

UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

REPORT OF A WORKSHOP ORGANIZED BY THE
INSTITUTE OF DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES
(IDSS)



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OVERVIEW

The Workshop, the second of a series of four conferences on “Evolving Security Approaches” in the Asia-Pacific organized by the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies with support from the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, was held in Tokyo at the United Nations University on 12–13 February 2003. It brought together researchers and practitioners in peacekeeping from around the world, but mostly Asia, to examine the U.N. doctrine and framework for peace operations and interventions carried out in the name of the U.N., look at the new strategies of the U.N. in dealing with peace operations, and assess the division of labour between the U.N. and regional organizations.

The Workshop looked at sub-regional perspectives from South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia of U.N. peace operations and examined the prospects of regional organizations like ASEAN undertaking such operations. Lessons from the PKOs in Cambodia and East Timor were analysed. Attention was paid to the role of Japan in peacekeeping operations and the need for efforts to make its participation more effective. Also discussed was China’s role and participation in future PKOs, possibly in partnership with Japan. The Workshop noted that both could bring tremendous assets and cooperation between the two countries in this field could be critical for maintenance of peace and stability in the region

Two keynote speeches highlighted Japan’s increased interest in participating in PKOs: one by **Mr. Gen Nakatani**, MP, former Director-General of the Japan Self Defence Agency, on “Japan’s Role in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations”, the other by **Mr. Kyoji Komachi**, Executive Secretary, International Peace Cooperation, Cabinet Office, on “Evolving Principles of Japanese Development Assistance and Peace Cooperation”.

Nakatani affirmed Japan’s intention to engage actively in UNPKOs by enhancing its emergency deployment ability and maintaining standby forces to promote more effective participation in PKOs. He also expressed Japan’s support for the establishment of a centre in East Asia for information, education, training and logistics for UNPKOs.

Komachi highlighted Japan’s striving to have a new peace-building element in its ODA Charter while endorsing calls for a revision of its PKO Law. He said ODA and peace cooperation should be made available by the international community to countries trying to cope with post-conflict difficulties in order to strengthen their political commitment for the peace process.

SESSION ONE

UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS: NEW CHALLENGES AND NEW RESPONSES

Takahisa Kawakami presented the paper by Julian Harston highlighting two aspects: (i) the need to go beyond traditional peacekeeping to new peace operations; and (ii) expanding the scope of PKOs to include prevention and protection. He argued that strategies for solving post-Cold War conflicts required a broader approach and greater efforts for sustained peace. Modern peacekeeping efforts were multi-dimensional complex operations and a combination of peacekeeping and peace building. Success depended on mandate, structure and leadership of peacekeeping missions, as demonstrated in East Timor. Other factors such as political support and contributions made by countries in the region were also important.

Kawakami commented that prevention was less acrimonious but raised the question of how to identify situations where international action was necessary and members states were willing to use their resources for those conflicts that were not overheated. A similar dilemma faced preventive action—if the action succeeded and there was no conflict then the question was whether such action was necessary; if the action failed and open conflict broke out then they would be blamed for the failure. As for protection and whether humanitarian intervention was allowed, he felt that rules of engagement should not be limited to stroke-for-stroke response. Where enforcement action was required it should be entrusted to a coalition of willing states.

Kawakami held that U.N. peacekeeping was different from coalition operations and

OPENING SPEECH
MR. GEN NAKATANI, MP
FORMER DIRECTOR-GENERAL, JAPAN DEFENCE AGENCY



Mr. Gen Nakatani delivering his keynote address

In his opening remarks, Mr Nakatani reiterated his call for a forum for defence ministers of the Asia-Pacific and the need to establish a counterpart of NATO in Asia. Such an organization could help increase understanding among Asian countries and also consider how to bring peace and stability in the region. If there was an Asian NATO they could deal with issues like China-Taiwan and North Korea. He suggested that Asian countries study the possibility of establishing such a framework for carrying out dialogue for peace in the region; with all countries participating as equal partners.

There was also a need for defence authorities to study how they could cooperate in carrying out peacekeeping activities, disaster relief and anti-piracy and counter-terrorism in the region. As there were differences in systems they should set up a system for the exchange of information to deal with common issues together in order to ensure peace and stability. All knew the tragedies that would result if they lost peace and stability in the region; so everyone should make aggressive efforts to establish such a common security framework.

Mr. Nakatani reviewed the state of PKOs in Asia; since February 2002 some 44,000 personnel from 88 nations were participating in 15 PKOs. Reviewing Japan's participation in the PKOs since 1992, he said the Japanese SDF had been appreciated by the recipient countries and contributed to international cooperation and understanding. The military staff personnel, engineering and other units had imparted technical skills while enhancing their own capacity in a new environment. The SDF was now enjoying a high reputation as a result. He endorsed the recommendations made by a high level advisory committee on how to make Japan's future PKO more effective and efficient. Japan should have a system to provide a good standby force and provide the necessary cooperation and support for a centre for education and training and logistics in East Asia to support PKOs in the region.

had its own advantages. Coalition operations were better suited for situations that required more aggressive military operations with a high level of integration among participants. UNPKOs had an advantage in operations that required universal participation, for example, in Cambodia.

The next speaker, **Jussi Saressalo**, noted that today's peacekeeping operations were mandated to perform or support coalitions of civilian and military forces essential to maintain peace and implement peace agreements to begin post-conflict resolutions. The question was whether the U.N. could take on an ever-increasing range of peacekeeping operations or it should go back to basics—concerning itself with norm-setting, standards and political support—and leave peacekeeping to regional organizations or other actors.

Amitav Acharya discussed the report of the International Commission on Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty—*The Responsibility to Protect*. The aim was to set rules and criteria under which the international community was justified in using force to intervene in the domestic affairs of a state. It redefined humanitarian intervention as a responsibility and not a right, something to be undertaken as a last resort under very exceptional circumstances. Sovereignty remained the basic organizational principle of international relations. The most important criterion was the right authority—which was the heart of legitimacy. The UNSC was the best authority and chief applicator of this legitimacy. Regional organizations could lend legitimacy by debating U.N. intervention and making it feasible.

