of the new media when he stated that the “media had better situational awareness” of the crises than his government officials.

Easy access to the media has also allowed media users more avenues to express themselves. Even soldiers stationed in war zones such as Afghanistan have used the media as a way of documenting their experiences and giving their personal perspectives on conditions in their theater of operations. The internet has spawned a plethora of websites such as Youtube.com that allow members of the public to upload videos and images without any form of mediation or quality control. The high rate of viewership of such websites only reinforces the argument that the new media are becoming more influential. Regimes of power and influence have also recognized this and have utilized the new media to cultivate public opinion, a move reflected for example in the establishment of the British Monarchy’s “Royal Channel” on Youtube.com.

What are the implications? For one, the phenomenon has pressured governments to address many of the compelling issues raised by the media. In addition, since the new media allow for the swift dissemination of unverified and unverifiable information, they consequently increase the vulnerability and fragility of governments. For example, the propagation of conspiracy theories surrounding the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in late 2007 served to undermine the credibility of the Pervez Musharraf government in Pakistan.

As far as the military is concerned, the new media have also put its operations under the spotlight. The rules of engagement on the battlefield are closely scrutinized. Soldiers who record their frontline experiences may also threaten operational security. The recordings may likewise undermine the respect that should be given to casualties of war. Unsurprisingly, the military is confronted with a dilemma: whether personal cameras should be banned to maintain the security of military operations or whether soldiers should be allowed to carry them in order to advance morale within the rank and file.

Apart from causing concern within the military, the new media have also impacted on the media industry. A dramatic shortening of the timeline has obtained. Due to the speed in which information is relayed, there is now less time for the authenticity of the information to be verified—a phenomenon known as the “credibility crunch.” Also, with an immense amount of information being disseminated and a shortened timeline to publish the data, the media have been compelled to operate in this manner: being first and fast in delivering the news and ensuring that it is not flawed. Gowing stated that any incoming information should be filtered for

relevance and closely scrutinized. Confirming the authenticity of any information can be time-consuming, however, and this will limit the media organizations’ ability to relay timely news.

In conclusion, Gowing stated that governments should be attuned to the new developments in the media industry. New approaches to public diplomacy may be necessary. Governments should also adapt to media developments in cyberspace.

In the question and answer session, it was first noted that public diplomacy is a complex operation. The military should, therefore, accept that its media operations may not be successful all the time. Officials, nevertheless, should be trained to deal with the media. Second, it appeared that nongovernmental organizations have been embracing and effectively exploiting the new media to advance their causes. Finally, it was recognized that while a code of conduct does govern the media industry and professionalism is highly valued, not every agency adhere to it strictly to the letter. Each agency may be compelled to conform to different social and political conditions within the countries that they operate in.

SESSION III

The Rise of Private Military Companies



Associate Professor Simon Chesterman discussing the rise of private military companies

Simon Chesterman discussed the rise of private military companies (PMCs), their involvement in recent conflicts, and issues related to transparency, accountability, and control of the PMCs.

The historical forerunners of the PMCs were mercenaries who sold their services to the highest bidder. The age of nationalism saw mercenaries becoming more obscure as citizens volunteered and staffed the armed forces. PMCs, however, began to make a comeback when the cold war ended. They are in demand as small-scale conflicts demanding skilled military services proliferated. State militaries have also cut back on their numbers and face difficulty deploying regular troops to fight small wars. While weak or failed states in Africa hire PMCs to compensate for their military deficiencies, more powerful states like the

United States use the PMCs to reinforce their ability to fight several campaigns simultaneously.

In terms of regulation, Chesterman argued that international efforts to regulate PMCs have failed. The users' ability to control the PMCs is also limited since many of them are weak or failing states. Unregulated, the PMCs' operations are oftentimes counterproductive. Operations undertaken by Blackwater, for example, had undermined U.S. objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan. If regulating the PMCs is difficult, market forces and competition may be the only means to control the companies. Unprofessional corporations that do not adhere to a code of conduct will find themselves losing their business to those that do.

Chesterman predicted that PMCs will play a more prominent role in resolving future conflicts. In fact, the UN has debated the use of PMCs in peacekeeping operations. PMCs may be employed to reinforce UN peacekeeping contingents facing manpower limitations in the field or in addressing nontraditional security issues. Still, it must be noted that compared to modern states, the PMCs will probably be comparatively more deficient in capabilities such as intelligence gathering. In employing PMCs, nevertheless, Chesterman indicated that their operations must be regulated according to international law and norms. Unregulated, misconduct perpetrated by the PMCs can redound to the detriment of the UN's or a state's standing.

ST Engineering Distinguished Dinner Lecture The Responsibility to Protect



The Hon. Gareth Evans delivering his lecture

Gareth Evans defined the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) as a principle that relates to a country’s responsibility to protect its citizens’ fundamental rights and to intervene with other members of the international community to prevent or stop genocide and gross human rights violations in another country. This principle, however, is not universally accepted. On one side are those that argue that a country’s sovereignty is inviolate. They argue that the international community has no right to interfere in another country’s domestic affairs. Supporters of R2P, on the other hand, contend that the international community is obliged to act against those that commit atrocities against their citizens.

Conceptually, Evans argued that R2P differs from humanitarian intervention, which is mainly concerned with coercive military intervention. R2P is about states taking preventative action and checking a limited conflict in a country from escalating into a full-scale crisis that will result in the mass slaughter of people. Intervention is not limited to coercive action, but can be political, diplomatic, legal, and economic. The international community’s intervention is aimed at helping the country help itself.