DISCUSSION

During discussion, a question was raised as to how the capacity of the U.N. could be strengthened at a time when the international community was being marginalized, for example, in the case of Iraq, the U.N. was seen as irrelevant to the likely outcome.

Kawakami disputed the suggestion that the U.N. was marginalized. The UNSC was fully involved in the debate about Iraq. The U.S. had acknowledged the UNSC was an important body. As for intervention, if there was a possibility of one being carried out, he did not see the possibility of U.N. peacekeeping operations as well. Comparing the merits and demerits of U.N. and coalition operations, he thought the U.N. had shortcomings.

Acharya said it would be unwise to dismiss the U.N. system in the discussion of Iraq. U.N. peacekeeping operations were still needed. Even if the Iraqi regime was wiped out by U.S. military forces Iraq would still have to be looked after. It underscored the limitations of the U.N. system but that did not mean that it was not important. In the case of Iraq the U.N. had made the U.S. account for its behaviour. If the U.S. went it alone without attempting to justify it, responsible members of the international community would consider the U.S. action illegitimate.

To a comment that Japan SDF's participation in the PKO in Cambodia, although limited to non-military activities, had made an important contribution to its reconstruction, **Nakatani** clarified that changes to the law such as lifting the restriction on the use of weapons, now enabled Japanese SDF to function more effectively in PKOs. **Sarasello** said if a peace



From left to right, Mr. Mushabid Ali, Mr. Takabisa Kawakami, Col. Jussi Saressalo, Prof. Amitav Acharya and Mr. Gen Nakatani

operation was only mandated by the U.N. but carried out by another body as a sub-contractor, for example, NATO in Kosovo, or the EU taking charge of reconstruction, there was no unified chain of command and it was more difficult to control. A Special Representative of UNSG should head such operations.

Kawakami said that in UNPKO member states had the sovereign right to join or get out. But once inside, troops of members states would be placed under operational control of the Mission force commander or UNSG's Special Representative. And joining or withdrawing by a particular country should be decided not just by itself but in consultation with the U.N.

Another participant noted that humanitarian intervention was talked of in a situation of civil war in a country. But in Iraq or North Korea the threat was not confined to either country but extended to its neighbours through proliferation of WMD. Humanitarian intervention might not be appropriate; hence the U.S. was arguing for preventive attack. It was not intervention under U.N. auspices. He questioned whether peace operations would be applicable after a pre-emptive attack or unilateral intervention.

Acharya said the Commission looked at humanitarian intervention to protect human rights of people; intervention that really went into the internal political system and affairs of a state. That was different from the collective security mission of the U.N.; anything became an issue of the U.N. if the SC determined that it was a threat to international security, even if something happened inside a country. The problem was in the grey area, where there was a question what was internal and what was international; what was humanitarian. He thought it was possible to have international peacekeeping operations after a pre-emptive strike, as in Afghanistan. However, in Iraq there was talk of a plan for occupation by the U.S., not the U.N.

Kawakami stressed the need for preventive measures or diplomacy in areas where problems existed. Outside countries and institutions had to take action with the consent of the national government, for example, with the Indonesian government in respect of Aceh. Asked whether peacekeeping operations would

be better served by a regional approach or by regional countries without being viewed with scepticism about their interests in expanding their regional power, Kawakami conceded there were problems using the regional mechanism, particularly in the case of UNPKO. Peacekeepers were supposed to conduct themselves according to some standards in carrying out their mandate. They might not have that guarantee if regional organizations and forces were in charge, unless authorized by the UNSC.

Sarasselo said there must be a strong regional unified spirit and political will to create such a force; it would take years to generate, to



Mr. Takahisa Kawakami responding to questions

cooperate and train together to get operational military forces. The EU had a crisis management force which would be ready by mid-summer. But they had to depend on NATO for troops, tanks, infantry and chain of command structure. Regional approach to peace operations would be feasible when nations within a region are able to create a regional force. The Africans created a regional peacekeeping force for Africans that would take care of African problems by themselves, authorized by the U.N.

Concluding the discussion, **Acharya** noted there was interest in creating a regional capacity for peacekeeping training centres, for example, in Malaysia. Australia had a PK training centre which took students from all over the world. There was no consensus about regional organizations being better than the U.N. At the same time a force from the U.N. might not be seen as legitimate but as being dominated by big powers. In the case of humanitarian intervention, in the case of East Timor, partly

because of China's insistence, U.N. authorization came only after Indonesia consented to such a force. No mechanism has emerged for a regional force. There was no political will to create an ASEAN/ARF force for peacekeeping such as ECOWACS. Their focus was on preventive diplomacy rather than peacekeeping.

SESSION TWO

CURRENT TRENDS IN U.N. PEACE

OPERATIONS: REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES

Kamarulzaman Askandar reviewed ASEAN countries' perceptions of recent peacekeeping operations, which covered the whole range of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace building. While the responsibility for conflict prevention lay mainly with the respective governments they were cautious about *The Responsibility to Protect* doctrine. Preventive action should be initiated early, by mainly Southeast Asian countries and regionally by ASEAN. The idea of cooperative peace and shared prosperity had to be weighed against tensions over sovereignty between older and newer members of ASEAN in managing conflict. The ASEAN mechanism and style of conflict management and resolution was accepted as the norm.

Referring to the main points of concern set out in reports on peacekeeping operations, he said more discussions were required on human rights—what U.N. peace operations could do to complement or support peace efforts by local and regional actors. In Aceh more efforts were needed to enhance peacekeeping operations, development and other programmes. In Mindanao peace was still elusive between the government and rebel factions. But they would welcome peace operations under development programmes to resolve the root causes of conflict. These should be done with the local government and regional organizations. He argued that U.N. peace operations should be comprehensive and involve all parties and all stages, going beyond traditional peacekeeping operations and focussing on creating and promoting justice and orderly peace.