What justifies such intervention? To Evans, there are five questions that policymakers should consider. How serious is the threat? What is the primary purpose of the proposed military action? Is the intervention an action of last resort? Are the anticipated benefits of intervention proportionate to its expected evils or harms? What is the probability of success? In all, the R2P is not an excuse to intrude into the affairs of another state. It is about protecting people from mass atrocities.

Evans also stated that a R2P operation can be complex. States undertaking a multilateral operation consequently need to carefully manage and agree on the actions that each party will advance. These may involve peacekeeping and police work. To ensure success, states also need to consider the configuration of their forces and their preparedness. Likewise, the rules of engagement and the prospect for military-civilian cooperation should be deliberated.

To Evans, the lack of political will is the biggest obstacle to advancing the R2P. Political will needs to be built up. To that end, governments and public opinion need to be made aware of the atrocity. Appropriate arguments need to be crafted to generate concern. The international community needs to be convinced that the intervention will reap benefits. And finally, institutions need to be established to carry out the operation.

Following Evans’ presentation, a number of issues were discussed. First, it was suggested that apart from highlighting the morality of R2P interventions, an appeal to the international community’s interests more importantly should be made. States that oppress or cannot protect their own citizens tend to be those that are failing or have failed. Such states can become safe havens for terrorists and threaten the security of all the members of the international community. It would consequently be in the interest of the international community to intervene.

Second, it was recognized that civilian and military forces play important roles in dealing with conflicts. Civilians can act as mediators in resolving tensions and misunderstandings among warring communities. They can also participate in postconflict peacebuilding operations. The military, meanwhile, acts as the coercive force to compel warring factions to stop committing atrocities. An intervention force trained to perform police functions will also be valuable in R2P operations.

Finally, it was reiterated that the objective of intervention is to prevent as well as to stop mass atrocities. R2P operations are not launched to spread democracy. If states employed the R2P concept loosely, they will find themselves becoming entangled unnecessarily in or exacerbating a domestic conflict.

PANEL DISCUSSION I

Cultural Knowledge & Military Operations



Dr. Jessica Turnley, Professor Alan Okros, Dr. Tang Shiping addressing the officers

Jessica Glicken Turnley began her presentation by pointing out that culture influences the way one perceives the world. It informs peoples' attitudes and values. And it shapes peoples' responses to their external environment.

Cultural considerations are especially important in irregular conflicts. Such struggles involve the fight for legitimacy and influence. Military officials need to appreciate that a local community's identity may not necessarily conform to the identity imputed to it by a foreign military force. For example, while American culture may celebrate individualism, U.S. defense officials should not assume that the foreign societies they operate in share similar values. They should understand that kinship ties and communitarianism may be the values informing the way a foreign community orders itself. If an armed force is culturally sensitive to the norms and values in the field, therefore,

it is less likely to commit cultural gaffes and lose the hearts and minds of the local population.

Turnley next discussed some examples of how armed forces can be culturally sensitive in the environments that they operate in. They should recognize the value of promoting partnerships with locals. They can leverage on local knowledge to enhance their military and intelligence-gathering capabilities in the theater of operations. They may wish to identify the prominent and respected leaders in a community, and communicate messages to the wider populace through these leaders. They should also understand the spatial dimension of local authority and influence; how locals order their social life; and what are the local taboos. To operate effectively in hostile terrain, it is crucial that military personnel be equipped with adequate cultural knowledge.

The second speaker, **Alan Okros**, focused on the Canadian experience. Recognizing the importance of understanding Afghan culture before deploying troops to the country, Canadian preparations included acquiring rudimentary local language skills, familiarity with regional politics, and understanding the political, social, and cultural history of Afghanistan. Canadian military personnel who possessed extensive cultural expertise of the country were also tasked to provide advice to commanders and decision-makers. The preparations ultimately helped advance Canada's operations in Afghanistan, which were multifaceted and involved military maneuvers, reconstruction, and diplomacy.

Okros stated that intervention forces should not violate local customs, traditions, and cultures. To win hearts and minds, the local population should not be impressed with concerns that their culture is being violated by a high-handed foreign force. All local groups should also be treated even-handedly. In addition, a foreign force should protect itself from being manipulated by local forces or becoming embroiled in local conflicts.

Apart from understanding another country's culture, it is important that militaries appreciate their own institutional cultures and the cultural inclinations of their personnel. Armed forces, of course, socialize their soldiers into their institutions' values, traditions, and beliefs. Soldiers operating in the field, however, may not necessarily act according to institutional norms. Their personal cultural and ethical beliefs may, in fact, overshadow their institutions'. Military leaders should consequently be well appraised of their institutions' cultures as well as the cultural beliefs of their soldiers and the adversaries.

The third speaker, **Tang Shiping**, discussed ethnocentrism, culture, and national security. Tang explained that ethnocentrism concerns three things: (1) us versus you/them; (2) pride in one's in-group; and (3) prejudice against the out-group. Ethnocentrism also has consequences. It facilitates in-group trust/cooperation, but hinders inter-group trust/cooperation. It contributes to inter-group

misunderstandings because groups are unable to empathize with the other side's concerns. It also promotes self-righteous attitudes and behavior.