B.S. Malik highlighted some points of the paper by **Dipankar Banerjee** on the historical

development of peacekeeping. He said the burden on the developing world was being unable to provide basic resources, arms and training; regional organizations were no better. Commenting on the report on *The Responsibility to Protect*, he said two points had to be borne in mind. Peacekeeping should be discussed not in general but in a specific context, where the international community acted to maintain peace in an area wider than the area of conflict. Peacekeeping was an externally engineered phenomenon; whatever precaution had to be taken, it would put a limitation on state sovereignty. The affirmative implementation of collective responsibility might create a situation that questioned traditional sovereignty.

Pointing out that in South Asia and Southeast Asia there were pluralities in the societies, which overlapped in regard to origin and ethnicity, language, religion, culture and identity, Malik said people outside who could not distinguish overlapping plurality could aggravate the situation. Thus some of the answers in conflict situations would have to come from within, for example, in Kashmir the ceasefire line had become the line of control and the change had been accepted. This sort of internal effort to find solutions must be encouraged.

Akiko Yamanaka reviewed the legislative changes made by Japan since 11 September 2001 such as the anti-terrorism special measures law, and allowing the SDF to take part in UNPKO. She agreed that in the post-Cold War era all states in the region must cooperate with one another and security should be extended to people whose lives were not free from fear because of civil wars, insurgencies, state repressions and economic factors. Traditional peacekeeping did not work in cases where non-state armed actors exacerbated conflict. There was a real need for a multi-dimensional framework to enlarge the scope of peacekeeping and establish legal guidelines for the controversial idea of humanitarian intervention. This new approach would incorporate an early warning system, analysis of root causes and direct prevention efforts.

Economic activities also depended heavily on regional security. She highlighted the urgent need to have troops that could be placed on alert to deal with emergencies and for regional

PKOs to be conducted in Asia. Recalling Japan's landmark decision in sending 700 SDF troops to East Timor, she said the Advisory Group on International Cooperation for Peace had made ten recommendations to improve and expand the structures for promotion of international peace cooperation.

While the Japanese constitution did not allow Japan to make a military contribution to solve international conflicts, it did permit international contributions through the U.N. Japan should upgrade its cooperative relationship with the U.S. into an "equal partnership". Japan should become more actively involved as a member of the international society, particularly in Asia. Young people from Japan and other Asian countries should be brought together for training with English as the common language of instruction, to form a network which could become the foundation for Asian peace building in future. She believed such a policy would meet Japan's national interest to win the trust of the international society.

DISCUSSION

The issue of impartiality of peace operations was raised—when a regional body was seen to be less impartial if the region was dominated by a hegemonic power, or a U.N. operation was

led by an external power. On the accountability of U.N. operations the question was should it be accountable to the U.N. or to countries or societies to which the U.N. operations were assigned. Another query was whether such operations were not in contravention of the ASEAN principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs of member states.

Askandar said that striking a balance between regional and international forces depended on the type of conflict. For some it was more acceptable to receive regional involvement but others required international forces for their conflicts; it also depended on the host country and forces involved. In East Timor the other ASEAN countries would have been better for Indonesia but would not be acceptable to the international audience. A balance had to be struck. On accountability he said if the U.N. gave the mandate then accountability should be to the U.N. and not just to the countries of the region. As for ASEAN non-interference it was difficult for ASEAN members to decide whether to interfere or not in a member country. Further, it depended on whom the parties wanted; for example, an ASEAN peacekeeping force might not be acceptable in Aceh or Mindanao if it included Malaysian troops.

Malik said as the history of countries in the region was not long, nation states were still asserting themselves and territorial disputes made it complicated. The key issue was involving the people of the region who were sending the forces in the selection of the force and the making of the mandate; these should not be left only to the permanent members of the UNSC.

Yamanaka agreed that in military conflict, peace making, negotiations and ceasefire, the UNPKO were needed. There were limitations of human resources and financial support. If U.N. peacekeeping was expanded it was more practical to bring regional or local people under the U.N. umbrella. Accountability would be clearly set out. They had to review the machinery of peacekeeping operations in the 21st century, which were different from what they had run successfully during the Cold War.

Acharya highlighted some of the issues that had been raised relating to Japanese interest in



From left to right, Dr. Kamarulzaman Askandar and Ms. Akiko Yamanaka during their panel presentation. Partly hidden, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Dr. B.S. Malik



the region. Although Japan was a regional and global actor, the region had not heard about its interest in regional peacekeeping efforts nor its proposal for a regional peacekeeping centre. Did Japan believe in a regional mechanism? What was its motive for going into peace operations in general? What was Japan's view of non-interference? While one camp favoured this, a strong sense of state sovereignty prevailed in ASEAN. He questioned whether there was an ASEAN strategy after what happened between some member states. Was there a regional framework for ASEAN? He suggested that they were talking about the U.N. because there was dissatisfaction with the regional framework. In his view regional mechanisms existed to supplement the U.N. But the U.N. was trying to address deficiencies of the regional system. Some governments would support U.N. peace operations in the guise of developmental programmes. This was tried with the early warning system, but some countries did not have it.

Askandar said that having an Asian conflict management mechanism did not mean it would work. In Southeast Asia there was a lot of intra-state conflicts, which ASEAN said they would not interfere in. What good would those mechanisms be in the face of this non-

interference strategy? At the inter-state level, however, there were a lot of conflicts, which put a question mark on that strategy. There were territorial disputes, for example, Malaysia had conflicts with all its neighbours despite being a peaceful nation. What good would those mechanisms do? Many preferred the term "conflict management"—at least they were not going to war with each other; intensity and emotions being put on hold, conflict not escalating to another level which might involved armed conflict. That had been the argument for the ASEAN strategy of conflict management. Many were not convinced. They argued for strategies to not only manage but also resolve those conflicts by engaging civil society to deal with people involved. This would include human development that helped to reduce conflicts.

Malik agreed and added that in South Asia and Southeast Asia, if one went deeper into the troubles, most of them had economic root causes. Noting that India, which had been looking West previously, was starting to look East, he thought that they could have a certain economic trajectory in the region which could be good for other countries. They had to take into account problems of their neighbourhood, as suggested by Japan.