A group's culture admittedly cannot prevail without a sense of pride in and a desire to protect that culture. Ethnocentrism, in other words, underpins culture. Yet culture also reinforces ethnocentrism. All human beings are thus prejudiced in varying degrees. Yet if decision-makers become uncritical or unaware of their prejudices toward another society or state, this may lead to misunderstandings and interstate conflict. Minimizing ethnocentric tendencies can consequently help promote stability and cooperation among groups, nations, and states.

During the discussion, it was suggested that while understanding another society's culture is important, this may still not prevent wars from occurring. The point was, nevertheless, taken that cultural sensitivity may help societies to coexist, diminishing the probability of cultural misunderstanding becoming a factor for conflict. Another issue that was discussed was the ways in which militaries might attempt to study another culture. It was suggested that military officials can and should also continue to deepen their understanding of the culture of the societies that they operate in through personal observation, analysis, and interaction with the locals.

SESSION IV

The Future of Warfare



Professor Jeremy Black delivering his lecture

Jeremy Black focused his lecture on three issues: the future of war, future capabilities, and the military's role in the future. Black argued that too much attention is being paid to the way the leading power in the international system conducts warfare. Not every state operates according to the rules of the dominant power. Possessing more advanced weapons also does not necessarily ensure victory. To win a war, one's opponents will have to be persuaded that they have lost. In that connection, different combatants have different understandings of victory, defeat, suffering, and loss. The manner in which military establishments are formed and fight reflects such understandings, and one would do well to appreciate the differences.

Moving on to capabilities, Black said the pace of technological advancement in the last century was phenomenal. Futurists have begun to speculate about the roles robots, clones, humanoids, and disposable soldiers can play in war. Robots have been employed to diffuse bombs while drones have engaged combatants. Studies of the human brain and human genome can also be manipulated for military purposes. In all, there continues to be a convergence between civilian and military science such that advancements in the former can be adapted by the military to advance its aims on the battlefield.

As regards the military's role in contemporary affairs, Black noted that much of the discussion of warfare today is about aspirations: what thinkers, jurists, and those concerned about human rights would like war to be. They have attempted to create a legal and normative framework to constrain the use of force, and make war antiseptic and bloodless. Some also suggest that war is *passé*. But uncertainties such as energy and resource insecurity, and global socioeconomic inequalities indicate that inter- and intrastate violence cannot be totally ruled out. Armed forces, therefore, have to prepare for all eventualities.

Black observed that it is unlikely that the world's security problems will be resolved anytime soon. What it means for the future of war is that militaries will not only have to fight interstate wars, but they will increasingly find themselves being called upon to take on policing roles. Joint operations may end up being executed by a combined army-paramilitary-police force. Militaries in Latin America already play such roles. Other armed forces may have to do so in the future. At the same time, preparation for conventional warfare cannot be abandoned. Governments have to invest in conventional capabilities to hedge against the unpredictable future.

Following the lecture, a question about the durability of the state was raised. Developments in Europe seem to suggest that nation-state and citizenship identities are being transformed as the European Union increases in significance as a transnational political entity. But such entities are not proliferating across the international system. China and India remain strong states with strong national identities. In sum, nation-states are here to stay for the foreseeable future.

PANEL DISCUSSION II

Maritime Security



Professor Eric Grove, Commodore Rajeev Sawhney, and Associate Professor You Ji discussing maritime security

The first speaker, **Eric Grove**, focused his talk on the importance of having historical perspective when one examines the current maritime security situation. The lessons of history can inform contemporary strategists. He said the current maritime landscape is not dissimilar to the maritime situation eighteen years after the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815. First, the maritime preoccupation in both eras was on protecting global trade in an increasingly globalized world. Second, the dominant powers in both eras, namely the British Empire and the United States, were concerned about the security of the seas. Finally, both powers believed that if they maintained a powerful fleet, their economic, political, and security interests would be furthered.

Grove argued, nevertheless, that like the British, the Americans would probably face challenges to their naval superiority. Germany, France, and Russia challenged Britain's position as the leading naval power after 1815. By the end of the 1880s, Britain was no longer the preponderant naval power. In the contemporary era, it is likely that countries like China will attempt to erode American naval supremacy. If the

British ruled the seas for about seventy years after 1815, the question is how long will the U.S. navy continue to dominate the seas?

The second speaker, **Rajeev Sawhney**, stated that one of the contemporary threats to maritime trade is piracy and terrorism. Pirates and terrorists operate across national boundaries, and in largely unregulated areas of the oceans. In 2005, the International Maritime Bureau reported a total of 276 pirate and terrorist attacks on ships worldwide, the majority of which occurred in the Indian Ocean. Although the overall numbers have declined since then, there have been some noteworthy attacks involving pirates in the Malacca Strait and in Somalian waters in recent years. Policymakers should also be concerned about maritime terrorism. Two terrorist groups—the LTTE and Al Qaeda—are reported to have developed maritime capabilities and have expressed a desire to carry out maritime attacks against their adversaries.

Apart from piracy and terrorism, Sawhney also highlighted other maritime concerns. He noted that the Indian Ocean Region is prone to natural disasters. Criminals trafficking in narcotics, arms, and humans are also active in the area. To address these concerns, cooperation among the littoral states is vital. Activities in the ocean should be jointly tracked and intelligence should be shared among the littoral states. Initiatives such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) should also be supported. This symposium was first held in February 2008 and saw twenty-six leaders of various maritime authorities gathering to address the common maritime challenges that confronted them. To address contemporary maritime challenges, it is clear that cooperation is vital.