SESSION THREE

REGIONAL ACTORS AND U.N. PEACE OPERATIONS IN ASIA

Edy Prasetyo outlined the main arguments for involving regional organizations like ASEAN in security issues like U.N. peace operations. An ASEAN peace operation would be significant for regional peace and stability for three reasons: (i) as the nature and sources of threat had been diverse, complex and multi-dimensional, regional cooperation in the security and political fields were required to address them; (ii) as internal conflicts challenge regional stability, an ASEAN peace operation would reflect member states' deep interest in conflict management; and (iii) ASEAN credibility—tarnished by its non-action over killings in Indonesia and ethnic clashes on the Thai-Myanmar border—would be restored. ASEAN peace operations would provide new roles for the military in support of national security interests.

Constraints on ASEAN peace operations were the primacy of national sovereignty and principle of non-interference, which formed the basis of ASEAN cooperation. ASEAN was far from establishing a regional mechanism for peace operation as the principle precluded any direct intervention by the organization. Another factor was its consensus-based decision-making mechanism. A third factor was the animosity and mutual distrust that exist among member states. Finally, ASEAN lacked the relevant tradition, financial resources, political prestige and credibility and operational capacity, and it was difficult for ASEAN to fulfil the requirements of the U.N. ASEAN had the potential to develop a security community that could contribute to the promotion of a regional peace operation in the region. To do so, ASEAN principles had to be adjusted to current reality. At the practical level ASEAN needed to strengthen political and security cooperation to determine whether and how it could become involved in conflict management and settlement. ASEAN had to move beyond the current state of affairs to make it relevant to new security issues. ASEAN needed to strengthen its institutional capacity and financial and human resources as well as its credibility to parties involved in conflict and the international community.

Tan See Seng discussed the role of non-state actors and the nexus between NGOs and state actors, in particular the military forces. Reporting on a field survey made by IDSS on NGOs' relations with the military in East Timor, he said peacekeepers found the smaller NGOs willing to improve cooperation, rather than the bigger organizations. In conflict resolution NGOs felt a speedy withdrawal of peacekeepers from the ground would facilitate dialogue and rebuilding the community. NGOs perceived their role to be different, that is, humanitarian work should be kept separate from peacekeeping. They generally maintain that it is better for NGOs to work alongside peacekeepers, but not with them. The study made several recommendations, such as NGOs and peacekeepers should engage in confidence-building activities with each other; peacekeepers should avoid mission creep but focus on providing security on the ground, leaving the humanitarian aspects to NGOs; NGOs and peacekeepers should emphasize coordination rather than cooperation in conflict management; NGOs and militaries should pursue post-conflict cooperation; the military should maintain civil-military operations centres.

In her comments, **Mely Anthony** said that there was an urgency to move beyond the rhetoric of task-sharing among the U.N., regional organizations and NGOs. This triangular relationship must be pragmatically assessed and understood. She also noted that there was insufficient expectation of NGOs, and scant attention paid to them by the U.N. Such organizations could realistically supplement the efforts of regional organizations, for example, in providing early warning mechanism, fact-finding troika or EEG (eminent experts group), some of whom could provide advice to the U.N. Some civil society organizations have helped monitor the peace process; some bigger groups helped in providing liaison for example, between the Philippine government and the CPP and Muslim groups. They could be tapped to prevent conflicts from escalating. Regional organizations could be a conduit for local actors at the U.N. Regionally the ASEAN-ISIS organized two ASEAN People's Assembly in which local civil organizations have been talking to each other for the first time. If there were such avenues for communication and participation



From left to right, Dr. Albrecht Schnabel, Dr. Edy Prasetyo, Dr. Tan See Seng and Dr. Mely Anthony

of civil society groups they could help formulate the mandate for peace operations, from the ground to the U.N.

Discussion

Asked what was unique about the ASEAN region and why NGOs in the region were wary of cooperation with peacekeepers, **Tan** said the Asia-Pacific region was different from Europe but not unique. There was recognition that mutual suspicions still ran high. Yet the military themselves were most affirmative in their perception of current and future cooperation with NGOs; peacekeepers recognized that NGOs had a role to play, and that there were many aspects of peacekeeping that they were not aware of. The best form of synergy that could be expected was military and NGOs working alongside as opposed to working with one another.

Prasetyo said many governments in Southeast Asia were sensitive about NGO activities. They gave very little support to NGOs in Track 2 activities like the early warning system or ASEAN People's Assembly, and provided no financial contributions.

Anthony agreed, saying there was no NGO unit in ASEAN like the NGOs support bureau in EU. Nevertheless, the fact that such an initiative as the People's Assembly had taken place was a good start in the process of opening channels of communication between governments and NGOs in the region.

Taking up the point about the difficulty of

cooperation, though not coordination, between NGOs and PKs, one participant said even coordination among NGOs themselves was difficult, as well as between NGOs, academics and policy makers, because each was guarding its territory and right to be involved. It was difficult for NGOs to be involved in civil society building when the state military and rebel forces maintained their stance of being in armed conflict. Another commented that ASEAN could not involve itself in internal intra-state conflicts nor resolve non-traditional security issues which caused those conflicts, because traditional conflicts among them were increasing. A third said civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) was more feasible because civil organizations wanted to cooperate but nobody wanted to be coordinated. In Bosnia and Kosovo, some 500 NGOs were working together with peacekeepers and local organizations and people. It was good to exchange liaison officers between military and NGOs, to reduce mutual antipathy, and to share information that was not military secrets. The military should realize that the NGOs were there before the former came into an area and would remain after they had gone.

Acharya said the IDSS project of interviewing military and NGOs about their perception of each other was not yet completed. Some western NGOs had money and resources greater than many ASEAN members' military, some were funded by western governments and undertook community projects. It would be interesting to learn how best NGOs have operated and cooperated with governments. He also asked if ASEAN had to be a security

community first in order to conduct peace operations more effectively, pointing out that the U.N. was not a security community but was effective in peace operations.

Prasetnyo said he was thinking of comprehensive peace operations, not just humanitarian intervention, but also providing conflict resolution and a sort of peace. ASEAN could not do that at present. It was not just to conduct peace operations in the traditional way as in Cambodia. In order to be effective in dealing comprehensively with peace operations ASEAN had to be a security community. It was impossible for ASEAN to be a security community unless it fostered a relationship among its members based on common norms and identity and values. ASEAN was still far from being that.

On a flexible definition of sovereignty, he said sovereignty basically depended on interaction. However there was no regional or international organization that stated in its treaty that they were ready to give up their sovereignty. It depended on the situation and interaction. What was important was when it came to problems concerning all of them, members needed to make a proper flexible interpretation of sovereignty; because there could not be absolute sovereignty in today's internationalism.

Tan said some NGOs that had capacity or resources did not need military assistance, except safety. There was no study of what coordination meant to those actors. But turf battles were aplenty, between and within them. Even peacekeepers had differences with other peacekeepers, between Southeast Asian nations and North East Asian forces. Many of the big NGOs were concerned about military interest in their areas; they did not want military actors coming in asking the same questions as they. Many of the big NGOs were leery of military involvement; however, for this reason taking the risk of going into certain areas might be dangerous for them in some cases.

Anthony said with regard to a security community that ASEAN did have common norms, agreement on certain principles, for example, renunciation of force, and statement of aspirations. They did not have discussions on security like NATO because it was not a

security organization. However, they had contributed forces in East Timor, which validated its involvement like a mini-security community. ASEAN had been very flexible; it was able to participate in peace operations. Although they declared the principle of non-interference was sacrosanct there were many cases where this principle had been overcome. In the economic sector, there was AFTA, which showed the extent ASEAN members had been flexible in trying to match national interest with regional interest. Further, in peace operations the mandate of peacekeeping was clearer than in humanitarian intervention; the coordinating agency could guide NGOs on the mandate and call for specific people to do specific things.

A participant who had worked in peacekeeping operations said where the military engaged in humanitarian activities they were moving from a primary area of expertise to a secondary area. It was not surprising that people who had this as the primary area of interest showed concern. The military had an interest in moving to humanitarian areas because it was operating in an environment that was often uncommon; requiring new responses and achieving objectivity in a peacekeeping environment—psy ops or winning the hearts and minds of people. All these strategies that played a minor role in conflict situations got a bigger role in a peacekeeping situation. So the military had a strong interest in moving into humanitarian areas of work. CIMIC was not neutral but located within the military; it was a military liaison office towards NGOs. It was understandable if the NGOs were concerned about it wanting to coordinate them. The military was concerned about NGOs wanting to carry arms. But the U.S. military was walking around without uniforms; it was accessing communities and that worried NGOs, particularly when the military started using the Red Cross sign. He suggested that the scope of the study be expanded to cover OCHA and UNHCR as NGOs were the implementing agencies for these organizations.

One participant referred to the list of NGOs maintained by the U.N. which was rather fluid. He questioned whether the ICRC was an NGO when it was an international organization under protection of international law, recognized in the Geneva Protocols. He agreed it was high time that Asia—Southeast Asia or ASEAN, with

the cooperation of China, Japan, Korea, the EU and the U.S.—had an NGO recognized, recommended and screened in the U.N. for peacekeeping operations such as in East Timor. Noting that some NGOs wanted to equate themselves to local military warlords to control the inflow of aid to areas of conflict, for example, in Afghanistan, he called for a common list of recommended guidelines for NGOs.

SESSION FOUR

REGIONAL POWERS IN U.N. PEACE OPERATIONS IN ASIA

M. Akiyama said with the revision of the International Peace Cooperation Law of 1992 in November 2001, Japan was able to despatch an SDF unit to East Timor in 2002 to replace part of the Australian unit. Now the legal framework of Japan's PKO was similar to other countries and it could play an important role in PKO in Asia. The conditions to overcome were Japan's will, intention and strategy on the maintenance of stability in the region, to become an ordinary nation. Japan must review its PKO law to further match the transformation of U.N. peace activities and to coordinate PKO activities in Asia among powers in the region—China, Australia, New Zealand, India and the ASEAN countries. If China became more engaged in PKO activities then Japan and Australia would have substantial cooperation activities with them. This would have positive outcomes—Japan would maintain its status as an economic power; the JDF abroad would be appreciated by the international community; Japanese pacifism could become an asset, because it could be based on reality; and the Japan-U.S. alliance would enable Japan's PKO activities to involve effective cooperation from the U.S.

Pang Zhongying gave an appraisal of China's role in PKO. As a P5 member of the UNSC meeting its international responsibility, there had been some progress in China's engagement with PKO and some problems. He linked China's participation in PKO with some factors—globalization and international society, and domestic change in political and social and economic fields, which have affected its perception; and democracy. As China

wanted to become part of the international society, China needed to participate positively in peacekeeping operations and peace causes in international society. The Chinese concept of a normal nation state was like the Japanese concept of an ordinary nation. China was part of the international system but not necessarily part of international society. Now China wanted to be part of the international society and participation in peacekeeping was part of this effort. China's new security concept, as outlined in the Chinese Foreign Minister's policy statement, had as its guiding principle, participation in UNPKO. There were many problems in China's participation in PKO but its attitude was turning positive.

T.J. Pempel commented that both China and Japan should think about PKOs as tools to restructure their policies and their capacity to influence policy on security within Asia. PKO activity could play a positive role. Given the hostility between China and Japan over the last century, cooperation in PKO activities has allowed both to improve their bilateral relations.

The two countries were ambivalent about how they saw PKO activities, whether it should be East Asia or global. They needed to balance and think about their overall global and regional roles. Both were giants, with different strengths, for example, Japan preserving its historical ties with the U.S. but wanting to play an active role



Prof. Masashi Nishihara delivering his Chairman's remarks

in ASEAN. There was scepticism whether it is was really an Asian or European country. China was viewed sceptically because of its rivalry with Japan and its obsession with Taiwan and the Taiwan issue in China's politics. There was worry that China was too obsessed with the U.S. and the global balance of power and not sensitive to intra-Asian issues.