The third speaker, **You Ji**, discussed China's naval strategy and doctrine, and the transformation of its navy. Admiral Liu Huaqing's pronouncement on China's maritime strategy in 1987, in particular, was reviewed. There are three phases to that strategy. In the first phase, China would seek to achieve undisputed control over its coastal waters (brown water) by 2010. The second phase would see China exerting effective control of the seas within the first island chain between 2010 and 2020. Finally, by 2050, the Chinese navy should have developed the capabilities to project its power worldwide.

As far as naval doctrines are concerned, the Chinese navy has worked with several. One is termed the "layered defense," where defensive naval positions are concentrated in China's home waters. Another is the "extended defense," where the navy seeks to secure defense in depth for the homeland by extending the defensive perimeter 500 nautical miles from China's coast. Still another involves mounting a sea blockade in waters east of Taiwan and constructing support facilities along major SLOCs for submarine operations in the Indian Ocean. Finally, another doctrine focuses on "access denial operations," which attempts to negate the American capability to intervene in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. In all, these doctrines will inform Chinese naval maneuvers in two operational theaters. The first is the area traversing the Bohai Channel, the

Taiwan Strait, and the Qiongzhou Strait. The second includes the Bohai Sea, the East China Sea, and in parts of the South China Sea.

Turning finally to the subject of transformation, You Ji discussed the efforts taken by the navy to modernize itself since 2000. These include the acquisition of new surface combatants (twelve in the last six years); the modernization of the submarine fleet; and the commissioning of new combat aircraft (the J-10, J-11, and FB-7). In addition, the navy has developed modern radar and battlefield management systems.

Following the presentations, a number of issues were discussed. On whether there is Sino-Indian competition for naval dominance, it was suggested that the two countries' relationship is relatively stable. China is India's largest trading partner. Both also seem focused on pursuing economic growth. Both consequently will not attempt to derail their development by engaging in conflict. In fact, both sides have made efforts to improve their relationship. Regarding maritime terrorism, the consensus was that terrorists are less likely to strike military and commercial ships than aircraft and land transportation. This is because few terrorist groups have the capabilities to attack maritime targets. Additionally, terrorists do not find maritime targets to be attractive.

Distinguished Lunch Talk What Colonels Need to Know about the Changing International System



Professor Neil MacFarlane delivering his lecture

Neil MacFarlane stated that shifts in the international balance of power can significantly affect a country's armed forces. Military doctrines and strategies, and the training and recruitment of personnel may have to change as security concerns change. MacFarlane then discussed five types of change that military officers should take note.

The first was contextual change involving technology and the state of the physical environment. Technological advancements have made military and political affairs much more transparent than they used to be. Advances in technology have also profoundly affected the flow and exchange of information, and enabled people to interact on a global scale. But the development has also enabled outsiders to engage with or interfere in the domestic affairs of other societies. New cybersecurity threats have also arisen as societies become more connected.

Changes to the physical environment have also impacted on the military. Armed forces may be mobilized to deal with humanitarian problems associated with resource scarcity or natural disasters. States competing with one another for control of resources may also resort to force. More directly, as fuel prices increase, the cost of military training and

troop deployments will also increase, putting pressure on a state's defense budget.

The second type of change was ideational or normative change in the international system. With the shift from a bipolar world to one that seems to embrace liberal ideas, there has been a corresponding change in the norms governing the use of force. War is now considered less a legitimate instrument of statecraft. The frequency of interstate war has consequently declined. The role of the armed forces will thus be radically transformed in the future.

Transactions change—the third type—refers to the change in the intensity and forms of transaction between states and other actors in the international community, and the way states relate to each other. Advances in communications have promoted greater interdependence among states. They have, however, also impacted on how information should be monitored and controlled. Likewise, the speed in which information travels now puts pressure on governments to respond in kind.

The fourth is systemic change. The proliferation of weak and failed states, the rise of nonstate actors, and the increase in the number of multilateral institutions operating in the international system provide compelling evidence that change has occurred in that system. Armed forces consequently need to be aware of the development and respond accordingly.

Finally, military officers need to appreciate changes to the international balance of power. A bipolar, multipolar, or unipolar world can be inherently stable or unstable.

In conclusion, MacFarlane said that we now live in a more complex world. Policymakers and military strategists need to be watchful of new developments that can cause international order and stability to break down swiftly. Militaries also need to be sufficiently flexible to deal with a host of threats and challenges. They need to continually refine their doctrines, strategies, military plans, and training arrangements.

Distinguished Lunch Talk The Evolution in Military Affairs



Professor Lui Pao Chuen delivering his talk

Lui Pao Chuen described the Singapore Armed Forces' (SAF) experience since its inception in 1965 as reflecting a progressive evolution of technology, organization, and doctrine. Highlighting some of the SAF's developments over the past decades, Lui also described how he thought the SAF would evolve over the next decade.

Singapore's limited land mass and natural resources as well as its strategic location shaped the thinking of Singaporean strategists. The island is dependent on imports such as food and water, and its economy is built on trade and the attraction of foreign direct investments. Hence, maintaining the security of the sea lines of communications to Singapore, and advancing order and stability in the country are crucial for the island's continued economic development.

A credible military helps to advance that objective. For Singapore, its defense budget has been capped at 6 percent of the GDP though real expenditure has been less than 5 percent in recent years. In addition, approximately 20 percent of the island has been allocated for operational bases, military camps, and training areas. Besides, all Singaporean men are required to serve two to two-and-a-half years of National Service. The qualitative edge of the SAF is its human resource. But given that there are only three million Singaporean citizens, the SAF cannot build a large professional military. One of the ways of compensating for this is to improve the quality of the SAF's people by investing in education and training. In addition, the development of effective and appropriate organizations, war fighting doctrines, and

engineering systems is necessary. Lui stated that this has been the formula for the development of Singapore's military capabilities.

Lui then described the difference between a revolution in military affairs and an evolution in military affairs. It is generally difficult for militaries to achieve a RMA during times of peace. The RMA generally occurs under stringent and difficult circumstances such as a war. Most militaries around the world thus encounter evolutions in military affairs as opposed to a revolution. This is because capital assets such as tanks and ships take a long period of time, as much as thirty years, to depreciate and be replaced. Therefore, only a small percentage of the military force is renewable annually. But it is possible, nevertheless, for "daring dreamers and doers" and "visionaries and missionaries" to usher in revolutionary changes to the military. Military personnel should be constantly challenged to reevaluate doctrines, weapons systems, and war fighting concepts. Modeling and simulation should also be used to experiment with change.

Tracing the evolution of the SAF, Lui stated that the SAF has been moving towards greater integration of the services since the 1980s. When the idea of integration was first conceived, Singapore did not have an appropriate model to emulate. It therefore planned, designed, and built its own system from scratch—the SAF Command, Control and Communication & Intelligence System. While the physical components of the system took less than a decade to develop, the other components such as personnel, doctrines, and procedures took much longer.

Lui commented that with new concepts of operations emerging, the SAF also needed new ways of conceptualizing war. The functions of a military can be seen as the ability to strike and protect. In future warfare, new technologies will be used to enhance the military's capacity to lift the fog of war and strike accurately at the adversary. Protection, furthered by stealth technology, electronic warfare, and anti-missile batteries, will also be necessary. Finally, the quality of the human element in operating these new technologies and platforms will remain vital. It is critical for militaries to continue to recruit the best personnel, to educate, and to train them to advance the security of their homelands.

SESSION V

Non-traditional Security & the Role of the Armed Forces



Major-General Heryadi delivering his lecture

Major-General Heryadi began his presentation by giving an overview of Indonesia's demographic challenge, the roles and functions of the Indonesian National Defence Force (TNI), and the state of regional defense cooperation. Indonesia has a large population, and is ethnically diverse and religiously varied. Due to the fact that the country is prone to natural disasters, and is situated in a region of varying political and economic development, the maintenance of strong and stable relationships with its neighbors is crucial to Indonesia's security. Jakarta has thus sought to promote relations with neighboring states. One way is to cooperate on addressing nontraditional security issues.

Heryadi noted that the Law on Military Operations in Indonesia has been amended to ensure that the TNI looks beyond the threat of interstate war to address nontraditional security challenges. These challenges include armed separatist movements, armed rebellions, terrorism, ethnic and religious radicalism, maritime piracy, irregular migration, illegal fishing and sea pollution, illegal logging and smuggling, natural disasters, and humanitarian assistance.

To deal with the nontraditional security threats, the TNI has found it necessary to broaden its role and cooperate with other regional armed forces. Through joint training exercises and information sharing, the regional defense establishments have helped to enhance regional political stability, build confidence and avert conflicts, and advance cooperative disaster relief operations. When the tsunami hit Aceh in 2004, for example, the TNI was able to work with military personnel from sixteen countries and a large group of local and international nongovernmental organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to the people in the province. The operation ran smoothly and was well coordinated.

In conclusion, Heryadi remarked that regional governments should cooperate more to address the challenges posed by nontraditional security threats to their countries' wellbeing. He identified humanitarian disaster relief operations as one activity that regional armed forces can assist each other. They can take part in joint training exercises, share information, and develop an early warning and response system to monitor, assess, forecast, and address natural crises. By embarking on such cooperative efforts, confidence among regional governments can also be enhanced.

In fact, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore are meeting regularly to address nontraditional security matters that may affect their security. More, however, can be done. A regional coordination center should be established to combat nontraditional threats. But such an initiative needs to be supported by all the governments in ASEAN.

PANEL DISCUSSION III

Terrorism & International Security

Ian Cousins remarked that security agencies must understand the nature of terrorism when they attempt to confront it. He argued that terrorism does not have a distinct cause and a defined objective. Terrorist methods vary. Terrorists also do not originate from one country, but are multinational. Members of Jemaah Islamiyah, for example, comprise Indonesians, Malaysians, Filipinos, and Singaporeans. Several Australian citizens were also arrested in 2005 for championing extremist ideas.

Cousins said there are three types of terrorist groups operating in contemporary times. They may be local groups inspired by extremist ideas. They may be foreign fighters bolstering the ranks of local terrorist groups. And they may be groups which are directly funded and managed by foreign organizations. Terrorist groups may, therefore, possess no distinct footprint or signature.

Cousins advised those forces that are engaged in counterterrorism operations to appreciate the motivations and nature of the terrorist groups. Defense and police forces should also attempt to starve the terrorists of foreign inspiration and cut them off from foreign support. Security forces from across the globe will do well to cooperate and fight the terrorists. It is not inconceivable that terrorists will eventually be able to obtain chemical, biological, and radiological weapons to advance their cause.