Both countries brought tremendous assets. As they thought about the regional and global balance both countries needed to think about whether to focus on PKO in Asia or outside Asia. If they focussed on Asia it would allow them to play a role in shaping the Asian environment and a positive role in their neighbourhood. The negative side was the mistrust that they were using PKO to advance their own interests in Asia. If they focussed on global PKO it would contribute to the perception that both countries were being good global citizens and their motives seen as more trustworthy. The downside was if their focus were on Africa or elsewhere, they would be seen as abandoning Asia.

Pempel added that both countries had to think about a coordination mechanism to allow them to work with each other in PKO. Some form of structure, whether within the ARF or bilateral security arrangements, was required to help them think through PKOs, as well as with South Korea and Australia. The risk was of U.S. disapproval; there was the underlying fear that if China and Japan were on the same side of the equation, it would not be to the advantage of the U.S. which sought to maintain a triangular relationship and prevent the two of them from linking up against the U.S.

Even as both moved forward in PKO it was important for them to keep in mind how much PKO could affect their broad foreign policy. It would do nothing for either of them in their northern territories or the Taiwan issue, the Muslim problem in Central Asia or eliminating WMD or TMD issues, or their broad diplomatic roles. It merely provided them the capacity to change their image within Asia and the international society and contribute to the democracy of international relations. Nevertheless, they could acquire a rising role in the global power balance for countries of

Asia by moving the balance away from U.S.-dominated hegemony or European-American dominance.

DISCUSSION

Dipankar Bannerjee expressed South Asian concerns about PKOs. While South Asia contributed the largest number of peacekeepers, 40 per cent of global PKs, and four South Asian countries were among the top ten—viz. India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal—the countries that planned the PKOs differed from those taking part. This disjunction between decision-making structures, implementing structures and U.N. structures no longer reflected today's world. South Asia was not represented, but was ignored.

Some participants asked whether U.N. peace operations meant PKOs alone, which were not quite relevant in the Asian context; they should focus on peace building as well. Japan played an important role in peace building in Cambodia and rebuilt the country. Japan and China should include peace building in PKO. There should also be better coordination among donors in peace building. There were some contradictions in China's PKO activities—the number of missions versus the numbers involved, only 122; its stress on state sovereignty versus flexibility; unilateralism versus democratization; lack of principles, but pragmatism towards PKO; China abstained from key votes in UNSC but now taking a slightly more active role. As China and Japan were getting into the international scene there was concern that the apple cart could be disturbed, or lead to greater instability, as the present controllers of resources and energy would feel threatened. Nevertheless both China and Japan's involvement would be welcomed by Asian neighbours.

One participant asked whether Japan could do more to the PKO Law without amending the Constitution. It was high time for Japan to consider this to give a proper role to Japan's armed forces in peace operations. She insisted that Japan should change its constitution or at least its interpretation to do more in PKO. Japan could make policy on PKO operations without direct coordination with the U.S. But the U.S. should always be taken into account in the maintenance of peace and stability in Asia.



From left to right, Prof. Masashi Nishihara, Mr. Masabiro Akiyama, Prof. Pang Zhongying, Dr. T.J. Pempel and Dr. Javeed Masood

Another asked whether there were any rules of engagement for SDF in dealing with societal problems.

Pang, giving a general response, agreed that narrow national interests were included in PKO participation. The Chinese government had reservations about PKO but supported peace building. China would like to rejoin the international community to undertake normative responsibilities to protect world peace and security. Peacekeeping was a moral cause. Narrow national interests must be managed carefully, not drive the PKO process. He agreed China was changing and the process had many contradictions, for example, sovereignty vs. flexibility; capacity vs. responsibility. China needed to balance these contradictions and problems. China could help keep peace and maintain world stability. China could help build peace and support local people.

Akiyama concurred that in Sino-Japanese relations cooperation in PKO was important and critical for the Asia-Pacific region. There were many problems to overcome but they would be able to cooperate. Their cooperation in this field would be a key point for the maintenance of peace and stability in the region through PKO. It could also enhance their broad diplomacy. On sovereignty, he said the world was leaving the Westphalia Treaty regime respecting sovereignty and was now facing humanitarian problems beyond sovereignty. Discussions and conclusions must be reached on rules,

standards and concepts required in future for the future regime for peace and stability.

Concluding, **M. Nishihara** noted that both China and Japan had constraints—state sovereignty for China, legal for Japan—and compromised. Both were more enthusiastic and more concerned with post conflict situations. As to whether they should cooperate to work in Asia or outside, he thought it was easier to do so outside Asia. They were in different situations—China being a P5 member, Japan was not; China covered less than 1.5 per cent of the PKO budget, Japan covered 20 per cent. There was growing dissatisfaction among those who wanted China to cover more and Japan to pay less.

SESSION FIVE

THE EXPERIENCE OF U.N. PEACE OPERATIONS IN ASIA

Alexander Mayer-Rieckh presented an overview of the U.N.'s involvement in East Timor. He said that UNTAET's good record in traditional peacekeeping was not matched by its performance in other areas of its mandate, which suffered from a shortage of expertise. UNTAET faced problems in institution building and governance because it applied the logic of traditional peacekeeping to address peace-building tasks, which required different strategies and skills. Asian countries were well represented in the peace operations in East

KEYNOTE SPEECH
KYOJI KOMACHI
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PEACE COOPERATION HEADQUARTERS, CABINET OFFICE
GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN



Mr. Kyoji Komachi giving his dinner speech

In his keynote speech, Mr. Komachi, reviewed the evolution of Japan's development assistance and peace cooperation following the 1991 Gulf War. The adoption of an ODA Charter and the Peace Cooperation Law provided the Japanese Government with the legal basis to engage in traditional U.N. peacekeeping operations, albeit with conditions.

The role of ODA was important in maintaining and consolidating peace. It was essential that peacemakers incorporated in their overall peace plan a promising prospect for the rehabilitation and recovery of conflict-torn economies. Peace-building efforts by the international community in Cambodia contributed to the reconstruction of the economy. Stressing the crucial role of NGOs, he said funding of their activities through ODA was highly appropriate.