Mr. Ali Soufan tackling the subject of terrorism

The second speaker, **Ali Soufan**, pointed out that the 2000 attack on the USS Cole was part of a series of attacks that were designed to further Osama Bin Laden's 1996 declaration of war against the United States. But it was only after 9/11 that Washington decided to act decisively against Al Qaeda. The U.S. defense, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies, with the support of its allies, have been deployed to destroy the terrorist group.

Despite being seriously undermined, Al Qaeda remains a threat to international security. Its terrorist networks remain operational and have adapted to the new circumstances. Some have turned to criminal activities to raise money for their operations and to support other terrorists. Al Qaeda has also abandoned centralized control of the movement. It is no longer the chief operator of the movement, but has become its chief motivator. The group utilizes the internet, videos, and works produced by its media arm—Al Sahab—to advance its propaganda. While its operational infrastructure has been damaged and its ability to move funds and operatives around the globe has been crippled, its ability to inflict chaos and instability remains significant. Intelligence and law enforcement officers must, therefore, be properly trained to spot suspicious activities and detect signs of radicalization among their country's population.

While it is estimated that between 1 and 2 percent of the global Muslim community sympathize with and support the terrorists, the majority of Muslims do not. Supporters are drawn to the terrorists because they perceive them to be champions of a purer version of Islam. Counterterrorism efforts should consequently aim to decrease the number of sympathizers and supporters by showing that it is not the world that is waging war on Islam, but it is Al Qaeda and likeminded groups that are waging war on humanity. If Al Qaeda is perceived to be the enemy of Islam, this will strike a major blow to its appeal.



Professor Rohan Gunaratna tackling the subject of terrorism

The third speaker, **Rohan Gunaratna**, discussed how Al Qaeda has evolved since 9/11. The organization remains intent on attacking the United States' most iconic political, military, and economic landmarks. It also seeks to provide direction and guidance to Islamist movements in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Al Qaeda has, in fact, invested much of its resources in developing propaganda and enhancing its training capabilities. It created a multimedia arm called Al Sahab to spread extremist teachings to Muslim communities. It has also conducted training for terrorist groups from the Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the Middle East in Afghanistan.

Gunaratna commented that while the terrorist threat in Asia is largely ideological, governments should not neglect their coercive counterterrorism capabilities. In Indonesia, it was noted that Detachment 88 has been responsible for successfully cracking down on Jemaah

Islamiyah, arresting more than 200 of its members. In the Philippines, the counterterrorism effort has also been stepped up.

To Gunaratna, the focus in the next five years must be to counter the influence of extremist ideologies in Muslim communities. It is important, therefore, for governments to strike a partnership with Muslim communities and work together to undermine Al Qaeda and its associated groups. He cited the strategy developed by Singapore in dealing with this problem. Additionally, efforts should be undertaken to counter extremism on the internet. There are less than 100 websites currently established to respond to almost 5,000 extremist websites. This must change.

Following the presentations, it was noted that while Al Qaeda's central leadership has probably been seriously degraded, it has not been completely destroyed. If home-grown terrorists collaborate with or are supported by external terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, they can become very lethal. It was also remarked that terrorist groups often exploit conflict zones and failed states to carry out their activities. Resolving conflicts such as the Palestinian issue and improving governance in some states are crucial in the fight against terrorists.

It was noted that terrorist groups can be divided into four broad categories: politico-religious, ethno-nationalist, leftwing and rightwing extremism, and single issue groups. The politico-religious groups such as Al Qaeda are the most dangerous. In the fight against Al Qaeda, it was crucial that Muslim communities come forward and play a role in defeating the terrorists. The West and the Muslim world also need to cooperate more actively in areas such as intelligence exchange. The counterterrorist should likewise seek to appreciate the mindset of the terrorists. Instead of exacerbating situations, the counterterrorist's response has to be appropriate and proportionate. Overreaction or underreaction can result in adverse impacts.

SESSION VI

Asia-Pacific Security Architecture



Professor William Tow delivering his lecture

William Tow began his talk by noting that the “security architecture” concept has typically been criticized as being unduly rigid, and therefore not well suited to the dynamics of the highly variegated Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, the Asia-Pacific is characterized both by such a multiplicity of visions and variety of functional needs that must be accommodated that the regional governments have not sought to institute a comprehensive European-like arrangement on the region. While acknowledging that the idea of an Asia-Pacific “security architecture” in the European usage of that terminology may prove difficult, if not unattainable, Tow argued that the architecture metaphor is still useful for three main reasons.

First, debates about the definitions of “architecture” serve the very important function of facilitating more effective scholarly communication. Tow pointed out that scholars of Asia-Pacific security continue to employ the architectural metaphor with reference to quite different forms, dimensions, and configurations of cooperative activity. He therefore suggested that any usage of the term “security architecture” must be in an overarching, macro-analytical sense. It should not be used interchangeably with other descriptors such as “institutions,” “arrangements,” “networks,” or even “systems.” Nor should these be referred to as “architectures” by themselves.

Second, by circumscribing the usage and conceptual meaning of the term, Tow hoped that there would be more effective interaction between scholars and practitioners of Asia-Pacific security. The very fact that the “security architecture” concept has become so deeply embedded in academic and policy discourse should be compelling enough for retaining it and for privileging it over competing terminologies. The gap between the so-called “worlds” of academia and policymaking has, after all, traditionally been a difficult one to bridge, with issues of language and terminology often tending to reinforce differences between the two.