Citing the report of an Advisory Group headed by Yasushi Akashi on Peace Cooperation, he said the Japan Government was urged to enhance and improve the organizational structure for international peace cooperation and to use ODA actively for such efforts as conflict prevention, conflict-resolution and post-conflict humanitarian aid and reconstruction assistance. More active application of ODA was also required for the development of social infrastructure such as education.

Komachi said Japan was striving for a new peace-building element in its ODA Charter while discussing a possible revision of the PKO Law. Japan should not shy away from placing economically-disguised political conditionalities on its ODA implementation. ODA and peace cooperation should be made available by the international community to countries trying to cope with post-conflict difficulties in order to strengthen their political commitment for the peace process.

Timor. The advantage of U.N. peace intervention over regional intervention was its universal legitimacy. Operationally, however, there was a case to regionalize peace-building activities to ensure local know-how and understanding. The contributions of regional countries in the peace operations in East Timor have been positive and important. East Timor, however, remains weak and faces tremendous challenges over the coming years. Sustained involvement was necessary well beyond the usual limited span of attention and commitment of the international community.

Sorpong Peou, in his presentation, suggested that what the international donor community had done in Cambodia served the idea of collective human security (CHS). The concept included various aspects of peace operations related to peacekeeping and peace building. It was more complete than the concept of human security by including more actors to promote that security. Cambodia was a test laboratory for collective human security, by showing that the disarmament and justice approaches to safeguarding human security were less successful than political and socio-economic methods. The Paris Peace Agreements of 1991 laid a good foundation for CHS by ensuring not only the integrity of Cambodia as a sovereign state but making sure that Cambodia would comply with international norms, human rights and democratic values.

Cambodia would remain a sovereign state legally but at the same time the state would not exercise absolute power over the Cambodian people. Over the past decade the U.N. had adopted four methods to promote human security in Cambodia but the state was unable to provide for security. The Cambodian state had failed to satisfy the basic security needs of the people. He concluded that the effectiveness of the four methods used by the U.N. varied; the political approach was more successful, followed by the economic approach. But the disarmament and justice approach had not been successful. Although the U.N. deserved credit for Cambodia's rehabilitation, it had its limitations.

Kawakami said while Mayer-Rieckh correctly identified the shortcomings of U.N. operations in East Timor, it was unfair not to mention the

role played by Interfet, even after UNTAET—with which it co-existed for four months. Without the successful restoration of security by Interfet, UNAMET would have faced more difficulties. The creation of a national army was not the responsibility of the U.N. but bilaterally arranged by Australia and Portugal. The U.N. did not have direct official responsibility. As for the police, he agreed the benchmarks set by UNTAET might not have been very pertinent. Staff members might not have the right skills and knowledge. In Cambodia the U.N. left only a two-man political mission. In East Timor they had thousands, who were still there. If they had to consider peace building in context of peacekeeping then they should consider including peace-building tasks in PKO. They had to be realistic. PKO could not stay on forever; they were given no more than six months by the UNSC, which would not accept a huge complex mission for several years. As for the role of ASEAN countries he recalled that the UNSC was very specific about ownership of PKOs—that some leadership should be by ASEAN countries, starting with Thailand, followed by the Philippines and Singapore. UNTAET was the first mission that Singapore had provided infantry troops and commanders.

Askandar agreed that the U.N. had made a really good contribution to Cambodia's peace building. There were also shortcomings and U.N. efforts to bring violators of human rights to justice had been hampered by serious obstacles. So too were efforts to disarm and demobilize and reintegrate armed forces or factions. He concurred on the ineffectiveness of civil society actors and the limited success to develop the national economy. The U.N. achieved modest success because it was an extremely difficult case; with a high level of destruction by violent conflicts. U.N. institutions were unable to translate assistance into political influence. There was a need to deal and reconcile with the peace. A lot of NGOs worked in the area of reconciliation. If there was to be punishment of violators it should be done quickly and then life must continue.

Some lessons could be derived from the post-conflict reconstruction and experience in Cambodia—they should not just do the four things for CHS but have a good balance between what the international community wanted and

what the local community wanted; they should have more staff and agencies from countries in the region (ASEAN); there should be greater involvement of regional actors in support of peace-building activities, not just by U.N. agencies but other Southeast Asian countries as well.

Prasetnyo commented that the U.N. operation in East Timor was multi-dimensional in responsibilities and had unique leverage, both executive and administrative. Factors which contributed to the successful work of the U.N. in East Timor included: (i) East Timor was seen as a non-self-governing territory; diplomatic and political struggles were focussed on the illegal occupation of East Timor by Indonesia; independence aspirations of the people left no room for pro-Indonesian factions to claim any jurisdiction over East Timor; (ii) unlike in Cambodia, there was no serious factional conflict among the pro-independence factions in East Timor; they accepted the presence of the U.N. mission; (iii) when the U.N. decided to send its peace operations there was no political structure; they welcomed the U.N.; (iv) the central role of Xanana Gusmao and Ramos Horta—symbols of unity of all factions; it was clear that people were tired of conflict; and (v) the role of the UNSG's Special Representative (de Mello, a Brazilian) who shared many things in common with Gusmao and Horta.

Mayer-Rieckh agreed that it was not the responsibility of the U.N. to create a national army, but that of the government.

The U.N. mission in East Timor was not just a peacekeeping force but had another role as well. Although there was a bilateral role by Australia, the U.N. Special Representative, de Mello, as de facto Head of State, had to make decisions. The UNSC did not give enough time to carry out peace-building tasks. However, this criticism should be addressed to member states. They should tell the SC what it needed to know, not what it wanted to hear. In UNTAET there were many experiments. Conflicting decisions taken by different departments within the U.N. were to the detriment of U.N. operations in planning and implementation. UNTAET was very special but peace building was an element of any PKO today. There were lessons for them all from the East Timor experiment. He argued that all peacekeeping operations had strong peace-building components; it was useful to have a strong regional representation; they had a better knowledge of the region and context.