Third, and most importantly, Tow argued that by distinguishing the security architecture in the macro-sense from the “nuts-and-bolts” institutions at the micro-level, it would then be possible to circumvent the impasse in which some scholars and practitioners of Asia-Pacific security speak of an emerging or nascent regional “security architecture,” whereas others refer to a structure that is already well and truly in place.

In conclusion, Tow argued that the need for a viable “security architecture” in the Asia-Pacific is currently more pressing than ever. The strategic environment in this part of the world is becoming more demanding and complex as the persistence of traditional security concerns such as WMD proliferation, regional flashpoints, and the prospects of a destabilizing arms race have been complicated by the increasing range of nontraditional security challenges including international terrorism, environmental issues, and disease-based threats. Moreover, as the continuing North Korean nuclear crisis and the plight of a starving North Korean population demonstrate all too well, there is also a growing awareness of the interdependence between these traditional and nontraditional security agendas. This environment promises to generate a myriad of crises requiring trans-boundary policy management in both the traditional and nontraditional sectors.

Yet unless and until scholars and practitioners of Asia-Pacific security are first able to agree on what they actually mean by the term “security architecture,” the urgent task of devising and implementing an effective region-wide structure to cope with this highly fluid and

treacherous strategic environment is likely to be fraught with difficulty. It is therefore hoped that the definition of “security architecture” put forward in his paper might offer a basis for such a consensus and, in the process, serve as a useful building block for regional security.

SESSION VII

Conflict & Violence in Southeast Asia



Associate Professor Joseph Liow delivering his lecture

Joseph Liow focused his talk on how to tackle internal conflicts in Southeast Asia, particularly in Southern Thailand. Internal civil conflict is defined as the breakdown of constitutionally prescribed political processes to settle distributional disputes, which then results in conflict within the borders of a state. The conflict can be at varying intensities within the borders of a state. It can occur along ethnic or religious lines. It can also reflect a total breakdown of the state. Not all civil conflicts involve terrorism, and not all acts of terrorism reflect the presence of civil conflict. The two, however, can become one when combatants in a civil conflict adopt terrorism as a means to attain their aims.

Internal conflict is likely to occur where there are unresolved grievances arising from cultural and religious discrimination, and political oppression. Ideological disputes can also fuel conflict. So can competition for economic wealth.

In Southeast Asia, there is violence in Indonesia (Aceh, Maluku, Kalimantan, Irian), the Philippines (Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao), and Thailand (southern border provinces). They tend to be long-drawn, originating

during the 1960s. They are the outgrowth of unresolved state and nation-building processes. And external parties and influence (Libya, Nasserite ideology, and global terrorism) may inspire these movements.

Liow next discussed the principles of counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency operations are aimed at restoring the government’s legitimacy. Winning the hearts and minds of the people is key. Good governance is consequently crucial in any counterinsurgency campaign. If a government restores its legitimacy, it will recover its authority, and win the cooperation and support of the people against the insurgents.

Another principle of counterinsurgency is unity of effort. Military and civilian institutions must work together to deal with the internal conflict rather than hoard information and work in silos. Still another key principle is that there must be clear political objectives to guide military activities. Political leaders must, therefore, be closely involved in the planning and execution of counterinsurgency operations. The rules of engagement must also be properly spelled out. Government forces that engage in illegitimate operations, arbitrarily use force to quell unrest, and violate human rights will exacerbate the conflict.

Counterinsurgency operatives should likewise have a clear understanding of the nature of the conflict. What are the motivations, strengths, and weaknesses of the insurgents? Are they backed by external actors such as foreign governments and foreign groups? In that connection, acquiring the correct intelligence will enable government agencies to deal more effectively with the insurgents.

More directly, Liow stated that insurgents must be isolated and starved of support. They should not be allowed to recuperate from setbacks. They should also be treated as criminals. Meanwhile, governments must address the broader social, political, and economic grievances that are fueling the insurgency.

Liow then reviewed the insurgency in southern Thailand and offered several solutions. The key to stabilization is an effective grassroots counterinsurgency campaign. The perpetrators of the conflict should also be brought to justice. The Thai government should work to win the trust of the local peoples. Economic development is necessary, but the focus should be on developing the local economy and supporting small and medium enterprises rather than attracting multinational

corporations to invest in the area. Education reforms should be implemented. More locals of the Islamic faith should be represented in the bureaucracy, which is currently staffed mainly by Buddhists. The government should allow the use of Malay as a working language in the area. Finally, the civilian and military agencies in the area should ensure that their counterinsurgency efforts are closely coordinated and complement one another.

Following Liow's remarks, it was noted during discussions that the Thai peoples in the south predominantly reject the Islamists' radical ideologies. The global jihad does not appeal to the Thais in the south. It was further suggested that the radicals should be discredited ideologically.

10TH ASIA-PACIFIC PROGRAMME FOR SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS 4TH - 10TH AUGUST 2008 SINGAPORE

Sunday, 3 August 2008

1900 **Welcome Dinner**
(Venue: Sentosa Resort)

Speaker: Mr. Nik Gowing
Presenter, BBC World

1500 **Discussion:**
The Media & International Conflict

Monday, 4 August 2008

0930 **Welcome Remarks**
Ambassador Barry Desker
Dean, RSIS, & Director, IDSS

1930 **Dinner:**
Guest of Honour:
Mr. S.R. Nathan
President of the Republic of Singapore

0935 **Keynote Address**
Mr. Teo Chee Hean
Minister for Defence
Singapore

1020 **Group Photography**

1045 **Session I:**
*New Dimensions in
International Security*

Chair: Professor Khong Yuen Foong
Senior Research Adviser, RSIS
Professor of International Relations
University of Oxford

Speaker: Professor Steve Smith
Vice-Chancellor
University of Exeter

1200 **Lunch**

1330 **Session II:**
The Media & International Conflict

Chair: Mr. Kwa Chong Guan
Head, External Programmes
RSIS

Tuesday, 5 August 2008

0830 **Introduction by Participants**

0930 **Session III:**
The Rise of Private Military Companies

Chair: Professor Ron Matthews
Deputy Director, IDSS

Speaker: Professor Simon Chesterman
Director, NYU@NUS Prog
Faculty of Law
National University of Singapore

1030 **Discussion:**
The Rise of Private Military Companies

1145 **Lunch**

1400 **Visit to SAFTI Military
Institute & Army Museum**

1830 **Cocktails followed by
Singapore Technologies
Engineering Distinguished
Dinner Lecture:**
The Responsibility to Protect

Chair: Ambassador Barry Desker
Dean, RSIS

Speaker:
The Hon. Gareth Evans
President
International Crisis Group

Wednesday, 6 August 2008

0830 **Introduction by Participants**

0930 **Panel Discussion I:**
Cultural Knowledge & Military Operations

Chair:
Associate Professor Leonard Sebastian
Head, Undergraduate Studies
RSIS

Speakers: Dr. Jessica Glicken Turnley
President
Galisteo Consulting Group

Professor Alan Okros
Canadian Forces College

Dr. Tang Shiping
Senior Fellow, RSIS

1145 **Lunch**

1400 **Tour of Old Parliament Building**

1515 **Session IV:**
The Future of Warfare

Chair:
Assistant Professor Bernard Loo
RSIS

Speaker: Professor Jeremy Black
Department of History
University of Exeter

1630 **Discussion:**
The Future of Warfare

1730 **Cocktails & Dinner**

Thursday, 7 August 2008

0830 **Introduction by Participants**

0930 **Panel Discussion II:**
Maritime Security

Chair:
Associate Professor Ralf Emmers

Speakers:
Professor Eric Grove
University of Salford

Commodore Rajeev Sawhney
National Maritime Foundation

Associate Professor You Ji
University of New South Wales

1145 **Distinguished Lunch Talk:**
*What Colonels Need to Know
about the Changing Int'l System*

Chair: Ambassador Barry Desker
Dean, RSIS

Speaker: Professor Neil MacFarlane
S. Rajaratnam Professor of Strategic Studies,
& Lester Pearson Professor of Int'l
Relations, University of Oxford

1400 **Military Heritage Tour**

1800 **Free & Easy**

Speakers: Mr. Ian Cousins

Retired Deputy Director- General,
Australian Security Intelligence Organization

Friday, 8 August 2008

0830 **Visit to Changi Naval Base**

1230 **Distinguished Lunch Talk:**
The Evolution in Military Affairs

Chair: Mr. Tan Seng Chye
Senior Fellow, RSIS

Speaker: Professor Lui Pao Chuen
Consultant
Ministry of Defence, Singapore

1415 **Session V:**
*Nontraditional Security & the
Role of the Armed Forces*

Chair: Associate Professor Rajesh Basrur
RSIS

Speaker: Major-General Heryadi
Assistant to C-in-C for Intelligence, TNI

1515 **Discussion:**
*Nontraditional Security & the
Role of the Armed Forces*

1700 **Free & Easy**

Saturday, 9 August 2008

0830 **Introduction by Participants**

0930 **Panel Discussion III:**
Terrorism & International Security

**Chair: Associate Professor Kumar
Ramakrishna**
Head
Centre of Excellence for
National Security, RSIS

Associate Professor Rohan Gunaratna
Head, International Centre for Political Violence
& Terrorism Research, RSIS

Mr. Ali Soufan
Chief Executive Officer
Soufan Group LLC

1200 **Lunch**

1345 **Session VI:**
Asia-Pacific Security Architecture

Chair: Professor C. Raja Mohan
RSIS

Speaker: Professor William Tow
Australian National University

1630 **National Day Parade**
Late Night Dinner

Sunday, 10 August 2008

0830 **Introduction by Participants**

0930 **Session VII:**
Conflict & Violence in Southeast Asia

Chair: Assistant Professor Joey Long
RSIS

Speaker: Associate Professor Joseph Liow
Associate Dean, RSIS

1030 **Discussion:**
*Conflict & Violence in
Southeast Asia*

1130 **Presentation of Certificates
followed by Farewell Lunch**

1400 **Departures**

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ABOUT THE S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (RSIS)

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) was inaugurated on 1 January 2007 as an autonomous School within the Nanyang Technological University (NTU), upgraded from its previous incarnation as the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), which was established in 1996.

The School exists to develop a community of scholars and policy analysts at the forefront of Asia-Pacific security studies and international affairs. Its three core functions are research, graduate teaching

and networking activities in the Asia-Pacific region. It produces cutting-edge security related research in Asia-Pacific Security, Conflict and Non-Traditional Security, International Political Economy, and Country and Area Studies.

The School's activities are aimed at assisting policymakers to develop comprehensive approaches to strategic thinking on issues related to security and stability in the Asia-Pacific and their implications for Singapore.



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