CONCLUSION

In his concluding remarks, **Amitav Acharya** said the Workshop had covered a lot of ground since the first one looked at how different concepts of security related to each other and how they could find common ground between them, viz. human security or new security or collective security, at the theory or practical levels, so that the security paradigm did not become a mutually contested affair in Asia.



From left to right, Prof. Amitav Acharya, Mr. Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, Mr. Takabisa Kawakami, Dr. Sorpong Peou and Dr. Kamarulzaman Askandar

The second Workshop had looked at U.N. peace operations from regional perspectives of South, Southeast and East Asia. They had looked at new players in the peace operations and reviewed the cases studies of Cambodia, the largest, and East Timor, one of the most significant operations of the U.N.

The conference was held in Tokyo to get a better understanding of how Japan was getting into the area of U.N. peace operations and the implications it had for its domestic debate and regional relations in the Asia-Pacific

Rapporteur: Mushahid Ali

WORKSHOP PROGRAMME

Day One

12 February 2003

- 0900 – 1000h Arrivals & Registration
- 1000 – 1015h Opening Remarks
 Prof. Hans van Ginkel, UNU
 Prof. Amitav Acharya, IDSS
 Dr. Takashi Shirasu, SPF
- 1015 – 1030h Keynote Address
 Mr. Gen Nakatani
 Former Director General of the Defence
 Agency, Japan
- 1030 – 1100h Coffee break
- 1100 – 1300h **Session 1 – The U.N. Peace Operations:
 New Challenges and New Responses**
 This session provides an overview of the
 current challenges in U.N. Peace Operations
 and the new initiatives undertaken by
 the U.N. as reflected in the three reports:
Brahimi Report on Peace Operations,
Prevention of Armed Conflict and the
Responsibility to Protect.
 Chair:
 Amb. Mushahid Ali
 Senior Fellow, IDSS
 Panellists:
 Mr. Julian Harston
 Director of the Asia and Middle East
 Division, UN-DPKO
 Colonel Jussi Saressalo
 Military Advisor, International Peace
 Academy
 New York, U.S.A.
 Prof. Amitav Acharya
 Deputy Director, IDSS, Singapore
- Discussion
- 1300 – 1400h Lunch

- 1400 – 1530h **Session 2 – Current Trends in U.N. Peace
 Operations: Regional Perspectives**
 This session presents the regional
 perspectives on the current state of U.N.
 Peace Operations. The regions represented
 in this session are South Asia, Southeast Asia
 and Northeast Asia.
 Chair:
 Prof. Amitav Acharya
 Deputy Director, IDSS
 Presenters:
 Maj. Gen. (Retd) Dipankar Banerjee
 Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace,
 U.S.A.
 Dr. Kamarulzaman Askandar
 Centre for Conflict Studies, Penang,
 Malaysia
 Discussants:
 Ms. Akiko Yamanaka
 Visiting Professor, United Nations
 University, Japan
 Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Dr. B.S. Malik
 India
- 1530 – 1600h Coffee break
- 1600 – 1730h **Session 3 – Regional Actors and the
 U.N. Peace Operations in Asia**
 This session examines the role of regional
 actors in U.N. Peace Operations. Issues to
 be addressed include the experiences of
 regional actors in their participation in U.N.
 Peace Operations, problems encountered and
 prospects for more active involvement in the
 multi-dimensional aspects of peace operations.
 Chair:
 Dr Albrecht Schnabel
 Peace and Governance Programme, UNU
 1. *Role of Regional Organisations in Peace
 Operations: The Case of ASEAN*
 Dr. Edy Prasetyo
 CSIS, Jakarta
 2. *Role of NGOs in Peace Operations*
 Dr. Tan See Seng
 IDSS, Singapore
 Discussant:
 Dr. Mely Anthony
 IDSS, Singapore
- 1800 – 2000h Dinner
 Guest Speaker:
 Mr. Kyoji Komachi
 International Peace Cooperation HQs,
 Japan

Day Two
13 February 2003

- 0930 – 1100h **Session 4 – Regional Powers in U.N. Peace Operations in Asia**
This session examines the prospective roles of regional powers in U.N. Peace Operations. These would include analyses of their respective perspectives on U.N. Peace Operations, their experiences, and prospects for more active participation in peace operations.
- Chair:
- Prof. Masashi Nishihara
President, National Defense Academy,
Japan
1. *The Role of Japan in Peacekeeping Operations: Implications for the Region*
Mr. Masahiro Akiyama
President of the Ship and Ocean
Foundation
Former Under-Secretary of Defence
Agency
2. *China and Peacekeeping Operations*
Prof. Pang Zhongying
Tsinghua University, Beijing
- Discussants:
- Dr. T.J. Pempel
University of California, Berkeley, U.S.A.
Dr. Javeed Masood
Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia

1000 – 1115h Coffee break

1115 – 1230h **Session 5 – The Experience of U.N. Peace Operation in Asia**

This session examines the experience of U.N. Peace Operations in Asia; comparing the experiences of peace operations in Cambodia and East Timor; looking at the lessons learnt and suggestions for future directions in peace operations.

Chair:

Prof. Toshiya Hoshino
Osaka University, Japan

1. *The U.N. in East Timor*

Mr. Ian Martin

Vice President, International Center for
Transitional Justice and Former Special
Representative of the UNSC for East
Timor

Mr. Alexander Mayer-Rieckh

Center for Civil and Human Rights
Notre Dame Law School, Indiana, U.S.A.

Discussant:

Mr. Takahisa Kawakami
MOFA, Japan

2. *The U.N. in Cambodia*

Dr. Sorpong Peou

Associate Professor, Sophia University,
Tokyo, Japan

Discussant:

Dr. Kamarulzaman Askandar
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1230 – 1300h Closing remarks

1300 – 1400h Lunch

Departures

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The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) was established in July 1996 as an autonomous research institute within the Nanyang Technological University. Its objectives are to:

- conduct research on security, strategic and international issues;
- provide general and graduate education in strategic studies, defence management and defence technology; and
- promote joint and exchange programs with similar regional institutions; organize seminars/conferences on topics salient to the strategic and policy communities of the Asia-Pacific.